Bombay High Court Raps Maharastra Police For Misusing Official Secrets Act, Says Police Stations Not 'Prohibited Place' For Videography

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The Bombay High Court has pulled up the police for registering FIRs under Section 3 of the Official Secrets Act against those videographing "discussions" or taking photographs inside police stations and directed the authorities to take appropriate steps to ensure the law is not misused.

The division bench of Justice Revati Mohite Dere and Justice Prithviraj K. Chavan said it would be open for the Director General of Police, Commissioner of Mumbai Police and Home Department to consider whether a senior high-ranking level officer is informed when an FIR under the Official Secrets Act is lodged, in matters concerning the Police Station, to curb misuse of the Act.

"We regularly come across cases where F.I.R are being registered by the Police, under section 3 of the Official Secrets Act, without application of mind, which is a matter of serious concern i.e., for acts done in the Police Station, video graphing of discussions in the Police Station, taking photographs within the Police Station, etc, more particularly, when a 'Police Station' is not a prohibited place," said the court.

Section 3 (Penalties for spying) of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 provides punishment for spying at a 'prohibited place' under section 2(8) of the Act. It is for acts against the safety or interest of the state.

The court relied on Ravindra Shitalrao Upadyay v. State of Maharashtra wherein it was held that video recording made on a mobile phone within the police station would not attract section 3 of the Act. It said to attract the provisions of the Official Secrets Act, the place where the incident takes place has to be a prohibited place', as defined in section 2(8) of the enactment.

Prasar Bharati Cannot Encrypt DD Sports: Delhi High Court, Dismisses Amazon's Plea Against Broadcast Of India-New Zealand Cricket Series On Dish TV

Upholding an interim order of the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal, the Delhi High Court on Friday ruled that Prasar Bharti cannot encrypt the contents of DD Sports as long as it remains in the list of Free-to-air channels which are required to be compulsorily carried by all cable operators.

Justice Yashwant Varma said DD Sports has been made FTA by the government in the exercise of powers conferred by the Cable Television Network (Regulation) Act, 1995 and it continues to remain included in the notification dated September 06, 2013.

"Thus, even if the content in question be one which was acquired by Prasar Bharati under Section 12(3)(c) of the [Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act]1990 Act, as long as the same is aired on the DD Sports platform, it would be subject to the power that the Union Government may exercise under Section 8 of the 1995 Act," said the court

NI Act | Complainant Can't Seek To Prosecute Company's Former Directors For Cheque Issued To Repay Amount Invested When They Held Office: Karnataka HC

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The Karnataka High Court has quashed the proceedings initiated against two former directors of a company under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by the complainant claiming that when he invested the money in the company they were directors.

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single-judge bench of Justice Hemant Chandangoudar allowed the petition filed by Sunita and Vidya and quashed the proceedings pending against them.

A private complaint was filed under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, 'the Act'), alleging that the cheque, which was issued by the Company in favour of the complainant, when presented for realisation was dishonoured for want of funds. The Magistrate, after recording the sworn statement of the complainant, took cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and issued summons to the accused.

The bench said, "The cheque in question was issued on 01.08.2019. The petitioners, who were the Directors of the Company, ceased to be the Directors of the Company with effect from 22.03.2017 which is evident from Form No.DIR-12 issued by Registrar of the Companies and the same has remained uncontroverted."

It then held, "Hence, it implies that the petitioners ceased to be the Directors of the Companies as on the date of issuance of the cheque. Hence, registration of the complaint against the petitioners for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act is not sustainable."

No fine can be imposed for feeding stray dogs: Supreme Court modifies Bombay High Court order

The Supreme Court on Wednesday modified an order of the Bombay High Court that had directed authorities to impose fines on citizens who feed stray dogs in Nagpur [Swati Sudhirchandra Chatterjee and ors v. Vijay Shankarrao Talewar and ors].

