'Bulldozer Reminds Of Lawlessness' : Supreme Court Says Properties Can't Be Demolished Merely Because Of Criminal Accusations/Convictions

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The essential purposes of the rule of law are to prevent the abuse of power, protect the human rights and dignity of all members of society, and ensure that government actions are governed by established legal principles rather than arbitrary discretion. It serves as a safeguard against the arbitrary use of state power and is integral to democracy and good governance. Additionally, it provides a framework for predictability and stability in the legal system.

Summary of Legal Principles and Rights

• The concept of 'rule of law' emphasizes that all individuals, including government officials, must adhere to the law.

• Mechanisms must exist to enforce legal rules and protect human rights.

• Accused individuals retain rights to dignity and humane treatment, as established in legal precedents.

• Demolition of properties must follow due process, ensuring fair notice and opportunity for legal recourse.

• Public accountability and transparency are essential in state actions, preventing abuse of power by officials.

• Sending a strong message against the trend of "bulldozer justice", the Supreme Court on Wednesday (November 13) held that the executive cannot demolish the houses/properties of persons only on the ground that they are accused or convicted in a crime.

  Permitting such action by the executive is contrary to the rule of law and also a violation of the principle of separation of powers, as it is for the judiciary to pronounce on the guilt of a person.

  "The executive cannot declare a person guilty, as this process is the fundamental aspect of the judicial review. Only on the basis of the accusations, if the executive demolishes the property/properties of such an accused person without following the due process of law, it would strike at the basic principle of rule of law and is not permissible. The executive cannot become a judge and decide that a person accused is guilty and, therefore, punish him by demolishing his residential/commercial property/properties. Such an act of the executive would be transgressing its limits.

  The chilling sight of a bulldozer demolishing a building, when authorities have failed to follow the basic principles of natural justice and have acted without adhering to the principle of due process, reminds one of a lawless state of affairs, where “might was right”. In our constitution, which rests on the foundation of 'the rule of law', such high-handed and arbitrary actions have no place. Such excesses at the hands of the executive will have to be dealt with the heavy hand of the law. Our constitutional ethos and values would not permit any such abuse of power and such misadventures cannot be tolerated by the court of law," the Court pronounced.

  The Court emphasised that house demolition cannot be an action against a person convicted of an offence:

  "Such an action also cannot be done in respect of a person who is convicted of an offence. Even in the case of such a person the property/properties cannot be demolished without following the due process as prescribed by law.

  Such an action by the executive would be wholly arbitrary and would amount to an abuse of process of law. The executive in such a case would be guilty of taking the law in his hand and giving a go-bye to the principle of the rule of law."

  Officials taking part in illegal demolition to be held accountable

  The Court also held that the public officials who demolish the properties in such a manner should be held accountable. 

  "Public officials who take law in their hands and act in such a high-handed manner must be fastened with accountability..." the Court observed while highlighting the importance of restitution.

  The Court also observed that such actions amount to imposing "collective punishment" on the family of the accused/convict. Further, when properties are selectively demolished, there is a presumption that it was a malafide action.

  "When a particular structure is chosen for demolition all of a sudden, and the rest of similar properties are not touched, the presumption could be that the real motive was not the illegal structure but the action of penalising without trial," the Court observed.

  A bench of Justices BR Gavai and KV Viswanathan pronounced the judgment in a batch of petitions filed by Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind and various other petitioners seeking directions to stop the trend of "bulldozer justice".

  Directions laid down by the Court

  The Court issued a set of steps to be followed before demolition.

  Even after the orders of demolition are passed, the affected party needs to be given some time so as to challenge the order of demolition before the appropriate forum.

  Even in cases of persons who do not wish to contest the demolition order, sufficient time needs to be given to vacate.

  "It is not a happy sight to see women, children and aged persons dragged to the street overnight. Heavens will not fall on the authorities if they hold their hands for some period," the Court observed.

  The Court clarified that that these directions will not be applicable if there is any unauthorised structure in any public place such as a road, street, footpath, abutting railway lines or any river body or water body and also in cases where there is an order passed by a Court of law.

  Prior show-cause notice

  No demolition should be carried out without prior show cause notice returnable either in accordance with the time provided in the local municipal laws or within 15 days time from the date of service, whichever is later.

