Civil Court's Jurisdiction and Industrial Disputes Act -Supreme Court

Read Judgment

Industrial Disputes Act 1947 - Jurisdiction of civil court not ousted when the matter relates to correction of date of birth -Jurisdiction of the civil court is not ousted, as this is not a case relating to the enforcement of a right or an obligation under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

A Bench of Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Bela S Trivedi reiterated the principles laid down in the Premier Automobiles case as follows :

(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute or does not relate to the enforcement of any other right under the Act, the remedy lies only in the civil court.

(2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the jurisdiction of the civil court is an alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy.

(3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act.

(4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, such as Chapter VA, then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be.

The third and fourth principles are not applicable in the present case, the Supreme Court observed, in view of the above.

"In our opinion, the present case is not covered by principles (3) and (4) as the issue involved relates only to the correction of the date of birth. Jurisdiction of the civil court is not ousted, as this is not a case relating to enforcement of a right or an obligation under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Equally, on merits, we find that the appellant is entitled to relief as claimed. The respondents have not been just and fair", the Supreme Court's order read.

This being the case, the Bench held that the appellant is entitled to back wages from October 1, 2007, to October 31, 2009, that is, the actual wages payable to the appellant, as if he had worked during that period.