The Bench of Justices Sanjiv Khanna and JK Maheshwari said that it is permissible to feed stray dogs without causing a nuisance to the public and that no coercive steps like fines can be imposed for feeding the animals.

"Wherever there are human beings, there is bound to be a conflict of interest. There will be wrongs done by stray dogs as well, we have to be conscious of both. There may be other considerations...You cannot insist that people who feed dogs must adopt them." 

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Last month, the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court had directed authorities to impose a fine of not more than ₹200 on citizens who feed stray dogs on the roads and in public places in the city.

The High Court had noted that despite measures taken by the authorities, the menace of stray dogs had increased in the city because of the irresponsible behaviour of some citizens, who feed such dogs on the streets.

The Bench had stated that if these so-called friends of stray dogs are really interested in the protection and welfare of the strays, they must adopt them, take them home or at least put them up in dog shelter homes and bear all the expenses for their registration with municipal authorities and towards their maintenance, health and vaccination.

Education is not business to earn profit, tuition fees must be affordable: Supreme Court

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Education is not a business to earn a profit, the Supreme Court observed on Monday while upholding the Andhra Pradesh High Court order to strike down the State government's decision to hike the annual tuition fees for MBBS courses in private unaided medical colleges to ₹24 lakh.

Determination of fee or review of fee, the judges said, shall be within the parameters of the fixation rules and shall have direct nexus to:

- location of the professional Institution

- nature of 
the professional course

- cost of available infrastructure

- expenditure on administration and maintenance

- reasonable surplus required for growth and development of the Institution

- revenue foregone on account of waiver of the fee, if any, in respect of reserved category students.

'Bribe Giver' Is A Party Connected To 'Proceeds Of Crime' ; Can Be Prosecuted Under PMLA : Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court set aside a Madras High Court judgment which quashed PMLA proceedings initiated against a 'bribe giver'.

"By handing over the money to give a bribe, such person will be assisting or will knowingly be a party to an activity connected with the proceeds of crime. Without such active participation on the part of the person concerned, the money would not assume the character of being the proceeds of crime. The relevant expressions from Section 3 of the PML Act are thus wide enough to cover the role played by such a person.", the bench of CJI UU Lalit and Justice Bela M. Trivedi observed.

Padmanabhan Kishore (A2) allegedly handed over a sum of Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees fifty lakhs only) to a public servant. An FIR was registered under Section 120B, Indian Penal Code and Sections 7, 12, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Later, a case was registered by the Enforcement Directorate against the accused including Padmanabhan Kishore under Sections 3 and 4 of the PML Act. Later, the Madras High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the PMLA proceedings against him. According to High Court, the sum of Rs.50,00,000/- as long as it was in the hands of Padmanabhan Kishore (A2) could not have been stated as tainted money because it is not the case of the CBI that he had mobilised Rs.50,00,000/- via criminal activity. The sum of Rs.50,00,000/- became the proceeds of a crime only when Andasu Ravinder (A1) accepted it as a bribe. Even before Andasu Ravinder (A1) could project the sum of Rs.50,00,000/- as untainted money, the CBI intervened and seized the money in the car on 29.08.2011.

Muslim Man Can't Marry Another Woman As Per Quran If He Isn't Capable Of Fostering First Wife, Children: Allahabad High Court

Can't Compel Wife To Live With Muslim Husband Who Has Married Another Woman If It Isn't 'Equitable': Allahabad High Court

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As per the mandate of the Holy Quran, bigamy is not sanctified unless a man can do justice to orphans, the Allahabad High Court has observed that a Muslim man has to prevent himself to perform a second marriage if he is not capable of fostering his wife and children.

"The religious mandate of Sura 4 Ayat 3 (of Quran) is binding on all Muslim men which specifically mandates all Muslim men to deal justly with orphans and then they can marry women of their choice two or three or four but if a Muslim man fears that he will not be able to deal justly with them then only one. If a Muslim man is not capable of fostering his wife and children then as per the above mandate of the Holy Quran, he cannot marry the other woman," the Bench of Justice Surya Prakash Kesarwani and Justice Rajendra Kumar-IV observed.