  The notice shall be served upon the owner by registered post. It shall also be affixed on the outer portion of the structure. The time of 15 days will start from the receipt of the said notice.

  To prevent any allegations of ante-dating, the Court directed that as soon as notice is duly served, intimation thereof shall be sent to the office of Collector/District Magistrate digitally by email and auto-generated reply acknowledging the receipt of the mail should also be issued by the office of the Collector/DM.

  The DM shall designate a nodal officer and assign an email address and communicate the same to all officials in charge of building regulations within one month from today.

  Notice shall contain the nature of the unauthorized construction, details of specific violations and grounds of demolition. Notice should also specify the date for personal hearing and the designated authority.

  Every municipal authority should assign a designated digital portal within three months from the date of the judgment wherein details regarding service, pasting of notice, reply, show-cause notice, and order passed are available.

  Personal hearing and final order

  The designated authority shall allow a personal hearing to the party. The minutes of such a hearing shall be recorded. The final order of authority shall contain contentions of notice, the authority's findings and reasons, whether the unauthorised construction is compoundable, and whether the whole construction is to be demolished. The order should specify why the extreme step of demolition is the only option available.

  Judicial scrutiny of the final order

  Suppose the statute provides for an appellate authority and time for filing the appeal, even if it does not do so. In that case, the demolition order will not be implemented for 15 days from the receipt thereof. The order shall also be displayed on the digital portal.

  An opportunity should be given to the owner to remove the unauthorised construction. Only after the expiry of 15 days and the owner/occupier has not removed the unauthorised construction or if the order has not been stayed by the appellate authority, the concerned authority shall take steps to demolish the same.

  Demolition steps

  Only that part of unauthorised construction, which is not compoundable, can be demolished.

  Before demolition, a detailed inspection report must be prepared by the authority.

  The proceedings of demolition shall be videographed and preserved. The demolition report, with the list of police and civil personnel who participated in the process, should be forwarded to the Municipal Commissioner and displayed in the digital portal.

  Violating the directions would lead to the initiation of contempt proceedings and prosecution.

  If the demolition is found to violate the court's orders, the officers responsible will be held liable for restitution of the demolished property at their personal cost in addition to payment of damages.

  The copy of the judgment was directed to be circulated to the Chief Secretaries of all States/UTs and Registrar Generals of all High Courts. All State Governments shall issue circulars intimating the authorities about this judgment.

Offence Within Restaurant Not 'House Trespass' As Per Sections 442, 452 IPC : Supreme Court

Observing that a restaurant cannot be said to be either a place used for human dwelling or worship or the custody of the property, the Supreme Court set aside the conviction of a person accused of the offence of "house trespassing after preparation for hurt" under Section 452 of IPC.

The bench comprising Justice Bela M Trivedi and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma noted that the Restaurant does not meet the criteria of a "house" under Section 442 IPC because it is neither a dwelling, a place of worship, nor a place for the custody of property. Thus, the necessary element for an offence under Section 452 was not fulfilled.

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As per Section 442 of IPC, the offence of House Trespass is said to be committed by entering into or remaining in any building, tent, or vessel used as a human dwelling or any building used as a place for worship, or as a place for the custody of property.

Section 452 of the IPC punishes an act of entering or remaining on a property after preparing to cause harm or commit other criminal acts.

“452. House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint.—Whoever commits house-trespass, having made preparation for causing hurt to any person or for assaulting any person, or for wrongfully restraining any person, or for putting any person in fear of hurt, or of assault, or of wrongful restraint, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend.”

Canada Overhauls Visa Policy, Ends Ten-Year Tourist Visa Validity

Canada has updated its visa policy, allowing officers to issue single or multiple-entry visas.

The Canadian government has revised its visa policy and will no longer issue tourist visas with a validity of up to ten years, shifting away from the practice of issuing multiple-entry visas.

Under the new guidelines, immigration officers will now have the discretion to decide whether to issue a single-entry or multiple-entry visa and to determine the appropriate validity period. Earlier, the multiple-entry visa allowed the holder to enter Canada from any country as often as necessary during the visa’s validity period. It had a maximum validity of up to 10 years or until the expiry of the travel document or biometrics.

