Twitter-SC refused to intervene

The Supreme Court refused to intervene in a plea seeking for directions to Twitter for removal of communal hashtags on the social media platform and directed the Petitioner to approach Telangana High Court instead. 



The petition, filed by Advocate Khaja Aijazuddin, avers that hashtags on Twitter, such as #IslamicCoronavirusJihad, #NizumuddinIdiots, #TablighiJamaatVirus and others, which are trending on the social media platform have the ability to insult the religion and may also disturb the communal harmony of the country. 



The Petitioner, being aggrieved by the nature of attaching the religion to the pandemic on Twitter, seeks for directions to put an end to the "illegal trending on the Social Network" and to restrain the sites from carrying messages which might hurt or insult the feelings of a particular community.



A Bench comprising of Chief Justice of India SA Bobde and Justice Aniruddha Bose heard the matter and directed the Petitioner to approach the Telangana High Court for proper adjudication of the issue involved. 



The Petitioner insisted that the Apex Court was equally empowered under the law to adjudicate the issue, however, the Bench did not agree with the submission. 

CJI Bobde remarked, 



"How can the Court stop this? You are saying that people are saying wrong things on Twitter. This is like saying that people are saying wrong things on phone. How can we direct MTNL?"



The Petitioner informed the Bench that he was merely seeking for directions to the platform to drop the hashtags which were inflammatory in nature. 

The Court refused to intervene in the matter and allowed the Petitioner to withdraw the plea with the liberty to approach the Telangana High Court.

SC Upholds The Constitutional Validity Of Rule Empowering RAW To Compulsorily Retire Officers

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Taking a strong exception to "improper handling" of the complaint of sexual harassment made by a former employee of the RAW, the Supreme Court on Friday directed the Union of India to pay "constitutional compensation" to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000/- for "impinging upon the Fundamental Rights of the Petitioner".

A bench of Justice AM Khanwilkar and Justice Dinesh Maheshwari noted that the Petitioner was subjected to "insensitive and undignified circumstances" by the organization which constituted an Internal Complaints Committee in accordance with the guidelines laid down in Vishaka and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others, after a delay of three months.

While the Committee concluded that the allegations of sexual harassment could not be proved, the court observed,

"In the present case, the petitioner had faced exceedingly insensitive and undignified circumstances due to improper handling of her complaint of sexual harassment. Regardless of the outcome of the inquiry into the stated complaint, the fundamental rights of the petitioner had clearly impinged. Taking an overall view of the circumstances, we consider this to be a fit case to award compensation to the petitioner for the stated violation of her right to life and dignity, quantified at Rs.1,00,000/-."

The Petitioner had made complaints of sexual harassment against her seniors, Ashok Chaturvedi, the then Secretary in charge of the organisation and Sunil Uke, the then joint secretary.

She had alleged that the charged officers subjected her to harassment by asking her to join the sex racket running inside the Organisation for securing quicker promotions and upon refusal to oblige, she was subjected to persecution.

The court noted that the Organisation responded to the allegations of sexual harassment after a gap of almost three months by constituting a Complaints Committee which did not consist of a "third party as a representative of an NGO or other body who is familiar with the issue of sexual harassment", as predicted by the guidelines given in Vishaka (supra).

Subsequently, the Committee was re­constituted with the addition of Dr. Tara Kartha, Director, National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), which ultimately submitted that the allegations of sexual harassment were not proven against Sunil Uke.

During this period, however, the court noted, there were glaring incidents of violation of the fundamental rights of the Petitioner, whose complaints of sexual harassment were met with "procedural ignorance" and "casual attitude" of her seniors in the department.

The bench observed that there were "unwarranted attacks" on the Petitioner's psychological status, clearly in violation of her right to life with dignity.

In these circumstances, the Court recalled,

"The approach of law as regards the cases of sexual harassment at workplace is not confined to cases of the actual commission of acts of harassment, but also covers situations wherein the woman employee is subjected to prejudice, hostility, discriminatory attitude and humiliation in day to day functioning at the workplace."

The bench observed that the scheme of the 2013 Act, Vishaka Guidelines, and Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) predicates that a "non-hostile" working environment is the basic limb of dignified employment.

The present case, the bench averred, is replete with a lack of sensitivity on the part of Secretary (R) qua the complaint of sexual harassment. "To wit, time is taken to process the stated complaint and improper constitution of the first Complaints Committee (intended or unintended) in violation of the Vishaka Guidelines, constitute an appalling conglomeration of undignified treatment and violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioner, more particularly Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution," it held.

The bench thus ordered the Union of India to compensate the Petitioner, for subjecting her to a hostile work environment, denying timely representation before a Complaints Committee, and violating her right to life with dignity.

"A priori, when inaction or procrastination (intentionally or otherwise) is meted out in response to the attempt of setting the legal machinery in motion, what is put to peril is not just the individual cries for the assistance of law but also the foundational tenets of a society governed by the rule of law, thereby threatening the larger public interests. The denial of timely inquiry and by a competent forum inevitably results in denial of justice and violation of fundamental right," the court held.

However, the Bench has upheld the RAW's order of compulsory retirement passed against the appellant/petitioner.

In this case, the bench was also confronted to decide the Constitutional validity of Rule 135 of the RAW (Recruitment, Cadre and Services) Rules, 1975, which gives power to the Central government to voluntary retire RAW Officers whose identity is exposed or compromised.