Section 125 CrPC- Able-bodied husband duty-bound to maintain wife, child even by doing physical labour: Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court recently held that an able-bodied husband is duty-bound to maintain his wife and minor child even by doing physical labour and he cannot shirk that responsibility saying he has no source of income. 

A division bench of Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Bela M Trivedi believed that it is the sacrosanct duty of the husband to provide financial support to the wife and the minor children.

"It is the sacrosanct duty of the husband to provide financial support to the wife and the minor children. The husband is required to earn money even by physical labour, if he is able-bodied, and could not avoid his obligation, except on the legally permissible grounds mentioned in the statute." 

The Court has also rejected the stand of the respondent-husband that he has no source of regular income as his party business has now been closed.

"The respondent being able-bodied is obliged to earn by legitimate means and maintain his wife and the minor child. Having regard to the evidence of the appellant-wife before the Family Court, and having regard to the other evidence on record, the Court has no hesitation in holding that though the respondent had a sufficient source of income and was able-bodied, had failed and neglected to maintain the appellants."

Allegation of rape on false promise to marry will not stand if woman continued relationship after knowing of man's marriage: Kerala High Court

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The Kerala High Court recently observed that an allegation of rape on false promise to marry would not stand if the woman knew that the man was already married and continued the sexual relationship with the accused. 

The Court noted that the statement of the complainant disclosed that she knew the petitioner since 2010 and she came to know about the fact that the petitioner was married five to six years ago. Still, she was in a sexual relationship with him till 2019. She claimed that the petitioner had told her he was moving for divorce but she later came to know that he was in connection with some other women as well.

From the complainant's statement and other material on record, the Court concluded that the petitioner had no mala fide intention or clandestine motives to conduct the alleged rape under the pretext of marriage.

The fact the complainant had had a relationship with the petitioner since 2010 and she continued the relationship knowing about his marriage from 2013 onwards would nullify the story regarding the sexual intercourse on the false pretext of marrying her, the Court opined.

Therefore, it quashed the FIR registered against the petitioner.

All Women Entitled To Safe & Legal Abortion, Distinction Between Married & Unmarried Women Unconstitutional : Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court on 29/09/22 declared that unmarried women are also entitled to seek abortion of pregnancy within 20-24 weeks arising out of a consensual relationship.

The Court ruled that excluding unmarried women who conceive out of live-in relationships from the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules is unconstitutional.

"All women are entitled to safe and legal abortion, " the Court noted that the 2021 amendment to the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act does not distinguish between married and unmarried women.

The issue relates to whether the exclusion of unmarried women, whose pregnancy arises out of a consensual relationship, from Rule 3B of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules is valid. Rule 3B mentions the categories of women whose pregnancy in the duration of 20-24 weeks can be terminated.

The distinction between married and unmarried women is unsustainable

"If Rule 3B(c) is understood as only for married women, it would perpetuate the stereotype that only married women indulge in sexual activities. This is not constitutionally sustainable. The artificial distinction between married and unmarried women cannot be sustained. Women must have the autonomy to have free exercise of these rights", Justice Chandrachud, the presiding judge of the bench, read out the excerpts of the judgment.

Teenage Pregnancies -Doctor Need Not Disclose Identity Of Minor Girl Seeking Abortion In Information Given To Police : Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court on 28/09/22 read down the mandatory police reporting requirement under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act to hold that a doctor need not disclose the name and identity of the minor girl in the information given to police.

A bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud, AS Bopanna and JB Pardiwala, called for a harmonious reading of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy (MTP) Act and the POCSO Act and held that a registered medical practitioner was exempt from disclosing the identity and other personal details of a minor in the information provided under Section 19 of the POCSO Act.

