Shouting and threatening someone doesn't amount to committing an offence of assault under Section 351 of the IPC (Section 130 of BNS) SC

A bench comprising Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah held that Shouting and threatening someone doesn't amount to committing an offence of assault under Section 351 of the IPC (Section 130 of BNS).            

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of K. Dhananjay v. Cabinet Secretary & Ors.  

• The appellant, formerly employed at the Indian Institute of Astrophysics, Bangalore, challenged his dismissal through a petition filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Bangalore Bench. 
• During his case proceedings, he sought access to specific documents, which were granted. 
• While inspecting these documents in the office of Ms A. Thomeena, Deputy Registrar at CAT, Bangalore, he allegedly engaged in disruptive behaviour, including shouting and threatening the staff, which led to an FIR being filed against him under Sections 353 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). 
• The complaint stated that the appellant threatened staff and disrupted office work, yet no actions amounted to physical assault as defined under Section 351 IPC. 
• The High Court dismissed his petition to quash the case, leading to his appeal to the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court stated that the only allegation against the appellant in the said complaint was that he was shouting and threatening the staff. This itself will not amount to any assault. 
• To our mind, the High Court made a mistake by not interfering in this case. This case is nothing but an abuse of the process of law, and therefore, in order to meet the ends of justice, we allow this appeal and quash the entire proceedings initiated against the appellant. 

What are the Provisions concerning Assault? 

• Section 351 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC):  
  • This section now covered under Section 130 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) deals with the offence of assault. It states that whoever makes any gesture, or any preparation intending or knowing it to be likely that such gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend that he who makes that gesture or preparation is about to use criminal force on that person, is said to commit an assault. 
  • Explanation. —Mere words do not amount to an assault. But the words a person uses may give his gestures or preparations such a meaning as may make those gestures or preparations amount to an assault. 
• Essential Elements 
  • The Prosecution must establish the following two ingredients to prosecute a person for assault:  
    • Making any gesture or preparation by a person in the presence of another; and 
    • Intention or Knowledge of the likelihood that such gesture or preparation will cause the person to apprehend that the person making it is about to use criminal force to him. 
• Section 353 of the IPC (Section 132 of the BNS): 
  • It states that whoever assaults or uses criminal force on any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such person to the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 
• Case Laws 
  • Rupabati v. Shyama (1958):  
    • The Court held that causing of some actual hurt is not necessary for constituting assault, mere threat may constitute assault.  
  • Padarath Tewari vs Dulhin Tapesha Kueri (1932):  
    • The Court held that a medical examination of woman without her consent constitutes the offence of assault. 

Power Of States To Regulate Industrial Alcohol Under Term 'Intoxicating Liquor'-Supreme Court

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A nine-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on Wednesday (October 23), held by 8:1 majority, held that the States have the power to regulate 'denatured spirit or industrial alcohol'.

The majority concluded so by holding that the term "intoxicating liquor" in Entry 8 of List II (State List) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution will include industrial alcohol.

The majority held that the term "intoxicating liquor" cannot be interpreted narrowly to include only alcohol which is fit for human consumption. It was held that liquids which contain alcohol which can be used or misused for human consumption can be included within the term "intoxicating liquor".

The present matter was referred to a nine-judge bench in 2007 and pertains to the interpretation of Section 18G of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951(IDR Act). Section 18G allows the Central Government to ensure that certain products related to scheduled industries are distributed fairly and are available at reasonable prices. They can do this by issuing an official notification to control the supply, distribution, and trade of these products. However, as per Entry 33 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the State legislature has the power to regulate trade, production, and distribution of products from industries under Union control and similar imported goods. It was argued that in Synthetics and Chemical Ltd. vs. State of U.P., a seven-judge bench had failed to address Section 18G's interference with the concurrent powers of the State. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held–

"If the decision in the Synthetics and Chemicals case (supra) concerning the interpretation of Section 18-G of the 1951 Act is allowed to stand, it would render the provisions of Entry 33 (a) of List III nugatory or otiose."

The matter was then referred to a nine-judge bench. It may be noted that apart from Entry 33 List III, Entry 8 List II also provides regulation powers to the state with regards to 'Intoxicating Liquor'. As per Entry 8 List II, the state has law-making powers over - “ Intoxicating liquors, that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors”

Investigation Transfer To CBI Cannot Be Ordered While Rejecting Bail Application: Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court granted bail to the appellants, overturning the High Court's decision to deny bail and transfer the investigation to the CBI.

