Friday, August 31, 2018

New vehicle owners have to buy long-term cover

New vehicle owners have to buy long-term cover

From September, buyers of new cars and two-wheelers must purchase upfront insurance cover for at least three and five years, respectively. Long-term premium payments would proportionately raise the initial outgo on new vehicles, but save consumers the trouble of yearly renewals. 

As the practice of annual premium payments gets a quiet burial, the initial insurance cover on a new private car exceeding 1500 cc will be at least Rs 24,305, up from abase of Rs 7,890 now. For bikes with an engine capacity beyond 350 cc, the buyer must pay Rs 13,024 against Rs 2,323 currently. Insurance premiums can vary across models. 
On July 20, the Supreme Court ordered that third-party insurance cover for new cars be for a period of three years, and five years for two-wheelers. The order would apply to all policies sold from September 1. The SC directed insurers to offer long-term, third-party covers because of lower penetration, although insurance is mandatory for all road-worthy vehicles. 

‘MOVE TO HELP IMPROVE PENETRATION’ 
As vehicles age and depreciation accelerates, many owners either tend to skip annual renewals, or buy policies that do not cover risk totally. “This initiative goes toward improving penetration in the overall sector and more vehicles are going to be covered,” said Sanjay Datta, head of underwriting, ICICI Lombard General Insurance. “The question of uninsured vs insured will go away. The extent of insurance cover on third-party vehicles will be bigger and better.” 

Murder suspect jailed for refusing to give FB password

Murder suspect jailed for refusing to give FB password:

The man suspected of murdering a schoolgirl has been jailed for refusing to provide his Facebook password to police investigating her death. Investigators had hoped to read through his private messages to see if he had sent any messages to the girl before her murder. But he refused to give up his password and has now been convicted. Stephen Nicholson pleaded guilty to the charge under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, during an appearance through a video-link at Southampton Crown Court on 31th August.

Galpha pharmaceutical company accused of trademark infringement to shell out Rs 1.5 crore as legal costs

The Bombay high court ordered a pharmaceutical company accused of trademark infringement to shell out Rs 1.5 crore as legal costs, which must be donated to the Kerala Chief Minister's Distress Relief Fund.


“Considering the catastrophe that has hit Kerala recently and the fact that the flood situation is a ‘disaster of a serious nature’ which has been categorized as L3 level of disaster by the National Disaster Management Guidelines, the (company) should pay costs of Rs 1.5 crore as a donation to the Kerala Chief Minister Distress Relief Fund,” said Justice Shahrukh Kanthawalla. The court was hearing a petition filed by Glenmark Pharmaceuticals against Galpha Laboratories for infringing their trademark.
Galpha was accused of copying the artwork, colour scheme, font style, a manner of writing and trade dress that refers to the visual appearance of one of Glenmark’s products.
“It is clear that Galpha is not only indulging in infringing activities by repeatedly copying brands of other companies but also appears to be in complete violation of the FDA regulations,” said the judge, adding that the company seemed to be a habitual offender. "Drugs are not sweets. Pharmaceutical companies which provide medicines for the health of the consumers have a special duty of care towards them. These companies, in fact, have a greater responsibility towards the general public. However, nowadays, the corporate and financial goals of such companies cloud the decisions of its executives whose decisions are incentivized by profits, more often than not, at the cost of public health. This case is a perfect example of just that,” the judge said.

Ex-GU VC Parimal Trivedi acquitted in atrocity case

A special court on Friday acquitted former Gujarat University vice-chancellor Parimal Trivedi by granting him the benefit of the doubt in a decade-old atrocity case, in which he was accused of using casteist abuse against a lecturer.
Additional district judge B J Somani acquitted Trivedi after the prosecution examined 18 witnesses. The hearing in the case was expedited after Gujarat high court pulled up the trial court for the delay in completing the trial on a complaint made by the accused.
A history lecturer at GLS College Pankaj Shrimali filed a complaint against Trivedi on May 3, 2008. Shrimali and Trivedi allegedly had a tiff over an administrative issue. Trivedi was booked under the Atrocities Act by University police. The HC protected him from arrest initially. Police twice sought to close the case by filing summary reports, but courts rejected them on both occasions. Ultimately, Trivedi was arrested and released on bail the same day in 2012.
The trial against Trivedi began in 2012. The high court shifted the case from the city sessions court to another court in the Mirzapur rural court campus, over complaints against the judicial officer. Final arguments concluded on Thursday and the court pronounced its verdict on Friday, as the HC had set an August 31 a deadline for the trial.

SC clears Priya, says wink not blasphemous

The SC quashed the FIR against actor Priya Prakash Varrier on Friday for her wink in the song “Manikya Malaraya Poovi” from the Malayalam film “Oru Adaar Love”, and said a wink could never be “blasphemous” for Islam or any religion.