Passenger Injured On Account Of Mine Blast Entitled To Compensation Under Motor Vehicle Act: J&K&L High Court

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The Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court on 22/09/22 ruled that even if the cause of the accident is remote or due to subversive activity involved, the victim is entitled to a grant of compensation under the Motor Vehicle Act.

The appellants assailed the impugned judgment primarily on the ground that there was no negligence on the part of the driver or the appellants and the death of the deceased and injuries to the injured had been caused by a mine blast which was beyond their control as such even the incident in question was too remote, and unconnected with the use of the vehicle.

Adjudicating upon the matter the bench observed that even if the cause of the accident is remote or as a result of subversive activity involved, the victim is entitled to grant of compensation under Motor Vehicle Act, for the use of the vehicle and all other reliefs granted under some other statutes or schemes are not adjustable towards the compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act.

Order I Rule 10 CPC - Nobody Can Be Permitted To Be Impleaded As Defendants Against The Wish Of The Plaintiffs Unless Court Suo Motu Directs: Supreme Court

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Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ; Order I Rule 10 - Plaintiffs are the domius litis - Unless the court suo motu directs to join any other person not a party to the suit for the effective decree and/or for proper adjudication as per Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, nobody can be permitted to be impleaded as defendants against the wish of the plaintiffs - In case the counter-claim is allowed, it will not be open for the plaintiffs to contend that no decree in the counter-claim be passed in absence of the subsequent purchasers - Non-impleading the subsequent purchasers as defendants on the objection raised by the plaintiffs shall be at the risk of the plaintiffs.

The Supreme Court observed that a High Court can quash a cheque case only if it comes across some unimpeachable and incontrovertible evidence to indicate that the Director/partner of a firm could not have been concerned with the issuance of cheques. "Vicarious criminal liability can be inferred against the partners of a firm when it is specifically averred in the complaint about the status of the partners 'qua' the firm.", the bench comprising Justices Surya Kant and JB Pardiwala observed.

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The High Court quashed a cheque case against the accused (partner of a firm) on the ground that there was nothing to indicate in what manner the accused herein was in­charge and responsible for the day­to­day affairs of the firm so as to make her vicariously liable for the alleged offence with the aid of Section 141 of the NI Act. The High Court held that merely by reciting the words used under Section 141 of the NI Act in the complaint no vicarious liability can be fastened on the firm's partner.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ; Section 482 - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ; Section 138,141 - High Court should not interfere under Section 482 of the Code at the instance of an accused unless it comes across some unimpeachable and incontrovertible evidence to indicate that the Director/partner of a firm could not have been concerned with the issuance of cheques - If any Director wants the process to be quashed by filing a petition under Section 482 of the Code on the ground that only a bald averment is made in the complaint and that he/she is really not concerned with the issuance of the cheque, he/she must in order to persuade the High Court to quash the process either furnish some sterling incontrovertible material or acceptable circumstances to substantiate his/her contention. He/she must make out a case that making him/her stand the trial would be an abuse of process of Court. (Para 47)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138,141 - Vicarious criminal liability can be inferred against the partners of a firm when it is specifically averred in the complaint about the status of the partners 'qua' the firm. This would make them liable to face prosecution but it does not lead to an automatic conviction. On the other elements of an offence under Section 138 being satisfied, the burden is on the Board of Directors or the officers in charge of the affairs of the company/partners of a firm to show that they were not liable to be convicted. (Para 47)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138,141 - The object of notice before the filing of the complaint is not just to give a chance to the drawer of the cheque to rectify his omission to make his stance clear so far as his liability under Section 138 of the NI Act is concerned - It is essential for the person to whom statutory notice is issued under Section 138 of the NI Act to give an appropriate reply. The person concerned is expected to clarify his or her stance. If the person concerned has some unimpeachable and incontrovertible material to establish that he or she has no role to play in the affairs of the company/firm, then such material should be highlighted in the reply to the notice as a foundation. (Para 44)