Summary of Supreme Court Order

• Case: Abhishek & Anr. vs. The State of Rajasthan & Ors.

• Appeal: Criminal Appeal No. 4283 of 2024

• Decision: The Supreme Court granted bail to the appellants, overturning the High Court's decision to deny bail and transfer the investigation to the CBI.

• Action: Appellants must be produced before the Trial Court within one week; bail is to be granted on appropriate terms until the trial conclusion.

• Date of Order: October 21, 2024.

The Supreme Court held on October 21 that the Court cannot transfer the investigation to another agency while dealing with a bail application filed under Section 439 of the CrPC.

The Rajasthan High Court's order to transfer the investigation to the CBI was passed in a murder case involving the bajri (sand) mafia. The case involved the killing of a 22-year-old man from a marginalized Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) community, allegedly murdered at the behest of the sand mafia to "set an example" and protect its interests.

Justice Sameer Jain's single-judge bench transferred the case to the CBI after observing multiple discrepancies in the investigation conducted by the state police and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID).

The High Court found that the investigation was "unfair, tainted, and incomplete," particularly in the medical reports, which had conflicting findings regarding the cause of death. The postmortem report indicated 14 injuries on the victim's body, including severe injuries to his neck, which were considered the primary cause of death. Despite these findings, the state medical experts attributed the death to intoxication and deemed the injuries "simple," leading the Court to question the investigation's integrity.

Further, the Court noted procedural lapses in the handling of the case under the SC/ST Act. The FIR was delayed by three days, and several key provisions of the Act needed to be followed, which hampered evidence collection. Despite allegations against individuals connected to the sand mafia, no charges were filed against them. The family of the deceased also alleged that they were pressured to enter into a compromise through threats or financial incentives.

In light of these factors, the Rajasthan High Court deemed it necessary to transfer the investigation to the CBI.

Wife calling husband 'Hijda' is cruelty: Punjab and Haryana High Court

The Punjab and Haryana High Court recently ruled that a wife calling her husband Hijda (transgender) amounts to mental cruelty.

The Division Bench of Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Jasjit Singh Bedi was hearing a wife’s appeal against the divorce decree granted in favour of her husband by a family court on July 12.

The husband’s mother had deposed that his wife would call her son a Hijda.  

“If the findings recorded by the learned Family Court, are examined in the light of the … judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it comes out that the acts and conduct of the appellant-wife amounts to cruelty. Firstly, terming the respondent-husband as Hijda (transgender) and calling his mother to have given birth to a transgender, is an act of cruelty,” the Bench said.

The couple had married in December 2017. The husband in the divorce plea had alleged that his wife used to wake up late at night and also ask his ailing mother to send her lunch on the first floor from the ground floor. 

“Considering the overall acts and conduct of the appellant-wife and further considering that the parties had been living separately for the last six years, it was rightly found by the learned family court that the marriage between the parties has ruptured beyond repair and it has become a dead wood,” the Court further said.

It was also alleged that she was addicted to porn and mobile games. In particular, the husband alleged that the wife used to ask him to record the duration of sex and would also state that it “must go on for at least 10-15 minutes at a time and that it must be at least thrice per night”. 

She used to taunt him for not “being physically fit to compete with her” and had disclosed that she wanted to marry someone else, the plea said.

The Court also said the parties have been living separately for the past six years and there is no possibility of reunion.

Accordingly, it upheld the family court's decision to dissolve the marriage and dismissed the wife’s appeal.

Supreme Court Upholds Maintainability Of Appeals Filed By Airports Economic Regulatory Authority Against Orders Of TDSAT On Tariff Imposition

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The Supreme Court on October 18 upheld the maintainability of appeals filed by the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority (AERA) assailing orders of the TDSAT under the AERA Act 2008 relating to tariff imposition on certain services.

The bench led by CJI DY Chandrachud comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra permitted the appeals to be filed by AERA in the following order :

"The appeals by AERA against the TDSAT order are held to be maintainable. Registry to list the hearing appeals."

Voluntary Retirement Scheme Does Not Extinguish Employee's Right To Challenge Disciplinary Penalties: Delhi HC

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The court examined the scope and content of the SVRS and Sharma's undertaking. It acknowledged that while Sharma had accepted the scheme with the understanding that his salary would be calculated based on his reduced pay scale, the benefits being claimed did not form part of the retirement package.