While upholding the same, the bench remarked, "Exposure of an intelligence officer could be hazardous not only for the Organisation but also for the officer concerned."

Notice Sent Under Certificate Of Posting Is Sufficient Where Mode Of Giving Notice Is Not Mentioned : SC

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The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that Notice sent under Certificate of Posting is sufficient, where the mode of service is not mentioned.

A bench comprising Justices R Banumathi and Vineet Saran was considering the issue whether a landlord had served proper notice to the tenant for the vacation of premises in accordance with Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent, and Eviction) Act, 1972.

The Court noted that the section does not provide for a particular mode of service.

"From the perusal of the aforesaid Proviso to the said Section, it is clear that no particular mode of giving notice by the landlord to the tenant has been provided for, meaning thereby that the same could be given orally or in writing; and if in writing, it is not necessary that it should be sent only by registered post. What is required is that "the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant"

The HC had set aside the release application granted in favour of the landlord on the primary finding that there was no proof of service of notice to the tenant.

In this regard, the SC observed :

"It may be so that mere receipt of notice having been sent under certificate of posting, in itself, may not be sufficient proof of service, but if the same is coupled with other facts and circumstances which go to show that the party had notice, the same could be held to be sufficient service on the party".

This observation was first made by the top court in Sumitra Devi v. Sampuran Singh, (2011) 3 SCC 556. There the Supreme Court had held that notice sent under certificate of posting is sufficient service, and the same may be determined from a case to case basis.

The bench also referred to the decision in in the case of V.S. Krishnan vs. Westfort Hi­Tech Hospitals (2008) 3 SCC 363, which held that service of notice sent under certificate of posting would be sufficient where "there are materials to show that notices were sent, the burden is on the addressee to rebut the statutory presumption

The decision in Ranju vs. Rekha Ghosh (2007) 14 SCC 81 was also referred, which had held that that service of notice sent under certificate of posting was sufficient where the mode of service was not mentioned.

In the present case, the top court was again faced with the issue of proof of service of notice. A bench of Justice R. Banumathi and Justice Vineet Saran was hearing an appeal filed by a landlord, challenging the order of the Allahabad High Court whereby the release application filed by him had been rejected.

In the backdrop, the Appellant-landlord had bought a shop, already in occupation of the Respondent-tenant. Seeking vacation of the same, the Appellant had approached the Prescribed Authority, Lucknow which allowed the release application while observing that the Appellant had complied with Section 21(1)(a) of the Rent Control Act inasmuch as:

(i) release application was filed after the expiry of three years of Sale Deed obtained by the Appellant;

(ii) Appellant had given six months prior notice to the Respondent-tenant.

On the contrary, the High Court held that six months prior notice was not given to the Respondent-tenant, while hearing the appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority.

Thus, the issue in dispute before the Supreme Court was proof of service of notice.

Findings

The Supreme Court firstly observed that Section 21 of the Rent Control Act does not prescribe any particular mode of giving notice to the tenant.

"From the perusal of the aforesaid Proviso to the said Section, it is clear that no particular mode of giving notice by the landlord to the tenant has been provided for, meaning thereby that the same could be given orally or in writing; and if in writing, it is not necessary that it should be sent only by registered post. What is required is that "the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant," it observed.

The bench then noted, in terms of the judgment in Sumitra Devi (supra) that Notice sent under Certificate of Posting is sufficient proof of service, and the same depends on the facts of each case.

On an assessment of the facts of the present case, the court noted that Appellant had filed the copy of receipt dated 25.07.2006 of having sent the notice under certificate of posting; whereas, in the year 2007, the Respondent-tenant admitted that the Appellant was his landlord and thereafter filed an application to deposit rent in Court in the year 2007.

On the basis of the chain of events as illustrated above, the court held that the Respondent-tenant "had notice" of the proceedings.

"It may be so that mere receipt of notice having been sent under certificate of posting, in itself, may not be sufficient proof of service, but if the same is coupled with other facts and circumstances which go to show that the party had notice, the same could be held to be sufficient service on the party. In the present case, the law permits the filing of a document (a receipt of under certificate of posting in this case) to be filed along with an affidavit, which has been done so in this case. Further, there was a clear admission of the respondent (tenant) that the appellant was his landlord (for which sale deed had been supplied to the tenant) and subsequent act of the respondent (tenant) depositing the rent under Section 30(1) of the Rent Control Act in the Court and other attending circumstances, as has been considered by the Prescribed Authority, would all clearly go to show that there was sufficient proof of service of notice, which finding of fact has been affirmed by the Appellate Authority, and we see no reason for the Writ Court to have unsettled such concurrent findings of fact," the bench thus held.

Lastly, the court noted that the Appellant faced "comparative hardship" and thus, he was entitled to get the premises vacated.

"The judgment of the Writ Court is set aside and the release application of the appellant (landlord), which was allowed by the Prescribed Authority, and affirmed by the Appellate Authority, stands affirmed. The respondent (tenant) is directed to vacate the premises in question and hand over possession to the appellant (landlord) within six months from today," the Court directed.

No Construction Allowed In Plots Left For Open Spaces/Gardens In Approved Layout Plans : SC

The Supreme Court has held that open spaces left for garden areas in approved building layout plans cannot be allowed for construction. A bench comprising Justices Mohan M Shantanagoudar and R Subhash Reddy held

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