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Witness Can't Be Allowed To Seek Correction In Evidence After He Signs Deposition Sheet: Orissa High Court

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The Court noted that Section 278, Cr.P.C. deals with procedure with regard to the evidence when it is completed and it states, inter alia, that as the evidence of each witness taken under section 275 or section 276 of Cr.P.C. is completed, it shall be read over to him in the presence of the accused, if in attendance, or of his pleader, if he appears by pleader, and shall, if necessary, be corrected and it is further provided that if the witness denies the correctness of any part of the evidence when the same is read over to him, the Magistrate or Presiding Officer may, instead of correcting the evidence, make a memorandum thereon of the objection made to it by the witness and shall add such remarks as he thinks necessary.

The Bench observed that where the certificate of the Magistrate endorsed on the deposition sheet states that the deposition was read out to the witness and that the witness admitted it to be correct, the Court is bound to accept this as correct under 
Section 80 of the Evidence Act until it is proved to be untrue. Before a deposition is closed, a witness is given an opportunity of explaining and correct any contradictions which it may contain and the statement that the witness finally declares to be the true one and that statement only must be taken to be the statement that the witness intended to make.

It was further held that all the Courts whether civil or criminal have an obligation to read over the deposition to the witness before he is called upon to affix the signature. Having regard for the statutory mandate, the Court observed,

"…after his cross-examination is over, he was asked to go through his deposition sheet and put his signature on each page of the deposition sheet, he never raised any objection about of any wrong recording. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that everything was done in a hurried manner and the petitioner could not get time to go through the evidence minutely and therefore, the evidence should be corrected is not acceptable. The correction, which has been sought in the evidence is completely different from what evidence has been recorded. Therefore, it would be too risky to allow further examination of the petitioner as D.W.1 and permit him to make corrections in the evidence already recorded."

Before concluding, however, the Court made it clear that if any new fact is there with the petitioner to be deposed to prove his case which he has inadvertently left out, his counsel can file an application for recall of petitioner to depose only those aspects and in the recall petition, specific questions likely to be put to D.W.1 should be mentioned and the same shall be considered by the Trial Court and if it is found to be relevant, just and proper.

Passport Officer Can't Usurp Power Of Authority Issuing Birth Certificate Or Make Independent Enquiry Into Applicant's Date Of Birth: Rajasthan HC

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Justice Ashok Kumar Gaur held that the Passport Authorities are always within their competence to direct the parties to produce relevant documents either from the Authorities functioning under the Births & Deaths Registration Act or from the Judicial Magistrate or from the Civil Court, as the case may be.

Engagement does not give prospective groom right to sexually exploit fiancée: Punjab & Haryana High Court

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The Punjab and Haryana High Court on 5/9/2022 held that a couple engaged and meeting each other did not give the prospective bridegroom the right or liberty to sexually exploit his fiancée without her consent [Sagar Kapoor v State of Haryana].

"The petitioner cannot get any leverage to physically exploit the fiancée against the consent during the period intervening the engagement and the marriage", the single-judge said.

"In the instant case, there is a categoric statement of the prosecutrix that the petitioner entered into physical relationship with her, despite her reluctance, refusal and denial."

"In the peculiar circumstances of the case, it is not made out that it was a case of consensual relationship," the court concluded while refusing anticipatory bail.

Peaceful protest is offence under Railways Act-Rail Roko Agitation and Bandh etc., the offence under Section 174(a) of the Railways Act - Allahabad High Court

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"Even if a peaceful agitation/protest can lead to obstruction of running of any train by squatting or picketing or during any Rail Roko Agitation or bandh, the same would amount to an offence under Section 174(a) of the Railways Act. It is no one’s case that the protest was violent, but the fact remains that the protesters, including the appellants, had stopped the train for 15 minutes by picketing on the railway track and climbed on the engine of the train when it was stopped." 