The court analyzed BSES's reliance on the A.K. Bindal judgment. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that an employee who avails voluntary retirement cannot later seek financial benefits like pay revision. However, the court here noted that A.K. Bindal dealt with pay revisions directly linked to retirement packages, whereas Sharma's claim arose from a disciplinary action unrelated to the SVRS package itself. Thirdly, the court referred to A. Satyanarayana Reddy, which allowed employees to claim certain financial benefits post-retirement if those claims were not explicitly covered under the SVRS. In Sharma's case, the court found that the pay revision linked to the penalty reduction was a separate issue, not part of the retirement benefits package under SVRS.

Government Employee Can't Refuse To Join New Place Of Posting While Contesting Transfer : Supreme Court

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The Court opined that when a person works for the government, the incidence of transfer becomes inherent in the terms of service unless it is specifically barred. As such, once relieved from a particular place of posting, the employee has no right to remain absent or to refute to the new place of posting. He can join the new posting place and continue contesting the transfer.

 "..an employee has no right to remain absent or refuse to join the new place of transfer once relieved from their current place of posting. The employee is entitled to avail all available remedies for redressal of grievances, but it does not entitle them to not comply with the transfer orders. The employee is well within his rights to join the transferred place of posting and still continue to avail the remedies available under the law for redressal of his grievances against the transfer."

Two primary concerns were flagged by the Court relating to such absenteeism of employees:

(i) Transfers are made by authorities to fill vacancies in new places of posting. If transferred employees don't join, optimal service at full capacity can't be provided;

(ii) While the challenge to transfer is underway, authorities would have to employ other individuals to fill the vacancies. This would amount to paying twice for the same job - firstly, to the individual who is actually performing the job, and secondly, to the transferred employee who is unauthorizedly absent.

"Such a situation would result in nothing but burning a hole in the pocket of public exchequer, lead to the excessive financial burden on the Government institutions, and would fundamentally jeopardize public interest", the Court said.

Briefly put, the Court was dealing with the case of Tamil Nadu Agricultural University and 6 private respondents, who initially challenged their transfer orders by the University before the Madras High Court. A Single Judge allowed the respondents' pleas and quashed the transfer orders. Against the same, the appellant-University filed writ appeals. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appellant-university's appeals. Aggrieved by the same, it approached the Supreme Court.

Pursuant to the Supreme Court's initial orders, the private respondents joined their new places of posting. However, an issue remained with regard to regularization for the period during which they did not join services despite transfer.

With regard to 4 respondents, who had interim orders in their favor from the High Court, the appellant-University conceded that it was not opposed to regularization and payment of arrears.

So far as the other 2 respondents, the Court noted that without any interim order in their favor, they remained unauthorizedly absent from service during the pendency of their petitions before the Single Judge of the High Court. As such, they could not be regularized and/or paid arrears for the said period. However, they were entitled to regularization and payment of salaries for the period after the Single Judge pronounced the decision quashing the transfer orders.

"Despite there being no interim order in their favour, respondent nos. 4 and 7 continued to remain absent after being relieved from their original place of posting. As such, this Court is not inclined to extend any benefit of salary for the period of unauthorised absence. However, as the transfer order was quashed by the learned Single Judge, their service periods shall continue to be treated in continuity, and they would be entitled to whatever other benefits accrued to them due to this continuity, but no salary for the said period of unauthorised absence."

Ultimately, the appeals were allowed, with a direction to the appellant-University to clear arrears of the private respondents, subject to the condition that two respondents (who did not have interim orders in their favour) were not to be paid for the period of unauthorized absence.

Kerala High Court Refuses To Quash Case Against Man For Criticizing Muslim Girl's Handshake.'Can't Impose One's Religious Belief On Another'

This comes as the Court dismissed a petition filed by Abdul Noushad of Kottakkal, who has been accused of criticising a Muslim girl for shaking hands with former Finance Minister Thomas Issac at a public event. 

• Petition dismissed against woman shaking hands with ex-minister
• Court says shaking hands is a traditional gesture
• Video circulated accusing woman of violating Shariat Law

The Kerala High Court has refused to quash the proceedings against a man who made allegations against a Muslim girl that she committed adultery and violated Shariat Law by shaking hands with the former Finance Minister of Kerala, observing that no religious belief stands above the Constitution.

The ruling came by a single-judge bench of Justice P V Kunhikrishnan, who dismissed a petition filed by Abdul Noushad of Kottakkal, accused of criticising the Muslim girl for shaking hands with former Finance Minister Thomas Issac at a public event.

Justice P V Kunhikrishnan noted that "shaking hands" is a traditional gesture that symbolises greeting, respect, courtesy, agreement, deal, friendship, solidarity, etc

The woman complainant accused Abdul Noushad of circulating a video through WhatsApp that contained a speech claiming that she had violated Shariat Law by shaking hands with a man. According to the video, the act was considered adultery because she, as a woman, had touched another man.

The incident occurred when the woman, a second-year law student at Markaz Law College, participated in an interactive session with former Finance Minister Thomas Isaac, during which students received gifts for asking questions. After accepting the gifts, they shook hands with Isaac. However, the petitioner shared a video alleging that the woman had violated Shariat Law, leading to police charges against him under Section 153 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 119(a) of the Kerala Police Act, 2011.

The woman stated that the video brought disgrace to both her and her family. The court observed that a courageous Muslim woman had come forward, asserting that the video's distribution infringed upon her freedom of religious belief.

"In such situations, our Constitution will protect her interests. Moreover, society has to support her," Justice Kunhikrishnan said.

"No religious belief is above the Constitution. The Constitution is supreme," he added.

Emphasising the importance of personal choice in religious practice, the court also stated that "there is no compulsion in religion, especially in Islam".

In the ruling, the court highlighted that one individual cannot force another to adhere to their religious beliefs, reinforcing the idea that religious practice is a personal decision for every citizen. The court asserted, "The woman in the case has a right to follow a religious practice in her own way," stressing that no one should impose their beliefs on others.

Demanding sex from spouse does not constitute cruelty: Allahabad high court

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How will spouses satisfy sexual urges if not from each other? Allahabad High Court junks cruelty case

A husband or a wife demanding sex from the other does not constitute cruelty, Allahabad HC said while dismissing a dowry and torture case filed against a Noida resident by his estranged spouse as one motivated by "sexual incompatibility" between the couple.

"If a man would not demand sexual favours from his wife and vice-versa, where will they go to satisfy their physical urges in a morally civilised society," Justice Anish Kumar Gupta said in an Oct 3 ruling. He was hearing a petition filed by the husband, asking for criminal proceedings against him to be quashed. The dowry case against him - he was also accused of forcing his wife into "unnatural sex" - was pending in a Gautam Buddh Nagar court.

Justice Gupta cited the FIR and the complainant's recorded statement to conclude that assault, if any, was triggered not by any unfulfilled demand for dowry but by the wife's refusal to "fulfil the sexual urges of the husband". "In any of the events, the wife has ever sustained no injury. From the facts of the case, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said to be an offence of cruelty in Section 498A of IPC. There is no averment concerning any specific demand of dowry made by any specific person except general and vague allegations," Justice Gupta said.

The couple married in 2015, after which the man and his family allegedly demanded a dowry. The husband was also accused of abusing and assaulting his wife. When she objected, he allegedly tried to strangle her.

Suspension Of Sentence Can't Be Denied Merely Because Another Trial Is Pending Against Accused : Supreme Court

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The accused demanded parity with other co-accused, who were granted the benefit of suspension of sentence. The state opposed the plea for suspension of the sentence of one of the accused on the ground that a trial in another criminal case was pending against him. 

It was contended by the accused/appellant that mere pendency of the trial should not stand in the way of this Court considering The Supreme Court yesterday (Oct. 4) observed that the pendency of the trial against the accused in one case cannot be a ground for denying him the benefit of a suspension of sentence. 

The bench comprising Justices Dipankar Datta and Prashant Kumar Mishra granted a relief to the accused who was convicted in a murder case but denied the benefit of the suspension of sentence by the High Court. 

the prayer of the appellant-Narendra Singh for suspension of sentence. 

Setting aside the High Court's decision, the Court accepted the Appellant's contention and granted him the benefit of suspension of sentence. 

“That apart, mere pendency of the other trial where the appellant-Narendra Singh is an accused (on bail) cannot be regarded as sufficient for denying him the benefit of suspension of sentence in this case. After all, he is presumed to be innocent till found guilty.”, the court observed.

“Bearing in mind the above factors, we are of the view that the appellants have made out sufficient ground for suspension of sentence and release on bail upon such terms and conditions to be imposed by the Sessions Court.”,