Monday, August 27, 2018

Girl does a U-turn in Supreme Court: 'Prefer parents to husband'

An unusual love story, in which a Muslim man converted to 
Hinduism to marry a  Hinduwoman, came unstuck with the woman telling the Supreme Court on Monday that though she had indeed married of her own will, she now preferred to stay with her parents.
The 33-year-old Muslim man converted to Hinduism and assumed the name Aryan Arya to marry a 23-year-old Hindu ‘Jain’ woman in Raipur in February. He knocked the SC’s doors on August 17 with a habeas corpus petition alleging the woman’s parents and a Hindu group were forcibly separating them. A bench of Chief Justice Dipak Misraand Justices A MKhanwilkar and D Y Chandrachud had taken note of Arya’s counsel Nikhil Nayyar’s allegations and ordered the superintendent of police, Dhamtari, to produce the woman in court on August 27.
Before the judges could interact with her, state advocate general Jugal Kishore Gilda said it was a sham marriage as the man had been divorced twice and had concealed it. The CJI brushed this aside.
The woman repeatedly told the bench that though she had married the man, she would prefer to stay with her parents. She told the bench she was not under parental pressure. 
The bench told Nayyar though she admitted to the marriage, she did not want to go with the man. Nayyar pleaded the woman was under psychological pressure from her parents and was not speaking from her free will.
But the bench said, “She is an adult and must be allowed to exercise her free will. If she does not want to go with her husband, then it becomes a matrimonial case, which can be adjudicated by an appropriate court.”

UK wife killer to be repatriated to India

An Indian man currently serving a jail term in the UK for murdering his wife will be repatriated to India, a top prison official has told BBC Punjabi.
Harpreet Aulakh was sentenced to a minimum of 28 years in a UK prison in December 2010 for ordering the murder of Geeta Aulakh.
Mother-of-two Ms Aulakh, 28, had her hand severed with a machete during the attack in Greenford, London, in 2009.
Aulakh ordered the murder after she asked for a divorce. 
IPS Sahota, a top prison official in the northern Indian state of Punjab, told BBC Punjabi's Arvind Chhabra that Aulakh would arrive in India on Tuesday and would be sent to a prison in Amritsar district. 
"All arrangements are in place. According to the plan, the UK authorities will bring him to Delhi from where a team of Punjab police officers will bring him to Amritsar," Mr Sahota said.

Flat owner can’t recover house repair cost from society

A flat owner cannot recover cost of repairs to his flat from the society, Bombay high court has said. Justice Ramesh Dhanuka struck down a 16-year-old order passed by the secretary, cooperating department of the state and the deputy registrar, cooperative societies directing Maitri Park housing society in Chembur to reimburse repair costs incurred by the member. The society had claimed that it was not liable to reimburse the costs of repairs to the terrace and the flat.



"It is the case of the society that the member has not only claimed for the repairs to the terrace and other structures but has also got his flat repaired... In my view, such demand by the member for repairs allegedly carried out in his flat from the society even otherwise was totally untenable," said the judge.
The Court said registrar could only decide on administrative issues like maintenance of accounts and not disputes between parties. The judge pointed out that the provisions under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, the registrar is empowered to look into issues relating to the maintenance of accounts, filing of returns, but had nothing to do with the "obligations of the society to carry out repairs in respect of the tenements occupied by the members."
The society set up in the 1960s, comprised of 32 buildings of ground plus one storey and 12 buildings of ground plus two to four storeys. In the ground plus one storey structures, the lower floor flats had exclusive access to individual gardens while the first floor flats had exclusive use of their respective terrace. In 2000, the society passed a resolution refunding the amount collected towards repair funds to its members. The flat owners on the ground floor and first floor were responsible for maintaining and carrying out repairs for their respective gardens and terraces.
The dispute was raised by a member on the first floor asking the society to carry out repairs to the terrace. The deputy registrar in 2002 ordered the society to carry out repairs. Subsequently, it appointed the member itself as an agent of the registrar authorising him to carry out repairs. The member carried out repairs and submitted a bill of around Rs 1,82,000. The society said that following the 2002 resolution and refunding of the repair fund, it was not liable to carry out repairs.
The HC agreed and struck down the orders of the deputy registrar which was subsequently upheld by the secretary.

Sunday, August 26, 2018

Suspension Must Necessarily Be For A Short Duration: SC Upholds Revocation Of 6-Yr Long Suspension Of IPS Officer

This Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 291 has frowned upon the practice of protracted suspension and held that suspension must necessarily be for a short duration.’
Reiterating that suspension must necessarily be for a short duration, the Supreme Court has upheld a Madras High Court judgment that had quashed the disciplinary proceedings against an Inspector General of Police in Tamil Nadu and revoked the suspension.
Pramod Kumar IPS was accused of abusing his official position as Inspector General of Police in extorting money from the directors of a financial institution who had allegedly cheated a large number of depositors to the tune of Rs 1,210 crores. As the IPS officer was arrayed as an accused in the said crime and was arrested and was detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours, he was suspended from service. Pursuant to this, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him.
The officer challenged the disciplinary proceedings before the administrative tribunal, which though refused to interfere in the matter, revoked the suspension by holding that there was no material to indicate that he had tampered with the evidence or influenced the witnesses. The high court upheld the revocation of suspension and also quashed the disciplinary proceedings against him.
Before the apex court (State of Tamil Nadu vs. Pramod Kumar IPS), Senior Advocate V Giri appeared for the state and contended that the high court erred in quashing the charge memo on the ground that it was not approved by the disciplinary authority. He further submitted that the apex court judgment in Union of India vs. BV Gopinath was not correctly decided and that the approval of the disciplinary authority at the initial stage and the stage of initiation of the disciplinary proceedings is sufficient and there is no need for an approval of the charge memo by the disciplinary authority as held in the above judgment.
On the other hand, Senior Advocate P Chidambaram contended on behalf of the officer that the issue pertaining to the approval of the disciplinary authority at the stage of issuance of a charge memo is no more res integra.
In BV Gopinath, it was held that if any authority other than the disciplinary authority is permitted to draw the charge memo, the same would result in destroying the underlying protection guaranteed under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India.
Rejecting the senior counsel’s contentions, the bench of Justice SA Bobde and Justice L Nageswara Rao observed: “We see no reason to take a view different from the one taken by this Court in B.V.Gopinath (supra). We also see no substance in the submission made by the Senior Counsel for the State that the said judgment needs reconsideration. Assuming that Mr.Giri is right in his submission that the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and issuance of charge memo are at the same stage, the mandatory requirement of Rule 8 which provides for the charge memo to be drawn by the disciplinary authority cannot be ignored. We reject the submission on behalf of the Appellant that Gopinath’s case can be distinguished on facts. We are not in agreement with the contention of the Appellant that the business rules and standing orders of the State of Tamil Nadu are quite different from the office orders and circulars issued by Union of India which formed the basis of the judgment in Gopinath’s case. A close reading of the said judgment would disclose that reliance on the office note was only in addition to the interpretation of the Rule.”
The bench upheld the high court order quashing the charge memo, and observed that in this case mandatory requirement of Rule 8 (4) and the charge memo being drawn up or cause to be drawn up by the disciplinary authority was not complied with. However, it gave liberty to the disciplinary authority to issue a charge memo afresh after taking approval from the disciplinary authority.
On the question of suspension continuing for six years, the bench observed: “There cannot be any dispute regarding the power or jurisdiction of the State Government for continuing the first Respondent under suspension pending criminal trial. There is no doubt that the allegations made against the first Respondent are serious in nature. However, the point is whether the continued suspension of the first Respondent for a prolonged period is justified.”
The bench noted that, while releasing the officer on bail, liberty was given to the investigating agency to approach the court in case he indulged in tampering with the evidence and  no complaint has been made by the CBI in that regard. It also observed that it is only on the basis of the minutes of the review committee meeting, that the Principal Secretary, Home (SC) Department ordered extension of the period of suspension.
Upholding the high court judgment, the bench said: “This Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 291 has frowned upon the practice of protracted suspension and held that suspension must necessarily be for a short duration. On the basis of the material on record, we are convinced that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the first Respondent under suspension any longer and that his reinstatement would not be a threat to a fair trial. We reiterate the observation of the High Court that the Appellant State has the liberty to appoint the first Respondent in a non sensitive post.”

Thursday, August 23, 2018

SC slams wife beating, says not accepted social norm

While a sessions court in Karnataka thought that “one or two beatings is not the kind of cruelty that could drive a woman to commit suicide”, the Supreme Court on Thursday deprecated all kinds of “insensitivity” shown by people as well as judges towards crimes against women.
Appealing for no-tolerance towards any sort of physical violence on women, the apex court said that “mindset” of people, including that of the judges, must change to make sure that the protection granted to women by the Constitution and other laws are proved “meaningful”.
In a judgment, a Bench led by Justice Aftab Alam reprimanded the trial court judge for making certain observations that suggested that “giving one or two beating was not cruelty to drive the deceased to commit suicide”.
The trial court had acquitted the man of the penal charges after noting that there was no concrete evidence to suggest his actions forced his wife to end life in 2002. The Karnataka HC however sent the man to jail for five years for abetting her suicide.
Expressing “anguish” over the insensitivity shown by sessions judge, the Bench said, “The tenor of the judgment suggests that wife beating is a normal facet of married life. Does that mean giving one or two slaps to a wife by a husband just does not matter? We do not think that that can be a right approach. It is one thing to say that every wear and tear of married life need not lead to suicide and it is another thing to put it so crudely and suggest that one or two assaults on a woman is an accepted social norm,” said the court.
The Bench upheld the five-year jail term for the accused.

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Higher Education Loan and subsidy scheme

Kids born to EU nationals turned down for passports

MORE than 1,000 children born in the UK to parents from eight EU countries have been refused British passport renewals after a Home Office ‘error’.
Families were not asked for full documentation when they initially applied for and received passports, according to the BBC.
Now when they apply for a renewal, the applications are being rejected as the families are unable to provide the old paperwork.
The Home Office said the error in guidance made in 2008 was corrected in 2014 and it ‘regrets any inconvenience or delay that this has caused’. 
It added it would assist the ones who are affected to get citizenship.
Those involved are the children of nationals from the eight countries that joined the EU in 2004, including Poland and the Czech Republic. 
They are automatically born a British citizen if one or both parents have the status of a resident at the time of their birth. The Home Office said that in some cases officials failed to check the required residency paperwork, most commonly the Workers Scheme Registration (WRS) certificate.
As such they refuse to renew the passports unless documents are provided. The WRS was scrapped in 2011.
Piotr Lugowski, who has been working in the UK for 13 years, said the Home Office rejected an application to renew his eight-year-old son’s passport. ‘I feel they want to make us not welcome here anymore.

Wednesday, August 22, 2018

How To Break The Employment Agreement ?

How To Break The Employment Agreement ?

As an employer or an employee, you have specific obligations to uphold your employment contract. Even if the contract is verbally implied, both employer and employee are bound by that contract. It can be difficult to get out of an employment contract, but there are ways it can be legally done, which saves you from facing a potential lawsuit for breaching the contract.
No, employment bond is not enforceable.
Many people think it is contract and parties are abide by it. But section 27 of indian contract act 1872 says something different.
Employment bonds are employment agreements with negative covenant. Under the Indian Law, the employment agreements with negative covenants is valid and legally enforceable if the parties agree with their free consent i.e. without fraud, coercion, undue influence, mistake and misrepresentation. The Indian courts have held that in the event of a breach of contract by the employee, the employer shall be entitled to recover damages only if a considerable amount of expenditure was borne by the employer. Indian law mandates the employment bonds to be “reasonable” in order to be valid. The term reasonable remains undefined anywhere in the Indian law and therefore the courts have given meaning to “reasonable” depending upon the facts and circumstances of the cases. The proposition which has emerged till now is that conditions stipulated in the contract should be necessary to protect the interest of the employer and compensate the loss caused by breach of contract. Additionally, the penalty or compulsory employment period stipulated should not exorbitant.

How to Challenge the enforceability of Employment Bond?
The validity of Employment bonds can be challenged on the basis of Section27 of the Indian Contract Act. Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 prohibits any agreement in restraint of trade and profession. Any agreement in trade and profession according to Section 27 is void.

As per the Section 27, any terms and conditions of an agreement which directly or indirectly compels the employee to serve the employer or puts a restriction on them joining the competitor or other employer is not valid under the Indian law, The employee has right to resign from the employment even if he has agreed in the employment bond to serve the employer for a specific period of time.
For an employment bond to be valid under Indian law, it has to be proved that it is necessary for the freedom of trade. In the case where the employer is able to prove that the employee is joining the competitor to disclose the trade secret then the court may issue an injunction order restricting the employee from joining the competitor. If an agreement is challenged on the grounds of violating the provision relating to restraint of trade, the onus is on the party supporting the contract to show that restraint is reasonably necessary to protect his interests.

Following are the requirements of a valid employment bond agreement.
  1. The agreement must be signed by the parties with free consent.
  2. The conditions stipulated must be reasonable and:
  • The conditions imposed on the employee must be proved to be necessary to safeguard the interest of the employer.
  1. The employment bond is to be executed on a stamp paper of appropriate value in order to be valid and enforceable.

Remedies Available to Employer and Employee
If an employment bond is breached, the employer might be entitled to compensation. The compensation awarded should be reasonable to compensate the loss and should not exceed the penalty, if any stipulated in the contract. The court computes the reasonable compensation amount by computing the actual loss incurred by the employer having regard to all facts and circumstances of the case. Even if the bond stipulates payment of any penalty amount in the event of breach, it does not mean that the employer shall be entitled to receive the stipulated amount in full; the courts shall determine the reasonable amount of compensation to be paid. One interesting question arises, whether the employers are entitled to seek for reinstatement of their employee or obtain restraining order against the employee from joining any competitor or another employer? The Supreme Court while dealing with a similar situation has held that specific performance action cannot be sought for breach of contract of personal service or bond and therefore employer shall not be entitled for reinstatement of their employees as relief in the event of breach of bond. We have witnessed the trend that courts are not willing to grant an injunction against the employees restricting their employment with another employer unless it is necessary for the protection of proprietary interests or trade secrets of the employer.
The court considers the actual expenses incurred by the employer, the period of service by the employee, the conditions stipulated in the contract to determine the loss incurred by the employer to arrive at reasonable compensation amount.

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Thursday, August 16, 2018

K.V. prakash Babu V.s State of Karnataka 22 November 2016

Supreme Court of India

K.V. Prakash Babu vs State Of Karnataka on 22 November, 2016
Bench: Dipak Misra, Amitava Roy

Dipak Misra, J.
Leave granted.
2. The instant appeals reveal a factual score that has the potentiality to shock a sensitive mind and a sincere heart, for the materials brought on record show how “suspicion” can corrode the rational perception of value of life and cloud the thought of a wife to such an extent, that would persuade her to commit suicide which entail more deaths, that is, of the alleged paramour, her mother and brother who being not able to emotionally cope up with the social humiliation, extinguish their life-spark; and ultimately the situation ropes in the husband to face the charge for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) read with Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (‘1961 Act’ for short). As the facts would unveil, the husband gets acquitted for the offence under Section 302 IPC but convicted in respect of other two charges by the trial court. In appeal, his conviction under  Section 3 of the 1961 Act is annulled but success does not come in his way as regards the offence underSection 498-A IPC. And the misery does not end there since in the appeal preferred by the State, he is found guilty of the offence under Section 306 IPC and sentenced to suffer four years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.50,000/- to be given to the father of the victim with a default clause.
3. In the course of our adumbration and analysis of facts, it will be uncurtained how the seed of suspicion grows enormously and the rumours can bring social dishonor and constrain not-so-thick skinned people who have bound themselves to limitless sorrow by thinking ‘it is best gift of God to man” and choose to walk on the path of deliberate death. A sad incident, and a shocking narrative, but we must say, even at the beginning, the appellant-husband has to be acquitted regard being had to the evidence brought on record and the exposition of law in the field.
4. The singular issue, as the aforesaid passage would show, that arises for consideration in these appeals, by special leave, that assails the judgment and order dated 13.04.2016 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Criminal Appeal No. 655 of 2012 whereby the High Court has allowed the appeal preferred by the State which had called in question the legal acceptability of the judgment and order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-III, District Kolar, Karnataka, who vide judgment dated 5.1.2012 had found the appellant guilty of the offences punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and  Section 3 of the 1961 Act and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment of one year and two years respectively with the default clause. It is apt to note here that the appellant had also preferred Criminal Appeal No. 126 of 2012 wherein the High Court while passing the common judgment has opined that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the conviction under the 1961 Act. However, as stated earlier, it found the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 306IPC and the result of such conviction was imposition of four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) with the further stipulation that Rs.45,000/- (Rupees forty five thousand only) be paid to the father of the deceased.
5. The occurrence that led to launching of prosecution is that the marriage between the appellant and the deceased, Anjanamma, was solemenised on 12.10.1997. The appellant, as alleged, got involved with one Deepa, daughter of one Ashwathamma inasmuch as his visit to the house of Ashwathamma was quite frequent. As the prosecution story proceeds, the deceased felt extremely hurt and eventually being unable to withstand the conduct of the husband who was allegedly involved in an extra-marital affair, put an end to her life on 20th August, 2004. An FIR was lodged at the concerned police station by the father of the deceased, which set the criminal law in motion and the investigating officer recorded statement of witnesses under Section 161 of the IPC and after completing the investigation, placed the charge sheet under Sections 201302and 498-A of the IPC and Section 3 of the 1961 Act before the concerned Magistrate who, in turn, committed the matter to the Court of Session. The accused abjured his guilt and expressed his intention to face trial, advancing the plea of denial and false implication. In order to establish the charges, the prosecution examined 31 witnesses in all. The defence chose not to adduce any evidence. The main witnesses are father of the deceased, PW-1 and the neighbours who have deposed about the extra- marital affair of the husband and the death of the deceased.
6. As we have already stated about the conviction and the punishment, the same need not be stated in detail. There is no dispute that the learned trial judge as well as the High Court has not found the appellant guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The High Court has also arrived at the conclusion after detailed deliberation that the prosecution has not been able to establish the offence under  Section 3 of the 1961 Act. However, it has found the appellant guilty of the offence under Sections 498-A and 306 of the IPC.
7. It is submitted by Mr. S.R. Singh, learned senior counsel that the High Court has completely erred in appreciating the evidence to sustain the conviction under Section 498-Ainasmuch as there is no material whatsoever with regard to demand of dowry or any kind of torture. According to Mr. Singh, the High Court has applied the second limb of Section 498-A IPC on the foundation that the involvement of the husband in extra-marital affair established cruelty under the said provision and, therefore, it would be an offence under  Section 306 of the IPC which is contrary to the pronouncements of this Court.
8. Mr. V.N. Raghupathy, learned counsel appearing for the State had supported the judgment and order passed by the High Court by placing reliance on the analysis of the various facets and the scrutiny and scanning of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses including that of the father, the neighbours and the investigating officer.
9. To appreciate the submissions raised at the Bar, we have bestowed our anxious consideration and carefully examined the decision rendered by the trial court and that of the High Court. On a studied scrutiny of the evidence, it is demonstratable that the father of the deceased in his deposition has not stated anything with regard to any kind of cruelty meted out to the deceased except stating that she quite often complained to the parents about the visit of the appellant to the house of Ashwathamma and that she had suspicion against her husband that he was going to have a second marriage. The other witnesses including the investigating officer have deposed that there was discussion in the locality about the illicit connection of the appellant with one lady at Chelur Village. Barring the aforesaid, there is no whisper with regard to any kind of ill-treatment or cruel behaviour by the husband.
10. In view of the aforesaid evidence, the question that emerges for consideration is whether the conviction under Section 498A and  306 IPC is legally justiciable in this context. We think it appropriate to refer to Section 498A of the IPC. The said provision reads as follows:- “498-A. HUSBAND OR RELATIVE OF HUSBAND OF A WOMAN SUBJECTING HER TO CRUELTY:
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation: For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" means
(a) Any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman;
or
(b) Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand”
11. The said provision came up for consideration in  Giridhar Shankar Tawade vs. State of Maharashtra[1], where the Court dwelling upon the scope and purport of Section 498-A IPC has held thus:-
“The basic purport of the statutory provision is to avoid 'cruelty' which stands defined by attributing a specific statutory meaning attached thereto as noticed herein before. Two specific instances have been taken note of in order to ascribe a meaning to the word 'cruelty' as is expressed by the legislatures : Whereas explanation (a) involves three specific situations viz., (i) to drive the woman to commit suicide or (ii) to cause grave injury or (iii) danger to life, limb or health, both mental and physical, and thus involving a physical torture or atrocity, in explanation (b) there is absence of physical injury but the legislature thought it fit to include only coercive harassment which obviously as the legislative intent expressed is equally heinous to match the physical injury : whereas one is patent, the other one is latent but equally serious in terms of the provisions of the statute since the same would also embrance the attributes of 'cruelty' in terms of Section 498-A.” [emphasis added]
12.  In Gurnaib Singh v. State of Punjab[2], while dwelling upon the concept of ‘cruelty’ enshrined under Section 498-Athe Court has opined thus:-
“Clause (a) of the Explanation to the aforesaid provision defines “cruelty” to mean “any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide”. Clause (b) of the Explanation pertains to unlawful demand. Clause (a) can take in its ambit mental cruelty.”
13. The aforesaid analysis of the provision clearly spells how coercive harassment can have the attributes of cruelty that would meet the criterion as conceived of under Section 498-A of the IPC. Thus, the emphasis is on any wilful conduct which is of such a nature that is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide. The mental cruelty which is engraved in the first limb of Section 498-A of the IPC has nothing to do with the demand of dowry. It is associated with mental cruelty that can drive a woman to commit suicide and dependent upon the conduct of the person concerned.
14. In this regard, Mr. Singh has drawn our attention to the authority in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat[3]. In the said case, the Court was dealing with as to whether relationship between the appellant and the second accused therein was extra-marital leading to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC and whether that would amount to abetment leading to the act of suicide within the meaning of  Section 306 IPC. Dealing with the extra-marital relationship, the Court has opined that marital relationship means the legally protected marital interest of one spouse to another which include marital obligation to another like companionship, living under the same roof, sexual relation and the exclusive enjoyment of them, to have children, their up-bringing, services in the home, support, affection, love, liking and so on, but extra-marital relationship as such is not defined in the IPC. The Court analyzing further in the context of Section 498A observed that the mere fact that the husband has developed some intimacy with another woman, during the subsistence of marriage and failed to discharge his marital obligations, as such would not amount to “cruelty”, but it must be of such a nature as is likely to drive the spouse to commit suicide to fall within the explanation to Section 498A IPC. The Court further elucidated that harassment need not be in the form of physical assault and even mental harassment also would come within the purview of Section 498A IPC. Mental cruelty, of course, varies from person to person, depending upon the intensity and the degree of endurance, some may meet with courage and some others suffer in silence, to some it may be unbearable and a weak person may think of ending one’s life. The Court ruled that in the facts of the said case the alleged extra-marital relationship was not of such a nature as to drive the wife to commit suicide. The two-Judge Bench further opined that:- “Section 306refers to abetment of suicide which says that if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine. The action for committing suicide is also on account of mental disturbance caused by mental and physical cruelty. To constitute an offence under Section 306, the prosecution has to establish that a person has committed suicide and the suicide was abetted by the accused. The Prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased committed suicide and the accused abetted the commission of suicide. But for the alleged extra marital relationship, which if proved, could be illegal and immoral, nothing has been brought out by the prosecution to show that the accused had provoked, incited or induced the wife to commit suicide.” [emphasis added]
15. Slightly recently in  Ghusabhai Raisangbhai Chorasiya v. State of Gujarat[4], the Court perusing the material on record opined that even if the illicit relationship is proven, unless some other acceptable evidence is brought on record to establish such high degree of mental cruelty the explanation (a) to Section 498-A of the IPC which includes cruelty to drive the woman to commit suicide, would not be attracted. The relevant passage from the said authority is reproduced below:-
“True it is, there is some evidence about the illicit relationship and even if the same is proven, we are of the considered opinion that cruelty, as envisaged under the first limb of Section 498A IPC would not get attracted. It would be difficult to hold that the mental cruelty was of such a degree that it would drive the wife to commit suicide. Mere extra-marital relationship, even if proved, would be illegal and immoral, as has been said in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal (supra), but it would take a different character if the prosecution brings some evidence on record to show that the accused had conducted in such a manner to drive the wife to commit suicide. In the instant case, the accused may have been involved in an illicit relationship with the appellant no.4, but in the absence of some other acceptable evidence on record that can establish such high degree of mental cruelty, the Explanation to Section 498-A which includes cruelty to drive a woman to commit suicide, would not be attracted.”
16. The concept of mental cruelty depends upon the milieu and the strata from which the persons come from and definitely has an individualistic perception regard being had to one’s endurance and sensitivity. It is difficult to generalize but certainly it can be appreciated in a set of established facts. Extra-marital relationship, per se, or as such would not come within the ambit of Section 498-AIPC. It would be an illegal or immoral act, but other ingredients are to be brought home so that it would constitute a criminal offence. There is no denial of the fact that the cruelty need not be physical but a mental torture or abnormal behaviour that amounts to cruelty or harassment in a given case. It will depend upon the facts of the said case. To explicate, solely because the husband is involved in an extra-marital relationship and there is some suspicion in the mind of wife, that cannot be regarded as mental cruelty which would attract mental cruelty for satisfying the ingredients of Section 306 IPC.
17. We are absolutely conscious about the presumption engrafted under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. The said provision enables the Court to draw presumption in a particular fact situation when necessary ingredients in order to attract the provision are established. In this regard, we may reproduce a passage from Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal (supra):-
“Criminal law amendment and the rule of procedure was necessitated so as to meet the social challenge of saving the married woman from being ill- treated or forcing to commit suicide by the husband or his relatives, demanding dowry. Legislative mandate of the section is that when a woman commits suicide within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty as per the terms defined in Section 498-A IPC, the court may presume having regard to all other circumstances of the case that such suicide has been abetted by the husband or such person. Though a presumption could be drawn, the burden of proof of showing that such an offence has been committed by the accused under Section 498-A IPC is on the prosecution.” We have reproduced the aforesaid passage only to highlight that the Court can take aid of the principles of the statutory presumption.
18. In the instant case, as the evidence would limpidly show, the wife developed a sense of suspicion that her husband was going to the house of Ashwathamma in Village Chelur where he got involved with Deepa, the daughter of Ashwathamma. It has come on record through various witnesses that the people talked in the locality with regard to the involvement of the appellant with Deepa. It needs to be noted that Deepa, being not able to digest the humiliation, committed suicide. The mother and the brother of Deepa paved the same path. In such a situation, it is extremely difficult to hold that the prosecution has established the charge under  Section 498A and the fact that the said cruelty induced the wife to commit suicide. It is manifest that the wife was guided by the rumour that aggravated her suspicion which has no boundary. The seed of suspicion planted in mind brought the eventual tragedy. But such an event will not constitute the offence or establish the guilt of the accused-appellant under Section 306 of the IPC.
19. Having said that we intend to make it clear that if the husband gets involved in an extra-marital affair that may not in all circumstances invite conviction under Section 306 of the IPC but definitely that can be a ground for divorce or other reliefs in a matrimonial dispute under other enactments. And we so clarify.
20. Consequently, the appeals are allowed. The conviction under  Sections 306 and 498-A of the IPC is set aside. The appellant be set at liberty unless his detention is required in connection with any other case.
…............…..…..............J.
(DIPAK MISRA) …............…..…..............J.

SC Upholds Conviction Of Man Whose Extramarital Affair Abetted Wife’s Suicide

It cannot be said that the appellant’s act of having illicit relationship with another woman would not have affected to negate the ingredients of Section 306 I.P.C.’
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a man whose illicit relationship with another woman allegedly ‘abetted’ his wife’s suicide.
Kavita had committed suicide by jumping into well within four months of her marriage with Siddaling.  The reason for the suicide, according to the prosecution, was stated to be harassment due to alleged dowry demand and also cruelty meted out to her as Siddaling was having an illicit relationship.
The prosecution had also produced before the court an agreement executed by Siddaling before the panchayat in which the accused admitted to be living with another woman and that was seen by his wife.
The trial court convicted Siddaling and his father under Sections 498-A and 304-B r/w 34 IPC and Sections 306 r/w 34 IPC and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The high court partly allowed the appeal sustaining conviction under Sections 498-A and 306 of the husband.
Although Girish Ananthamurthy, the counsel for the accused, relying on apex court judgments on this aspect, contended that abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or in any manner aiding that person in doing of the thing, the apex court bench comprising Justice R Banumathi and Justice Vineet Saran was not inclined to interfere with the concurrent convictions.
It cannot be said that the appellant’s act of having illicit relationship with another woman would not have affected to negate the ingredients of Section 306 I.P.C.’
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a man whose illicit relationship with another woman allegedly ‘abetted’ his wife’s suicide.
Kavita had committed suicide by jumping into well within four months of her marriage with Siddaling.  The reason for the suicide, according to the prosecution, was stated to be harassment due to alleged dowry demand and also cruelty meted out to her as Siddaling was having an illicit relationship.
The prosecution had also produced before the court an agreement executed by Siddaling before the panchayat in which the accused admitted to be living with another woman and that was seen by his wife.
The trial court convicted Siddaling and his father under Sections 498-A and 304-B r/w 34 IPC and Sections 306 r/w 34 IPC and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The high court partly allowed the appeal sustaining conviction under Sections 498-A and 306 of the husband.
Although Girish Ananthamurthy, the counsel for the accused, relying on apex court judgments on this aspect, contended that abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or in any manner aiding that person in doing of the thing, the apex court bench comprising Justice R Banumathi and Justice Vineet Saran was not inclined to interfere with the concurrent convictions.

Upholding the high court judgment, the bench said: “In the case in hand, the witnesses – PW-1, PW-6, PW10 and PW-22 have clearly in their statement stated that the appellant continued his relation with another woman. The appellant’s illicit relation with another woman would have definitely created the psychological imbalance to the deceased which led her to take the extreme step of committing suicide. It cannot be said that the appellant’s act of having illicit relationship with another woman would not have affected to negate the ingredients of Sections 306 I.P.C.”
The bench also refused to reduce the sentence imposed on the accused. The bench said: “Keeping in view the fact that within four months of her marriage, the deceased-Kavitha has taken the extreme step of putting an end of her life and also within three months of convening the panchayat, the deceased Kavitha has committed suicide, showing any leniency would be a misplaced one.”
Apparent contradiction with earlier SC judgments
This judgment is in apparently contradictory to a 2015 judgment by the Supreme Court in a similar factual setting, which had held that mere evidence of extramarital relationship cannot amount to cruelty.
The bench headed by Justice Dipak Misra, in the said case had observed, “Mere extra-marital relationship, even if proved, would be illegal and immoral, as has been said in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal (supra), but it would take a different character if the prosecution brings some evidence on record to show that the accused had conducted in such a manner to drive the wife to commit suicide.”
The bench had relied on another judgment in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal vs. State of Gujarat to arrive at this conclusion. In the said judgment, Justice KS Radhakrishnan had observed thus: “We are of the view that the mere fact that the husband has developed some intimacy with another, during the subsistence of marriage and failed to discharge his marital obligations, as such would not amount to “cruelty”, but it must be of such a nature as is likely to drive the spouse to commit suicide to fall within the explanation to Section 498A IPC. Harassment, of course, need not be in the form of physical assault and even mental harassment also would come within the purview of Section 498A IPC. Mental cruelty, of course, varies from person to person, depending upon the intensity and the degree of endurance, some may meet with courage and some others suffer in silence, to some it may be unbearable and a weak person may think of ending one’s life. We, on facts, found that the alleged extramarital relationship was not of such a nature as to drive the wife to commit suicide or that A-1 had ever intended or acted in such a manner which under normal circumstances, would drive the wife to commit suicide.”
In the facts of that case, it was also observed: “But for the alleged extramarital relationship, which if proved, could be illegal and immoral, nothing has been brought out by the prosecution to show that the accused had provoked, incited or induced the wife to commit suicide.”
In another judgment in 2016 (KV Prakash Babu v. State Of Karnataka), the Supreme Court reiterated this position observing thus: “Extra-marital relationship, per se, or as such would not come within the ambit of Section 498-A IPC. It would be an illegal or immoral act, but other ingredients are to be brought home so that it would constitute a criminal offence. There is no denial of the fact that the cruelty need not be physical but a mental torture or abnormal behaviour that amounts to cruelty or harassment in a given case. It will depend upon the facts of the said case. To explicate, solely because the husband is involved in an extra-marital relationship and there is some suspicion in the mind of wife, that cannot be regarded as mental cruelty which would attract mental cruelty for satisfying the ingredients of Section 306 IPC.”
The judgment in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal (supra) is clear. That for conviction of a husband under Section 306 IPC, the prosecution has to prove that he had provoked, incited or induced the wife to commit suicide and mere proof of illicit/extramarital relationship of husband would not suffice. In this judgment delivered by Justice Banumathi, the whole focus is on the proof of illicit relationship.

Wednesday, August 15, 2018

Insurer Can’t Be Absolved Merely Because The Driving Licence Is Fake, Reiterates SC

Suffice it to observe that it is well established that if the owner was aware of the fact that the licence was fake and still permitted the driver to drive the vehicle, then the insurer would stand absolved. However, the mere fact that the driving licence is fake, per se, would not absolve the insurer.’
The Supreme Court has held that the mere fact that the driving licence is fake, per se, would not absolve the insurer and it can only be absolved if it is found that the owner was aware of the fake licence and still permitted the driver to drive the vehicle.
The bench of Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra and Justice AM Khanwilkar was considering an appeal (Rama Chandra Singh vs. Rajaram) against Allahabad High Court order that had absolved the insurer merely on the finding that the driving licence of the driver was fake.
The apex court bench observed that the tribunal and the high court made no attempt to ascertain whether the owner was aware of the fake driving licence possessed by the driver.
The bench also noticed that the high court had referred to the decision inPEPSU Road Transport Corporation v. National Insurance Company, but distinguished it by observing that it was on the facts of that case, where the court opined that there was no evidence to prove that the driving licence produced by the authorities was fake.
The bench said: “That approach, in our opinion, is manifestly wrong. Whereas, even in that case, the Court was called upon to deal with the similar question as is involved in this appeal.”
The bench, referring to various judgments on this subject, observed: “Suffice it to observe that it is well established that if the owner was aware of the fact that the licence was fake and still permitted the driver to drive the vehicle, then the insurer would stand absolved. However, the mere fact that the driving licence is fake, per se, would not absolve the insurer. Indubitably, the High Court noted that the counsel for the appellant did not dispute that the driving licence was found to be fake, but that concession by itself was not sufficient to absolve the insurer.”
The bench then relegated the matter before the high court for fresh consideration only on the question of liability of the owner or of the insurer to pay the compensation amount.

OCI card holders appear to enjoy freedom of speech, equality like other Indians: HC

 The Delhi High Court has said that Overseas Citizens of India (OCIs) appear to enjoy the fundamental rights of equality before law and freedom of speech and expression in the same way as any other Indian citizen does.
The court’s observation came while asking the Centre to place before it the material based on which an intelligence report had recommended cancellation of the OCI registration of a US-based Indian-origin doctor.
Dr Christo Thomas Philip had challenged the cancellation of his OCI registration for alleged missionary activities in Bihar.
“In terms of section 7B (1) of the Citizenship Act, 1955, all rights other than those specified in sub-section (2) of the said section are available to an OCI card holder. Although, Article 16 of the Constitution of India is specified in Section 7B (2) of the Act, Articles 14 and 19 are not included. 
“Thus, prima facie, the rights under Article 14 (equality before law) and 19 (freedom of speech and expression) of the Constitution of India which are guaranteed to the citizen of India also appear to be extended to an OCI card holder,” Justice Vibhu Bakhru said.
The court issued the direction after finding that one of the facts, regarding the doctor’s place of birth, was “incorrect” in the report and there was no material on record to support the government assumption that he was acting as a medical missionary — the reason for cancellation of his OCI registration.
“The said report indicates that the petitioner was born in USA. This is stoutly disputed by the petitioner. He states that he was born in Kerala. Thus, one of the factual premise in the intelligence report appears to be incorrect. 
Although, the report states that the petitioner has been acting as a medical missionary, there is no material on record, which supports this assumption,” the court said. 
OCI is a scheme introduced in response to the demands for dual citizenship by the Indian diaspora.
The doctor, in his plea filed through advocates Robin David and Dhiraj Philip, claimed that the action was taken against him without any evidence and there was no basis for coming to the conclusion that he was involved in missionary and evangelical activities in India leading to unrest and law-and-order problems.
According to the petition, Philip was granted the OCI card and a lifelong visa by the government to visit India on November 22, 2012.
He claimed he visited India several times in the past to serve as a volunteer doctor with Duncan Hospital at Raxaul in Bihar from January 2014 till he was allegedly “unlawfully deported” on April 26, 2016 from the IGI Airport here.
He had moved the high court last year against his cancellation of OCI card by the Consulate General of India at Houston, US.
The court had asked him to approach the government against the Consulate General’s order and directed the authority concerned to decide his case “as expeditiously as possible”.
The revisional authority, which he had approached with his representation, on December 22 last year upheld the Consulate General’s decision.
In his present plea, the doctor challenged the revisional authority’s decision.
Apart from that, he also challenged the Consulate General’s August 1, 2017 decision to cancel his OCI card as well as the look-out circular issued against him.
He also sought directions to the authorities to permit him to visit his family members in Kerala.