"In a democratic polity governed by a written Constitution, people have the right to protest against the Government’s policies and perceived atrocities. The right to protest, is also part of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India. The citizens of this country have rights to demonstration, agitation and staging protests. However, this right is not an absolute right, and it is subject to reasonable restriction," the bench observed.

"The law clarifies that if any Railway servant or any other person obstructs any train by squatting or picketing or during Rail Roko Agitation and Bandh etc., the offence under Section 174(a) of the Railways Act would get attracted."

Muslim Husband Cannot Avoid His Liability To Maintain Unless Divorce Is Validly Pronounced And Properly Communicated : J&K&L High Court

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Deciding the matter the bench observed that it is clear that for a Muslim husband to avoid his liability to maintain his wife on the ground that he has divorced his wife, he has not only to show that the divorce is validly pronounced in accordance with Muslim law but he has also to show that the said divorce has been communicated to the wife.

Explaining the said position of law the bench recorded the observations of the supreme court in Shamim Ara v. the State of U.P. and another, (2002)wherein SC observed.

The bench also placed reliance on a Judgement of the J&K High Court in Mohd. Naseem Bhat v. Bilquees Akhter and another wherein Court observed that for a husband to wriggle out of his obligations under marriage including one to maintain his wife, claiming to have divorced her has not merely to prove that he has pronounced Talaak or executed divorce deed to divorce his wife but has to compulsorily plead and prove the following:-

I) that effort was made by the representatives of husband and wife to intervene, and settle disputes and disagreements between the parties and that such effort for reasons not attributable to the husband did not bear any fruit.

II) that he had a valid reason and genuine cause to pronounce divorce on his wife.

III) that Talaak was pronounced in the presence of two witnesses endued with justice.

IV) that Talaak was pronounced during the period

An Ex-Parte Decree Obtained By Suppressing Fact Of Non-Service Of Summons On Defendant Would Be Vitiated By Fraud: Calcutta HC

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The Calcutta High Court has held that an ex-parte decree which is obtained by suppression of the fact of non-service on the defendant would be vitiated by fraud.

The Bench of Justice Shekhar B. Saraf set aside an ex-parte decree under Order IX Rule 13 CPC on the ground that the defendant could not be served with a notice of original plaint, the amended plaint, and the writ of summons of the amended plaint as it was not present in the address mentioned in the plaint and the service.

The Court further held that a suit cannot be transferred to the category of 'Undefended Suit' when the defendant was never served with the notice of the suit.

POCSO Act Not Meant To Breakdown Happy Family Relationship: Meghalaya High Court Quashes Proceedings Against Minor's Partner

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The Meghalaya High Court, while quashing a POCSO FIR against a minor's partner, reiterated that rigours of the Act may not be applied to break down a happy family relationship. Such cases must be decided by taking a sympathetic view towards the accused, who is in a consensual relationship with the minor, in the instant case almost 18 years of age.

The accused was booked after the minor was admitted to the hospital in connection with her pregnancy and was found to be aged 17 years.

The matter was reported to the local Police which swung into action and registered a case under Section 5(j)(ii)/6 of the POCSO Act, 2012.

The minor submitted that their union was blessed by the family members of both sides and therefore, the continuation of the criminal proceedings would not be for ends of justice.

Fraud claim can reconsideration by Same MAC Tribunal

आज मैं मोटर दुर्घटना दावा मामले में कदाचार, धोखाधड़ी, झूठे दस्तावेज जमा करने और गैर-आकस्मिक चोटों में झूठे सबूत बनाने और पुलिस के साथ झूठी शिकायत दर्ज करने के बाद  प्राप्त पुरस्कार- निर्णय पर चर्चा करूंगा।

मोटर दुर्घटना मुआवजे के आवेदन में फर्जीवाड़े, फर्जी दस्तावेज, दुर्घटना मुआवजा दिलाने के लिए झूठी शिकायतें  की जा रही है.