Sexual Assault Under POCSO Can't Be Quashed Based On 'Compromise', Offence Is Heinous & Not Of Private Nature : Supreme Court

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The bench comprising Justices CT Ravikumar and Sanjay Kumar observed that matters related to sexual assault cannot be treated as private matters eligible for compromise-based quashing. The Court emphasized the societal impact of such crimes and mandated that proceedings continue in the interest of justice.

“Obviously, rubbing the breast of a child would constitute an offence of 'sexual assault' under Section 7 of the POCSO Act, punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than three years and may extend to five years and also fine. They would reveal that the commission of such offences against the children should be viewed as heinous and serious. Needless to say, that commission of such offences cannot be taken lightly as offences of private nature and in fact, such offences are bound to be taken as offences against the society.”, the Court observed.

Reference was made to the decision in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan (2019) 5 SCC 688 which held that an offence against the society cannot be compromised.

The Court also approved the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Sunil Raikwar v. State and Another, which held that a POCSO Act offence cannot be "permitted to be settled."

"Because of the very object and purpose of enacting the POCSO Act, we find no reason to disagree with the conclusions in paragraph 12 (of the Delhi HC judgment) extracted above in the given case," the Supreme Court stated.

The Court also rejected the respondent's argument that the third person/appellant had no locus standi to challenge the quashing of FIR as they were not part of the criminal proceedings. The Court said that the offence of sexual assault, being grave and impacting society, cannot be categorized as a private dispute disentitling the appellant's locus to challenge FIR quashing.

“Because of the nature of the offences alleged against the third respondent, one can only say that if they are proven they could be treated only as offences against the society and at any rate, it cannot be said that prosecuting an offender against whom such allegations are made is not in the interest of the society. In fact, it would only be in the interest of the society. In that view of the matter, when by quashing the FIR by invoking the power under Section 482, Cr. P.C., the accused was relieved of the liability to face the trial coupled with the aforesaid circumstances and the position of law qua locus standi of third party to maintain a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, as revealed from the decisions referred above, we have no hesitation to hold that the challenge based on the appellants' locus standi got no merit at all.”, the court observed.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, overturning the High Court's order and directing that criminal proceedings against the accused continue. Emphasizing that POCSO Act cases involve serious public interest, the Court held that such matters should not be dismissed solely based on a compromise between parties.

Shouting and threatening someone doesn't amount to committing an offence of assault under Section 351 of the IPC (Section 130 of BNS) SC

A bench comprising Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah held that Shouting and threatening someone doesn't amount to committing an offence of assault under Section 351 of the IPC (Section 130 of BNS).            

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of K. Dhananjay v. Cabinet Secretary & Ors.  

• The appellant, formerly employed at the Indian Institute of Astrophysics, Bangalore, challenged his dismissal through a petition filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Bangalore Bench. 
• During his case proceedings, he sought access to specific documents, which were granted. 
• While inspecting these documents in the office of Ms A. Thomeena, Deputy Registrar at CAT, Bangalore, he allegedly engaged in disruptive behaviour, including shouting and threatening the staff, which led to an FIR being filed against him under Sections 353 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). 
• The complaint stated that the appellant threatened staff and disrupted office work, yet no actions amounted to physical assault as defined under Section 351 IPC. 
• The High Court dismissed his petition to quash the case, leading to his appeal to the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court stated that the only allegation against the appellant in the said complaint was that he was shouting and threatening the staff. This itself will not amount to any assault. 
• To our mind, the High Court made a mistake by not interfering in this case. This case is nothing but an abuse of the process of law, and therefore, in order to meet the ends of justice, we allow this appeal and quash the entire proceedings initiated against the appellant. 

What are the Provisions concerning Assault? 

• Section 351 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC):  
  • This section now covered under Section 130 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) deals with the offence of assault. It states that whoever makes any gesture, or any preparation intending or knowing it to be likely that such gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend that he who makes that gesture or preparation is about to use criminal force on that person, is said to commit an assault. 
  • Explanation. —Mere words do not amount to an assault. But the words a person uses may give his gestures or preparations such a meaning as may make those gestures or preparations amount to an assault. 
• Essential Elements 
  • The Prosecution must establish the following two ingredients to prosecute a person for assault:  
    • Making any gesture or preparation by a person in the presence of another; and 
    • Intention or Knowledge of the likelihood that such gesture or preparation will cause the person to apprehend that the person making it is about to use criminal force to him. 
• Section 353 of the IPC (Section 132 of the BNS): 
  • It states that whoever assaults or uses criminal force on any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such person to the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 
• Case Laws 
  • Rupabati v. Shyama (1958):  
    • The Court held that causing of some actual hurt is not necessary for constituting assault, mere threat may constitute assault.  
  • Padarath Tewari vs Dulhin Tapesha Kueri (1932):  
    • The Court held that a medical examination of woman without her consent constitutes the offence of assault. 

Power Of States To Regulate Industrial Alcohol Under Term 'Intoxicating Liquor'-Supreme Court

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A nine-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on Wednesday (October 23), held by 8:1 majority, held that the States have the power to regulate 'denatured spirit or industrial alcohol'.

The majority concluded so by holding that the term "intoxicating liquor" in Entry 8 of List II (State List) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution will include industrial alcohol.

The majority held that the term "intoxicating liquor" cannot be interpreted narrowly to include only alcohol which is fit for human consumption. It was held that liquids which contain alcohol which can be used or misused for human consumption can be included within the term "intoxicating liquor".

The present matter was referred to a nine-judge bench in 2007 and pertains to the interpretation of Section 18G of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951(IDR Act). Section 18G allows the Central Government to ensure that certain products related to scheduled industries are distributed fairly and are available at reasonable prices. They can do this by issuing an official notification to control the supply, distribution, and trade of these products. However, as per Entry 33 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the State legislature has the power to regulate trade, production, and distribution of products from industries under Union control and similar imported goods. It was argued that in Synthetics and Chemical Ltd. vs. State of U.P., a seven-judge bench had failed to address Section 18G's interference with the concurrent powers of the State. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held–

"If the decision in the Synthetics and Chemicals case (supra) concerning the interpretation of Section 18-G of the 1951 Act is allowed to stand, it would render the provisions of Entry 33 (a) of List III nugatory or otiose."

The matter was then referred to a nine-judge bench. It may be noted that apart from Entry 33 List III, Entry 8 List II also provides regulation powers to the state with regards to 'Intoxicating Liquor'. As per Entry 8 List II, the state has law-making powers over - “ Intoxicating liquors, that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors”

Investigation Transfer To CBI Cannot Be Ordered While Rejecting Bail Application: Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court granted bail to the appellants, overturning the High Court's decision to deny bail and transfer the investigation to the CBI.

Summary of Supreme Court Order

• Case: Abhishek & Anr. vs. The State of Rajasthan & Ors.

• Appeal: Criminal Appeal No. 4283 of 2024

• Decision: The Supreme Court granted bail to the appellants, overturning the High Court's decision to deny bail and transfer the investigation to the CBI.

• Action: Appellants must be produced before the Trial Court within one week; bail is to be granted on appropriate terms until the trial conclusion.

• Date of Order: October 21, 2024.

The Supreme Court held on October 21 that the Court cannot transfer the investigation to another agency while dealing with a bail application filed under Section 439 of the CrPC.

The Rajasthan High Court's order to transfer the investigation to the CBI was passed in a murder case involving the bajri (sand) mafia. The case involved the killing of a 22-year-old man from a marginalized Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) community, allegedly murdered at the behest of the sand mafia to "set an example" and protect its interests.

Justice Sameer Jain's single-judge bench transferred the case to the CBI after observing multiple discrepancies in the investigation conducted by the state police and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID).

The High Court found that the investigation was "unfair, tainted, and incomplete," particularly in the medical reports, which had conflicting findings regarding the cause of death. The postmortem report indicated 14 injuries on the victim's body, including severe injuries to his neck, which were considered the primary cause of death. Despite these findings, the state medical experts attributed the death to intoxication and deemed the injuries "simple," leading the Court to question the investigation's integrity.

Further, the Court noted procedural lapses in the handling of the case under the SC/ST Act. The FIR was delayed by three days, and several key provisions of the Act needed to be followed, which hampered evidence collection. Despite allegations against individuals connected to the sand mafia, no charges were filed against them. The family of the deceased also alleged that they were pressured to enter into a compromise through threats or financial incentives.

In light of these factors, the Rajasthan High Court deemed it necessary to transfer the investigation to the CBI.

Wife calling husband 'Hijda' is cruelty: Punjab and Haryana High Court

The Punjab and Haryana High Court recently ruled that a wife calling her husband Hijda (transgender) amounts to mental cruelty.

The Division Bench of Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Jasjit Singh Bedi was hearing a wife’s appeal against the divorce decree granted in favour of her husband by a family court on July 12.

The husband’s mother had deposed that his wife would call her son a Hijda.  

“If the findings recorded by the learned Family Court, are examined in the light of the … judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it comes out that the acts and conduct of the appellant-wife amounts to cruelty. Firstly, terming the respondent-husband as Hijda (transgender) and calling his mother to have given birth to a transgender, is an act of cruelty,” the Bench said.

The couple had married in December 2017. The husband in the divorce plea had alleged that his wife used to wake up late at night and also ask his ailing mother to send her lunch on the first floor from the ground floor. 

“Considering the overall acts and conduct of the appellant-wife and further considering that the parties had been living separately for the last six years, it was rightly found by the learned family court that the marriage between the parties has ruptured beyond repair and it has become a dead wood,” the Court further said.

It was also alleged that she was addicted to porn and mobile games. In particular, the husband alleged that the wife used to ask him to record the duration of sex and would also state that it “must go on for at least 10-15 minutes at a time and that it must be at least thrice per night”. 

She used to taunt him for not “being physically fit to compete with her” and had disclosed that she wanted to marry someone else, the plea said.

The Court also said the parties have been living separately for the past six years and there is no possibility of reunion.

Accordingly, it upheld the family court's decision to dissolve the marriage and dismissed the wife’s appeal.

Supreme Court Upholds Maintainability Of Appeals Filed By Airports Economic Regulatory Authority Against Orders Of TDSAT On Tariff Imposition

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The Supreme Court on October 18 upheld the maintainability of appeals filed by the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority (AERA) assailing orders of the TDSAT under the AERA Act 2008 relating to tariff imposition on certain services.

The bench led by CJI DY Chandrachud comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra permitted the appeals to be filed by AERA in the following order :

"The appeals by AERA against the TDSAT order are held to be maintainable. Registry to list the hearing appeals."

Voluntary Retirement Scheme Does Not Extinguish Employee's Right To Challenge Disciplinary Penalties: Delhi HC

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The court examined the scope and content of the SVRS and Sharma's undertaking. It acknowledged that while Sharma had accepted the scheme with the understanding that his salary would be calculated based on his reduced pay scale, the benefits being claimed did not form part of the retirement package.

The court analyzed BSES's reliance on the A.K. Bindal judgment. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that an employee who avails voluntary retirement cannot later seek financial benefits like pay revision. However, the court here noted that A.K. Bindal dealt with pay revisions directly linked to retirement packages, whereas Sharma's claim arose from a disciplinary action unrelated to the SVRS package itself. Thirdly, the court referred to A. Satyanarayana Reddy, which allowed employees to claim certain financial benefits post-retirement if those claims were not explicitly covered under the SVRS. In Sharma's case, the court found that the pay revision linked to the penalty reduction was a separate issue, not part of the retirement benefits package under SVRS.

Government Employee Can't Refuse To Join New Place Of Posting While Contesting Transfer : Supreme Court

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The Court opined that when a person works for the government, the incidence of transfer becomes inherent in the terms of service unless it is specifically barred. As such, once relieved from a particular place of posting, the employee has no right to remain absent or to refute to the new place of posting. He can join the new posting place and continue contesting the transfer.

 "..an employee has no right to remain absent or refuse to join the new place of transfer once relieved from their current place of posting. The employee is entitled to avail all available remedies for redressal of grievances, but it does not entitle them to not comply with the transfer orders. The employee is well within his rights to join the transferred place of posting and still continue to avail the remedies available under the law for redressal of his grievances against the transfer."

Two primary concerns were flagged by the Court relating to such absenteeism of employees:

(i) Transfers are made by authorities to fill vacancies in new places of posting. If transferred employees don't join, optimal service at full capacity can't be provided;

(ii) While the challenge to transfer is underway, authorities would have to employ other individuals to fill the vacancies. This would amount to paying twice for the same job - firstly, to the individual who is actually performing the job, and secondly, to the transferred employee who is unauthorizedly absent.

"Such a situation would result in nothing but burning a hole in the pocket of public exchequer, lead to the excessive financial burden on the Government institutions, and would fundamentally jeopardize public interest", the Court said.

Briefly put, the Court was dealing with the case of Tamil Nadu Agricultural University and 6 private respondents, who initially challenged their transfer orders by the University before the Madras High Court. A Single Judge allowed the respondents' pleas and quashed the transfer orders. Against the same, the appellant-University filed writ appeals. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appellant-university's appeals. Aggrieved by the same, it approached the Supreme Court.

Pursuant to the Supreme Court's initial orders, the private respondents joined their new places of posting. However, an issue remained with regard to regularization for the period during which they did not join services despite transfer.

With regard to 4 respondents, who had interim orders in their favor from the High Court, the appellant-University conceded that it was not opposed to regularization and payment of arrears.

So far as the other 2 respondents, the Court noted that without any interim order in their favor, they remained unauthorizedly absent from service during the pendency of their petitions before the Single Judge of the High Court. As such, they could not be regularized and/or paid arrears for the said period. However, they were entitled to regularization and payment of salaries for the period after the Single Judge pronounced the decision quashing the transfer orders.

"Despite there being no interim order in their favour, respondent nos. 4 and 7 continued to remain absent after being relieved from their original place of posting. As such, this Court is not inclined to extend any benefit of salary for the period of unauthorised absence. However, as the transfer order was quashed by the learned Single Judge, their service periods shall continue to be treated in continuity, and they would be entitled to whatever other benefits accrued to them due to this continuity, but no salary for the said period of unauthorised absence."

Ultimately, the appeals were allowed, with a direction to the appellant-University to clear arrears of the private respondents, subject to the condition that two respondents (who did not have interim orders in their favour) were not to be paid for the period of unauthorized absence.

Kerala High Court Refuses To Quash Case Against Man For Criticizing Muslim Girl's Handshake.'Can't Impose One's Religious Belief On Another'

This comes as the Court dismissed a petition filed by Abdul Noushad of Kottakkal, who has been accused of criticising a Muslim girl for shaking hands with former Finance Minister Thomas Issac at a public event. 

• Petition dismissed against woman shaking hands with ex-minister
• Court says shaking hands is a traditional gesture
• Video circulated accusing woman of violating Shariat Law

The Kerala High Court has refused to quash the proceedings against a man who made allegations against a Muslim girl that she committed adultery and violated Shariat Law by shaking hands with the former Finance Minister of Kerala, observing that no religious belief stands above the Constitution.

The ruling came by a single-judge bench of Justice P V Kunhikrishnan, who dismissed a petition filed by Abdul Noushad of Kottakkal, accused of criticising the Muslim girl for shaking hands with former Finance Minister Thomas Issac at a public event.

Justice P V Kunhikrishnan noted that "shaking hands" is a traditional gesture that symbolises greeting, respect, courtesy, agreement, deal, friendship, solidarity, etc

The woman complainant accused Abdul Noushad of circulating a video through WhatsApp that contained a speech claiming that she had violated Shariat Law by shaking hands with a man. According to the video, the act was considered adultery because she, as a woman, had touched another man.

The incident occurred when the woman, a second-year law student at Markaz Law College, participated in an interactive session with former Finance Minister Thomas Isaac, during which students received gifts for asking questions. After accepting the gifts, they shook hands with Isaac. However, the petitioner shared a video alleging that the woman had violated Shariat Law, leading to police charges against him under Section 153 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 119(a) of the Kerala Police Act, 2011.

The woman stated that the video brought disgrace to both her and her family. The court observed that a courageous Muslim woman had come forward, asserting that the video's distribution infringed upon her freedom of religious belief.

"In such situations, our Constitution will protect her interests. Moreover, society has to support her," Justice Kunhikrishnan said.

"No religious belief is above the Constitution. The Constitution is supreme," he added.

Emphasising the importance of personal choice in religious practice, the court also stated that "there is no compulsion in religion, especially in Islam".

In the ruling, the court highlighted that one individual cannot force another to adhere to their religious beliefs, reinforcing the idea that religious practice is a personal decision for every citizen. The court asserted, "The woman in the case has a right to follow a religious practice in her own way," stressing that no one should impose their beliefs on others.