पिछले कुछ वर्षों में फर्जी मोटर दुर्घटना दावों की मात्रा में वृद्धि हुई है। कुछ दावे धोखे से दायर किए जाते हैं और बीमा कंपनी की लापरवाही के कारण, ऐसे फर्जी मामले किसी विशेष जांच से पहले रिपोर्ट नहीं किए जाते हैं। और बीमा कंपनी पर को ऐसे कलेईम में पैसा चुकाना पडता है।

भले ही इस तरह के झूठे मुआवजे के आवेदन, धोखाधड़ी द्वारा प्राप्त पुरस्कार-निर्णय को आमतौर पर उच्च न्यायालय में चुनौती दी जाती है, जिस कंपनी के खिलाफ नामदार उच्च न्यायालय में निर्णय दिया गया होता है उसी आदेश का 30 प्रतिशत या कम ज्यादा रकम  जमा करने का आदेश अपील दायर करते है।और उक्त राशि को ट्रिब्यूनल में जमा किया जाना होता है। जबकि कई मामलों में, धोखाधड़ी के ऐसे मामलों में पूरी राशि की प्रतिपूर्ति बीमा कंपनी द्वारा आवेदक को की जाती है क्योंकि कई में मामलों में, वीमा कंपनी को धोखाधड़ी पुरस्कार के दस्तावेजों के सत्यापन या प्रामाणिकता का भी पता नहीं था।

अब ऐसे मामलों में गुजरात हाईकोर्ट ने अभी अभी जजमेन्ट दीया है जिससे कंपनी को काफी राहत मिलती है.

अब मैं उस फैसले पर चर्चा करूंगा जिसे ट्रिब्यूनल में ही इस तरह के फर्जी फैसले के खिलाफ चुनौती दी जा सकती है।

लेकिन इन सभी मामलों में निर्णय के बाद भी मोटर दुर्घटना दावा न्यायाधिकरण गुजरात उच्च न्यायालय द्वारा इस तरह के एक महत्वपूर्ण फैसले को रिमांड कर सकता है, अब मैं आज इसके बारे में चर्चा करूंगा।

लेकीन अभी ईन सभी कीस्सेमे एवोर्ड होनेके बाद भी मोटर एकसीडन्ट कलेईम ट्रीब्युनल अपना दीया हुवा एवोर्ड फीरसे विचाराधीन करखे रीमान्ड कर शकता है एसा महत्व पूर्ण जजमेन्ट डो गुजरात हाईकोर्टने अभी अबी दीया ईसके बारेमें आजमें चर्चा करुंगा।

यदि दावेदार धोखाधड़ी करता है तो मोटर दुर्घटना दावा न्यायाधिकरण अपने ही आदेश वापस ले सकता है: गुजरात हाईकोर्ट

यदि दावेदार धोखाधड़ी करता है तो मोटर दुर्घटना दावा न्यायाधिकरण अपने ही आदेश वापस ले सकता है: गुजरात हाईकोर्ट

गुजरात हाईकोर्ट ने स्पष्ट किया कि जब मोटर दुर्घटना दावा न्यायाधिकरण ( Motor Accident Claims Tribunal) के समक्ष मामले में दावेदार पक्षकार ट्रिब्यूनल के साथ धोखाधड़ी करता है तो ट्रिब्यूनल को अपना आदेश वापस लेने का अधिकार है, जिसके द्वारा उसने राहत दी थी।

जस्टिस गीता गोपी ने कहा,

"पुनर्विचार आवेदन सीपीसी के आदेश 47(1) के तहत आने से बच जाएगा, क्योंकि यह रिकॉर्ड पर स्पष्ट त्रुटि है। अन्यथा, जैसा कि ड्राइवर और मालिक द्वारा धोखाधड़ी की गई तो ट्रिब्यूनल के पास अपने आदेश को वापस लेने की शक्ति है।"

बीमा कंपनी द्वारा वर्तमान आवेदन दायर किया गया था, जिसमें ट्रिब्यूनल के उस आदेश को चुनौती दी गई थी जिसमें उसकी पुनर्विचार याचिका को खारिज कर दिया गया था। इस याचिका में दावेदार के पक्ष में इस आधार पर अवार्ड वापस लेने की मांग की गई थी कि दावेदार का दुर्घटना की तारीख पर बीमा नहीं किया गया था और उसने जाली बीमा दस्तावेज बनाए थे।

हाईकोर्ट ने कहा कि ट्रिब्यूनल ने पुनर्विचार आवेदन को खारिज कर दिया, क्योंकि बीमा कंपनी ने दावा याचिका में अपना लिखित बयान भी दाखिल नहीं किया। इसके अलावा, विवादित दस्तावेज को मामले में साक्ष्य के रूप में पेश नहीं किया गया, इसलिए पुनर्विचार आवेदन खारिज कर दिया गया।

कोर्ट ने दावा न्यायाधिकरण को साक्ष्य के स्तर से दावा याचिका पर नए सिरे से विचार करने का निर्देश दिया।

अनीता बनाम रामबिलास मामले पर भरोसा करते हुए कहा गया:

"यदि यह साबित हो जाता है कि पक्षकार में से एक ने अदालत में धोखाधड़ी की है तो केवल सीपीसी की धारा 151 के तहत पुनर्विचार याचिका पर सुनवाई की जा सकती है।"

ऑर्डर डाउनलोड करने के लिए यहां क्लिक करें

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Transfer Orders Cannot Be Passed In Absence Of Vacancy, Must Show Place Of New Posting: Karnataka High Court

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The Karnataka High Court has directed the State government to ensure that if transfers are made after the period of general transfers, no request for transfers should be entertained or orders made unless there is a vacant place.

The Bench  observed,

"In the present case, none of the procedures are followed. Despite the observations by the Division Bench of this Court in M.Arun Prasad's case (supra) and also the Government, Circulars referred to above, time and again orders of transfer are being passed without showing places for posting."

"In the present case, as stated earlier, there was no vacant place while considering the representation of respondent No.6 to be transferred and posted in the place of the petitioner. It is also noticed that the case of respondent No.6 is on the basis of the letter of the Member of the Legislative Assembly. Nevertheless, the procedure requires to be followed."

Drawer Liable Even If Details Of Cheque Was Filled Up By Some Other Person; Handwriting Expert's Report Cannot Rebut Presumption U/s 139 NI Act: Supreme Court

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Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 138,139 - A drawer handing over a cheque signed by him is liable unless it is proved by adducing evidence at the trial that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability. The evidence of a hand-writing expert on whether the accused had filled in the details in the cheque would be immaterial to determining the purpose for which the cheque was handed over. Therefore, no purpose is served by allowing the application for adducing the evidence of the hand-writing expert - The presumption which arises on the signing of the cheque cannot be rebutted merely by the report of a hand-writing expert. Even if the details in the cheque have not been filled up by the drawer but by another person, this is not relevant to the defense whether the cheque was issued towards payment of a debt or in the discharge of a liability. 

The Supreme Court observed that a drawer of a cheque is liable even if the details in the cheque have been filled up not by the drawer, but by some other person.

The presumption which arises on the signing of the cheque cannot be rebutted merely by the report of a hand-writing expert, the bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and AS Bopanna observed.

Referring to Section 139 NI Act, the Apex Court bench noted that a drawer who signs a cheque and hands it over to the payee is presumed to be liable unless the drawer adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque has been issued towards payment of a debt or in the discharge of a liability.

"For such a determination, the fact that the details in the cheque have been filled up not by the drawer, but by some other person would be immaterial. The presumption which arises on the signing of the cheque cannot be rebutted merely by the report of a hand-writing expert. Even if the details in the cheque have not been filled up by drawer but by another person, this is not relevant to the defense whether cheque was issued towards payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability."