IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO 494 OF 2012
JUSTICE K S
PUTTASWAMY (RETD.), AND ANR. ..Petitioners
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ..Respondents
WITH T.C. (CIVIL) NO 151 OF 2013 T.C. (CIVIL) NO 152 OF 2013
W.P.(CIVIL) NO 833 OF 2013 W.P.(CIVIL) NO 829 OF 2013 W.P.(CIVIL) NO 932 OF
2013 CONMT. PET. (CIVIL) NO 144 OF 2014 IN W.P.(C) NO. 494/2012 T.P.(CIVIL) NO
313 OF 2014 T.P.(CIVIL) NO 312 OF 2014 S.L.P(CRL.) NO.2524/2014 W.P.(CIVIL)
NO.37/2015 W.P.(CIVIL) NO.220/2015 REPORTABLE 2 CONMT. PET. (C)NO.674/2015 IN
W.P.(C) NO.829/2013 T.P.(CIVIL)NO.921/2015 CONMT.PET.(C)NO.470/2015 IN W.P.(C)
NO.494/2012 CONMT.PET.(C)NO.444/2016 IN W.P.(C) NO.494/2012
CONMT.PET.(C)NO.608/2016 IN W.P.(C) NO.494/2012 W.P.(CIVIL) NO.797/2016
CONMT.PET.(C)NO.844/2017 IN W.P.(C) NO.494/2012 W.P. (C) NO. 342/ 2017 AND WITH
W.P.(C) NO.000372/2017
J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
This judgment has
been divided into sections to facilitate analysis. They are : A The reference B
Decision in M P Sharma C Decision in Kharak Singh D Gopalan doctrine:
fundamental rights as isolated silos E Cooper and Maneka: Interrelationship
between rights F Origins of privacy G Natural and inalienable rights H
Evolution of the privacy doctrine in India I The Indian Constitution • Preamble
• Jurisprudence on dignity 3 • Fundamental Rights cases • No waiver of
Fundamental Rights • Privacy as intrinsic to freedom and liberty • Discordant
Notes : (i) ADM Jabalpur (ii) Suresh Koushal J India’s commitments under International
law K Comparative law on privacy (i) UK decisions (ii) US Supreme Court
decisions (iii) Constitutional right to privacy in South Africa (iv)
Constitutional right to privacy in Canada (v) Privacy under the European
Convention on Human Rights and the European Charter (vi) Decisions of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights L Criticisms of the privacy doctrine a
Thomson’s Reductionism b Posner’s Economic critique c Bork’s critique d
Feminist critique M Constituent Assembly and privacy: limits of originalist
interpretation N Is the statutory protection to privacy reason to deny a
constitutional right? O Not an elitist construct P Not just a common law right
Q Substantive Due Process R Essential nature of privacy S Informational privacy
T Conclusions PART A 4 A The reference 1 Nine judges of this Court assembled to
determine whether privacy is a constitutionally protected value. The issue
reaches out to the foundation of a constitutional culture based on the
protection of human rights and enables this Court to revisit the basic
principles on which our Constitution has been founded and their consequences
for a way of life it seeks to protect. This case presents challenges for
constitutional interpretation. If privacy is to be construed as a protected
constitutional value, it would redefine in significant ways our concepts of
liberty and the entitlements that flow out of its protection. 2 Privacy, in its
simplest sense, allows each human being to be left alone in a core which is
inviolable. Yet the autonomy of the individual is conditioned by her
relationships with the rest of society. Those relationships may and do often
pose questions to autonomy and free choice. The overarching presence of state
and nonstate entities regulates aspects of social existence which bear upon the
freedom of the individual. The preservation of constitutional liberty is, so to
speak, work in progress. Challenges have to be addressed to existing problems.
Equally, new challenges have to be dealt with in terms of a constitutional
understanding of where liberty places an individual in the context of a social
order. The emergence of new challenges is exemplified by this case, where the
debate on privacy is being analysed in the context of a global information
based society. In an age where information technology governs virtually every
aspect of our lives, the task before the Court is to PART A 5 impart
constitutional meaning to individual liberty in an interconnected world. While
we revisit the question whether our constitution protects privacy as an
elemental principle, the Court has to be sensitive to the needs of and the
opportunities and dangers posed to liberty in a digital world. 3 A Bench of
three judges of this Court, while considering the constitutional challenge to
the Aadhaar card scheme of the Union government noted in its order dated 11
August 2015 that the norms for and compilation of demographic biometric data by
government was questioned on the ground that it violates the right to privacy.
The Attorney General for India urged that the existence of a fundamental right
of privacy is in doubt in view of two decisions : the first – M P Sharma v
Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi1 (“M P Sharma”) was rendered by a
Bench of eight judges and the second, in Kharak Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh2
(“Kharak Singh”) was rendered by a Bench of six judges. Each of these
decisions, in the submission of the Attorney General, contained observations
that the Indian Constitution does not specifically protect the right to privacy.
On the other hand, the submission of the petitioners was that M P Sharma and
Kharak Singh were founded on principles expounded in A K Gopalan v State of
Madras3 (“Gopalan”). Gopalan, which construed each provision contained in the
Chapter on fundamental rights as embodying a distinct protection, was held not
to be good law by an eleven-judge 1 (1954) SCR 1077 2 (1964) 1 SCR 332 3 AIR
1950 SC 27 PART A 6 Bench in Rustom Cavasji Cooper v Union of India4
(“Cooper”). Hence the petitioners submitted that the basis of the two earlier
decisions is not valid. Moreover, it was also urged that in the seven-judge
Bench decision in Maneka Gandhi v Union of India5 (“Maneka”), the minority
judgment of Justice Subba Rao in Kharak Singh was specifically approved of and
the decision of the majority was overruled. 4 While addressing these
challenges, the Bench of three judges of this Court took note of several
decisions of this Court in which the right to privacy has been held to be a
constitutionally protected fundamental right. Those decisions include : Gobind
v State of Madhya Pradesh6 (“Gobind”), R Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu7
(“Rajagopal”) and People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India8
(“PUCL”). These subsequent decisions which affirmed the existence of a constitutionally
protected right of privacy, were rendered by Benches of a strength smaller than
those in M P Sharma and Kharak Singh. Faced with this predicament and having
due regard to the far-reaching questions of importance involving interpretation
of the Constitution, it was felt that institutional integrity and judicial
discipline would require a reference to a larger Bench. Hence the Bench of
three learned judges observed in its order dated 11 August 2015: “12. We are of
the opinion that the cases on hand raise far reaching questions of importance
involving interpretation of the Constitution. 4 (1970) 1 SCC 248 5 (1978) 1 SCC
248 6 (1975) 2 SCC 148 7 (1994) 6 SCC 632 8 (1997) 1 SCC 301 PART A 7 What is
at stake is the amplitude of the fundamental rights including that precious and
inalienable right under Article 21. If the observations made in M.P. Sharma
(supra) and Kharak Singh (supra) are to be read literally and accepted as the
law of this country, the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution
of India and more particularly right to liberty under Article 21 would be
denuded of vigour and vitality. At the same time, we are also of the opinion
that the institutional integrity and judicial discipline require that
pronouncement made by larger Benches of this Court cannot be ignored by the
smaller Benches without appropriately explaining the reasons for not following
the pronouncements made by such larger Benches. With due respect to all the
learned Judges who rendered the subsequent judgments - where right to privacy
is asserted or referred to their Lordships concern for the liberty of human
beings, we are of the humble opinion that there appears to be certain amount of
apparent unresolved contradiction in the law declared by this Court. 13. Therefore,
in our opinion to give a quietus to the kind of controversy raised in this
batch of cases once for all, it is better that the ratio decidendi of M.P.
Sharma (supra) and Kharak Singh (supra) is scrutinized and the jurisprudential
correctness of the subsequent decisions of this Court where the right to
privacy is either asserted or referred be examined and authoritatively decided
by a Bench of appropriate strength.” 5 On 18 July 2017, a Constitution Bench
presided over by the learned Chief Justice considered it appropriate that the
issue be resolved by a Bench of nine judges. The order of the Constitution
Bench reads thus: “During the course of the hearing today, it seems that it has
become essential for us to determine whether there is any fundamental right of
privacy under the Indian Constitution. The determination of this question would
essentially entail whether the decision recorded by this Court in M.P. Sharma
and Ors. vs. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi and Ors. - 1950 SCR
1077 by an eight-Judge Constitution Bench, and also, in Kharak Singh vs. The
State of U.P. and Ors. - 1962 (1) SCR 332 by a six-Judge Constitution Bench,
that there is no such fundamental right, is the correct expression of the
constitutional position. PART A 8 Before dealing with the matter any further,
we are of the view that the issue noticed hereinabove deserves to be placed
before the nine-Judge Constitution Bench. List these matters before the
NineJudge Constitution Bench on 19.07.2017.” 6 During the course of hearing, we
have been ably assisted on behalf of the petitioners by Mr Gopal Subramanium,
Mr Kapil Sibal, Mr Arvind Datar, Mr Shyam Divan, Mr Anand Grover, Ms Meenakshi
Arora, Mr Sajan Poovayya and Mr Jayant Bhushan, learned senior counsel. Mr J S
Attri, learned senior counsel supported them on behalf of the State of Himachal
Pradesh. On behalf of the Union of India, the Court has had the benefit of the
erudite submissions of Mr K K Venugopal, Attorney General for India. He has
been ably supported by Mr Tushar Mehta, Additional Solicitor General, Mr Rakesh
Dwivedi, senior counsel for the State of Gujarat, Mr Aryama Sundaram for the
State of Maharashtra, Mr Gopal Sankaranarayanan and Dr Arghya Sengupta
respectively. While some state governments have supported the stand of the
Union government, others have supported the petitioners. 7 The correctness of
the decisions in M P Sharma and Kharak Singh, is to be evaluated during the
course of the reference. Besides, the jurisprudential correctness of subsequent
decisions holding the right to privacy to be a constitutionally protected right
is to be determined. The basic question whether privacy is a right protected
under our Constitution requires an understanding of what privacy means. For it
is when we understand what interests or entitlements privacy safeguards, that
we can determine whether the Constitution protects privacy. The contents of
privacy need to PART B 9 be analysed, not by providing an exhaustive
enunciation or catalogue of what it includes but by indicating its broad
contours. The Court has been addressed on various aspects of privacy including
: (i) Whether there is a constitutionally protected right to privacy; (ii) If
there is a constitutionally protected right, whether this has the character of
an independent fundamental right or whether it arises from within the existing
guarantees of protected rights such as life and personal liberty; (iii) the
doctrinal foundations of the claim to privacy; (iv) the content of privacy; and
(v) the nature of the regulatory power of the state. B Decision in M P Sharma 8
An investigation was ordered by the Union government under the Companies Act
into the affairs of a company which was in liquidation on the ground that it
had made an organized attempt to embezzle its funds and to conceal the true
state of its affairs from the share-holders and on the allegation that the
company had indulged in fraudulent transactions and falsified its records.
Offences were registered and search warrants were issued during the course of which,
records were seized. The challenge was that the searches violated the
fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 19(1)(f) and Article 20(3)
of the Constitution. The former challenge was rejected. The question which this
Court addressed was whether there was a contravention of Article 20(3). Article
20(3) mandates that no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. Reliance was placed on a judgment9 of the US 9 Boyd v.
United States, 116 US 616 (1886) PART B 10 Supreme Court holding that obtaining
incriminating evidence by an illegal search and seizure violates the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments of the American Constitution. While tracing the history of
Indian legislation, this Court observed that provisions for search were
contained in successive enactments of the Criminal Procedure Code. Justice
Jagannadhadas, speaking for the Bench, held that a search or seizure does not
infringe the constitutional right guaranteed by Article 20(3) of the
Constitution: “…there is no basis in the Indian law for the assumption that a
search or seizure of a thing or document is in itself to be treated as
compelled production of the same. Indeed a little consideration will show that
the two are essentially different matters for the purpose relevant to the
present discussion. A notice to produce is addressed to the party concerned and
his production in compliance therewith constitutes a testimonial act by him
within the meaning of Article 20(3) as above explained. But a search warrant is
addressed to an officer of the Government, generally a police officer. Neither
the search nor the seizure are acts of the occupier of the searched premises.
They are acts of another to which he is obliged to submit and are, therefore,
not his testimonial acts in any sense.”10 9 Having held that the guarantee
against self-incrimination is not offended by a search and seizure, the Court
observed that : “A power of search and seizure is in any system of
jurisprudence an overriding power of the State for the protection of social
security and that power is necessarily regulated by law. When the Constitution
makers have thought fit not to subject such regulation to constitutional
limitations by recognition of a fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the
Fourth Amendment, we have no justification to import it, into a totally
different fundamental right, by some process of strained construction. Nor is
it legitimate to assume that the constitutional 10 MP Sharma (Supra note 1), at
page 1096 PART C 11 protection under Article 20(3) would be defeated by the
statutory provisions for searches.”11 (emphasis supplied) 10 These observations
– to be more precise in one sentence - indicating that the Constitution makers
did not subject the regulation by law of the power of search and seizure to a
fundamental right of privacy, similar to the Fourth amendment of the US
Constitution, have been pressed in aid to question the existence of a protected
right to privacy under our Constitution. C Decision in Kharak Singh 11 After
being challaned in a case of dacoity in 1941, Kharak Singh was released for
want of evidence. But the police compiled a “history sheet” against him.
‘History sheets’ were defined in Regulation 228 of Chapter XX of the U P Police
Regulations as “the personal records of criminals under surveillance”. Kharak
Singh, who was subjected to regular surveillance, including midnight knocks,
moved this Court for a declaration that his fundamental rights were infringed.
Among the measures of surveillance contemplated by Regulation 236 were the
following: “(a) Secret picketing of the house or approaches to the houses of
suspects; (b) domiciliary visits at night; (c) thorough periodical inquiries by
officers not below the rank of sub-inspector into repute, habits, associations,
income, expenses and occupation; (d) the reporting by constables and chaukidars
of movements and absences from home; 11 Ibid, at page 1096-97 PART C 12 (c) the
verification of movements and absences by means of inquiry slips; (f) the
collection and record on a history-sheet of all information bearing on
conduct.” 12 This Court held that the freedom to move freely throughout the
territory of India, guaranteed by Article 19(1)(d) was not infringed by a
midnight knock on the door of the petitioner since “his locomotion is not
impeded or prejudiced in any manner”. 13 When the decision in Kharak Singh was
handed down, the principles governing the inter-relationship between the rights
protected by Article 19 and the right to life and personal liberty under
Article 21 were governed by the judgment in Gopalan. Gopalan considered each of
the articles in the Chapter on fundamental rights as embodying distinct (as
opposed to over-lapping) freedoms. Hence in Kharak Singh, the Court observed :
“In view of the very limited nature of the question before us it is unnecessary
to pause to consider either the precise relationship between the “liberties” in
Article 19(1)(a) & (d) on the one hand and that in Article 21 on the other,
or the content and significance of the words “procedure established by law” in
the latter Article, both of which were the subject of elaborate consideration
by this Court in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras.”12 14 The decision in Kharak
Singh held that clause (b) of Regulation 236 which provided for domiciliary
visits at night was violative of Article 21. The Court observed: “Is then the
word “personal liberty” to be construed as excluding from its purview an
invasion on the part of the police of the sanctity 12 Kharak Singh (Supra note
2), at page 345 PART C 13 of a man's home and an intrusion into his personal
security and his right to sleep which is the normal comfort and a dire
necessity for human existence even as an animal? It might not be inappropriate
to refer here to the words of the preamble to the Constitution that it is
designed to “assure the dignity of the individual” and therefore of those
cherished human values as the means of ensuring his full development and
evolution. We are referring to these objectives of the framers merely to draw
attention to the concepts underlying the constitution which would point to such
vital words as “personal liberty” having to be construed in a reasonable manner
and to be attributed that sense which would promote and achieve those
objectives and by no means to stretch the meaning of the phrase to square with
any pre-conceived notions or doctrinaire constitutional theories.”13 15 In
taking this view, Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar, speaking for a majority of five
judges, relied upon the judgment of Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the US
Supreme Court in Wolf v Colorado14, which held : “The security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police … is basic to a free society… We have
no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police
incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”15 (emphasis supplied) While the Court observed that the Indian
Constitution does not contain a guarantee similar to the Fourth Amendment of
the US Constitution, it proceeded to hold that : “Nevertheless, these extracts
would show that an unauthorised intrusion into a person's home and the
disturbance caused to him thereby, is as it were the violation of a common law
right of a man an ultimate essential of ordered liberty, if not of the very 13
Ibid, at pages 347-348 14 338 US 25 (1949) 15 Cited in Kharak Singh (Supra note
2), at page 348 PART C 14 concept of civilisation. An English Common Law maxim
asserts that “every man's house is his castle” and in Semayne case [5 Coke 91 :
1 Sm LC (13th Edn) 104 at p. 105] where this was applied, it was stated that
“the house of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress as well as for his
defence against injury and violence as for his repose”. We are not unmindful of
the fact that Semayne case [(1604) 5 Coke 91 : 1 Sm LC (13th Edn) 104 at p.
105] was concerned with the law relating to executions in England, but the
passage extracted has a validity quite apart from the context of the particular
decision. It embodies an abiding principle which transcends mere protection of
property rights and expounds a concept of “personal liberty” which does not
rest on any element of feudalism or on any theory of freedom which has ceased
to be of value.”16 (emphasis supplied) 16 Kharak Singh regards the sanctity of
the home and the protection against unauthorized intrusion an integral element
of “ordered liberty”. This is comprised in ‘personal liberty’ guaranteed by
Article 21. The decision invalidated domiciliary visits at night authorised by
Regulation 236 (b), finding them to be an unauthorized intrusion into the home
of a person and a violation of the fundamental right to personal liberty.
However, while considering the validity of clauses (c),(d) and (e) which
provided for periodical enquiries, reporting by law enforcement personnel and
verification of movements, this Court held as follows : “…the freedom
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(d) is not infringed by a watch being kept over the
movements of the suspect. Nor do we consider that Article 21 has any relevance
in the context as was sought to be suggested by learned Counsel for the
petitioner. As already pointed out, the right of privacy is not a guaranteed
right under our Constitution and therefore the attempt to ascertain the
movements of an individual which is merely a manner in 16 Ibid, at page 349
PART C 15 which privacy is invaded is not an infringement of a fundamental
right guaranteed by Part III.”17 (emphasis supplied) In the context of clauses
(c), (d) and (e), the above extract indicates the view of the majority that the
right of privacy is not guaranteed under the Constitution. 17 Justice Subba Rao
dissented. Justice Subba Rao held that the rights conferred by Part III have
overlapping areas. Where a law is challenged as infringing the right to freedom
of movement under Article 19(1)(d) and the liberty of the individual under
Article 21, it must satisfy the tests laid down in Article 19(2) as well as the
requirements of Article 21. Justice Subba Rao held that : “No doubt the
expression “personal liberty” is a comprehensive one and the right to move
freely is an attribute of personal liberty. It is said that the freedom to move
freely is carved out of personal liberty and, therefore, the expression
“personal liberty” in Article 21 excludes that attribute. In our view, this is
not a correct approach. Both are independent fundamental rights, though there
is overlapping. There is no question of one being carved out of another. The
fundamental right of life and personal liberty have many attributes and some of
them are found in Article 19. If a person's fundamental right under Article 21
is infringed, the State can rely upon a law to sustain the action; but that
cannot be a complete answer unless the said law satisfies the test laid down in
Article 19(2) so far as the attributes covered by Article 19(1) are concerned.
In other words, the State must satisfy that both the fundamental rights are not
infringed by showing that there is a law and that it does amount to a reasonable
restriction within the meaning of Article 19(2) of the Constitution. But in
this case no such defence is available, as admittedly there is no such law. So
the petitioner can legitimately plead that his fundamental rights both under
Article 19(1)(d) and Article 21 are infringed by the State.”18 17 Ibid, at page
351 18 Ibid, at pages 356-357 PART C 16 18 Justice Subba Rao held that Article
21 embodies the right of the individual to be free from restrictions or
encroachments. In this view, though the Constitution does not expressly declare
the right to privacy as a fundamental right, such a right is essential to
personal liberty. The dissenting opinion places the matter of principle as
follows: “In an uncivilized society where there are no inhibitions, only physical
restraints may detract from personal liberty, but as civilization advances the
psychological restraints are more effective than physical ones. The scientific
methods used to condition a man's mind are in a real sense physical restraints,
for they engender physical fear channelling one's actions through anticipated
and expected grooves. So also the creation of conditions which necessarily
engender inhibitions and fear complexes can be described as physical
restraints. Further, the right to personal liberty takes in not only a right to
be free from restrictions placed on his movements, but also free from
encroachments on his private life. It is true our Constitution does not
expressly declare a right to privacy as a fundamental right, but the said right
is an essential ingredient of personal liberty. Every democratic country
sanctifies domestic life; it is expected to give him rest, physical happiness,
peace of mind and security. In the last resort, a person's house, where he
lives with his family, is his “castle”; it is his rampart against encroachment
on his personal liberty. The pregnant words of that famous Judge, Frankfurter
J., in Wolf v. Colorado [[1949] 238 US 25] pointing out the importance of the
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police, could have
no less application to an Indian home as to an American one. If physical
restraints on a person's movements affect his personal liberty, physical
encroachments on his private life would affect it in a larger degree. Indeed, nothing
is more deleterious to a man's physical happiness and health than a calculated
interference with his privacy. We would, therefore, define the right of
personal liberty in Article 21 as a right of an individual to be free from
restrictions or encroachments on his person, whether those restrictions or
encroachments are directly imposed or indirectly brought about by calculated
measures. If so understood, all the acts of surveillance under PART D 17
Regulation 236 infringe the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article
21 of the Constitution.”19 (emphasis supplied) Significantly, both Justice
Rajagopala Ayyangar for the majority and Justice Subba Rao in his dissent rely
upon the observations of Justice Frankfurter in Wolf v Colorado which specifically
advert to privacy. The majority, while relying upon them to invalidate
domiciliary visits at night, regards the sanctity of the home as part of
ordered liberty. In the context of other provisions of the regulation, the
majority declines to recognise a right of privacy as a constitutional
protection. Justice Subba Rao recognised a constitutional by protected right to
privacy, considering it as an ingredient of personal liberty. D Gopalan
doctrine : fundamental rights as isolated silos 19 When eight judges of this
Court rendered the decision in M P Sharma in 1954 and later, six judges decided
the controversy in Kharak Singh in 1962, the ascendant and, even well
established, doctrine governing the fundamental rights contained in Part III
was founded on the Gopalan principle. In Gopalan, Chief Justice Kania, speaking
for a majority of five of the Bench of six judges, construed the relationship
between Articles 19 and 21 to be one of mutual exclusion. In this line of
enquiry, what was comprehended by Article 19 was excluded from Article 21. The
seven freedoms of Article 19 were not subsumed in the fabric of life or
personal liberty in Article 21. 19 Ibid, at pages 358-359 PART D 18 The
consequence was that a law which curtailed one of the freedoms guaranteed by
Article 19 would be required to answer the tests of reasonableness prescribed
by clauses 2 to 6 of Article 19 and those alone. In the Gopalan perspective,
free speech and expression was guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) and was hence
excluded from personal liberty under Article 21. Article 21 was but a residue.
Chief Justice Kania held : “Reading Article 19 in that way it appears to me
that the concept of the right to move freely throughout the territory of India
is an entirely different concept from the right to “personal liberty”
contemplated by Article 21. “Personal liberty” covers many more rights in one
sense and has a restricted meaning in another sense. For instance, while the
right to move or reside may be covered by the expression, “personal liberty” the
right to freedom of speech (mentioned in Article 19(1)(a)) or the right to
acquire, hold or dispose of property (mentioned in 19(1)(f)) cannot be
considered a part of the personal liberty of a citizen. They form part of the
liberty of a citizen but the limitation imposed by the word “personal” leads me
to believe that those rights are not covered by the expression personal
liberty. So read there is no conflict between Articles 19 and 21. The contents
and subject-matters of Articles 19 and 21 are thus not the same and they
proceed to deal with the rights covered by their respective words from totally
different angles. As already mentioned in respect of each of the rights
specified in sub-clauses of Article 19(1) specific limitations in respect of
each is provided, while the expression “personal liberty” in Article 21 is
generally controlled by the general expression “procedure established by
law”.”20 ‘Procedure established by law’ under Article 21 was, in this view, not
capable of being expanded to include the ‘due process of law’. Justice Fazl Ali
dissented. The dissent 20 Gopalan (Supra note 3), at pages 36-37 PART D 19
adopted the view that the fundamental rights are not isolated and separate but
protect a common thread of liberty and freedom: “To my mind, the scheme of the
Chapter dealing with the fundamental rights does not contemplate what is
attributed to it, namely, that each article is a code by itself and is
independent of the others. In my opinion, it cannot be said that Articles
19,20, 21 and 22 do not to some extent overlap each other. The case of a person
who is convicted of an offence will come under Articles 20 and 21 and also
under Article 22 so far as his arrest and detention in custody before trial are
concerned. Preventive detention, which is dealt with an Article 22, also
amounts to deprivation of personal liberty which is referred to in Article 21,
and is a violation of the right of freedom of movement dealt with in Article
19(1)(d)… It seems clear that the addition of the word “personal” before
“liberty” in Article 21 cannot change the meaning of the words used in Article
19, nor can it put a matter which is inseparably bound up with personal liberty
beyond its place...”21 20 In Satwant Singh Sawhney v D Ramarathnam22 (“Satwant
Singh Sawhney”), Justice Hidayatullah, speaking for himself and Justice R S
Bachawat, in the dissenting view noticed the clear lines of distinction between
the dissent of Justice Subba Rao and the view of the majority in Kharak Singh.
The observations of Justice Hidayatullah indicate that if the right of
locomotion is embodied by Article 21 of which one aspect is covered by Article
19(1)(d), that would in fact advance the minority view in Kharak Singh: “Subba
Rao J. (as he then was) read personal liberty as the antithesis of physical
restraint or coercion and found that Articles 19(1) and 21 overlapped and
Article 19(1)(d) was not carved out of personal liberty in Article 21.
According to him, personal liberty could be curtailed by law, but that law must
satisfy the test in Article 21 Ibid, at pages 52-53 22 (1967) 3 SCR 525 PART E
20 19(2) in so far as the specific rights in Article 19(1)(3) are concerned. In
other words, the State must satisfy that both the fundamental rights are not
infringed by showing that there is a law and that it does not amount to an
unreasonable restriction within the meaning of Article 19(2) of the
Constitution. As in that case there was no law, fundamental rights, both under
Article 19(1)(d) and Article 21 were held to be infringed. The learned Chief
Justice has read into the decision of the Court a meaning which it does not
intend to convey. He excludes from Article 21 the right to free motion and
locomotion within the territories of India and puts the right to travel abroad
in Article 21. He wants to see a law and if his earlier reasoning were to
prevail, the law should stand the test of Article 19(2). But since clause (2)
deals with matters in Article 19(1) already held excluded, it is obvious that
it will not apply. The law which is made can only be tested on the ground of
articles other than Article 19 such as Articles 14, 20 and 22 which alone bears
upon this matter. In other words, the majority decision of the Court in this
case has rejected Ayyangar J.'s view and accepted the view of the minority in
Kharak Singh case… This view obviously clashes with the reading of Article 21
in Kharak Singh case, because there the right of motion and locomotion was held
to be excluded from Article 21. In other words, the present decision advances
the minority view in Kharak Singh case above the majority view stated in that
case.”23 E Cooper and Maneka : Interrelationship between rights 21 The theory
that the fundamental rights are water-tight compartments was discarded in the
judgment of eleven judges of this Court in Cooper. Gopalan had adopted the view
that a law of preventive detention would be tested for its validity only with
reference to Article 22, which was a complete code relating to the subject.
Legislation on preventive detention did not, in this view, have to meet the
touchstone of Article 19(1)(d). The dissenting view of Justice Fazl Ali in
Gopalan was noticed by 23 Ibid, at page 554 PART E 21 Justice J C Shah,
speaking for this Court, in Cooper. The consequence of the Gopalan doctrine was
that the protection afforded by a guarantee of personal freedom would be
decided by the object of the State action in relation to the right of the
individual and not upon its effect upon the guarantee. Disagreeing with this
view, the Court in Cooper held thus : ”…it is necessary to bear in mind the
enunciation of the guarantee of fundamental rights which has taken different
forms. In some cases it is an express declaration of a guaranteed right:
Articles 29(1), 30(1), 26, 25 and 32; in others to ensure protection of
individual rights they take specific forms of restrictions on State action —
legislative or executive — Articles 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22(1), 27 and 28; in
some others, it takes the form of a positive declaration and simultaneously
enunciates the restriction thereon: Articles 19(1) and 19(2) to (6); in some
cases, it arises as an implication from the delimitation of the authority of
the State, e.g. Articles 31(1) and 31(2); in still others, it takes the form of
a general prohibition against the State as well as others: Articles 17, 23 and
24. The enunciation of rights either express or by implication does not follow
a uniform pattern. But one thread runs through them: they seek to protect the
rights of the individual or groups of individuals against infringement of those
rights within specific limits. Part III of the Constitution weaves a pattern of
guarantees on the texture of basic human rights. The guarantees delimit the
protection of those rights in their allotted fields: they do not attempt to enunciate
distinct rights.”24 (emphasis supplied) 22 The abrogation of the Gopalan
doctrine in Cooper was revisited in a sevenjudge Bench decision in Maneka.
Justice P N Bhagwati who delivered the leading opinion of three Judges held
that the judgment in Cooper affirms the dissenting 24 Cooper (Supra note 4), at
page 289 (para 52) PART E 22 opinion of Justice Subba Rao (in Kharak Singh) as
expressing the valid constitutional position. Hence in Maneka, the Court held
that: “It was in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.[AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR
332 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 329] that the question as to the proper scope and meaning
of the expression “personal liberty” came up pointedly for consideration for
the first time before this Court. The majority of the Judges took the view
“that “personal liberty” is used in the article as a compendious term to
include within itself all the varieties of rights which go to make up the
“personal liberties” of man other than those dealt with in the several clauses
of Article 19(1). In other words, while Article 19(1) deals with particular
species or attributes of that freedom, ‘personal liberty’ in Article 21 takes
in and comprises the residue. The minority Judges, however, disagreed with this
view taken by the majority and explained their position in the following words:
“No doubt the expression ‘personal liberty’ is a comprehensive one and the
right to move freely is an attribute of personal liberty. It is said that the
freedom to move freely is carved out of personal liberty and, therefore, the
expression ‘personal liberty’ in Article 21 excludes that attribute. In our
view, this is not a correct approach. Both are independent fundamental rights,
though there is overlapping. There is no question of one being carved out of
another. The fundamental right of life and personal liberty has many attributes
and some of them are found in Article 19. If a person's fundamental right under
Article 21 is infringed, the State can rely upon a law to sustain the action,
but that cannot be a complete answer unless the said law satisfies the test
laid down in Article 19(2) so far as the attributes covered by Article 19(1)
are concerned.” There can be no doubt that in view of the decision of this
Court in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India [(1970) 2 SCC 298 : (1971) 1 SCR 512]
the minority view must be regarded as correct and the majority view must be
held to have been overruled.”25 (emphasis supplied) 23 Following the decision
in Maneka, the established constitutional doctrine is that the expression
‘personal liberty’ in Article 21 covers a variety of rights, some of which 25
Maneka (Supra Note 5), at page 278 (para 5) PART E 23 ‘have been raised to the
status of distinct fundamental rights’ and given additional protection under
Article 19. Consequently, in Satwant Singh Sawhney, the right to travel abroad
was held to be subsumed within Article 21 as a consequence of which any
deprivation of that right could be only by a ‘procedure established by law’.
Prior to the enactment of the Passports Act, 1967, there was no law regulating
the right to travel abroad as a result of which the order of the Passport
Officer refusing a passport was held to be invalid. The decision in Maneka
carried the constitutional principle of the over-lapping nature of fundamental
rights to its logical conclusion. Reasonableness which is the foundation of the
guarantee against arbitrary state action under Article 14 infuses Article 21. A
law which provides for a deprivation of life or personal liberty under Article
21 must lay down not just any procedure but a procedure which is fair, just and
reasonable. 24 The decisions in M P Sharma and Kharak Singh adopted a doctrinal
position on the relationship between Articles 19 and 21, based on the view of
the majority in Gopalan. This view stands abrogated particularly by the
judgment in Cooper and the subsequent statement of doctrine in Maneka. The
decision in Maneka, in fact, expressly recognized that it is the dissenting
judgment of Justice Subba Rao in Kharak Singh which represents the exposition
of the correct constitutional principle. The jurisprudential foundation which
held the field sixty three years ago in M P Sharma and fifty five years ago in
Kharak Singh has given way to what is now a settled position in constitutional
law. Firstly, the fundamental rights emanate from basic notions of liberty and
dignity and the enumeration of some facets of liberty as PART E 24 distinctly
protected rights under Article 19 does not denude Article 21 of its expansive
ambit. Secondly, the validity of a law which infringes the fundamental rights
has to be tested not with reference to the object of state action but on the
basis of its effect on the guarantees of freedom. Thirdly, the requirement of
Article 14 that state action must not be arbitrary and must fulfil the
requirement of reasonableness, imparts meaning to the constitutional guarantees
in Part III. 25 The doctrinal invalidation of the basic premise underlying the
decisions in M P Sharma and Kharak Singh still leaves the issue of whether
privacy is a right protected by Part III of the Constitution open for
consideration. There are observations in both decisions that the Constitution
does not contain a specific protection of the right to privacy. Presently, the
matter can be looked at from the perspective of what actually was the
controversy in the two cases. M P Sharma was a case where a law prescribing a
search to obtain documents for investigating into offences was challenged as
being contrary to the guarantee against self-incrimination in Article 20(3).
The Court repelled the argument that a search for documents compelled a person
accused of an offence to be witness against himself. Unlike a notice to produce
documents, which is addressed to a person and whose compliance would constitute
a testimonial act, a search warrant and a seizure which follows are not
testimonial acts of a person to whom the warrant is addressed, within the
meaning of Article 20(3). The Court having held this, the controversy in M P
Sharma would rest at that. The observations in M P Sharma to the effect that
the constitution makers had not thought it fit to subject the regulatory power
of search and seizure to constitutional limitations PART E 25 by recognising a
fundamental right of privacy (like the US Fourth amendment), and that there was
no justification to impart it into a ‘totally different fundamental right’ are
at the highest, stray observations. 26 The decision in M P Sharma held that in
the absence of a provision like the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution, a
right to privacy cannot be read into the Indian Constitution. The decision in M
P Sharma did not decide whether a constitutional right to privacy is protected
by other provisions contained in the fundamental rights including among them,
the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. Hence the decision
cannot be construed to specifically exclude the protection of privacy under the
framework of protected guarantees including those in Articles 19 or 21. The
absence of an express constitutional guarantee of privacy still begs the
question whether privacy is an element of liberty and, as an integral part of
human dignity, is comprehended within the protection of life as well. 27 The
decision in Kharak Singh is noteworthy because while invalidating Regulation 236(b)
of the Police Regulations which provided for nightly domiciliary visits, the
majority construed this to be an unauthorized intrusion into a person’s home
and a violation of ordered liberty. While arriving at this conclusion, the
majority placed reliance on the privacy doctrine enunciated by Justice
Frankfurter, speaking for the US Supreme Court in Wolf v Colorado (the extract
from Wolf cited in the majority judgment specifically adverts to ‘privacy’
twice). Having relied on this doctrine PART F 26 to invalidate domiciliary
visits, the majority in Kharak Singh proceeded to repel the challenge to other
clauses of Regulation 236 on the ground that the right of privacy is not
guaranteed under the Constitution and hence Article 21 had no application. This
part of the judgment in Kharak Singh is inconsistent with the earlier part of
the decision. The decision of the majority in Kharak Singh suffers from an
internal inconsistency. F Origins of privacy 28 An evaluation of the origins of
privacy is essential in order to understand whether (as the Union of India
postulates), the concept is so amorphous as to defy description. The submission
of the government is that the Court cannot recognize a juristic concept which
is so vague and uncertain that it fails to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
This makes it necessary to analyse the origins of privacy and to trace its
evolution. 29 The Greek philosopher Aristotle spoke of a division between the
public sphere of political affairs (which he termed the polis) and the personal
sphere of human life (termed oikos). This dichotomy may provide an early
recognition of “a confidential zone on behalf of the citizen”26. Aristotle’s
distinction between the public and private realms can be regarded as providing
a basis for restricting governmental authority to activities falling within the
public realm. On the other hand, activities in the private 26 Michael C. James,
“A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Privacy in the United States, Canada
and Europe”, Connecticut Journal of International Law (Spring 2014), Vol. 29,
Issue 2, at page 261 PART F 27 realm are more appropriately reserved for
“private reflection, familial relations and self-determination”27 . 30 At a
certain level, the evolution of the doctrine of privacy has followed the public
– private distinction. William Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of
England (1765) spoke about this distinction while dividing wrongs into private
wrongs and public wrongs. Private wrongs are an infringement merely of
particular rights concerning individuals and are in the nature of civil
injuries. Public wrongs constitute a breach of general and public rights
affecting the whole community and according to him, are called crimes and
misdemeanours. 31 John Stuart Mill in his essay, ‘On Liberty’ (1859) gave
expression to the need to preserve a zone within which the liberty of the
citizen would be free from the authority of the state. According to Mill : “The
only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that
which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind,
the individual is sovereign.”28 While speaking of a “struggle between liberty
and authority”29, Mill posited that the tyranny of the majority could be reined
by the recognition of civil rights such as the individual right to privacy,
free speech, assembly and expression. 27 Ibid, at page 262 28 John Stuart Mill,
On Liberty, Batoche Books (1859), at page 13 29 Ibid, at page 6 PART F 28 32
Austin in his Lectures on Jurisprudence (1869) spoke of the distinction between
the public and the private realms : jus publicum and jus privatum. The
distinction between the public and private realms has its limitations. If the
reason for protecting privacy is the dignity of the individual, the rationale
for its existence does not cease merely because the individual has to interact
with others in the public arena. The extent to which an individual expects
privacy in a public street may be different from that which she expects in the
sanctity of the home. Yet if dignity is the underlying feature, the basis of
recognising the right to privacy is not denuded in public spaces. The extent of
permissible state regulation may, however, differ based on the legitimate
concerns of governmental authority. 33 James Madison, who was the architect of
the American Constitution, contemplated the protection of the faculties of the
citizen as an incident of the inalienable property rights of human beings. In
his words : “In the former sense, a man’s land, or merchandize, or money is
called his property. In the latter sense, a man has property in his opinions
and the free communication of them… He has an equal property interest in the
free use of his faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ
them. In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be
equally said to have a property in his rights. Where an excess of power
prevails, property of no sort is duly respected. No man is safe in his
opinions, his person, his faculties or his possessions… Conscience is the most
sacred of all property; other property depending in part on positive law, the
exercise of that, being a natural and inalienable right. To guard a man’s house
as his castle, PART F 29 to pay public and enforce private debts with the most
exact faith, can give no title to invade a man’s conscience which is more
sacred than his castle, or to withhold from it that debt of protection, for
which the public faith is pledged, by the very nature and original conditions
of the social pact.”30 Madison traced the recognition of an inviolable zone to
an inalienable right to property. Property is construed in the broadest sense
to include tangibles and intangibles and ultimately to control over one’s
conscience itself. 34 In an article published on 15 December 1890 in the
Harvard Law Review, Samuel D Warren and Louis Brandeis adverted to the
evolution of the law to incorporate within it, the right to life as “a recognition
of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect”31. As legal
rights were broadened, the right to life had “come to mean the right to enjoy
life – the right to be let alone”. Recognizing that “only a part of the pain,
pleasure and profit of life lay in physical things” and that “thoughts,
emotions, and sensations demanded legal recognition”, Warren and Brandeis
revealed with a sense of perspicacity the impact of technology on the right to
be let alone: “Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the
next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for
securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right “to be let alone”.
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts
of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make
good the prediction that “what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed
30 James Madison, “Essay on Property”, in Gaillard Hunt ed., The Writings of
James Madison (1906), Vol. 6, at pages 101-103. 31 Warren and Brandeis, “The
Right to Privacy”, Harvard Law Review (1890), Vol.4, No. 5, at page 193 PART F
30 from the house-tops.” For years there has been a feeling that the law must
afford some remedy for the unauthorized circulation of portraits of private
persons… The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man,
under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity,
so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but
modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy,
subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted
by mere bodily injury.”32 In their seminal article, Warren and Brandeis
observed that: “The principle which protects personal writings and all other
personal productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against
publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of private property,
but that of an inviolate personality.”33 (emphasis supplied) The right “to be
let alone” thus represented a manifestation of “an inviolate personality”, a
core of freedom and liberty from which the human being had to be free from
intrusion. The technology which provided a justification for the need to
preserve the privacy of the individual was the development of photography. The
right to be let alone was not so much an incident of property as a reflection
of the inviolable nature of the human personality. 35 The ringing observations
of Warren and Brandeis on the impact of technology have continued relevance
today in a globalized world dominated by the internet and 32 Ibid, at pages
195-196 33 Ibid, at page 205 PART F 31 information technology. As societies
have evolved, so have the connotations and ambit of privacy. 36 Though many
contemporary accounts attribute the modern conception of the ‘right to privacy’
to the Warren and Brandeis article, historical material indicates that it was
Thomas Cooley who adopted the phrase “the right to be let alone”, in his
Treatise on the Law of Torts34. Discussing personal immunity, Cooley stated:
“the right of one’s person may be said to be a right of complete immunity; the
right to be alone.”35 Roscoe Pound described the Warren and Brandeis article as
having done “nothing less than add a chapter to our law”36. However, another
writer on the subject states that: “This right to privacy was not new. Warren
and Brandeis did not even coin the phrase, “right to privacy,” nor its common
soubriquet, “the right to be let alone”.”37 The right to be let alone is a part
of the right to enjoy life. The right to enjoy life is, in its turn, a part of
the fundamental right to life of the individual. 34 Thomas Cooley, Treatise on
the Law of Torts (1888), 2nd edition 35 Ibid, at page 29 36 Dorothy J Glancy,
“The Invention of the Right to Privacy”, Arizona Law Review (1979) Vol. 21,
No.1, at page 1. The article attributes the Roscoe Pound quotation to “Letter
from Roscoe Pound to William Chilton (1916)” as quoted in Alpheus Mason,
Brandeis : A Free Man’s Life 70 (1956). 37 Ibid, at pages 2-3. PART F 32 37 The
right to privacy was developed by Warren and Brandeis in the backdrop of the
dense urbanization which occurred particularly in the East Coast of the United
States. Between 1790 and 1890, the US population had risen from four million to
sixtythree million. The population of urban areas had grown over a hundred-fold
since the end of the civil war. In 1890, over eight million people had
immigrated to the US. Technological progress and rapid innovations had led to
the private realm being placed under stress : “…technological progress during
the post-Civil War decades had brought to Boston and the rest of the United
States “countless, littlenoticed revolutions” in the form of a variety of
inventions which made the personal lives and personalities of individuals
increasingly accessible to large numbers of others, irrespective of
acquaintance, social or economic class, or the customary constraints of
propriety. Bell invented the telephone in Boston; the first commercial
telephone exchange opened there in 1877, while Warren and Brandeis were
students at the Harvard Law School. By 1890 there were also telegraphs, fairly
inexpensive portable cameras, sound recording devices, and better and cheaper
methods of making window glass. Warren and Brandeis recognized that these
advances in technology, coupled with intensified newspaper enterprise,
increased the vulnerability of individuals to having their actions, words,
images, and personalities communicated without their consent beyond the
protected circle of family and chosen friends.”38 Coupled with this was the
trend towards ‘newspaperization’39, the increasing presence of the print media
in American society. Six months before the publication of the Warren and
Brandeis’ article, E L Godkin, a newspaper man had published an article on the
same subject in Scribner’s magazine in July 1890. Godkin, however, suggested no
38 Ibid, at pages 7-8 39 Ibid, at page 8 PART F 33 realistic remedy for
protecting privacy against intrusion, save and except “by the cudgel or the
horsewhip”40. It was Warren and Brandeis who advocated the use of the common
law to vindicate the right to privacy.41 38 Criminal libel actions were
resorted to in the US during a part of the nineteenth century but by 1890, they
had virtually ceased to be “a viable protection for individual privacy”42. The
Sedition Act of 1789 expired in 1801. Before truth came to be accepted as a
defence in defamation actions, criminal libel prosecutions flourished in the
State courts.43 Similarly, truth was not regarded as a valid defence to a civil
libel action in much of the nineteenth century. By the time Warren and Brandeis
wrote their article in 1890, publication of the truth was perhaps no longer
actionable under the law of defamation. It was this breach or lacuna that they
sought to fill up by speaking of the right to privacy which would protect the
control of the individual over her personality.44 The right to privacy evolved
as a “leitmotif” representing “the long tradition of American individualism”.45
39 Conscious as we are of the limitations with which comparative frameworks46
of law and history should be evaluated, the above account is of significance.
It reflects 40 Ibid, at page 9 41 Ibid, at page 10 42 Ibid, at page 12 43 Ibid,
at page 14 44 Ibid, at Pages 15-16 45 Id at Pages 21-22 46 Illustratively, the
Centre for Internet and Society has two interesting articles tracing the origin
of privacy within Classical Hindu Law and Islamic Law. See Ashna Ashesh and
Bhairav Acharya ,“Locating Constructs of Privacy PART G 34 the basic need of
every individual to live with dignity. Urbanization and economic development
lead to a replacement of traditional social structures. Urban ghettos replace
the tranquillity of self-sufficient rural livelihoods. The need to protect the
privacy of the being is no less when development and technological change
continuously threaten to place the person into public gaze and portend to
submerge the individual into a seamless web of inter-connected lives. G Natural
and inalienable rights 40 Privacy is a concomitant of the right of the
individual to exercise control over his or her personality. It finds an origin
in the notion that there are certain rights which are natural to or inherent in
a human being. Natural rights are inalienable because they are inseparable from
the human personality. The human element in life is impossible to conceive
without the existence of natural rights. In 1690, John Locke had in his Second
Treatise of Government observed that the lives, liberties and estates of
individuals are as a matter of fundamental natural law, a private preserve. The
idea of a private preserve was to create barriers from outside interference. In
1765, William Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of England spoke of a
“natural liberty”. There were, in his view, absolute rights which were vested
in the individual by the immutable laws of nature. These absolute rights were
divided into within Classical Hindu Law”, The Centre for Internet and Society,
available at
https://cis-india.org/internetgovernance/blog/loading-constructs-of-privacy-within-classical-hindu-law.
See also Vidushi Marda and Bhairav Acharya, “Identifying Aspects of Privacy in
Islamic Law”, The Centre for Internet and Society, available at
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/identifying-aspects-of-privacy-in-islamic-law
PART G 35 rights of personal security, personal liberty and property. The right
of personal security involved a legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of life,
limbs, body, health and reputation by an individual. 41 The notion that certain
rights are inalienable was embodied in the American Declaration of Independence
(1776) in the following terms: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness”. (emphasis supplied) The term inalienable rights was incorporated in
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) adopted by the
French National Assembly in the following terms: “For its drafters, to ignore,
to forget or to depreciate the rights of man are the sole causes of public
misfortune and government corruption. These rights are natural rights,
inalienable and sacred, the National Assembly recognizes and proclaims them-it
does not grant, concede or establish them-and their conservation is the reason
for all political communities; within these rights figures resistance to
oppression”. (emphasis supplied) 42 In 1921, Roscoe Pound, in his work titled
“The Spirit of the Common Law”, explained the meaning of natural rights:
“Natural rights mean simply interests which we think ought to be secured;
demands which human beings may make which we think ought to be satisfied. It is
perfectly true that neither law nor state PART G 36 creates them. But it is
fatal to all sound thinking to treat them as legal conceptions. For legal
rights, the devices which law employs to secure such of these interests as it
is expedient to recognize, are the work of the law and in that sense the work
of the state.”47 Two decades later in 1942, Pound in “The Revival of Natural Law”
propounded that: “Classical natural law in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries had three postulates. One was natural rights, qualities of the ideal
or perfect man in a state of perfection by virtue of which he ought to have
certain things or be able to do certain things. These were a guarantee of
stability because the natural rights were taken to be immutable and
inalienable. (2) The social compact, a postulated contract basis of civil
society. Here was a guide to change. (3) An ideal law of which positive laws
were only declaratory; an ideal body of perfect precepts governing human
relations and ordering human conduct, guaranteeing the natural rights and
expressing the social compact.”48 (emphasis supplied) 43 In 1955, Edwin W
Patterson in “A Pragmatist Looks At Natural Law and Natural Rights” observed
that rights which individuals while making a social compact to create a
government, reserve to themselves, are natural rights because they originate in
a condition of nature and survive the social compact. In his words: “The basic
rights of the citizen in our political society are regarded as continuing from
a prepolitical condition or as arising in society independently of positive
constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions, which merely seek to “secure”
or “safeguard” rights already reserved. These rights are not granted by a
benevolent despot to his grateful subjects. The “natural rights” theory thus
provided a convenient ideology for the preservation of such important rights as
freedom of speech, freedom of religion and procedural due process of law. As a
pragmatist, I should prefer to 47 Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law,
Marshall Jones Company (1921), at page 92 48 Roscoe Pound, “The Revival of
Natural Law”, Notre Damne Lawyer (1942), Vol. 27, No 4, at page 330 PART G 37
explain them as individual and social interests which arise or exist normally
in our culture and are tuned into legal rights by being legally protected.” 49
44 Natural rights are not bestowed by the state. They inhere in human beings
because they are human. They exist equally in the individual irrespective of
class or strata, gender or orientation. 45 Distinguishing an inalienable right
to an object from the object itself emphasises the notion of inalienability.
All human beings retain their inalienable rights (whatever their situation,
whatever their acts, whatever their guilt or innocence). The concept of natural
inalienable rights secures autonomy to human beings. But the autonomy is not
absolute, for the simple reason that, the concept of inalienable rights
postulates that there are some rights which no human being may alienate. While
natural rights protect the right of the individual to choose and preserve
liberty, yet the autonomy of the individual is not absolute or total. As a
theoretical construct, it would otherwise be strictly possible to hire another
person to kill oneself or to sell oneself into slavery or servitude. Though
these acts are autonomous, they would be in violation of inalienable rights.
This is for the reason that: “…These acts, however autonomous, would be in
violation of inalienable rights, as the theories would have it. They would be
morally invalid, and ineffective actually to alienate inalienable rights.
Although self-regarding, they pretend to an autonomy that does not exist.
Inalienable rights are precisely directed against such false 49 Edwin W.
Patterson, “A Pragmatist Looks At Natural Law and Natural Rights”, in Arthur L.
Harding ed., Natural Law and Natural Rights (1955), at pages 62-63 PART G 38
autonomy. Natural inalienable rights, like other natural rights, have long
rested upon what has been called the law of nature of natural law. Perhaps all
of the theories discussed above could be called law of nature or natural law
theories. The American tradition, even as early as 1641, ten years before
Thomas Hobbes published Leviathan, included claims of natural rights, and these
claims appealed to the law of nature, often in terms. Without a moral order of
the law of nature sort, natural inalienable rights are difficult to pose. “’It
is from natural law, and from it alone, that man obtains those rights we refer
to as inalienable and inviolable…Human rights can have no foundation other than
natural law.”50 46 The idea that individuals can have rights against the State
that are prior to rights created by explicit legislation has been developed as
part of a liberal theory of law propounded by Ronald Dworkin. In his seminal
work titled “Taking Rights Seriously” 51 (1977), he states that: “Individual rights
are political trumps held by individuals. Individuals have rights when, for
some reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient justification for denying
them what they wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient
justification for imposing some loss or injury upon them.”52 (emphasis
supplied) Dworkin asserts the existence of a right against the government as
essential to protecting the dignity of the individual: “It makes sense to say
that a man has a fundamental right against the Government, in the strong sense,
like free speech, if that right is necessary to protect his dignity, or his
standing 50 Craig A. Ster and Gregory M. Jones, “The Coherence of Natural
Inalienable Rights”, UMKC Law Review (2007- 08), Volume 76 (4), at pages 971-972
51 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth (1977) 52 Ibid, at page
xi PART G 39 as equally entitled to concern and respect, or some other personal
value of like consequence.”53 (emphasis supplied) Dealing with the question
whether the Government may abridge the rights of others to act when their acts
might simply increase the risk, by however slight or speculative a margin, that
some person’s right to life or property will be violated, Dworkin says : “But
no society that purports to recognize a variety of rights, on the ground that a
man’s dignity or equality may be invaded in a variety of ways, can accept such
a principle54… If rights make sense, then the degrees of their importance
cannot be so different that some count not at all when others are mentioned55…
If the Government does not take rights seriously, then it does not take law
seriously either56…” Dworkin states that judges should decide how widely an
individual’s rights extend. He states: “Indeed, the suggestion that rights can
be demonstrated by a process of history rather than by an appeal to principle
shows either a confusion or no real concern about what rights are… This has
been a complex argument, and I want to summarize it. Our constitutional system
rests on a particular moral theory, namely, that men have moral rights against
the state. The different clauses of the Bill of Rights, like the due process
and equal protection clauses, must be understood as appealing to moral concepts
rather than laying down particular concepts; therefore, a court that undertakes
the burden of applying these clauses fully as law must 53 Ibid, at page 199 54
Ibid, at page 203 55 Ibid, at page 204 56 Ibid, at page 205 PART H 40 be an
activist court, in the sense that it must be prepared to frame and answer
questions of political morality…”57 A later section of this judgment deals with
how natural and inalienable rights have been developed in Indian precedent. H
Evolution of the privacy doctrine in India 47 Among the early decisions of this
Court following Kharak Singh was R M Malkani v State of Maharashtra58. In that
case, this Court held that Section 25 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 was not
violated because : “Where a person talking on the telephone allows another
person to record it or to hear it, it cannot be said that the other person who
is allowed to do so is damaging, removing, tampering, touching machinery
battery line or post for intercepting or acquainting himself with the contents
of any message. There was no element of coercion or compulsion in attaching the
tape recorder to the telephone.”59 This Court followed the same line of
reasoning as it had in Kharak Singh while rejecting a privacy based challenge
under Article 21. Significantly, the Court observed that : “Article 21 was
invoked by submitting that the privacy of the appellant’s conversation was
invaded. Article 21 contemplates procedure established by law with regard to
deprivation of life or personal liberty. The telephone conversation of an
innocent citizen will be protected by Courts against wrongful or high handed
interference by tapping the conversation. The protection is not for 57 Ibid, at
page 147 58 (1973) 1 SCC 471 59 Ibid, at page 476 (para 20) PART H 41 the
guilty citizen against the efforts of the police to vindicate the law and
prevent corruption of public servants. It must not be understood that the Court
will tolerate safeguards for the protection of the citizen to be imperilled by
permitting the police to proceed by unlawful or irregular methods.”60 In other
words, it was the targeted and specific nature of the interception which
weighed with the Court, the telephone tapping being directed at a guilty
person. Hence the Court ruled that the telephone conversation of an innocent
citizen will be protected against wrongful interference by wiretapping. 48 In
Gobind61, a Bench of three judges of this Court considered a challenge to the
validity of Regulations 855 and 856 of State Police Regulations under which a
history sheet was opened against the petitioner who had been placed under
surveillance. The Bench of three judges adverted to the decision in Kharak
Singh and to the validation of the Police Regulations (other than domiciliary
visits at night). By the time the decision was handed down in Gobind, the law
in the US had evolved and this Court took note of the decision in Griswold v
Connecticut62 (“Griswold”) in which a conviction under a statute on a charge of
giving information and advice to married persons on contraceptive methods was
held to be invalid. This Court adverted to the dictum that specific guarantees
of the Bill of Rights have penumbras which create zones of privacy. The Court
also relied upon the US Supreme Court decision in Jane Roe v Henry Wade63 in
which the Court upheld the right of a married woman 60 Ibid, at page 479 (para
31) 61 (1975) 2 SCC 148 62 381 US 479 (1965) 63 410 US 113 (1973) PART H 42 to
terminate her pregnancy as a part of the right of personal privacy. The
following observations of Justice Mathew, who delivered the judgment of the
Court do indicate a constitutional recognition of the right to be let alone :
“There can be no doubt that the makers of our Constitution wanted to ensure
conditions favourable to the pursuit of happiness. They certainly realized as
Brandeis, J. said in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States64, the
significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect
and that only a part of the pain, pleasure, satisfaction of life can be found
in material things and therefore, they must be deemed to have conferred upon
the individual as against the government a sphere where he should be let
alone”.65 These observations follow upon a reference to the Warren and Brandeis
article; the two decisions of the US Supreme Court noted earlier; the writings
of Locke and Kant; and to dignity, liberty and autonomy. 49 Yet a close reading
of the decision in Gobind would indicate that the Court eventually did not
enter a specific finding on the existence of a right to privacy under the
Constitution. The Court indicated that if the Court does find that a particular
right should be protected as a fundamental privacy right, it could be
overridden only subject to a compelling interest of the State : “There can be
no doubt that privacy-dignity claims deserve to be examined with care and to be
denied only when an important countervailing interest is shown to be superior.
If the Court does find that a claimed right is entitled to protection as a
fundamental privacy right, a law infringing it must satisfy the compelling
State interest test. Then the question would be 64 277 US 438 (1928) 65 Supra
note 6, at page 155 (para 20) PART H 43 whether a State interest is of such
paramount importance as would justify an infringement of the right.”66
(emphasis supplied) While emphasising individual autonomy and the dangers of
individual privacy being eroded by new developments that “will make it possible
to be heard in the street what is whispered in the closet”, the Court had
obvious concerns about adopting a broad definition of privacy since the right
of privacy “is not explicit in the Constitution”. Observing that the concept of
privacy overlaps with liberty, this Court noted thus : “Individual autonomy,
perhaps the central concern of any system of limited government, is protected
in part under our Constitution by explicit constitutional guarantees. In the
application of the Constitution our contemplation cannot only be of what has
been but what may be. Time works changes and brings into existence new
conditions. Subtler and far reaching means of invading privacy will make it
possible to be heard in the street what is whispered in the closet. Yet, too
broad a definition of privacy raises serious questions about the propriety of
judicial reliance on a right that is not explicit in the Constitution. Of
course, privacy primarily concerns the individual. It therefore relates to and
overlaps with the concept of liberty. The most serious advocate of privacy must
confess that there are serious problems of defining the essence and scope of
the right. Privacy interest in autonomy must also be placed in the context of
other rights and values.”67 (emphasis supplied) Justice Mathew proceeded to
explain what any right of privacy must encompass and protect and found it to be
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty : “Any right to privacy must
encompass and protect the personal intimacies of the home, the family,
marriage, motherhood, procreation and child rearing. This catalogue approach to
the question is obviously not as instructive as it does not give an analytical
picture of the distinctive characteristics of the right of 66 Ibid, at page 155
(para 22) 67 Ibid, at page 156 (para 23) PART H 44 privacy. Perhaps, the only
suggestion that can be offered as unifying principle underlying the concept has
been the assertion that a claimed right must be a fundamental right implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.”68 In adverting to ordered liberty, the
judgment is similar to the statement in the judgment of Justice Rajagopala
Ayyangar in Kharak Singh which found the intrusion of the home by nightly
domiciliary visits a violation of ordered liberty. The Court proceeded to hold
that in any event, the right to privacy will need a case to case elaboration.
The following observations were carefully crafted to hold that even on the
“assumption” that there is an independent right of privacy emanating from
personal liberty, the right to movement and free speech, the right is not
absolute: “The right to privacy in any event will necessarily have to go
through a process of case-by-case development. Therefore, even assuming that
the right to personal liberty, the right to move freely throughout the
territory of India and the freedom of speech create an independent right of
privacy as an emanation from them which one can characterize as a fundamental
right, we do not think that the right is absolute.”69 (emphasis supplied) Again
a similar “assumption” was made by the Court in the following observations:
“…Assuming that the fundamental rights explicitly guaranteed to a citizen have penumbral
zones and that the right to privacy is itself a fundamental right, that
fundamental right must be subject to restriction on the basis of compelling
public interest. As Regulation 856 has the force of law, it cannot be said that
the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 21 has been violated by
the provisions 68 Ibid, at page 156 (para 24) 69 Ibid, at page 157 (para 28)
PART H 45 contained in it : for, what is guaranteed under that Article is that
no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except by the
procedure established by ‘law’. We think that the procedure is reasonable
having regard to the provisions of Regulations 853 (c) and 857.”70 (emphasis
supplied) The Court declined to interfere with the regulations. 50 The judgment
in Gobind does not contain a clear statement of principle by the Court of the
existence of an independent right of privacy or of such a right being an
emanation from explicit constitutional guarantees. The Bench, which consisted
of three judges, may have been constrained by the dictum in the latter part of
Kharak Singh. Whatever be the reason, it is evident that in several places
Justice Mathew proceeded on the “assumption” that if the right to privacy is
protected under the Constitution, it is a part of ordered liberty and is not
absolute but subject to restrictions tailor-made to fulfil a compelling state
interest. This analysis of the decision in Gobind assumes significance because
subsequent decisions of smaller Benches have proceeded on the basis that Gobind
does indeed recognise a right to privacy. What the contours of such a right
are, emerges from a reading of those decisions. This is the next aspect to
which we now turn. 51 Malak Singh v State of Punjab and Haryana71 (“Malak
Singh”) dealt with the provisions of Section 23 of the Punjab Police Rules
under which a surveillance register 70 Ibid, at page 157-158 (para 31) 71
(1981) 1 SCC 420 PART H 46 was to be maintained among other persons, of all
convicts of a particular description and persons who were reasonably believed
to be habitual offenders whether or not, they were convicted. The validity of
the rules was not questioned in view of the decisions in Kharak Singh and
Gobind. The rules provided for modalities of surveillance. Justice O Chinnappa
Reddy speaking for a Bench of two judges of this Court recognised the need for
surveillance on habitual and potential offenders. In his view: “Prevention of
crime is one of the prime purposes of the constitution of a police force. The
preamble to the Police Act, 1861 says: “Whereas it is expedient to reorganise
the police and to make it a more efficient instrument for the prevention and
detection of crime.” Section 23 of the Police Act prescribes it as the duty of
police officers “to collect and communicate intelligence affecting the public
peace; to prevent the commission of offences and public nuisances”. In
connection with these duties it will be necessary to keep discreet surveillance
over reputed bad characters, habitual offenders and other potential offenders.
Organised crime cannot be successfully fought without close watch of suspects.
But, surveillance may be intrusive and it may so seriously encroach on the
privacy of a citizen as to infringe his fundamental right to personal liberty
guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution and the freedom of movement
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(d). That cannot be permitted. This is recognised by
the Punjab Police Rules themselves. Rule 23.7, which prescribes the mode of
surveillance, permits the close watch over the movements of the person under
surveillance but without any illegal interference. Permissible surveillance is
only to the extent of a close watch over the movements of the person under
surveillance and no more. So long as surveillance is for the purpose of
preventing crime and is confined to the limits prescribed by Rule 23.7 we do
not think a person whose name is included in the surveillance register can have
a genuine cause for complaint. We may notice here that interference in
accordance with law and for the prevention of disorder and crime is an
exception recognised even by European Convention of Human Rights to the right
to respect for a person's private and family life. Article 8 of the Convention
reads as follows: PART H 47 “(1) Everyone's right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence shall be recognised. (2) There
shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right,
except such as is in accordance with law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety, for the
prevention of disorder and crime or for the protection of health or morals.””72
(emphasis supplied) The Court did not consider it unlawful for the police to
conduct surveillance so long as it was for the purpose of preventing crime and
was confined to the limits prescribed by Rule 23.7 which, while authorising a
close watch on the movement of a person under surveillance, contained a
condition that this should be without any illegal interference. The object
being to prevent crime, the Court held that the person who is subject to
surveillance is not entitled to access the register nor was a pre-decisional
hearing compliant with natural justice warranted. Confidentiality, this Court
held, was required in the interest of the public, including keeping in
confidence the sources of information. Again the Court held: “But all this does
not mean that the police have a licence to enter the names of whoever they like
(dislike?) in the surveillance register; nor can the surveillance be such as to
squeeze the fundamental freedoms guaranteed to all citizens or to obstruct the
free exercise and enjoyment of those freedoms; nor can the surveillance so
intrude as to offend the dignity of the individual. Surveillance of persons who
do not fall within the categories mentioned in Rule 23.4 or for reasons
unconnected with the prevention of crime, or excessive surveillance falling
beyond the limits prescribed by the rules, will entitle a citizen to the court's
protection which the court will not hesitate to give. The very Rules 72 Ibid,
at pages 424-425 (para 6) PART H 48 which prescribe the conditions for making
entries in the surveillance register and the mode of surveillance appear to
recognise the caution and care with which the police officers are required to
proceed. The note following Rule 23.4 is instructive. It enjoins a duty upon
the police officer to construe the rule strictly and confine the entries in the
surveillance register to the class of persons mentioned in the rule. Similarly
Rule 23.7 demands that there should be no illegal interference in the guise of
surveillance. Surveillance, therefore, has to be unobtrusive and within
bounds.”73 The observations in Malak Singh on the issue of privacy indicate
that an encroachment on privacy infringes personal liberty under Article 21 and
the right to the freedom of movement under Article 19(1)(d). Without
specifically holding that privacy is a protected constitutional value under
Article 19 or Article 21, the judgment of this Court indicates that serious
encroachments on privacy impinge upon personal liberty and the freedom of
movement. The Court linked such an encroachment with the dignity of the
individual which would be offended by surveillance bereft of procedural
protections and carried out in a manner that would obstruct the free exercise
of freedoms guaranteed by the fundamental rights. 52 State of Maharashtra v
Madhukar Narayan Mardikar74 is another decision by a two-judge Bench which
dealt with a case of a police inspector who was alleged to have attempted to
have non-consensual intercourse with a woman by entering the hutment where she
lived. Following an enquiry, he was dismissed from service but the punishment
was modified, in appeal, to removal so as to enable him to apply for 73 Ibid,
at page 426 (para 9) 74 (1991) 1 SCC 57 PART H 49 pensionary benefits. The High
Court quashed the punishment both on the ground of a violation of the
principles of natural justice, and by questioning the character of the victim.
Holding that this approach of the High Court was misconceived, Justice A M
Ahmadi (as the learned Chief Justice then was) held that though the victim had
admitted “the dark side of her life”, she was yet entitled to her privacy : “The
High Court observes that since Banubi is an unchaste woman it would be
extremely unsafe to allow the fortune and career of a government official to be
put in jeopardy upon the uncorroborated version of such a woman who makes no
secret of her illicit intimacy with another person. She was honest enough to
admit the dark side of her life. Even a woman of easy virtue is entitled to
privacy and no one can invade her privacy as and when he likes. So also it is
not open to any and every person to violate her person as and when he wishes.
She is entitled to protect her person if there is an attempt to violate it
against her wish. She is equally entitled to the protection of law. Therefore,
merely because she is a woman of easy virtue, her evidence cannot be thrown overboard.
At the most the officer called upon to evaluate her evidence would be required
to administer caution unto himself before accepting her evidence.”75 (emphasis
supplied) As the above extract indicates, the issue before this Court was
essentially based on the appreciation of the evidence of the victim by the High
Court. However, the observations of this Court make a strong statement of the
bodily integrity of a woman, as an incident of her privacy. 53 The decision In
Life Insurance Corporation of India v Prof Manubhai D Shah76, incorrectly
attributed to the decision in Indian Express Newspapers 75 Ibid, at pages 62-63
(para 8) 76 (1992) 3 SCC 637 PART H 50 (Bombay) Pvt Ltd v Union of India77 the
principle that the right to free expression under Article 19(1)(a) includes the
privacy of communications. The judgment of this Court in Indian Express cited a
U N Report but did no more. 54 The decision which has assumed some significance
is Rajagopal78 . In that case, in a proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution,
a writ was sought for restraining the state and prison authorities from
interfering with the publication of an autobiography of a condemned prisoner in
a magazine. The prison authorities, in a communication to the publisher, denied
the claim that the autobiography had been authored by the prisoner while he was
confined to jail and opined that a publication in the name of a convict was
against prison rules. The prisoner in question had been found guilty of six
murders and was sentenced to death. Among the questions which were posed by
this Court for decision was whether a citizen could prevent another from
writing about the life story of the former and whether an unauthorized
publication infringes the citizen’s right to privacy. Justice Jeevan Reddy
speaking for a Bench of two judges recognised that the right of privacy has two
aspects: the first affording an action in tort for damages resulting from an
unlawful invasion of privacy, while the second is a constitutional right. The
judgment traces the constitutional protection of privacy to the decisions in
Kharak Singh and Gobind. This appears from the following observations: 77
(1985) 1 SCC 641 78 (1994) 6 SCC 632 PART H 51 “…The first decision of this
Court dealing with this aspect is Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. [(1964) 1 SCR
332 : AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 329] A more elaborate appraisal of
this right took place in a later decision in Gobind v.State of M.P.[(1975) 2
SCC 148 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 468] wherein Mathew, J. speaking for himself, Krishna
Iyer and Goswami, JJ. traced the origins of this right and also pointed out how
the said right has been dealt with by the United States Supreme Court in two of
its well-known decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut [381 US 479 : 14 L Ed 2d
510 (1965)] and Roe v. Wade [410 US 113 : 35 L Ed 2d 147 (1973)]…”79 The
decision in Rajagopal considers the decisions in Kharak Singh and Gobind thus:
“… Kharak Singh [(1964) 1 SCR 332 : AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 329] was
a case where the petitioner was put under surveillance as defined in Regulation
236 of the U.P. Police Regulations… Though right to privacy was referred to,
the decision turned on the meaning and content of “personal liberty” and “life”
in Article 21. Gobind [(1975) 2 SCC 148 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 468] was also a case
of surveillance under M.P. Police Regulations. Kharak Singh [(1964) 1 SCR 332 :
AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 329] was followed even while at the same
time elaborating the right to privacy…”80 The Court held that neither the State
nor its officials can impose prior restrictions on the publication of an
autobiography of a convict. In the course of its summary of the decision, the
Court held: 79 Ibid, at pages 639-640 (para 9) 80 Ibid, at page 643 (para 13)
PART H 52 “(1) The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and
liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a
“right to be let alone”. A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his
home, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and
education among other matters. None can publish anything concerning the above
matters without his consent — whether truthful or otherwise and whether
laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right to
privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages.
Position may, however, be different, if a person voluntarily thrusts himself
into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy. (2) The rule
aforesaid is subject to the exception, that any publication concerning the
aforesaid aspects becomes unobjectionable if such publication is based upon
public records including court records. This is for the reason that once a
matter becomes a matter of public record, the right to privacy no longer
subsists and it becomes a legitimate subject for comment by press and media
among others. We are, however, of the opinion that in the interests of decency
[Article 19(2)] an exception must be carved out to this rule, viz., a female
who is the victim of a sexual assault, kidnap, abduction or a like offence
should not further be subjected to the indignity of her name and the incident
being publicised in press/media. (3) There is yet another exception to the rule
in (1) above — indeed, this is not an exception but an independent rule. In the
case of public officials, it is obvious, right to privacy, or for that matter,
the remedy of action for damages is simply not available with respect to their
acts and conduct relevant to the discharge of their official duties. This is so
even where the publication is based upon facts and statements which are not
true, unless the official establishes that the publication was made (by the
defendant) with reckless disregard for truth. In such a case, it would be
enough for the defendant (member of the press or media) to prove that he acted
after a reasonable verification of the facts; it is not necessary for him to
prove that what he has written is true. Of course, where the publication is
proved to be false and actuated by malice or personal animosity, the defendant
would have no defence and would be liable for damages. It is equally obvious
that in matters not relevant to the discharge of his duties, the public
official enjoys the same protection as any other citizen, as explained in (1)
and (2) above. It needs no reiteration that judiciary, which is protected by
the power to punish for contempt of court and Parliament and legislatures
protected as their privileges are by Articles 105 and 104 PART H 53
respectively of the Constitution of India, represent exceptions to this
rule…”81 55 The judgment of Justice Jeevan Reddy regards privacy as implicit in
the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. In coming to the
conclusion, the judgment in Rajagopal notes that while Kharak Singh had
referred to the right of privacy, the decision turned on the content of life
and personal liberty in Article 21. The decision recognises privacy as a
protected constitutional right, while tracing it to Article 21. 56 In an
interesting research article on ‘State’s surveillance and the right to
privacy’, a contemporary scholar has questioned the theoretical foundation of
the decision in Rajagopal on the ground that the case essentially dealt with
cases in the US concerning privacy against governmental intrusion which was
irrelevant in the factual situation before this Court.82 In the view of the
author, Rajagopal involved a publication of an article by a private publisher
in a magazine, authored by a private individual, albeit a convict. Hence the
decision has been criticized on the ground that Rajagopal was about an action
between private parties and, therefore, ought to have dealt with privacy in the
context of tort law.83 While it is true that in Rajagopal it is a private
publisher who was seeking to publish an article about a death row convict, it
is equally true that the Court dealt with a prior restraint on publication
imposed by the 81 Ibid, at pages 649-650 (para 26) 82 Gautam Bhatia, “State
Surveillance and the Right to Privacy in India: A Constitutional Biography”,
National Law School of India Review (2014), Vol. 26(2), at pages 138-139 83
Ibid PART H 54 state and its prison officials. That is, in fact, how Article 32
was invoked by the publisher. 57 The intersection between privacy and medical
jurisprudence has been dealt with in a series of judgments of this Court, among
them being Mr X v Hospital Z84 . In that case, the appellant was a doctor in
the health service of a state. He was accompanying a patient for surgery from
Nagaland to Chennai and was tested when he was to donate blood. The blood
sample was found to be HIV+. The appellant claiming to have been socially
ostracized by the disclosure of his HIV+ status by the hospital, filed a claim
for damages before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC)
alleging that the hospital had unauthorizedly disclosed his HIV status
resulting in his marriage being called off and in social opprobrium. Justice
Saghir Ahmad, speaking for a Bench of two judges of this Court, adverted to the
duty of the doctor to maintain secrecy in relation to the patient but held that
there is an exception to the rule of confidentiality where public interest will
override that duty. The judgment of this Court dwelt on the right of privacy
under Article 21 and other provisions of the Constitution relating to the
fundamental rights and the Directive Principles: “Right to privacy has been
culled out of the provisions of Article 21 and other provisions of the
Constitution relating to the Fundamental Rights read with the Directive
Principles of State Policy. It was in this context that it was held by this
Court in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. [AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332]
that police surveillance of a person by domiciliary visits would be violative
of 84 (1998) 8 SCC 296 PART H 55 Article 21 of the Constitution. This decision
was considered by Mathew, J. in his classic judgment in Gobind v. State of M.P.
[(1975) 2 SCC 148 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 468] in which the origin of “right to
privacy” was traced and a number of American decisions, including Munn v.
Illinois [94 US 113 : 24 L Ed 77 (1877)] , Wolf v. Colorado [338 US 25 : 93 L
Ed 1782 (1949)] and various articles were considered…”85 The Court read the
decision in Malak Singh as reiterating the view taken earlier, on privacy in
Kharak Singh and Gobind. The Court proceeded to rely on the decision in
Rajagopal. The Court held that the right to privacy is not absolute and is
subject to action lawfully taken to prevent crime or disorder or to protect the
health, morals and the rights and freedoms of others. Public disclosure of even
true facts, the Court held, may amount to invasion of the right to privacy or
the right to be let alone when a doctor breaches confidentiality. The Court
held that: “Disclosure of even true private facts has the tendency to disturb a
person's tranquillity. It may generate many complexes in him and may even lead
to psychological problems. He may, thereafter, have a disturbed life all
through. In the face of these potentialities, and as already held by this Court
in its various decisions referred to above, the right of privacy is an
essential component of the right to life envisaged by Article 21. The right,
however, is not absolute and may be lawfully restricted for the prevention of
crime, disorder or protection of health or morals or protection of rights and
freedom of others.”86 However, the disclosure that the appellant was HIV+ was
held not to be violative of the right to privacy of the appellant on the ground
that the woman to whom he was to 85 Ibid, at page 305 (para 21) 86 Ibid, at
page 307 (para 28) PART H 56 be married “was saved in time by such disclosure
and from the risk of being infected”. The denial of a claim for compensation by
the NCDRC was upheld. 58 The decision in Mr X v Hospital Z fails to adequately
appreciate that the latter part of the decision in Kharak Singh declined to
accept privacy as a constitutional right, while the earlier part invalidated
domiciliary visits in the context of an invasion of ‘ordered liberty’.
Similarly, several observations in Gobind proceed on an assumption: if there is
a right of privacy, it would comprehend certain matters and would be subject to
a regulation to protect compelling state interests. 59 In a decision of a Bench
of two judges of this Court in PUCL87, the Court dealt with telephone tapping.
The petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of Section 5(2) of the
Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 and urged in the alternative for adopting procedural
safeguards to curb arbitrary acts of telephone tapping. Section 5(2) authorises
the interception of messages in transmission in the following terms: “On the
occurrence of any public emergency, or in the interest of the public safety,
the Central Government or a State Government or any officer specially
unauthorised in this behalf by the Central Government or a State Government
may, if satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interests
of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly
relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to
the commission of an offence, for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order,
direct that any message or class of messages to or from any person or class of
persons, or relating to any particular subject, brought for transmission by or
transmitted or received by any 87 (1997) 1 SCC 301 PART H 57 telegraph, shall
not be transmitted, or shall be intercepted or detained, or shall be disclosed
to the Government making the order or an officer thereof mentioned in the
order: Provided that press messages intended to be published in India of
correspondents accredited to the Central Government or a State Government shall
not be intercepted or detained, unless their transmission has been prohibited
under this sub-section.” 60 The submission on the invalidity of the statutory
provision authorising telephone tapping was based on the right to privacy being
a fundamental right under Articles 19(1) and 21 of the Constitution. Justice
Kuldip Singh adverted to the observations contained in the majority judgment in
Kharak Singh which led to the invalidation of the provision for domiciliary
visits at night under Regulation 236(b). PUCL cited the minority view of
Justice Subba Rao as having gone even further by invalidating Regulation 236,
in its entirety. The judgment, therefore, construes both the majority and
minority judgments as having affirmed the right to privacy as a part of Article
21: “Article 21 of the Constitution has, therefore, been interpreted by all the
seven learned Judges in Kharak Singh case [(1964) 1 SCR 332 : AIR 1963 SC 1295]
(majority and the minority opinions) to include that “right to privacy” as a
part of the right to “protection of life and personal liberty” guaranteed under
the said Article.”88 Gobind was construed to have upheld the validity of State
Police Regulations providing surveillance on the ground that the ‘procedure
established by law’ under Article 21 had not been violated. After completing
its summation of precedents, Justice Kuldip Singh held as follows: 88 Ibid, at
page 310 (para 14) PART H 58 “We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that
right to privacy is a part of the right to “life” and “personal liberty”
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. Once the facts in a given case
constitute a right to privacy, Article 21 is attracted. The said right cannot
be curtained “except according to procedure established by law”.”89 Telephone
conversations were construed to be an important ingredient of privacy and the
tapping of such conversations was held to infringe Article 21, unless permitted
by ‘procedure established by law’ : “The right to privacy — by itself — has not
been identified under the Constitution. As a concept it may be too broad and
moralistic to define it judicially. Whether right to privacy can be claimed or
has been infringed in a given case would depend on the facts of the said case.
But the right to hold a telephone conversation in the privacy of one's home or
office without interference can certainly be claimed as “right to privacy”.
Conversations on the telephone are often of an intimate and confidential
character. Telephone conversation is a part of modern man's life. It is
considered so important that more and more people are carrying mobile telephone
instruments in their pockets. Telephone conversation is an important facet of a
man's private life. Right to privacy would certainly include telephone
conversation in the privacy of one's home or office. Telephonetapping would,
thus, infract Article 21 of the Constitution of India unless it is permitted
under the procedure established by law.”90 The Court also held that telephone
tapping infringes the guarantee of free speech and expression under Article
19(1)(a) unless authorized by Article 19(2). The judgment relied on the
protection of privacy under Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (and a similar guarantee under Article 12 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights) which, in its view, must be an interpretative tool
for 89 Ibid, at page 311 (para 17) 90 Ibid, at page 311 (para 18) PART H 59
construing the provisions of the Constitution. Article 21, in the view of the
Court, has to be interpreted in conformity with international law. In the
absence of rules providing for the precautions to be adopted for preventing
improper interception and/or disclosure of messages, the fundamental rights
under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 could not be safeguarded. But the Court was not
inclined to require prior judicial scrutiny before intercepting telephone
conversations. The Court ruled that it would be necessary to lay down
procedural safeguards for the protection of the right to privacy of a person
until Parliament intervened by framing rules under Section 7 of the Telegraph
Act. The Court accordingly framed guidelines to be adopted in all cases
envisaging telephone tapping. 61 The judgment in PUCL construes the earlier
decisions in Kharak Singh (especially the majority view on the invalidity of
domiciliary visits), Gobind and Rajagopal in holding that the right to privacy
is embodied as a constitutionally protected right under Article 21. The Court
was conscious of the fact that the right to privacy has “by itself” not been
identified under the Constitution. The expression “by itself” may indicate one
of two meanings. The first is that the Constitution does not recognise a
standalone right to privacy. The second recognizes that there is no express
delineation of such a right. Evidently, the Court left the evolution of the
contours of the right to a case by case determination. Telephone conversations
from the home or office were construed to be an integral element of the privacy
of an individual. In PUCL, the Court consciously established the linkages
between various articles conferring guarantees of fundamental rights when it
noted that wire-tapping PART H 60 infringes privacy and in consequence the
right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and the freedom of speech
and expression under Article 19(1)(a). The need to read the fundamental
constitutional guarantees with a purpose illuminated by India’s commitment to
the international regime of human rights’ protection also weighed in the
decision. Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act was to be regulated by rules framed
by the Government to render the modalities of telephone tapping fair, just and
reasonable under Article 21. The importance which the Court ascribes to privacy
is evident from the fact that it did not await the eventual formulation of
rules by Parliament and prescribed that in the meantime, certain procedural
safeguards which it envisaged should be put into place. 62 While dealing with a
case involving the rape of an eight year old child, a threejudge Bench of this
Court in State of Karnataka v Krishnappa91 held: “Sexual violence apart from
being… dehumanising… is an unlawful intrusion of the right to privacy and
sanctity… It… offends her… dignity.”92 Similar observations were made in
Sudhansu Sekhar Sahoo v State of Orissa93 . 63 In Sharda v Dharmpal94, the appellant
and respondent were spouses. The respondent sued for divorce and filed an
application for conducting a medical examination of the appellant which was
opposed. The Trial Court allowed the 91 (2000) 4 SCC 75 92 Ibid, at page 82
(para 15) 93 (2002) 10 SCC 743 94 (2003) 4 SCC 493 PART H 61 application. The
High Court dismissed the challenge in a Civil Revision which led the appellant
to move this Court. The appellant argued before this Court that compelling her
to undergo a medical examination violated her personal liberty under Article 21
and that in the absence of an empowering provision, the matrimonial Court had
no jurisdiction to compel a party to undergo a medical examination. Justice S B
Sinha, speaking for the Bench of three judges, dealt with the first aspect of
the matter (whether a matrimonial Court has jurisdiction to order a medical
examination) in the following terms: “Even otherwise the court may issue an
appropriate direction so as to satisfy itself as to whether apart from
treatment he requires adequate protection inter alia by way of legal aid so
that he may not be subject to an unjust order because of his incapacity.
Keeping in view of the fact that in a case of mental illness the court has
adequate power to examine the party or get him examined by a qualified doctor,
we are of the opinion that in an appropriate case the court may take recourse
to such a procedure even at the instance of the party to the lis95…
Furthermore, the court must be held to have the requisite power even under Section
151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to issue such direction either suo motu or
otherwise which, according to him, would lead to the truth.96 ” 64 The second
question considered by the Court was whether a compulsive subjecting of a
person to a medical examination violates Article 21. After noticing the
observations in M P Sharma and Kharak Singh where it was held that the
Constitution has not guaranteed the right of privacy, the Court held that in
subsequent decisions, such a right has been read into Article 21 on an
expansive interpretation of 95 Ibid, at page 513 (para 52) 96 Ibid, at page 513
(para 53) PART H 62 personal liberty. In the course of its judgment, the Court
adverted to the decisions in Rajagopal, PUCL, Gobind and Mr X v Hospital Z on
the basis of which it stated that it had “outlined the law relating to privacy
in India”. In the view of this Court, in matrimonial cases where a decree of
divorce is sought on medical grounds, a medical examination is the only way in
which an allegation could be proved. In such a situation: “If the respondent
avoids such medical examination on the ground that it violates his/her right to
privacy or for that matter right to personal liberty as enshrined under Article
21 of the Constitution of India, then it may in most of such cases become
impossible to arrive at a conclusion. It may render the very grounds on which
divorce is permissible nugatory. Therefore, when there is no right to privacy
specifically conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution of India and with the
extensive interpretation of the phrase “personal liberty” this right has been
read into Article 21, it cannot be treated as an absolute right…”97 The right
of privacy was held not to be breached. 65 In District Registrar and Collector,
Hyderabad v Canara Bank98 (“Canara Bank”), a Bench of two judges of this Court
considered the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (as amended by a
special law in Andhra Pradesh). Section 73, which was invalidated by the High
Court, empowered the Collector to inspect registers, books and records, papers,
documents and proceedings in the custody of any public officer ‘to secure any
duty or to prove or would lead to the discovery of a fraud or omission’.
Section 73 was in the following terms: 97 Ibid, at page 523 (para 76) 98 (2005)
1 SCC 496 PART H 63 “73. Every public officer having in his custody any
registers, books, records, papers, documents or proceedings, the inspection
whereof may tend to secure any duty, or to prove or lead to the discovery of
any fraud or omission in relation to any duty, shall at all reasonable times
permit any person authorised in writing by the Collector to inspect for such
purpose the registers, books, papers, documents and proceedings, and to take
such notes and extracts as he may deem necessary, without fee or charge.” After
adverting to the evolution of the doctrine of privacy in the US from a right
associated with property99 to a right associated with the individual100, Chief
Justice Lahoti referred to the penumbras created by the Bill of Rights
resulting in a zone of privacy101 leading up eventually to a “reasonable
expectation of privacy”102. Chief Justice Lahoti considered the decision in M P
Sharma to be “of limited help” to the discussion on privacy. However, it was
Kharak Singh which invalidated nightlydomiciliary visits that provided guidance
on the issue. The evaluation of Kharak Singh was in the following terms:
“In…Kharak Singh v State of U P [(1964) 1 SCR 332 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 329] the
U.P. Regulations regarding domiciliary visits were in question and the majority
referred to Munn v. Illinois [94 US 113 : 24 L Ed 77 (1877)] and held that
though our Constitution did not refer to the right to privacy expressly, still
it can be traced from the right to “life” in Article 21. According to the
majority, clause 236 of the relevant Regulations in U.P., was bad in law; it
offended Article 21 inasmuch as there was no law permitting interference by
such visits. The majority did not go into the question whether these visits
violated the “right to privacy”. But, Subba Rao, J. while concurring that the
fundamental right to privacy was part of the right to liberty in Article 21,
part of the right to freedom of speech and expression in Article 19(1)(a), and
also of the right to movement in Article 19(1)(d), held that the Regulations
permitting surveillance 99 Boyd v United States, 116 US 616 (1886) 100 Olmstead
v United States, 277 US 438 (1928) 101 Griswold v State of Connecticut, 381 US
479 (1965) 102 Katz v United States, 389 US 347 (1967) PART H 64 violated the
fundamental right of privacy. In the discussion the learned Judge referred to
Wolf v. Colorado [338 US 25 : 93 L Ed 1782 (1949)] . In effect, all the seven
learned Judges held that the “right to privacy” was part of the right to “life”
in Article 21.”103 (emphasis supplied) The decision in Gobind is construed to
have implied the right to privacy in Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the
Constitution: “We have referred in detail to the reasons given by Mathew, J. in
Gobind to show that, the right to privacy has been implied in Articles 19(1)(a)
and (d) and Article 21; that, the right is not absolute and that any State
intrusion can be a reasonable restriction only if it has reasonable basis or
reasonable materials to support it.”104 (emphasis supplied) The Court dealt
with the application of Section 73 of the Indian Stamp Act (as amended), to
documents of a customer in the possession of a bank. The Court held: “Once we
have accepted in Gobind [(1975) 2 SCC 148 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 468] and in later cases
that the right to privacy deals with “persons and not places”, the documents or
copies of documents of the customer which are in a bank, must continue to
remain confidential vis-Ã -vis the person, even if they are no longer at the
customer's house and have been voluntarily sent to a bank. If that be the
correct view of the law, we cannot accept the line of Miller [425 US 435
(1976)] in which the Court proceeded on the basis that the right to privacy is
referable to the right of “property” theory. Once that is so, then unless there
is some probable or reasonable cause or reasonable basis or material before the
Collector for reaching an opinion that the documents in the possession of the
bank tend to secure any duty or to prove or to lead to the discovery of any
fraud or omission in relation to any duty, the search or taking notes or
extracts therefore, cannot be valid. The above safeguards must necessarily be
read into the provision 103 Supra Note 95, at page 516 (para 36) 104 Ibid, at
page 518 (para 39) PART H 65 relating to search and inspection and seizure so
as to save it from any unconstitutionality.”105 Hence the Court repudiated the
notion that a person who places documents with a bank would, as a result,
forsake an expectation of confidentiality. In the view of the Court, even if
the documents cease to be at a place other than in the custody and control of
the customer, privacy attaches to persons and not places and hence the
protection of privacy is not diluted. Moreover, in the view of the Court, there
has to be a reasonable basis or material for the Collector to form an opinion
that the documents in the possession of the bank would secure the purpose of
investigating into an act of fraud or an omission in relation to duty. The
safeguards which the Court introduced were regarded as being implicit in the
need to make a search of this nature reasonable. The second part of the ruling
of the Court is equally important for it finds fault with a statutory provision
which allows an excessive delegation of the power conferred upon the Collector
to inspect documents. The provision, the Court rules, would allow the
customers’ privacy to be breached by non-governmental persons. Hence the
statute, insofar as it allowed the Collector to authorize any person to seek
inspection, would be unenforceable. In the view of the Court: “Secondly, the
impugned provision in Section 73 enabling the Collector to authorise “any
person” whatsoever to inspect, to take notes or extracts from the papers in the
public office suffers from the vice of excessive delegation as there are no
guidelines in the Act and more importantly, the section allows the facts
relating to the customer's privacy to reach non-governmental persons and would,
on that basis, be an unreasonable encroachment into the customer's rights. This
part of Section 73 permitting delegation to 105 Ibid, at page 523 (para 53)
PART H 66 “any person” suffers from the above serious defects and for that
reason is, in our view, unenforceable. The State must clearly define the officers
by designation or state that the power can be delegated to officers not below a
particular rank in the official hierarchy, as may be designated by the
State.”106 66 The significance of the judgment in Canara Bank lies first in its
reaffirmation of the right to privacy as emanating from the liberties
guaranteed by Article 19 and from the protection of life and personal liberty
under Article 21. Secondly, the Court finds the foundation for the
reaffirmation of this right not only in the judgments in Kharak Singh and
Gobind and the cases which followed, but also in terms of India’s international
commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Thirdly, the
right to privacy is construed as a right which attaches to the person. The
significance of this is that the right to privacy is not lost as a result of
confidential documents or information being parted with by the customer to the
custody of the bank. Fourthly, the Court emphasised the need to read procedural
safeguards to ensure that the power of search and seizure of the nature
contemplated by Section 73 is not exercised arbitrarily. Fifthly, access to
bank records to the Collector does not permit a delegation of those powers by
the Collector to a private individual. Hence even when the power to inspect and
search is validly exercisable by an organ of the state, necessary safeguards
would be required to ensure that the information does not travel to
unauthorised private hands. Sixthly, information provided by an individual to a
third party (in that case a bank) carries with it a reasonable expectation that
it will be utilised 106 Ibid, at page 524 (para 54) PART H 67 only for the
purpose for which it is provided. Parting with information (to the bank) does
not deprive the individual of the privacy interest. The reasonable expectation
is allied to the purpose for which information is provided. Seventhly, while
legitimate aims of the state, such as the protection of the revenue may
intervene to permit a disclosure to the state, the state must take care to
ensure that the information is not accessed by a private entity. The decision
in Canara Bank has thus important consequences for recognising informational
privacy. 67 After the decision in Canara Bank, the provisions for search and
seizure under Section 132(5) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 were construed
strictly by this Court in P R Metrani v Commissioner of Income Tax107 on the
ground that they constitute a “serious intrusion into the privacy of a
citizen”. Similarly, the search and seizure provisions of Sections 42 and 43 of
the NDPS108 Act were construed by this Court in Directorate of Revenue v Mohd
Nisar Holia109. Adverting to Canara Bank, among other decisions, the Court held
that the right to privacy is crucial and imposes a requirement of a written
recording of reasons before a search and seizure could be carried out. 68
Section 30 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 prohibited the employment of “any man
under the age of 25 years” or “any woman” in any part of the premises in which
107 (2007) 1 SCC 789 108 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
109 (2008) 2 SCC 370 PART H 68 liquor or an intoxicating drug is consumed by
the public. The provision was also challenged in Anuj Garg v Hotel Association
of India110 on the ground that it violates the right to privacy. While holding
that the provision is ultra vires, the two-judge Bench observed: “Privacy
rights prescribe autonomy to choose profession whereas security concerns
texture methodology of delivery of this assurance. But it is a reasonable
proposition that that the measures to safeguard such a guarantee of autonomy
should not be so strong that the essence of the guarantee is lost. State
protection must not translate into censorship111… Instead of prohibiting women
employment in the bars altogether the state should focus on factoring in ways
through which unequal consequences of sex differences can be eliminated. It is
state’s duty to ensure circumstances of safety which inspire confidence in
women to discharge the duty freely in accordance to the requirements of the
profession they choose to follow. Any other policy inference (such as the one
embodied under Section 30) from societal conditions would be oppressive on the
women and against the privacy rights112… The Court’s task is to determine
whether the measures furthered by the State in form of legislative mandate, to
augment the legitimate aim of protecting the interests of women are
proportionate to the other bulk of well-settled gender norms such as autonomy,
equality of opportunity, right to privacy et al.113” (emphasis supplied) 69 In
Hinsa Virodhak Sangh v Mirzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat114 (“Hinsa Virodhak Sangh”),
this Court dealt with the closure of municipal slaughterhouses in the city of
Ahmedabad for a period of nine days each year during the Jain observance 110
(2008) 3 SCC 1 111 Ibid, at page 15 (para 35) 112 Ibid, at pages 16-17 (para
43) 113 Ibid, at page 19 (para 51) 114 (2008) 5 SCC 33 PART H 69 of paryushan,
pursuant to the resolution of the municipal corporation. The High Court had set
aside the resolutions. In appeal, this Court observed as follows: “Had the
impugned resolutions ordered closure of municipal slaughterhouses for a
considerable period of time we may have held the impugned resolutions to be
invalid being an excessive restriction on the rights of the butchers of
Ahmedabad who practise their profession of meat selling. After all, butchers
are practising a trade and it is their fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g)
of the Constitution which is guaranteed to all citizens of India. Moreover, it
is not a matter of the proprietor of the butchery shop alone. There may be also
several workmen therein who may become unemployed if the slaughterhouses are
closed for a considerable period of time, because one of the conditions of the
licence given to the shop-owners is to supply meat regularly in the city of
Ahmedabad and this supply comes from the municipal slaughterhouses of
Ahmedabad. Also, a large number of people are non-vegetarian and they cannot be
compelled to become vegetarian for a long period. What one eats is one's
personal affair and it is a part of his right to privacy which is included in
Article 21 of our Constitution as held by several decisions of this Court. In
R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N. [(1994) 6 SCC 632 : AIR 1995 SC 264] (vide SCC
para 26 : AIR para 28) this Court held that the right to privacy is implicit in
the right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21. It is a “right to be
let alone”.”115 (emphasis supplied) However, since the closure of
slaughterhouses was for a period of nine days, the Court came to the conclusion
that it did not encroach upon the freedom guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g). The
restriction was held not to be excessive. 115 Ibid, at pages 46-47 (para 27)
PART H 70 70 The decision in the State of Maharashtra v Bharat Shanti Lal
Shah116 deals with the constitutional validity of Sections 13 to 16 of the
Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act (MCOCA) which inter alia contains
provisions for intercepting telephone and wireless communications. Upholding
the provision, the Court observed: “The object of MCOCA is to prevent the
organised crime and a perusal of the provisions of the Act under challenge
would indicate that the said law authorises the interception of wire,
electronic or oral communication only if it is intended to prevent the
commission of an organised crime or if it is intended to collect the evidence
to the commission of such an organised crime. The procedures authorising such
interception are also provided therein with enough procedural safeguards, some
of which are indicated and discussed hereinbefore.”117 The safeguards that the
Court adverts to in the above extract include Section 14, which requires
details of the organized crime that is being committed or is about to be
committed, before surveillance could be authorized. The requirements also
mandate describing the nature and location of the facilities from which the
communication is to be intercepted, the nature of the communication and the
identity of the person, if it is known. A statement is also necessary on
whether other modes of enquiry or intelligence gathering were tried or had
failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or
whether these would be too dangerous or would likely result in the
identification of those connected with the operation. The duration of the
surveillance is restricted in time and the provision requires “minimal
interception”118 . 116 (2008) 13 SCC 5 117 Ibid, at page 28 (para 61) 118
Gautam Bhatia (supra note 82), at page 148 PART H 71 71 During the course of
the last decade, this Court has had occasion to deal with the autonomy of a
woman and, as an integral part, her control over the body. Suchita Srivastava v
Chandigarh Administration119 (“Suchita Srivastava”) arose in the context of the
Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act (MTP) Act, 1971. A woman who was alleged
to have been raped while residing in a welfare institution run by the government
was pregnant. The district administration moved the High Court to seek
termination of the pregnancy. The High Court directed that the pregnancy be
terminated though medical experts had opined that the victim had expressed her
willingness to bear the child. The High Court had issued this direction without
the consent of the woman which was mandated under the statute where the woman
is a major and does not suffer from a mental illness. The woman in this case
was found to suffer from a case of mild to moderate mental retardation.
Speaking for a Bench of three judges, Chief Justice Balakrishnan held that the
reproductive choice of the woman should be respected having regard to the
mandate of Section 3. In the view of the Court: “There is no doubt that a
woman's right to make reproductive choices is also a dimension of “personal
liberty” as understood under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is
important to recognise that reproductive choices can be exercised to procreate
as well as to abstain from procreating. The crucial consideration is that a
woman's right to privacy, dignity and bodily integrity should be respected.
This means that there should be no restriction whatsoever on the exercise of
reproductive choices such as a woman's right to refuse participation in sexual
activity or alternatively the insistence on use of contraceptive methods.
Furthermore, women are also free to choose birth control methods such as
undergoing sterilisation procedures. Taken to their logical 119 (2009) 9 SCC 1 PART
H 72 conclusion, reproductive rights include a woman's entitlement to carry a
pregnancy to its full term, to give birth and to subsequently raise children.
However, in the case of pregnant women there is also a “compelling State
interest” in protecting the life of the prospective child. Therefore, the
termination of a pregnancy is only permitted when the conditions specified in
the applicable statute have been fulfilled. Hence, the provisions of the MTP
Act, 1971 can also be viewed as reasonable restrictions that have been placed
on the exercise of reproductive choices.”120 (emphasis supplied) The Court
noted that the statute requires the consent of a guardian where the woman has
not attained majority or is mentally ill. In the view of the Court, there is a
distinction between mental illness and mental retardation and hence the State
which was incharge of the welfare institution was bound to respect the personal
autonomy of the woman. 72 The decision in Suchita Srivastava dwells on the
statutory right of a woman under the MTP Act to decide whether or not to
consent to a termination of pregnancy and to have that right respected where
she does not consent to termination. The statutory recognition of the right is
relatable to the constitutional right to make reproductive choices which has
been held to be an ingredient of personal liberty under Article 21. The Court
deduced the existence of such a right from a woman’s right to privacy, dignity
and bodily integrity. 120 Ibid, at page 15 (para 22) PART H 73 73 In Bhavesh
Jayanti Lakhani v State of Maharashtra121, this Court dealt with a challenge to
the validity of an arrest warrant issued by a US court and a red corner notice
issued by INTERPOL on the ground that the petitioner had, in violation of an
interim custody order, returned to India with the child. The Court did not
accept the submission that the CBI, by coordinating with INTERPOL had breached
the petitioner’s right of privacy. However, during the course of the
discussion, this Court held as follows: “Right to privacy is not enumerated as
a fundamental right either in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India
or otherwise. It, however, by reason of an elaborate interpretation by this
Court in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. [AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332]
was held to be an essential ingredient of “personal liberty”.”122 “This Court,
however, in Gobind v. State of M.P. upon taking an elaborate view of the matter
in regard to right to privacy vis-Ã -vis the Madhya Pradesh Police Regulations
dealing with surveillance, opined that the said Regulations did not violate the
“procedure established by law”. However, a limited fundamental right to privacy
as emanating from Articles 19(1)(a), (d) and 21 was upheld, but the same was
held to be not absolute wherefore reasonable restrictions could be placed in
terms of clause (5) of Article 19.”123 74 In Selvi v State of Karnataka124
(“Selvi”), a Bench of three judges of this Court dealt with a challenge to the
validity of three investigative techniques: narco-analysis, polygraph test
(lie-detector test) and Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) on the
ground that they implicate the fundamental rights under Articles 20(3) and 21
of the Constitution. The Court held that the results obtained through an
involuntary 121 (2009) 9 SCC 551 122 Ibid, at pages 584-585 (para 102) 123
Ibid, at page 585 (para 103) 124 (2010) 7 SCC 263 PART H 74 administration of
these tests are within the scope of a testimonial, attracting the protective
shield of Article 20(3) of the Constitution. Chief Justice Balakrishnan
adverted to the earlier decisions rendered in the context of privacy and noted
that thus far, judicial understanding had stressed mostly on the protection of
the body and physical actions induced by the state. The Court emphasised that
while the right against self-incrimination is a component of personal liberty
under Article 21, privacy under the constitution has a meeting point with
Article 20(3) as well. In the view of the Court: “The theory of
interrelationship of rights mandates that the right against self-incrimination
should also be read as a component of “personal liberty” under Article 21.
Hence, our understanding of the “right to privacy” should account for its
intersection with Article 20(3). Furthermore, the “rule against involuntary
confessions” as embodied in Sections 24, 25, 26 and 27 of the Evidence Act,
1872 seeks to serve both the objectives of reliability as well as voluntariness
of testimony given in a custodial setting. A conjunctive reading of Articles
20(3) and 21 of the Constitution along with the principles of evidence law
leads us to a clear answer. We must recognise the importance of personal
autonomy in aspects such as the choice between remaining silent and speaking.
An individual's decision to make a statement is the product of a private choice
and there should be no scope for any other individual to interfere with such
autonomy, especially in circumstances where the person faces exposure to
criminal charges or penalties… Therefore, it is our considered opinion that
subjecting a person to the impugned techniques in an involuntary manner
violates the prescribed boundaries of privacy. Forcible interference with a
person's mental processes is not provided for under any statute and it most
certainly comes into conflict with the “right against selfincrimination”.”125
125 Ibid, at pages 369-370 (paras 225-226) PART H 75 In tracing the right to
privacy under Article 20(3), as well as Article 21, the decision marks a
definite shift away from the M P Sharma rationale. The right not to be
compelled to speak or to incriminate oneself when accused of an offence is an
embodiment of the right to privacy. Selvi indicates how the right to privacy
can straddle the ambit of several constitutional rights - in that case,
Articles 20(3) and 21. 75 In Bhabani Prasad Jena v Orissa State Commission for
Women126, the Court was considering the question whether the High Court was
justified in issuing a direction for a DNA test of a child and the appellant
who, according to the mother of the child, was the father. It was held that:
“In a matter where paternity of a child is in issue before the court, the use
of DNA test is an extremely delicate and sensitive aspect. One view is that
when modern science gives the means of ascertaining the paternity of a child,
there should not be any hesitation to use those means whenever the occasion
requires. The other view is that the court must be reluctant in the use of such
scientific advances and tools which result in invasion of right to privacy of
an individual and may not only be prejudicial to the rights of the parties but
may have devastating effect on the child. Sometimes the result of such
scientific test may bastardise an innocent child even though his mother and her
spouse were living together during the time of conception.”127 76 In Amar Singh
v Union of India128, a Bench of two judges of this Court dealt with a petition
under Article 32 alleging that the fundamental right to privacy of the 126
(2010) 8 SCC 633 127 Ibid, at page 642 (para 21) 128 (2011) 7 SCC 69 PART H 76
petitioner was being breached by intercepting his conversations on telephone
services provided by a service provider. The Court held: “Considering the
materials on record, this Court is of the opinion that it is no doubt true that
the service provider has to act on an urgent basis and has to act in public
interest. But in a given case, like the present one, where the impugned
communication dated 9- 11-2005 is full of gross mistakes, the service provider
while immediately acting upon the same, should simultaneously verify the
authenticity of the same from the author of the document. This Court is of the
opinion that the service provider has to act as a responsible agency and cannot
act on any communication. Sanctity and regularity in official communication in
such matters must be maintained especially when the service provider is taking
the serious step of intercepting the telephone conversation of a person and by
doing so is invading the privacy right of the person concerned and which is a
fundamental right protected under the Constitution, as has been held by this
Court.”129 (emphasis supplied) 77 In Ram Jethmalani v Union of India 130 (“Ram
Jethmalani”), a Bench of two judges was dealing with a public interest litigation
concerned with unaccounted monies and seeking the appointment of a Special
Investigating Team to follow and investigate a money trail. This Court held
that the revelation of the details of the bank accounts of individuals without
the establishment of a prima facie ground of wrongdoing would be a violation of
the right to privacy. This Court observed thus: “Right to privacy is an
integral part of right to life. This is a cherished constitutional value, and
it is important that human beings be allowed domains of freedom that are free
of public scrutiny unless they act in an unlawful manner. We understand and
appreciate the fact that the situation with respect to unaccounted for monies
is 129 Ibid, at page 84 (para 39) 130 (2011) 8 SCC 1 PART H 77 extremely grave.
Nevertheless, as constitutional adjudicators we always have to be mindful of
preserving the sanctity of constitutional values, and hasty steps that derogate
from fundamental rights, whether urged by Governments or private citizens,
howsoever well meaning they may be, have to be necessarily very carefully
scrutinised. The solution for the problem of abrogation of one zone of
constitutional values cannot be the creation of another zone of abrogation of
constitutional values… The rights of citizens, to effectively seek the
protection of fundamental rights, under clause (1) of Article 32 have to be
balanced against the rights of citizens and persons under Article 21. The
latter cannot be sacrificed on the anvil of fervid desire to find instantaneous
solutions to systemic problems such as unaccounted for monies, for it would
lead to dangerous circumstances, in which vigilante investigations,
inquisitions and rabble rousing, by masses of other citizens could become the
order of the day. The right of citizens to petition this Court for upholding of
fundamental rights is granted in order that citizens, inter alia, are ever
vigilant about the functioning of the State in order to protect the
constitutional project. That right cannot be extended to being inquisitors of
fellow citizens. An inquisitorial order, where citizens' fundamental right to
privacy is breached by fellow citizens is destructive of social order. The
notion of fundamental rights, such as a right to privacy as part of right to
life, is not merely that the State is enjoined from derogating from them. It
also includes the responsibility of the State to uphold them against the
actions of others in the society, even in the context of exercise of
fundamental rights by those others.”131 (emphasis supplied) The Court held that
while the State could access details of the bank accounts of citizens as an
incident of its power to investigate and prosecute crime, this would not enable
a private citizen to compel a citizen to reveal bank accounts to the public at
large. 131 Ibid, at pages 35-36 (paras 83-84) PART H 78 78 In Sanjoy Narayan v
High Court of Allahabad132, the two-judge Bench dealt with a contempt petition
in respect of publication of an incorrect report in a newspaper which tarnished
the image of the Chief Justice of a High Court. The Court made the following
observations: “The unbridled power of the media can become dangerous if check
and balance is not inherent in it. The role of the media is to provide to the
readers and the public in general with information and views tested and found
as true and correct. This power must be carefully regulated and must reconcile
with a person's fundamental right to privacy.”133 (emphasis supplied) 79 In
Ramlila Maidan Incident v Home Secretary, Union of India134 , Justice B S
Chauhan in a concurring judgment held that: “Right to privacy has been held to
be a fundamental right of the citizen being an integral part of Article 21 of
the Constitution of India by this Court. Illegitimate intrusion into privacy of
a person is not permissible as right to privacy is implicit in the right to
life and liberty guaranteed under our Constitution. Such a right has been
extended even to woman of easy virtues as she has been held to be entitled to
her right of privacy. However, right of privacy may not be absolute and in
exceptional circumstance particularly surveillance in consonance with the
statutory provisions may not violate such a right.”135 In the view of the
Court, privacy and dignity of human life have “always been considered a
fundamental human right of every human being” like other constitutional values
such as free speech. We must also take notice of the construction placed by 132
(2011) 13 SCC 155 133 Ibid, at page 156 (para 6) 134 (2012) 5 SCC 1 135 Ibid,
at pages 119-120 (para 312) PART H 79 the judgment on the decision in Kharak
Singh as having “held that the right to privacy is a part of life under Article
21 of the Constitution” and which was reiterated in PUCL. 80 The judgment of a
Bench of two judges of this Court in Bihar Public Service Commission v Saiyed
Hussain Abbas Rizwi136 dealt with the provisions of Section 8(1)(g) of the
Right to Information Act, 2005. A person claiming to be a public-spirited
citizen sought information under the statute from the Bihar Public Service
Commission on a range of matters relating to interviews conducted by it on two
days. The commission disclosed the information save and except for the names of
the interview board. The High Court directed disclosure. Section 8(1)(g)
provides an exemption from disclosure of information of the following nature:
“information, the disclosure of which would endanger the life or physical
safety of any person or identify the source of information or assistance given
in confidence for law enforcement and security purposes.” Justice Swatanter
Kumar, speaking for the Court, held thus: “Certain matters, particularly in
relation to appointment, are required to be dealt with great confidentiality.
The information may come to knowledge of the authority as a result of
disclosure by others who give that information in confidence and with complete
faith, integrity and fidelity. Secrecy of such information shall be maintained,
thus, bringing it within the ambit of fiduciary capacity. Similarly, there may
be cases where the disclosure has no relationship to any public activity or
interest or it may even cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of the
individual. All these protections have to be given their due implementation as
they spring from statutory exemptions. It is not a decision simpliciter between
private interest and public interest. It is a matter 136 (2012) 13 SCC 61 PART
H 80 where a constitutional protection is available to a person with regard to
the right to privacy. Thus, the public interest has to be construed while
keeping in mind the balance factor between right to privacy and right to
information with the purpose sought to be achieved and the purpose that would
be served in the larger public interest, particularly when both these rights
emerge from the constitutional values under the Constitution of India.”137
(emphasis supplied) Significantly, though the Court was construing the text of
a statutory exemption contained in Section 8, it dwelt on the privacy issues
involved in the disclosure of information furnished in confidence by adverting
to the constitutional right to privacy. 81 The decision Lillu @Rajesh v State
of Haryana138 emphasized the right of rape survivors to privacy, physical and
mental integrity and dignity. The Court held thus: “In view of International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 1966; United Nations
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power 1985, rape survivors are entitled to legal recourse that does not
retraumatize them or violate their physical or mental integrity and dignity.
They are also entitled to medical procedures conducted in a manner that
respects their right to consent. Medical procedures should not be carried out
in a manner that constitutes cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and health
should be of paramount consideration while dealing with gender-based violence.
The State is under an obligation to make such services available to survivors
of sexual violence. Proper measures should be taken to ensure their safety and
there should be no arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy.” 139
(emphasis supplied) 137 Ibid, at page 74 (para 23) 138 (2013) 14 SCC 643 139
Ibid, at page 648 (para 13) PART H 81 82 In Thalappalam Service Cooperative
Bank Limited v State of Kerala140 , another Bench of two judges considered the
correctness of a decision of the Kerala High Court which upheld a circular
issued by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies. By the circular all
cooperative institutions under his administrative control were declared to be
public authorities within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Right to
Information Act, 2005. Section 8(j) contains an exemption from the disclosure
of personal information which has no relationship to any public activity or interest,
or which would cause “unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual”
unless the authority is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies its
disclosure. This Court observed that the right to privacy has been recognized
as a part of Article 21 of the Constitution and the statutory provisions
contained in Section 8(j) of the RTI Act have been enacted by the legislature
in recognition of the constitutional protection of privacy. The Court held
thus: “The right to privacy is also not expressly guaranteed under the
Constitution of India. However, the Privacy Bill, 2011 to provide for the right
to privacy to citizens of India and to regulate the collection, maintenance and
dissemination of their personal information and for penalisation for violation
of such rights and matters connected therewith, is pending. In several
judgments including Kharak Singh v. State of U.P .[AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1963) 2
Cri LJ 329] , R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N. [(1994) 6 SCC 632] , People's Union
for Civil Liberties v. Union of India [(1997) 1 SCC 301] and State of
Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah [(2008) 13 SCC 5] this Court has
recognised the right to privacy as a fundamental right emanating from Article
21 of the Constitution of India.”141 “Recognising the fact that the right to
privacy is a sacrosanct facet of Article 21 of the Constitution, the
legislation has put a lot of 140 (2013) 16 SCC 82 141 Ibid, at page 112 (para
57) PART H 82 safeguards to protect the rights under Section 8(j), as already
indicated.”142 This Court held that on facts the cooperative societies were not
public authorities and the decision under challenge was quashed. 83 In Manoj
Narula v Union of India143, a Constitution Bench of this Court was hearing a
petition filed in the public interest complaining of the increasing
criminalization of politics. Dealing with the provisions of Article 75(1) of
the Constitution, Justice Dipak Misra, while explaining the doctrine of
“constitutional implications”, considered whether the Court could read a
disqualification into the provisions made by the Constitution in addition to
those which have been provided by the legislature. In that context, the leading
judgment observes: “In this regard, inclusion of many a facet within the ambit
of Article 21 is well established. In R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N. [(1994) 6
SCC 632] , right to privacy has been inferred from Article 21. Similarly, in
Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. [(1994) 4 SCC 260 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1172 : AIR
1994 SC 1349] , inherent rights under Articles 21 and 22 have been stated.
Likewise, while dealing with freedom of speech and expression and freedom of
press, the Court, in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras [AIR 1950 SC 124 :
(1950) 51 Cri LJ 1514] , has observed that freedom of speech and expression
includes freedom of propagation of ideas… There is no speck of doubt that the
Court has applied the doctrine of implication to expand the constitutional
concepts, but the context in which the horizon has been expanded has to be
borne in mind… 142 Ibid, at page 114 (para 64) 143 (2014) 9 SCC 1 PART H 83 At
this juncture, it is seemly to state that the principle of implication is
fundamentally founded on rational inference of an idea from the words used in
the text… Any proposition that is arrived at taking this route of
interpretation must find some resting pillar or strength on the basis of
certain words in the text or the scheme of the text. In the absence of that, it
may not be permissible for a court to deduce any proposition as that would defeat
the legitimacy of reasoning. A proposition can be established by reading a
number of articles cohesively, for that will be in the domain of substantive
legitimacy.”144 (emphasis supplied) 84 In National Legal Services Authority v
Union of India145 (“NALSA”), a Bench of two judges, while dealing with the
rights of transgenders, adverted to international conventions acceded to by
India including the UDHR and ICCPR. Provisions in these conventions which
confer a protection against arbitrary and unlawful interference with a person’s
privacy, family and home would, it was held, be read in a manner which
harmonizes the fundamental rights contained in Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 with
India’s international obligations. Justice K S Radhakrishnan held that: “Gender
identity, therefore, lies at the core of one's personal identity, gender
expression and presentation and, therefore, it will have to be protected under
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. A transgender's personality
could be expressed by the transgender's behaviour and presentation. State
cannot prohibit, restrict or interfere with a transgender's expression of such
personality, which reflects that inherent personality. Often the State and its
authorities either due to ignorance or otherwise fail to digest the innate
character and identity of such persons. We, therefore, hold that values of
privacy, self-identity, autonomy and personal integrity are fundamental rights
guaranteed to members of the transgender community under Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution of 144 Ibid, at pages 47-48 (paras 69-70) 145 (2014) 5 SCC 438
PART H 84 India and the State is bound to protect and recognise those
rights.”146 Explaining the ambit of Article 21, the Court noted: “Article 21 is
the heart and soul of the Indian Constitution, which speaks of the rights to
life and personal liberty. Right to life is one of the basic fundamental rights
and not even the State has the authority to violate or take away that right.
Article 21 takes all those aspects of life which go to make a person's life
meaningful. Article 21 protects the dignity of human life, one's personal
autonomy, one's right to privacy, etc. Right to dignity has been recognised to
be an essential part of the right to life and accrues to all persons on account
of being humans. In Francis Coralie Mullin v. UT of Delhi[(1981) 1 SCC 608 :
1981 SCC (Cri) 212] (SCC pp. 618-19, paras 7 and 8), this Court held that the
right to dignity forms an essential part of our constitutional culture which
seeks to ensure the full development and evolution of persons and includes
“expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and
comingling with fellow human beings…147 Article 21, as already indicated,
guarantees the protection of “personal autonomy” of an individual. In Anuj Garg
v. Hotel Assn. of India [(2008) 3 SCC 1] (SCC p. 15, paras 34-35), this Court
held that personal autonomy includes both the negative right of not to be
subject to interference by others and the positive right of individuals to make
decisions about their life, to express themselves and to choose which
activities to take part in. Self-determination of gender is an integral part of
personal autonomy and self-expression and falls within the realm of personal
liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.148 ” Dr
Justice A K Sikri wrote a lucid concurring judgment. 146 Ibid, at page 490
(para 72) 147 Ibid, at page 490 (para 73) 148 Ibid, at page 491 (para 75) PART
H 85 NALSA indicates the rationale for grounding of a right to privacy in the
protection of gender identity within Article 15. The intersection of Article 15
with Article 21 locates a constitutional right to privacy as an expression of
individual autonomy, dignity and identity. NALSA indicates that the right to privacy
does not necessarily have to fall within the ambit of any one provision in the
chapter on fundamental rights. Intersecting rights recognise the right to
privacy. Though primarily, it is in the guarantee of life and personal liberty
under Article 21 that a constitutional right to privacy dwells, it is enriched
by the values incorporated in other rights which are enumerated in Part III of
the Constitution. 85 In ABC v The State (NCT of Delhi)149 , the Court dealt
with the question whether it is imperative for an unwed mother to specifically
notify the putative father of the child of her petition for appointment as
guardian of her child. It was stated by the mother of the child that she does
not want the future of her child to be marred by any controversy regarding his
paternity, which would indubitably result should the father refuse to
acknowledge the child as his own. It was her contention that her own
fundamental right to privacy will be violated if she is compelled to disclose
the name and particulars of the father of her child. Looking into the interest
of the child, the Bench directed that “if a single parent/unwed mother applies
for the issuance of a Birth Certificate for a child born from her womb, the
Authorities concerned may only require 149 (2015) 10 SCC 1 PART H 86 her to
furnish an affidavit to this effect, and must thereupon issue the Birth
Certificate, unless there is a Court direction to the contrary”150 . 86 While
considering the constitutional validity of the Constitution (Ninety-Ninth Amendment)
Act, 2014 which enunciated an institutional process for the appointment of
judges, the concurring judgment of Justice Madan B Lokur in Supreme Court
Advocates on Record Association v Union of India151 dealt with privacy issues
involved if disclosures were made about a candidate under consideration for
appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court or High Court. Dealing with the
right to know of the general public on the one hand and the right to privacy on
the other hand, Justice Lokur noted that the latter is an “implicit fundamental
right that all people enjoy”. Justice Lokur observed thus: “The balance between
transparency and confidentiality is very delicate and if some sensitive
information about a particular person is made public, it can have a
far-reaching impact on his/her reputation and dignity. The 99th Constitution
Amendment Act and the NJAC Act have not taken note of the privacy concerns of
an individual. This is important because it was submitted by the learned
Attorney General that the proceedings of NJAC will be completely transparent
and any one can have access to information that is available with NJAC. This is
a rather sweeping generalization which obviously does not take into account the
privacy of a person who has been recommended for appointment, particularly as a
Judge of the High Court or in the first instance as a Judge of the Supreme
Court. The right to know is not a fundamental right but at best it is an
implicit fundamental right and it is hedged in with the implicit fundamental
right to privacy that all people enjoy. The balance between the two implied
fundamental rights is difficult to maintain, 150 Ibid, at page 18 (para 28) 151
(2016) 5 SCC 1 PART H 87 but the 99th Constitution Amendment Act and the NJAC
Act do not even attempt to consider, let alone achieve that balance.”152
(emphasis supplied) 87 A comprehensive analysis of precedent has been necessary
because it indicates the manner in which the debate on the existence of a
constitutional right to privacy has progressed. The content of the
constitutional right to privacy and its limitations have proceeded on a case to
case basis, each precedent seeking to build upon and follow the previous
formulations. The doctrinal foundation essentially rests upon the trilogy of M
P Sharma – Kharak Singh – Gobind upon which subsequent decisions including
those in Rajagopal, PUCL, Canara Bank, Selvi and NALSA have contributed.
Reconsideration of the doctrinal basis cannot be complete without evaluating
what the trilogy of cases has decided. 88 M P Sharma dealt with a challenge to
a search on the ground that the statutory provision which authorized it,
violated the guarantee against self-incrimination in Article 20(3). In the
absence of a specific provision like the Fourth Amendment to the US
Constitution in the Indian Constitution, the Court answered the challenge by
its ruling that an individual who is subject to a search during the course of
which material is seized does not make a voluntary testimonial statement of the
nature that would attract Article 20(3). The Court distinguished a compulsory
search from a voluntary statement of disclosure in pursuance of a notice issued
by an authority to produce 152 Ibid, at page 676 (para 953) PART H 88
documents. It was the former category that was held to be involved in a
compulsive search, which the Court held would not attract the guarantee against
selfincrimination. The judgment, however, proceeded further to hold that in the
absence of the right to privacy having been enumerated in the Constitution, a
provision like the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution could not be read
into our own. The observation in regard to the absence of the right to privacy
in our Constitution was strictly speaking, not necessary for the decision of
the Court in M P Sharma and the observation itself is no more than a passing
observation. Moreover, the decision does not adjudicate upon whether privacy
could be a constitutionally protected right under any other provision such as
Article 21 or under Article 19. 89 Kharak Singh does not contain a reference to
M P Sharma. The decision of the majority in Kharak Singh is essentially divided
into two parts; the first dealing with the validity of a regulation for
nocturnal domiciliary visits (which was struck down) and the second dealing
with the rest of the regulation (which was upheld). The decision on the first
part, which dealt with Regulation 236(b) conveys an inescapable impression that
the regulation invaded the sanctity of the home and was a violation of ordered
liberty. Though the reasoning of the Court does not use the expression
‘privacy’, it alludes to the decision of the US Supreme Court in Wolf v
Colorado, which deals with privacy. Besides, the portion extracted in the
judgment has a reference to privacy specifically at two places. While holding
domiciliary visits at night to be invalid, the Court drew sustenance from the
right to life under Article 21 which means PART H 89 something more than a mere
animal existence. The right under Article 21 includes the enjoyment of those
faculties which render the right meaningful. Hence, the first part of the
decision in Kharak Singh represents an amalgam of life, personal liberty and
privacy. It protects interests which are grounded in privacy under the rubric
of liberty. The difficulty in construing the decision arises because in the
second part of its decision, the majority upheld the rest of the regulation and
observed (while doing so) that there is an absence of a protected right to
privacy under the Constitution. These observations in the second part are at
variance with those dealing with the first. The view about the absence of a
right to privacy is an isolated observation which cannot coexist with the
essential determination rendered on the first aspect of the regulation.
Subsequent Benches of this Court in the last five decades and more, have
attempted to make coherent doctrine out of the uneasy coexistence between the
first and the second parts of the decision in Kharak Singh. Several of them
rely on the protection of interests grounded in privacy in the first part,
under the conceptual foundation of ordered liberty. 90 Gobind proceeded on the
basis of an assumption and explains what according to the Court would be the
content of the right to privacy if it is held to be a constitutional right.
Gobind underlines that the right would be intrinsic to ordered liberty and
would cover intimate matters such as family, marriage and procreation. Gobind,
while recognizing that the right would not be absolute and would be subject to
the regulatory power of the State, conditioned the latter on the existence of a
compelling state PART H 90 interest. The decision also brings in the
requirement of a narrow tailoring of the regulation to meet the needs of a
compelling interest. The Bench which decided Gobind adverted to the decision in
Kharak Singh (though not M P Sharma). Be that as it may, Gobind has proceeded
on the basis of an assumption that the right to privacy is a constitutionally
protected right in India. Subsequent decisions of this Court have treated the
formulation of a right to privacy as one that emerges out of Kharak Singh or
Gobind (or both). Evidently, it is the first part of the decision in Kharak
Singh which is construed as having recognized a constitutional entitlement to
privacy without reconciling the second part which contains a specific
observation on the absence of a protected constitutional right to privacy in
the Constitution. Succeeding Benches of smaller strength were not obviously in
a position to determine the correctness of the M P Sharma and Kharak Singh
formulations. They had to weave a jurisprudence of privacy as new challenges
emerged from a variety of sources: wiretapping, narco-analysis, gender based
identity, medical information, informational autonomy and other manifestations
of privacy. As far as the decisions following upon Gobind are concerned, it
does emerge that the assumptions which find specific mention in several parts
of the decision were perhaps not adequately placed in perspective. Gobind has
been construed by subsequent Benches as affirming the right to privacy. 91 The
right to privacy has been traced in the decisions which have been rendered over
more than four decades to the guarantee of life and personal liberty in Article
21 PART H 91 and the freedoms set out in Article 19. In addition, India’s
commitment to a world order founded on respect for human rights has been
noticed along with the specific articles of the UDHR and the ICCPR which embody
the right to privacy.153 In the view of this Court, international law has to be
construed as a part of domestic law in the absence of legislation to the
contrary and, perhaps more significantly, the meaning of constitutional
guarantees must be illuminated by the content of international conventions to
which India is a party. Consequently, as new cases brought new issues and
problems before the Court, the content of the right to privacy has found
elaboration in these diverse contexts. These would include telephone tapping
(PUCL), prior restraints on publication of material on a death row convict
(Rajagopal), inspection and search of confidential documents involving the
banker - customer relationship (Canara Bank), disclosure of HIV status (Mr X v
Hospital Z), food preferences and animal slaughter (Hinsa Virodhak Sangh),
medical termination of pregnancy (Suchita Srivastava), scientific tests in
criminal investigation (Selvi), disclosure of bank accounts held overseas (Ram
Jethmalani) and the right of transgenders (NALSA). Early cases dealt with
police regulations authorising intrusions on liberty, such as surveillance. As
Indian society has evolved, the assertion of the right to privacy has been
considered by this Court in varying contexts replicating the choices and
autonomy of the individual citizen. 153 See Rishika Taneja and Sidhant Kumar,
Privacy Law: Principles, Injunctions and Compensation, Eastern Book Company
(2014), for a comprehensive account on the right to privacy and privacy laws in
India. PART I 92 92 The deficiency, however, is in regard to a doctrinal
formulation of the basis on which it can be determined as to whether the right
to privacy is constitutionally protected. M P Sharma need not have answered the
question; Kharak Singh dealt with it in a somewhat inconsistent formulation
while Gobind rested on assumption. M P Sharma being a decision of eight judges,
this Bench has been called upon to decide on the objection of the Union of
India to the existence of such a right in the first place. I The Indian
Constitution Preamble 93 The Preamble to the Constitution postulates that the
people of India have resolved to constitute India into a Republic which (among
other things) is Sovereign and Democratic and to secure to all its citizens:
“JUSTICE, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression,
belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to
promote among them all FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and
the unity of the Nation;…” 94 In Sajjan Singh v State of Rajasthan154, Justice
Mudholkar alluded to the fact that the Preamble to our Constitution is “not of
the common run” as is the Preamble in a legislative enactment but was marked
both by a “stamp of deep deliberation” and 154 (1965) 1 SCR 933 PART I 93
precision. This was suggestive, in the words of the Court, of the special
significance attached to the Preamble by the framers of the Constitution. 95 In
Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala155 (“Kesavananda Bharati”), Chief Justice
Sikri noticed that the Preamble is a part of the Constitution. The Preamble
emphasises the need to secure to all citizens justice, liberty, equality and
fraternity. Together they constitute the founding faith or the blueprint of
values embodied with a sense of permanence in the constitutional document. The
Preamble speaks of securing liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and
worship. Fraternity is to be promoted to assure the dignity of the individual.
The individual lies at the core of constitutional focus and the ideals of
justice, liberty, equality and fraternity animate the vision of securing a
dignified existence to the individual. The Preamble envisions a social ordering
in which fundamental constitutional values are regarded as indispensable to the
pursuit of happiness. Such fundamental values have also found reflection in the
foundational document of totalitarian regimes in other parts of the world. What
distinguishes India is the adoption of a democratic way of life, founded on the
rule of law. Democracy accepts differences of perception, acknowledges divergences
in ways of life, and respects dissent. 155 (1973) 4 SCC 225 PART I 94
Jurisprudence on dignity 96 Over the last four decades, our constitutional
jurisprudence has recognised the inseparable relationship between protection of
life and liberty with dignity. Dignity as a constitutional value finds
expression in the Preamble. The constitutional vision seeks the realisation of
justice (social, economic and political); liberty (of thought, expression,
belief, faith and worship); equality (as a guarantee against arbitrary
treatment of individuals) and fraternity (which assures a life of dignity to
every individual). These constitutional precepts exist in unity to facilitate a
humane and compassionate society. The individual is the focal point of the Constitution
because it is in the realisation of individual rights that the collective well
being of the community is determined. Human dignity is an integral part of the
Constitution. Reflections of dignity are found in the guarantee against
arbitrariness (Article 14), the lamps of freedom (Article 19) and in the right
to life and personal liberty (Article 21). 97 In Prem Shankar Shukla v Delhi
Administration156 , which arose from the handcuffing of the prisoners, Justice
Krishna Iyer, speaking for a three-judge Bench of this Court held: “…the
guarantee of human dignity, which forms part of our constitutional culture, and
the positive provisions of Articles 14, 19 and 21 spring into action when we
realise that to manacle man is more than to mortify him; it is to dehumanize
him and, therefore, to 156 (1980) 3 SCC 526 PART I 95 violate his very
personhood, too often using the mask of 'dangerousness' and security…157 The
Preamble sets the humane tone and temper of the Founding Document and
highlights Justice, Equality and the dignity of the individual. 158” 98 A Bench
of two judges in Francis Coralie Mullin v Union Territory of Delhi159 (“Francis
Coralie”) while construing the entitlement of a detenue under the Conservation
of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities (COFEPOSA) Act, 1974
to have an interview with a lawyer and the members of his family held that:
“The fundamental right to life which is the most precious human right and which
forms the ark of all other rights must therefore be interpreted in a broad and
expansive spirit so as to invest it with significance and vitality which may
endure for years to come and enhance the dignity of the individual and the
worth of the human person…160 …the right to life enshrined in Article 21 cannot
be restricted to mere animal existence. It means something much more than just
physical survival.161 …We think that the right to life includes the right to
live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare
necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and
facilities for reading, writing and expressing one-self in diverse forms,
freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings…Every
act which offends against or impairs human dignity would constitute deprivation
pro tanto of this right to live and it would have to be in accordance with
reasonable, fair and just procedure 157 Ibid, at pages 529-530 (para 1) 158
Ibid, at page 537 (para 21) 159 (1981) 1 SCC 608 160 Ibid, at page 618 (para 6)
161 Ibid, at page 618 (para 7) PART I 96 established by law which stands the
test of other fundamental rights…162 ” 99 In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of
India163, a Bench of three judges of this Court while dealing with individuals
who were living in bondage observed that: “…This right to live with human
dignity enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from the Directive
Principles of State Policy and particularly Clause (e) and (f) of “Article 39
and Arts. 41 and 42 and at the least, therefore, it must include protection of
the health and strength of the workers, men and women, and of the tender age of
children against abuse, opportunities and facilities for children to develop in
a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities,
just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. These are the minimum
requirements which must exist in order to enable a person to live with human
dignity, and nor State - neither the Central Government - has the right to take
any action which will deprive a person of the enjoyment of these basic
essentials.”164 100 Dealing with an allegation that activists of an
organization were arrested and paraded throughout the town by the police and
were beaten up in police custody, this Court in Khedat Mazdoor Chetna Sangath v
State of M P165 held that: “It is, therefore, absolutely essential in the
interest of justice, human dignity and democracy that this Court must
intervene; order an investigation determine the correct facts and take
strongest possible action against the respondents who are responsible for these
atrocities…166 162 Ibid, at pages 618-619 (para 8) 163 (1984) 3 SCC 161 164
Ibid, at page 183 (para 10) 165 (1994) 6 SCC 260 166 Ibid, at pages 262-263
(para 10) PART I 97 If dignity or honor vanishes what remains of life. 167 ”
101 Human dignity was construed in M Nagaraj v Union of India168 by a
Constitution Bench of this Court to be intrinsic to and inseparable from human
existence. Dignity, the Court held, is not something which is conferred and
which can be taken away, because it is inalienable: “The rights, liberties and
freedoms of the individual are not only to be protected against the State, they
should be facilitated by it… It is the duty of the State not only to protect
the human dignity but to facilitate it by taking positive steps in that
direction. No exact definition of human dignity exists. It refers to the
intrinsic value of every human being, which is to be respected. It cannot be
taken away. It cannot give. It simply is. Every human being has dignity by
virtue of his existence…169 India is constituted into a sovereign, democratic
republic to secure to all its citizens, fraternity assuring the dignity of the
individual and the unity of the nation. The sovereign, democratic republic
exists to promote fraternity and the dignity of the individual citizen and to
secure to the citizens certain rights. This is because the objectives of the
State can be realized only in and through the individuals. Therefore, rights
conferred on citizens and non-citizens are not merely individual or personal
rights. They have a large social and political content, because the objectives
of the Constitution cannot be otherwise realized.170” (emphasis supplied) 167
Ibid, at pages 271 (para 37) 168 (2006) 8 SCC 212 169 Ibid, at page 243-244
(para 26) 170 Ibid, at pages 247-248 (para 42) PART I 98 102 In Maharashtra
University of Health Sciences v Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal171 , this Court
held that the dignity of the individual is a core constitutional concept. In
Selvi, this Court recognised that: “…we must recognize that a forcible
intrusion into a person's mental processes is also an affront to human dignity
and liberty, often with grave and long-lasting consequences…”172 103 In Dr
Mehmood Nayyar Azam v State of Chhattisgarh173, this Court noted that when
dignity is lost, life goes into oblivion. The same emphasis on dignity finds
expression in the decision in NALSA. 104 The same principle was more recently
reiterated in Shabnam v Union of India174 in the following terms: “This right
to human dignity has many elements. First and foremost, human dignity is the
dignity of each human being ‘as a human being’. Another element, which needs to
be highlighted, in the context of the present case, is that human dignity is
infringed if a person’s life, physical or mental welfare is alarmed. It is in
this sense torture, humiliation, forced labour, etc. all infringe on human
dignity. It is in this context many rights of the accused derive from his
dignity as a human being.”175 171 (2010) 3 SCC 786 172 Ibid, at page 376 (para
244) 173 (2012) 8 SCC 1 174 (2015) 6 SCC 702 175 Ibid, at page 713 (para 14)
PART I 99 105 The recent decision in Jeeja Ghosh v Union of India176 construed
the constitutional protection afforded to human dignity. The Court observed:
“…human dignity is a constitutional value and a constitutional goal. What are
the dimensions of constitutional value of human dignity? It is beautifully
illustrated by Aharon Barak177 (former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Israel) in the following manner: “The constitutional value of human dignity has
a central normative role. Human dignity as a constitutional value is the factor
that unites the human rights into one whole. It ensures the normative unity of
human rights. This normative unity is expressed in the three ways: first, the
value of human dignity serves as a normative basis for constitutional rights
set out in the constitution; second, it serves as an interpretative principle
for determining the scope of constitutional rights, including the right to
human dignity; third, the value of human dignity has an important role in
determining the proportionality of a statute limiting a constitutional
right.”178 106 Life is precious in itself. But life is worth living because of
the freedoms which enable each individual to live life as it should be lived.
The best decisions on how life should be lived are entrusted to the individual.
They are continuously shaped by the social milieu in which individuals exist.
The duty of the state is to safeguard the ability to take decisions – the
autonomy of the individual – and not to dictate those decisions. ‘Life’ within
the meaning of Article 21 is not confined to the integrity of the physical 176
(2016) 7 SCC 761 177 Aharon Barak, Human Dignity- The Constitutional Value and
the Constitutional Right, Cambridge University Press (2015) 178 Supra Note 176,
at page 792 (para 37) PART I 100 body. The right comprehends one’s being in its
fullest sense. That which facilitates the fulfilment of life is as much within
the protection of the guarantee of life. 107 To live is to live with dignity.
The draftsmen of the Constitution defined their vision of the society in which
constitutional values would be attained by emphasising, among other freedoms,
liberty and dignity. So fundamental is dignity that it permeates the core of
the rights guaranteed to the individual by Part III. Dignity is the core which
unites the fundamental rights because the fundamental rights seek to achieve
for each individual the dignity of existence. Privacy with its attendant values
assures dignity to the individual and it is only when life can be enjoyed with
dignity can liberty be of true substance. Privacy ensures the fulfilment of
dignity and is a core value which the protection of life and liberty is
intended to achieve. Fundamental Rights cases 108 In Golak Nath v State of
Punjab179, there was a challenge to the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act,
1953 and to the Mysore Land Reforms Act (as amended) upon their inclusion in
the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution. Chief Justice Subba Rao dwelt on the
rule of law and its purpose in ensuring that every authority constituted by the
Constitution is subject to it and functions within its 179 (1967) 2 SCR 762
PART I 101 parameters. One of the purposes of constraining governmental power
was to shield the fundamental freedoms against legislative majorities. This
thought is reflected in the following extract from the judgment of Chief
Justice Subba Rao: “…But, having regard to the past history of our country, it
could not implicitly believe the representatives of the people, for
uncontrolled and unrestricted power might lead to an authoritarian State. It,
therefore, preserves the natural rights against the State encroachment and constitutes
the higher judiciary of the State as the sentinel of the said rights and the
balancing wheel between the rights, subject to social control. In short, the
fundamental rights, subject to social control, have been incorporated in the
rule of law…”180 (emphasis supplied) The learned Judge emphasised the position
of the fundamental rights thus: “…They are the rights of the people preserved
by our Constitution. “Fundamental Rights” are the modern name for what have
been traditionally known as “natural rights”. As one author puts: “they are
moral rights which every human being everywhere all times ought to have simply
because of the fact that in contradistinction with other things is rational and
moral”. They are the primordial rights necessary for the development of human
personality. They are the rights which enable a man to chalk out of his own
life in the manner he likes best…”181 (emphasis supplied) The fundamental
rights, in other words, are primordial rights which have traditionally been
regarded as natural rights. In that character these rights are inseparable from
human existence. They have been preserved by the Constitution, this being a
recognition of their existence even prior to the constitutional document. 180
Ibid, at page 788 181 Ibid, at page 789 PART I 102 109 In Kesavananda Bharati,
a Bench of 13 judges considered the nature of the amending power conferred by
Article 368 and whether the exercise of the amending power was subject to
limitations in its curtailment of the fundamental freedoms. Chief Justice Sikri
held that the fundamental rights are inalienable. In his view, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights had to be utilised to interpret the Constitution
having regard to the mandate of Article 51. India, having acceded to the Universal
Declaration, Sikri, C.J. held that the treatment of rights as inalienable must
guide the interpretation of the Court. The Chief Justice relied upon a line of
precedent holding these rights to be natural and inalienable and observed:
“300. Various decisions of this Court describe fundamental rights as ‘natural
rights’ or ‘human rights’. Some of these decisions are extracted below: “There
can be no doubt that the people of India have in exercise of their sovereign
will as expressed in the Preamble, adopted the democratic ideal, which assures
to the citizen the dignity of the individual and other cherished human values
as a means to the full evolution and expression of his personality, and in
delegating to the legislature, the executive and the judiciary their respective
powers in the Constitution, reserved to themselves certain fundamental rights
so-called, I apprehend because they have been retained by the people and made
paramount to the delegated powers, as in the American Model. (Per Patanjali
Sastri, J., in Gopalan v. State of Madras. [AIR 1950 SC 27: 1950 SCR 88,
198-199 : 1950 SCJ 174] (Emphasis supplied). (ii) “That article (Article 19)
enumerates certain freedoms under the caption ‘right to freedom’ and deals with
those great and basic rights which are recognised and guaranteed as the natural
rights inherent in the status of a citizen of a free country. (Per Patanjali
Sastri, C J., in State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose [AIR 1954 SC 92 :
1954 SCR 587, 596 : 1954 SCJ 127] ) (Emphasis supplied). PART I 103 “I have no
doubt that the framers of our Constitution drew the same distinction and
classed the natural right or capacity of a citizen ‘to acquire, hold and
dispose of property’ with other natural rights and freedoms inherent in the
status of a free citizen and embodied them in Article 19(1)… (ibid, p. 597)”
(Emphasis supplied). “For all these reasons, I am of opinion that under the
scheme of the Constitution, all those broad and basic freedoms inherent in the
status of a citizen as a free man are embodied and protected from invasion by
the State under clause (1) of Article 19…” (ibid, p. 600) (Emphasis supplied).
(iii) “The people, however, regard certain rights as paramount, because they
embrace liberty of action to the individual in matters of private life, social
intercourse and share in the Government of the country and other spheres. The
people who vested the three limbs of Government with their power and authority,
at the same time kept back these rights of citizens and also some times of non-citizens,
and made them inviolable except under certain conditions. The rights thus kept
back are placed in Part III of the Constitution, which is headed ‘Fundamental
Rights’, and the conditions under which these rights can be abridged are also
indicated in that Part. (Per Hidayatullah,J. in Ujjambai v. State of U.P.
[(1963) 1 SCR 778, 926-27 : AIR 1962 SC 1621]) (Emphasis supplied). 301. The
High Court Allahabad has described them as follows: “(iv)…man has certain
natural or inalienable rights and that it is the function of the State, in
order that human liberty might be preserved and human personality developed, to
give recognition and free play to those rights…suffice it to say that they
represent a trend in the democratic thought of our age. (Motilal v. State of
U.P.)” (Emphasis supplied).”182 This was the doctrinal basis for holding that
the fundamental rights could not be “amended out of existence”. Elaborating all
those features of the Constitution which formed a part of the basic structure,
Sikri, C J held that: 182 Supra note 155, at page 367-368 (para 300) PART I 104
“The learned Attorney-General said that every provision of the Constitution is
essential; otherwise it would not have been put in the Constitution. This is
true. But this does not place every provision of the Constitution in the same
position. The true position is that every provision of the Constitution can be
amended provided in the result the basic foundation and structure of the
Constitution remains the same. The basic structure may be said to consist of
the following features: (1) Supremacy of the Constitution; (2) Republican and
Democratic form of Government; (3) Secular character of the Constitution; (4)
Separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary;
(5) Federal character of the Constitution.”183 Justices Shelat and Grover held
that “[t]he dignity of the individual secured by the various freedoms and basic
rights in Part III and the mandate to build a welfare State contained in Part
IV”184 constituted a part of the basic structure. Justices Hegde and Mukherjea
emphasised that the primary object before the Constituent Assembly were: (i) to
constitute India into a sovereign, democratic republic and (ii) to secure its
citizens the rights mentioned in it. Hence, the learned Judges found it
impossible to accept that the Constitution makers would have made a provision
in the Constitution itself for the destruction of the very ideals which they
had embodied in the fundamental rights. Hence, Parliament had no power to
abrogate the fundamental features of the Constitution including among them “the
essential features of the individual freedoms secured to the citizens”. “On a
careful consideration of the various aspects of the case, we are convinced that
the Parliament has no power to abrogate or 183 Ibid, at page 366 (para 292) 184
Ibid, at page 454 (para 582) PART I 105 emasculate the basic elements or
fundamental features of the Constitution such as the sovereignty of India, the
democratic character of our polity, the unity of the country, the essential
features of the individual freedoms secured to the citizens. Nor has the
Parliament the power to revoke the mandate to build a welfare State and
egalitarian society. These limitations are only illustrative and not
exhaustive. Despite these limitations, however, there can be no question that
the amending power is a wide power and it reaches every Article and every part
of the Constitution. That power can be used to reshape the Constitution to
fulfil the obligation imposed on the State. It can also be used to reshape the
Constitution within the limits mentioned earlier, to make it an effective
instrument for social good. We are unable to agree with the contention that in
order to build a welfare State, it is necessary to destroy some of the human
freedoms. That, at any rate is not the perspective of our Constitution. Our
Constitution envisages that the State should without delay make available to
all the citizens of this country the real benefits of those freedoms in a
democratic way. Human freedoms are lost gradually and imperceptibly and their
destruction is generally followed by authoritarian rule. That is what history
has taught us. Struggle between liberty and power is eternal. Vigilance is the
price that we like every other democratic society have to pay to safeguard the
democratic values enshrined in our Constitution. Even the best of Governments
are not averse to have more and more power to carry out their plans and
programmes which they may sincerely believe to be in public interest. But a
freedom once lost is hardly ever regained except by revolution. Every
encroachment on freedom sets a pattern for further encroachments. Our
constitutional plan is to eradicate poverty without destruction of individual
freedoms.”185 (emphasis supplied) Justice Jaganmohan Reddy held that:
“…Parliament cannot under Article 368 expand its power of amendment so as to
confer on itself the power to repeal, abrogate the Constitution or damage,
emasculate or destroy any of the fundamental rights or essential elements of
the basic structure of the Constitution or of destroying the identity of the
Constitution…”186 185 Ibid, at pages 486-487 (para 666) 186 Ibid, at page 666
(para 1212) PART I 106 Justice Khanna in the course of the summation of his
conclusions held, as regards the power of amendment, that: “The power of
amendment under Article 368 does not include the power to abrogate the
Constitution nor does it include the power to alter the basic structure or
framework of the Constitution. Subject to the retention of the basic structure
or framework of the Constitution, the power of amendment is plenary and
includes within itself the power to amend the various articles of the
Constitution, including those relating to fundamental rights as well as those
which may be said to relate to essential features. No part of a fundamental
right can claim immunity from amendatory process by being described as the
essence, or core of that right. The power of amendment would also include
within itself the power to add, alter or repeal the various articles.”187
Significantly, even though Justice Mathew was in the minority, the learned
Judge in the course of his decision observed the importance of human dignity:
“The social nature of man, the generic traits of his physical and mental
constitution, his sentiments of justice and the morals within, his instinct for
individual and collective preservations, his desire for happiness, his sense of
human dignity, his consciousness of man’s station and purpose in life, all
these are not products of fancy but objective factors in the realm of
existence…”188 110 In Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain189, Justice Khanna
clarified that his view in Kesavananda Bharati is that Parliament in the
exercise of its power to amend the Constitution cannot destroy or abrogate the
basic structure of the Constitution. No distinction was made in regard to the
scope of the amending power relating to the 187 Ibid, at page 824 (para
1537(vii)) 188 Ibid, at pages 866-867 (para 1676) 189 (1975) 1 Suppl. SCC 1
PART I 107 provisions of the fundamental rights and in respect of matters other
than the fundamental rights: “…The limitation inherent in the word “amendment”
according to which it is not permissible by amendment of the Constitution to change
the basic structure of the Constitution was to operate equally on articles
pertaining to fundamental rights as on other articles not pertaining to those
rights…”190 Justice Khanna noted that the right to property was held by him not
to be a part of the basic structure. Justice Khanna observed that it would have
been unnecessary for him to hold so, if none of the fundamental rights were to
be a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. 111 Chandrachud C J, in
the course of his judgment for the Constitution Bench in Minerva Mills Ltd v
Union of India191 , traced the history of the evolution of inalienable rights,
founded in inviolable liberties, during the course of the freedom movement and
observed that both Parts III and IV of the Constitution had emerged as
inseparably inter-twined, without a distinction between the negative and
positive obligations of the state. The Constitution, in this view, is founded
on “the bedrock of the balance between Parts III and IV” and to give absolute
primacy to one over the other would be to disturb the harmony of the
Constitution. In the view of the Chief Justice: 190 Ibid, at page 115 (para
251) 191 (1980) 3 SCC 625 PART I 108 “The edifice of our Constitution is built
upon the concepts crystallised in the Preamble. We resolved to constitute
ourselves into a Socialist State which carried with it the obligation to secure
to our people justice – social, economic and political. We, therefore, put Part
IV into our Constitution containing directive principles of State policy which
specify the socialistic goal to be achieved. We promised to our people a
democratic polity which carries with it the obligation of securing to the
people liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; equality of
status and of opportunity and the assurance that the dignity of the individual
will at all costs be preserved. We, therefore, put Part III in our Constitution
conferring those rights on the people…”192 Articles 14 and 19, the Court held,
confer rights essential for the proper functioning of a democracy and are
universally so regarded by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Withdrawing the protection of Articles 14 and 19 was plainly impermissible and
the immunity granted by the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution to a law against
the challenge that it violates Articles 14 or 19 (if the law is for giving
effect to the Directive Principles) amounted to a violation of the basic
structure. No waiver of Fundamental Rights 112 In Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v
The State of Bombay193, Chief Justice Mahajan, speaking for the Constitution
Bench, noted the link between the constitutional vision contained in the
Preamble and the position of the fundamental rights as a means to facilitate
its fulfilment. Though Part III embodies fundamental rights, this was construed
to be part of the wider notion of securing the vision of justice 192 Ibid, at
page 654 (para 57) 193 (1955) 1 SCR 613 PART I 109 of the founding fathers and,
as a matter of doctrine, the rights guaranteed were held not to be capable of
being waived. Mahajan, CJ, observed: “We think that the rights described as
fundamental rights are a necessary consequence of the declaration in the
Preamble that the people of India have solemnly resolved to constitute India
into a sovereign democratic republic and to secure to all its citizens justice,
social, economic and political; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith
and worship; equality of status and of opportunity. These fundamental rights
have not been put in the Constitution merely for individual benefit, though
ultimately they come into operation in considering individual rights. They have
been put there as a matter of public policy and the doctrine of waiver can have
no application to provisions of law which have been enacted as a matter of
constitutional policy.”194 Privacy as intrinsic to freedom and liberty 113 The
submission that recognising the right to privacy is an exercise which would
require a constitutional amendment and cannot be a matter of judicial
interpretation is not an acceptable doctrinal position. The argument assumes
that the right to privacy is independent of the liberties guaranteed by Part
III of the Constitution. There lies the error. The right to privacy is an
element of human dignity. The sanctity of privacy lies in its functional
relationship with dignity. Privacy ensures that a human being can lead a life
of dignity by securing the inner recesses of the human personality from
unwanted intrusion. Privacy recognises the autonomy of the individual and the right
of every person to make essential choices which affect the course of life. In
doing so privacy recognises that living a life of dignity is essential for a
human being to fulfil the 194 Ibid, at pages 653-654 PART I 110 liberties and
freedoms which are the cornerstone of the Constitution. To recognise the value
of privacy as a constitutional entitlement and interest is not to fashion a new
fundamental right by a process of amendment through judicial fiat. Neither are
the judges nor is the process of judicial review entrusted with the
constitutional responsibility to amend the Constitution. But judicial review
certainly has the task before it of determining the nature and extent of the
freedoms available to each person under the fabric of those constitutional
guarantees which are protected. Courts have traditionally discharged that
function and in the context of Article 21 itself, as we have already noted, a
panoply of protections governing different facets of a dignified existence has
been held to fall within the protection of Article 21. 114 In Olga Tellis v
Bombay Municipal Corporation195, Chandrachud C J, while explaining the ambit of
Article 21 found a rationale for protecting the right to livelihood as an
incident of the right to life. For, as the Court held, deprivation of
livelihood would result in the abrogation of the right to life: “148. The sweep
of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far-reaching. It does
not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example,
by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to
procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An
equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no
person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood.
If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right
to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to
deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such
deprivation would not only denude the 195 (1985) 3 SCC 545 PART I 111 life of
its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to
live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the
procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a
part of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave
aside what makes life liveable, must be deemed to be an integral component of
the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall
have deprived him of his life…”196 115 In Unnikrishnan v State of Andhra
Pradesh197, Justice Jeevan Reddy, speaking for this Court, held that though the
right to education (as the Constitution then stood) was not “stated expressly
as a fundamental right” in Part III, that would not militate against its being
protected under the rubric of life under Article 21. These decisions have been
ultimately guided by the object of a Constitutional Court which must be to
expand the boundaries of fundamental human freedoms rather than to attenuate
their content through a constricted judicial interpretation In Maneka, it has
been stated that: “The attempt of the court should be to expand the reach and
ambit of the fundamental rights rather than attenuate their meaning and content
by process of judicial construction… “personal liberty” in Article 21 is of the
widest amplitude.”198 116 Now, would this Court in interpreting the
Constitution freeze the content of constitutional guarantees and provisions to
what the founding fathers perceived? The Constitution was drafted and adopted
in a historical context. The vision of the founding fathers was enriched by the
histories of suffering of those who suffered 196 Ibid, at page 572 (para 32)
197 (1993) 1 SCC 645 198 Maneka (Supra note 5), at page 280 (para 5) PART I 112
oppression and a violation of dignity both here and elsewhere. Yet, it would be
difficult to dispute that many of the problems which contemporary societies
face would not have been present to the minds of the most perspicacious
draftsmen. No generation, including the present, can have a monopoly over
solutions or the confidence in its ability to foresee the future. As society
evolves, so must constitutional doctrine. The institutions which the
Constitution has created must adapt flexibly to meet the challenges in a
rapidly growing knowledge economy. Above all, constitutional interpretation is
but a process in achieving justice, liberty and dignity to every citizen. 117
Undoubtedly, there have been aberrations. In the evolution of the doctrine in
India, which places the dignity of the individual and freedoms and liberties at
the forefront, there have been a few discordant notes. Two of them need
attention. Discordant Notes (i) ADM Jabalpur 118 In ADM Jabalpur v Shivakant
Shukla199 (“ADM Jabalpur”), the issue before this Court was whether an order
issued by the President under Article 359(1) of the Constitution suspends the
right of every person to move any Court for the enforcement of the right to
personal liberty under Article 21 upon being detained under a law providing for
preventive detention. The submission of the detenues in this Court was 199
(1976) 2 SCC 521 PART I 113 that the suspension of the remedy to enforce
Article 21 does not automatically entail suspension of the right or the rule of
law and that even during an emergency the rule of law could not be suspended. A
majority of four judges of this Court (Justice H R Khanna dissenting) held
that: “Liberty is confined and controlled by law, whether common law or
statute. It is in the words of Burke a regulated freedom. It is not an abstract
or absolute freedom. The safeguard of liberty is in the good sense of the
people and in the system of representative and responsible government which has
been evolved. If extraordinary powers are given, they are given because the
emergency is extraordinary, and are limited to the period of the emergency.”200
Dealing with the issue as to whether Article 21 is the sole repository of the
right to life, Ray C J, observed that where any right which existed before the
commencement of the Constitution has been incorporated in Part III, the common
law right would not exist under the Constitution. In a concurring judgment Justice
Beg held that while adopting the Constitution, there was a notional surrender
by the people of India of the control over these rights to a sovereign republic
and it is only the Constitution which is supreme and which can confer rights
and powers. There was, in this view, a notional surrender of individual
freedom. Justice Beg held that: “The whole object of guaranteed fundamental
rights is to make those basic aspects of human freedom, embodied in fundamental
rights, more secure than others not so selected. In thus recognising and
declaring certain basic aspects of rights as fundamental by the Constitution of
the country, the purpose was to protect them against undue encroachments upon
them by the legislative, or executive, and, sometimes even judicial (e.g.
Article 20) organs of the State. The encroachment must remain within
permissible limits and must 200 Ibid, at page 571 (para 33) PART I 114 take
place only in prescribed modes. The intention could never be to preserve
something concurrently in the field of natural law or common law. It was to
exclude all other control or to make the Constitution the sole repository of
ultimate control over those aspects of human freedom which were guaranteed
there.”201 (emphasis supplied) A similar position was adopted by Justice
Chandrachud: “The right to personal liberty has no hallmark and therefore when
the right is put in action it is impossible to identify whether the right is
one given by the Constitution or is one which existed in the pre-Constitution
era. If the argument of the respondents is correct, no action to enforce the
right to personal liberty can at all fall within the mischief of the
Presidential Order even if it mentions Articles 19, 20, 21 and 22 because,
every preliminary objection by the Government to a petition to enforce the
right to personal liberty can be effectively answered by contending that what
is being enforced is either the natural right to personal liberty or generally,
the pre-Constitution right to personal liberty. The error of the respondents
argument lies in its assumption, and in regard to the argument of some of the
counsel in its major articulate premise, that the qualitative content of the
non-constitutional or pre-constitutional right to personal liberty is different
from the content of the right to personal liberty conferred by Part III of the
Constitution…”202 (emphasis supplied) In his view: “It therefore does not make
any difference whether any right to personal liberty was in existence prior to
the enactment of the Constitution, either by way of a natural right, statutory
right, common law right or a right available under the law of torts. Whatever
may be the source of the right and whatever may be its jurisdiction, the right
in essence and substance is the right to personal liberty. That right having
been included in Part III, its 201 Ibid, at page 604 (para 183) 202 Ibid, at
page 664 (para 379) PART I 115 enforcement will stand suspended if it is
mentioned in the Presidential Order issued under Article 359(1).”203 Justice Bhagwati
held as follows: “Now, to my mind, it is clear that when this principle of rule
of law that the Executive cannot deprive a person of his liberty except by
authority of law, is recognised and embodied as a fundamental right and enacted
as such in Article 21, it is difficult to comprehend how it could continue to
have a distinct and separate existence, independently and apart from this
article in which it has been given constitutional vesture. I fail to see how it
could continue in force under Article 372 when it is expressly recognised and
embodied as a fundamental right in Article 21 and finds a place in the express
provisions of the Constitution. Once this principle is recognised and
incorporated in the Constitution and forms part of it, it could not have any
separate existence apart from the Constitution, unless it were also enacted as
a statutory principle by some positive law of the State…”204 (emphasis
supplied) In his view, it is the Constitution which is supreme and if it
ordains that a person who is detained otherwise than in accordance with law
would not be entitled to enforce the right of personal liberty, the Court was
duty bound to give effect to it: “…it cannot be overlooked that, in the
ultimate analysis, the protection of personal liberty and the supremacy of law
which sustains it must be governed by the Constitution itself. The Constitution
is the paramount and supreme law of the land and if it says that even if a
person is detained otherwise than in accordance with the law. he shall not be
entitled to enforce his right of personal liberty, whilst a Presidential Order
under Article 359, clause (1) specifying Article 21 is in force, I have to give
effect to it. Sitting as I do, as a Judge under the Constitution, I cannot
ignore the plain and emphatic command of the Constitution for what I may
consider to be necessary to meet the ends of justice. It is said that law has
203 Ibid, at page 666 (para 383) 204 Ibid, at page 701 (para 459) PART I 116
the feminine capacity to tempt each devotee to find his own image in her bosom.
No one escapes entirely. Some yield blindly, some with sophistication. Only a
few more or less effectively resist. I have always leaned in favour of
upholding personal liberty, for, I believe, it is one of the most cherished
values of mankind. Without it life would not be worth living. It is one of the
pillars of free democratic society. Men have readily laid down their lives at
its altar, in order to secure it, protect it and preserve it. But I do not
think it would be right for me to allow my love of personal liberty to cloud my
vision or to persuade me to place on the relevant provision of the Constitution
a construction which its language cannot reasonably bear. I cannot assume to
myself the role of Plato's “Philosopher King” in order to render what I
consider ideal justice between the citizen and the State. After all, the
Constitution is the law of all laws and there alone judicial conscience must
find its ultimate support and its final resting place. It is in this spirit of
humility and obedience to the Constitution and driven by judicial compulsion,
that I have come to the conclusion that the Presidential Order dated June 27,
1975 bars maintainability of a writ petition for habeas corpus where an order
of detention is challenged on the ground that it is mala fide or not under the
Act or not in compliance with it.”205 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Khanna
emphatically held that the suspension of the right to move any Court for the
enforcement of the right under Article 21, upon a proclamation of emergency,
would not affect the enforcement of the basic right to life and liberty. The
Constitution was not the sole repository of the right to life and liberty: “I
am of the opinion that Article 21 cannot be considered to be the sole
repository of the right to life and personal liberty. The right to life and
personal liberty is the most precious right of human beings in civilised
societies governed by the rule of law. Many modern Constitutions incorporate
certain fundamental rights, including the one relating to personal freedom.
According to Blackstone, the absolute rights of Englishmen were the rights of
personal security, personal liberty and private property. The American
Declaration of Independence (1776) states that all men are created equal, and
205 Ibid, at pages 723-724 (para 487) PART I 117 among their inalienable rights
are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness…”206 Even in the absence of
Article 21, it would not have been permissible for the State to deprive a person
of his life and liberty without the authority of the law: “Even in the absence
of Article 21 in the Constitution, the State has got no power to deprive a
person of his life or liberty without the authority of law. This is the
essential postulate and basic assumption of the rule of law and not of men in
all civilised nations. Without such sanctity of life and liberty, the
distinction between a lawless society and one governed by laws would cease to
have any meaning. The principle that no one shall be deprived of his life or
liberty without the authority of law is rooted in the consideration that life
and liberty are priceless possessions which cannot be made the plaything of
individual whim and caprice and that any act which has the effect of tampering with
life and liberty must receive sustenance from and sanction of the laws of the
land. Article 21 incorporates an essential aspect of that principle and makes
it part of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution.
It does not, however, follow from the above that if Article 21 had not been
drafted and inserted in Part III, in that event it would have been permissible
for the State to deprive a person of his life or liberty without the authority
of law. No case has been cited before us to show that before the coming into
force of the Constitution or in countries under rule of law where there is no
provision corresponding to Article 21, a claim was ever sustained by the courts
that the State can deprive a person of his life or liberty without the
authority of law…”207 The remedy for the enforcement of the right to life or
liberty would not stand suspended even if the right to enforce Article 21 is
suspended: “Recognition as fundamental right of one aspect of the
preconstitutional right cannot have the effect of making things less favourable
so far as the sanctity of life and personal liberty is 206 Ibid, at page 747
(para 525) 207 Ibid, at pages 749-750 (para 530) PART I 118 concerned compared
to the position if an aspect of such right had not been recognised as
fundamental right because of the vulnerability of fundamental rights accruing
from Article 359…”208 Justice Khanna held that while wide powers to order
preventive detention are vested in the State, there is no antithesis between the
power to detain and power of the Court to examine the legality of such a
detention: “The impact upon the individual of the massive and comprehensive
powers of preventive detention with which the administrative officers are armed
has to be cushioned with legal safeguards against arbitrary deprivation of
personal liberty if the premises of the rule of law is not to lose its content
and become meaningless…”209 119 The judgments rendered by all the four judges
constituting the majority in ADM Jabalpur are seriously flawed. Life and
personal liberty are inalienable to human existence. These rights are, as
recognised in Kesavananda Bharati, primordial rights. They constitute rights
under natural law. The human element in the life of the individual is integrally
founded on the sanctity of life. Dignity is associated with liberty and
freedom. No civilized state can contemplate an encroachment upon life and
personal liberty without the authority of law. Neither life nor liberty are
bounties conferred by the state nor does the Constitution create these rights.
The right to life has existed even before the advent of the Constitution. In
recognising the right, the Constitution does not become the sole repository of
the right. It would be preposterous to suggest that a democratic Constitution
without a Bill of Rights would leave individuals governed by the state without
either the existence of the right to live 208 Ibid, at page 751 (para 531) 209
Ibid, page 767 (para 574) PART I 119 or the means of enforcement of the right.
The right to life being inalienable to each individual, it existed prior to the
Constitution and continued in force under Article 372 of the Constitution.
Justice Khanna was clearly right in holding that the recognition of the right
to life and personal liberty under the Constitution does not denude the
existence of that right, apart from it nor can there be a fatuous assumption
that in adopting the Constitution the people of India surrendered the most
precious aspect of the human persona, namely, life, liberty and freedom to the
state on whose mercy these rights would depend. Such a construct is contrary to
the basic foundation of the rule of law which imposes restraints upon the
powers vested in the modern state when it deals with the liberties of the individual.
The power of the Court to issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus is a precious and
undeniable feature of the rule of law. 120 A constitutional democracy can
survive when citizens have an undiluted assurance that the rule of law will
protect their rights and liberties against any invasion by the state and that
judicial remedies would be available to ask searching questions and expect
answers when a citizen has been deprived of these, most precious rights. The
view taken by Justice Khanna must be accepted, and accepted in reverence for
the strength of its thoughts and the courage of its convictions. 121 When
histories of nations are written and critiqued, there are judicial decisions at
the forefront of liberty. Yet others have to be consigned to the archives,
reflective PART I 120 of what was, but should never have been. The decision of
the US Supreme Court in Buck v Bell210 ranks amongst the latter. It was a
decision in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. accepted the forcible
sterilization by tubular ligation of Carrie Bucks as part of a programme of
state sponsored eugenic sterilization. Justice Holmes, while upholding the
programme opined that: “three generations of imbeciles is enough”211. In the
same vein was the decision of the US Supreme Court in Korematsu v United
States212, upholding the imprisonment of a citizen in a concentration camp
solely because of his Japanese ancestry. ADM Jabalpur must be and is
accordingly overruled. We also overrule the decision in Union of India v
Bhanudas Krishna Gawde213, which followed ADM Jabalpur. 122 In I R Coelho v
State of Tamil Nadu214, this Court took the view that ADM Jabalpur has been
impliedly overruled by various subsequent decisions: “During Emergency, the
fundamental rights were read even more restrictively as interpreted by the
majority in ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla [(1976) 2 SCC 521]. The decision
in ADM, Jabalpur [(1976) 2 SCC 521] about the restrictive reading of right to
life and liberty stood impliedly overruled by various subsequent decisions.”215
210 274 US 200 (1927) 211 A moving account of the times and the position is to
be found in Siddhartha Mukherjee, The Gene: An Intimate History, Penguin Books
Ltd. (2016), pages 78-85. 212 323 US 214 (1944) 213 (1977) 1 SCC 834 214 (2007)
2 SCC 1 215 Ibid, at page 76 (para 29) PART I 121 We now expressly do so. 123
As a result of the Forty-Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, Article 359 has
been amended to provide that during the operation of a proclamation of
emergency, the power of the President to declare a suspension of the right to
move a Court for the enforcement of the fundamental rights contained in Part
III shall not extend to Articles 20 and 21. (ii) Suresh Koushal 124 Another
discordant note which directly bears upon the evolution of the constitutional
jurisprudence on the right to privacy finds reflection in a two judge Bench
decision of this Court in Suresh Kumar Koushal v NAZ foundation216 (“Koushal”).
The proceedings before this Court arose from a judgment217 of the Delhi High
Court holding that Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, insofar as it
criminalises consensual sexual acts of adults in private is violative of
Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. The Delhi High Court, however,
clarified that Section 377 will continue to govern non-consensual penile,
non-vaginal sex and penile non-vaginal sex involving minors. Among the grounds
of challenge was that the statutory provision constituted an infringement of
the rights to dignity and privacy. The Delhi High Court held that: “…The sphere
of privacy allows persons to develop human relations without interference from
the outside community or from 216 (2014) 1 SCC 1 217 Naz Foundation v
Government of NCT, 2010 Cri LJ 94 PART I 122 the State. The exercise of
autonomy enables an individual to attain fulfilment, grow in self-esteem, build
relationships of his or her choice and fulfil all legitimate goals that he or
she may set. In the Indian Constitution, the right to live with dignity and the
right of privacy both are recognised as dimensions of Article 21…” 218 Section
377 was held to be a denial of the dignity of an individual and to criminalise
his or her core identity solely on account of sexuality would violate Article
21. The High Court adverted at length to global trends in the protection of
privacy – dignity rights of homosexuals, including decisions emanating from the
US Supreme Court, the South African Constitutional Court and the European Court
of Human Rights. The view of the High Court was that a statutory provision
targeting homosexuals as a class violates Article 14, and amounted to a hostile
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation (outlawed by Article 15).
The High Court, however, read down Section 377 in the manner which has been
adverted to above. 125 When the matter travelled to this Court, Justice
Singhvi, speaking for the Bench dealt with several grounds including the one
based on privacy – dignity. The Court recognised that the right to privacy
which is recognised by Article 12 of the Universal Declaration and Article 17
of ICCPR has been read into Article 21 “through expansive reading of the right
to life and liberty”. This Court, however, found fault with the basis of the
judgment of the High Court for the following, among other reasons: “…the
Division Bench of the High Court overlooked that a miniscule fraction of the
country's population constitutes 218 Ibid, at page 110 (para 48) PART I 123
lesbians, gays, bisexuals or transgenders and in last more than 150 years less
than 200 persons have been prosecuted (as per the reported orders) for
committing offence under Section 377 IPC and this cannot be made sound basis
for declaring that section ultra vires the provisions of Articles 14, 15 and 21
of the Constitution.”219 (emphasis supplied) The privacy and dignity based
challenge was repelled with the following observations: “In its anxiety to
protect the so-called rights of LGBT persons and to declare that Section 377
IPC violates the right to privacy, autonomy and dignity, the High Court has
extensively relied upon the judgments of other jurisdictions. Though these
judgments shed considerable light on various aspects of this right and are
informative in relation to the plight of sexual minorities, we feel that they
cannot be applied blindfolded for deciding the constitutionality of the law
enacted by the Indian Legislature.”220 (emphasis supplied) 126 Neither of the
above reasons can be regarded as a valid constitutional basis for disregarding
a claim based on privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution. That “a
miniscule fraction of the country’s population constitutes lesbians, gays,
bisexuals or transgenders” (as observed in the judgment of this Court) is not a
sustainable basis to deny the right to privacy. The purpose of elevating
certain rights to the stature of guaranteed fundamental rights is to insulate
their exercise from the disdain of majorities, whether legislative or popular.
The guarantee of constitutional rights does not depend upon their exercise
being favourably regarded by majoritarian opinion. The test of popular
acceptance does not furnish a valid basis to disregard rights which are
conferred with the sanctity of constitutional protection. Discrete and insular
219 Koushal (Supra note 216), at page 69-70 (para 66) 220 Ibid, at page 78
(para 77) PART I 124 minorities face grave dangers of discrimination for the
simple reason that their views, beliefs or way of life does not accord with the
‘mainstream’. Yet in a democratic Constitution founded on the rule of law,
their rights are as sacred as those conferred on other citizens to protect
their freedoms and liberties. Sexual orientation is an essential attribute of
privacy. Discrimination against an individual on the basis of sexual
orientation is deeply offensive to the dignity and self-worth of the
individual. Equality demands that the sexual orientation of each individual in
society must be protected on an even platform. The right to privacy and the
protection of sexual orientation lie at the core of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. 127 The view in
Koushal that the High Court had erroneously relied upon international
precedents “in its anxiety to protect the so-called rights of LGBT. persons” is
similarly, in our view, unsustainable. The rights of the lesbian, gay, bisexual
and transgender population cannot be construed to be “so-called rights”. The
expression “so-called” seems to suggest the exercise of a liberty in the garb
of a right which is illusory. This is an inappropriate construction of the privacy
based claims of the LGBT population. Their rights are not “so-called” but are
real rights founded on sound constitutional doctrine. They inhere in the right
to life. They dwell in privacy and dignity. They constitute the essence of
liberty and freedom. Sexual orientation is an essential component of identity.
Equal protection demands protection of the identity of every individual without
discrimination. PART I 125 128 The decision in Koushal presents a de minimis
rationale when it asserts that there have been only two hundred prosecutions
for violating Section 377. The de minimis hypothesis is misplaced because the
invasion of a fundamental right is not rendered tolerable when a few, as
opposed to a large number of persons, are subjected to hostile treatment. The
reason why such acts of hostile discrimination are constitutionally
impermissible is because of the chilling effect which they have on the exercise
of the fundamental right in the first place. For instance, pre-publication
restraints such as censorship are vulnerable because they discourage people
from exercising their right to free speech because of the fear of a restraint
coming into operation. The chilling effect on the exercise of the right poses a
grave danger to the unhindered fulfilment of one’s sexual orientation, as an
element of privacy and dignity. The chilling effect is due to the danger of a
human being subjected to social opprobrium or disapproval, as reflected in the
punishment of crime. Hence the Koushal rationale that prosecution of a few is
not an index of violation is flawed and cannot be accepted. Consequently, we
disagree with the manner in which Koushal has dealt with the privacy – dignity
based claims of LGBT persons on this aspect. Since the challenge to Section 377
is pending consideration before a larger Bench of this Court, we would leave
the constitutional validity to be decided in an appropriate proceeding. PART J
126 J India’s commitments under International law 129 The recognition of
privacy as a fundamental constitutional value is part of India’s commitment to
a global human rights regime. Article 51 of the Constitution, which forms part
of the Directive Principles, requires the State to endeavour to “foster respect
for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised
peoples with one another”221. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, recognises the right to privacy: “Article 12: No one shall be subjected
to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” Similarly, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted on 16 December
1979 and came into effect on 23 March 1976. India ratified it on 11 December
1977. Article 17 of the ICCPR provides thus: “The obligations imposed by this
article require the State to adopt legislative and other measures to give
effect to the prohibition against such interferences and attacks as well as to
the protection of the right.” The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 which
has been enacted by Parliament refers to the ICCPR as a human rights
instrument. Section 2(1)(d) defines human rights: 221 Article 51(c) of the Indian
Constitution PART J 127 “human rights” means the rights relating to life,
liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution
or embodied in the International Covenants and enforceable by courts in India.”
Section 2(1)(f) defines International Covenants: “International Covenants”
means the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on the 16th December, 1966 [and such
other Covenant or Convention adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations as the Central Government may, by notification, specify” Under Section
12(f) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, the National Human Rights Commission:
“is entrusted with the function of studying treaties and other international
instruments on human rights and make recommendations for their effective
implementation.” 130 The ICCPR casts an obligation on states to respect,
protect and fulfil its norms. The duty of a State to respect mandates that it
must not violate the right. The duty to protect mandates that the government
must protect it against interference by private parties. The duty to fulfil
postulates that government must take steps towards realisation of a right.
While elaborating the rights under Article 17, general comment 16 specifically
stipulates that: “…..there is universal recognition of the fundamental
importance, and enduring relevance, of the right to privacy and of the need to
ensure that it is safeguarded, in law and practice.” PART J 128 Significantly,
while acceding to the ICCPR, India did not file any reservation or declaration
to Article 17. While India filed reservations against Articles 1, 9 and 13,
there was none to Article 17: “Article 1 refers to the right to
self-determination. The reservation to Article 1 states that “the Government of
the Republic of India declares that the words ‘the right of self-determination’
appearing in [this article] apply only to the peoples under foreign domination
and that these words do not apply to sovereign independent States or to a
section of a people or nation-which is the essence of national integrity. ‘ The
reservation to Article 9, which refers to the right to liberty and security of
person, detention and compensation payable on wrongful arrest or detention,
states that “the government of the Republic of India takes the position that
the provisions of the article shall be so applied as to be in consonance with
the provisions of clauses (3) to (7) of article 22 of the Constitution of
India. Further under the Indian Legal System, there is no enforceable right to
compensation for persons claiming to be victims of unlawful arrest or detention
against the State.” The reservation to Article 13 – which refers to protections
for aliens, states that “the Government of the Republic of India reserves its
right to apply its law relating to foreigners.” On 30 June 2014, a report was
presented by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights.222 The report underscores that: “…there is universal recognition of the
fundamental importance, and enduring relevance, of the right to privacy and of
the need to ensure that it is safeguarded, in law and in practice.”223 222 “The
Right to privacy in the Digital age”, Report of the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (30 June 2014) 223 Ibid, at page 5
(para 13) PART J 129 131 In Bachan Singh v State of Punjab224 (“Bachan Singh”),
this Court considered in relation to the death penalty, the obligations assumed
by India in international law, following the ratification of the ICCPR. The
Court held that the requirements of Article 6 of the ICCPR are substantially
similar to the guarantees contained in Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution.
The penal law of India was held to be in accord with its international
commitments. In Francis Coralie, this Court, while explaining the ambit of
Article 21, held that: “…there is implicit in Article 21 the right to
protection against torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment which is
enunciated in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
guaranteed by Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights…”225 132 In Vishaka v State of Rajasthan226, this Court observed that in
the absence of domestic law, the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is applicable. In NALSA, while dealing
with the rights of transgenders, this Court found that the international conventions
were not inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution and must be recognised and followed. 133 The position in law is
well settled. Where there is a contradiction between international law and a
domestic statute, the Court would give effect to the latter. In 224 (1980) 2
SCC 684 225 Francis Coralie (Supra note 159), at page 619 (para 8) 226 (1997) 6
SCC 241 PART K 130 the present case, there is no contradiction between the
international obligations which have been assumed by India and the
Constitution. The Court will not readily presume any inconsistency. On the
contrary, constitutional provisions must be read and interpreted in a manner
which would enhance their conformity with the global human rights regime. India
is a responsible member of the international community and the Court must adopt
an interpretation which abides by the international commitments made by the
country particularly where its constitutional and statutory mandates indicate
no deviation. In fact, the enactment of the Human Rights Act by Parliament
would indicate a legislative desire to implement the human rights regime
founded on constitutional values and international conventions acceded to by
India. K Comparative Law 134 This section analyses the evolution of the concept
of privacy in other jurisdictions from a comparative law perspective. The Court
is conscious of the limits of a comparative approach. Each country is governed
by its own constitutional and legal structure. Constitutional structures have an
abiding connection with the history, culture, political doctrine and values
which a society considers as its founding principles. Foreign judgments must
hence be read with circumspection ensuring that the text is not read isolated
from its context. The countries which have been dealt with are: (i) United
Kingdom; (ii) United States; (iii) South Africa; and PART K 131 (iv) Canada.
The narrative will then proceed to examine the decisions of the European Court
of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. These decisions are indicative of the
manner in which the right to privacy has been construed in diverse
jurisdictions based on the histories of the societies they govern and the
challenges before them. (i) U K decisions The first common law case regarding
protection of privacy is said to be Semayne’s Case227 (1604). The case related
to the entry into a property by the Sheriff of London in order to execute a
valid writ. The case is famous for the words of Sir Edward Coke: “That the
house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his
defence against injury and violence, as for his repose …” Then, in the case of
Entick v Carrington228 (1765), Entick’s house had been forcibly entered into by
agents of the State/King. Lord Camden CJ held that: “By the laws of England,
every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man
can set his foot upon my ground without my licence, but he is liable to an
action, though the damage be nothing; which is proved by every declaration in
trespass, where the defendant is called upon to answer for bruising the grass
and even treading upon the soil.” 227 Peter Semayne v Richard Gresham, 77 ER
194 228 (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1029 PART K 132 Privacy jurisprudence developed
further in the 19th century. In 1849, in Prince Albert v Strange229 (1849),
publication was sought to be restrained of otherwise unpublished private
etchings and lists of works done by Prince Albert and Queen Victoria. In the
High Court of Chancery, Lord Cottenham observed that: “… where privacy is the
right invaded, postponing the injunction would be equivalent to denying it
altogether. The interposition of this Court in these cases does not depend upon
any legal right, and to be effectual, it must be immediate.” However, the
approach adopted by the Court in Prince Albert case took a different turn in
the case of Kaye v Robertson230 (1991). In this case, when the appellant, after
an accident, was recovering from brain surgery in a private hospital room, two
journalists posed as doctors and took photographs of him. The appellant
attempted to obtain an order to restrain publication of the photographs. The
Court of Appeal held that: “… in English law there is no right to privacy, and
accordingly there is no right of action for breach of a person's privacy” The
decision in R v Director of Serious Fraud Office, ex parte Smith231 (1993)
discussed the question of the right to silence. The applicant (the chairman and
managing director of a company) was charged of doing acts with the intent to
defraud its creditors. After having been cautioned, he was asked to answer
questions of the Director of the Serious Fraud Office. The issue was whether
the requirement to 229 (1849) 41 ER 1171 230 [1991] FSR 62 231 [1993] AC 1 PART
K 133 answer questions infringed the right to silence. It was held that the
powers of the Director of the Serious Fraud Office, under the Criminal Justice
Act 1987, entitled him/her to compel the applicant to answer questions on pain
of commission of a criminal offence. Lord Mustill, who delivered the leading
opinion of the Court, held that: “[It] is a simple reflection of the common
view that one person should so far as possible be entitled to tell another
person to mind his own business. All civilised states recognise this assertion
of personal liberty and privacy. Equally, although there may be pronounced
disagreements between states, and between individual citizens within states,
about where the line should be drawn, few would dispute that some curtailment
of the liberty is indispensable to the stability of society; and indeed in the
United Kingdom today our lives are permeated by enforceable duties to provide
information on demand, created by Parliament and tolerated by the majority,
albeit in some cases with reluctance.” Lord Mustill’s statement “underlines the
approach taken by the common law to privacy” that “it recognised privacy as a
principle of general value” and that “privacy had only been given discrete and specific
protection at common law”.232 This approach was diluted in the case of
Wainwright v Home Office233(2004), where a mother and son were subjected to a
strip-search when visiting a prison in 1997, in accordance with existing Prison
Rules. The son, who was mentally impaired and suffered from cerebral palsy,
later developed post-traumatic stress disorder. Claims for damages arising from
trespass and trespass to the person were issued. At the time 232 Lord
Neuberger, “Privacy in the 21st Century”, UK Association of Jewish Lawyers and
Jurists' Lecture (28 November 2012) 233 [2004] 2 AC 406 PART K 134 of the
incident, the Human Rights Act, 1998 (HRA) had not yet come into force. When
the case reached before House of Lords, it was argued that “the law of tort
should give a remedy for any kind of distress caused by an infringement of the
right of privacy protected by article 8 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights”. It was further argued that reliance must be placed
upon the judgment of Sedley LJ in Douglas v Hello! Ltd234 (2001), where it was
said that: "What a concept of privacy does, however, is accord recognition
to the fact that the law has to protect not only those people whose trust has
been abused but those who simply find themselves subjected to an unwanted
intrusion into their personal lives. The law no longer needs to construct an
artificial relationship of confidentiality between intruder and victim: it can
recognise privacy itself as a legal principle drawn from the fundamental value
of personal autonomy." (emphasis supplied) However, Lord Hoffman in
Wainwright rejected all the contentions and held that: “I do not understand
Sedley LJ to have been advocating the creation of a high-level principle of
invasion of privacy. His observations are in my opinion no more (although
certainly no less) than a plea for the extension and possibly renaming of the
old action for breach of confidence.” Lord Hoffman also observed that: “What
the courts have so far refused to do is to formulate a general principle of
“invasion of privacy” … There seems to me a great difference between
identifying privacy as a value which underlies the existence of a rule of law
(and may point the direction in which the law should develop) and privacy as a
principle of law in itself. The English common law is familiar with 234 [2001]
QB 967 PART K 135 the notion of underlying values - principles only in the
broadest sense - which direct its development… Nor is there anything in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights which suggests that the
adoption of some high level principle of privacy is necessary to comply with
article 8 of the Convention. The European Court is concerned only with whether
English law provides an adequate remedy in a specific case in which it
considers that there has been an invasion of privacy contrary to article 8(1)
and not justifiable under article 8(2).” There has been a transformation in
this approach after the Human Rights Act, 1998 (HRA) came into force. For the
first time, privacy was incorporated as a right under the British law.235 In
Campbell v MGN236 (2004), a well-known model was photographed leaving a
rehabilitation clinic, following public denials that she was a recovering drug
addict. The photographs were published in a publication run by MGN. She sought
damages under the English law through her lawyers to bring a claim for breach
of confidence engaging Section 6 of the Human Rights Act. The House of Lords by
majority decided in her favour. Lord Hope writing for the majority held: “[I]f
there is an intrusion in a situation where a person can reasonably expect his
privacy to be respected, that intrusion will be capable of giving rise to
liability unless the intrusion can be justified… [A] duty of confidence arises
when confidential information comes to the knowledge of a person where he has
notice that the information is confidential.” 235 The UK Human Rights Act
incorporates the rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) into domestic British law. The Preamble of the Act states that it “gives
further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed” under the ECHR. Under the Act
(S. 6), it is unlawful for any public authority, including a court or tribunal
at any level, to act in a manner which is incompatible with a Convention right.
The Convention rights take precedence over rules of common law or equity, and
over most subordinate legislations. The Act, thereby, protects the right to
privacy, which has been provided under Article 8 (1) of the ECHR. See Ben
Emmerson et al. (ed), Human Rights and Criminal Justice, Sweet & Maxwell
(2000). See also “Concerns and Ideas about the Developing English Law of
Privacy”, Institute of Global Law, available online at
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/global_law/publications/institute/docs/privacy_100804.pdf.
236 [2004] 2 AC 457. PART K 136 In holding so, Lord Hope relied upon the
following statement of Lord Woolf in A v B Inc237 (2003): “A duty of confidence
will arise whenever a party subject to the duty is in a situation where he
either knows or ought to know that the other person can reasonably expect his
privacy to be protected.” Lord Hope also held that the Courts, in order to
decide a case, must carry out a “balancing operation, weighing the public
interest in maintaining confidence against a countervailing public interest
favouring disclosure”. Baroness Hale wrote a concurring judgment and held that:
“The Human Rights 1998 Act does not create any new cause of action between
private persons. But if there is a relevant cause of action applicable, the
court as a public authority must act compatibly with both parties' Convention
rights. In a case such as this, the relevant vehicle will usually be the action
for breach of confidence, as Lord Woolf CJ held in A v B plc [2002] EWCA Civ
337, [2003] QB 195, 202, para 4 : "[Articles 8 and 10] have provided new
parameters within which the court will decide, in an action for breach of
confidence, whether a person is entitled to have his privacy protected by the
court or whether the restriction of freedom of expression which such protection
involves cannot be justified. The court's approach to the issues which the
applications raise has been modified because, under section 6 of the 1998 Act,
the court, as a public authority, is required not to 'act in a way which is
incompatible with a Convention right'. The court is able to achieve this by
absorbing the rights which articles 8 and 10 protect into the longestablished
action for breach of confidence. This involves giving a new strength and breadth
to the action so that it accommodates the requirements of these articles."
237 [2003] QB 195 PART K 137 Later, in Douglas v Hello! Ltd238, it was held
that: “What the House [in Campbell] was agreed upon was that the knowledge,
actual or imputed, that information is private will normally impose on anyone
publishing that information the duty to justify what, in the absence of
justification, will be a wrongful invasion of privacy.” Subsequent cases
establish the contribution the HRA has made in jurisprudence on privacy in the
UK. In Associated Newspapers Limited v His Royal Highness the Prince of
Wales239 (2006), an appeal was made against the judgment in respect of the
claim of Prince Charles for breach of confidence and infringement of copyright.
The case brought about when ‘The Mail on Sunday’ published extracts of a
dispatch by the Prince of Wales. The Court held that: “The information at issue
in this case is private information, public disclosure of which constituted an
interference with Prince Charles’ Article 8 rights. As heir to the throne,
Prince Charles is an important public figure. In respect of such persons the
public takes an interest in information about them that is relatively trivial.
For this reason public disclosure of such information can be particularly
intrusive… Prince Charles has a valid claim based on breach of confidence and
interference with his Article 8 rights.” In Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd240
(2008), a photographer had taken a series of photographs of a writer’s infant son,
which were later published in a newspaper. The issue was whether there was
misuse of private information by taking photographs. It was held that: 238
[2006] QB 125 239 [2006] EWCA Civ 1776 240 [2008] 3 WLR 1360 PART K 138 “[The]
question of whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy is a broad
one, which takes account of all the circumstances of the case. They include the
attributes of the claimant, the nature of the activity in which the claimant
was engaged, the place at which it was happening, the nature and purpose of the
intrusion, the absence of consent and whether it was known or could be
inferred, the effect on the claimant and the circumstances in which and the
purposes for which the information came into the hands of the publisher… [I]t
is at least arguable that David had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The
fact that he is a child is in our view of greater significance than the judge
thought.” R v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis241 (2011) was a case
concerning the extent of the police's power (under guidelines issued by the
Association of Chief Police Officers- the ACPO guidelines) to indefinitely
retain biometric data associated with individuals who are no longer suspected
of a criminal offence. The UK Supreme Court, by a majority held that the police
force's policy of retaining DNA evidence in the absence of 'exceptional
circumstances' was unlawful and a violation of Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Lord Dyson, on behalf of the majority, held that:
“It is important that, in such an important and sensitive area as the retention
of biometric data by the police, the court reflects its decision by making a
formal order to declare what it considers to be the true legal position. But it
is not necessary to go further. Section 8(1) of the HRA gives the court a wide
discretion to grant such relief or remedy within its powers as it considers
just and appropriate. Since Parliament is already seized of the matter, it is
neither just nor appropriate to make an order requiring a change in the
legislative scheme within a specific period… 241 [2011] UKSC 21 PART K 139 ….he
present ACPO guidelines are unlawful because they are incompatible with article
8 of the ECHR. I would grant no other relief.” In the matter of an application
by JR38 for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland)242 (2015), the Appellant was
involved in rioting in 2010, when still only 14 years of age. The police, in
order to identify those responsible, and for the sake of deterrence, published
CCTV footage depicting the Appellant in two newspapers. The issue involved was:
“Whether the publication of photographs by the police to identify a young
person suspected of being involved in riotous behaviour and attempted criminal
damage can ever be a necessary and proportionate interference with that
person’s article 8 rights?” The majority held that Article 8 was not engaged,
as there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the case. Lord Toulson
(with whom Lord Hodge agreed), while stating that the conduct of the police did
not amount, prima facie, to an interference with the appellant’s right to
respect for his private life, held that: “The reasonable or legitimate
expectation test is an objective test. It is to be applied broadly, taking
account of all the circumstances of the case (as Sir Anthony Clarke said in
Murray’s case) and having regard to underlying value or values to be protected.
Thus, for example, the publication of a photograph of a young person acting in
a criminal manner for the purpose of enabling the police to discover his
identity may not fall within the scope of the protection of personal autonomy
which is the purpose of article 8, but the publication of the same photograph
for another purpose might.” 242 [2015] UKSC 42 PART K 140 Lord Clarke wrote a
separate judgment concurring with Lord Toulson and held that: “… the criminal
nature of what the appellant was doing was not an aspect of his private life
that he was entitled to keep private. He could not have had an objectively
reasonable expectation that such photographs, taken for the limited purpose of
identifying who he was, would not be published.” The decision in PJS v News
Group Newspapers Ltd243 (2016) dealt with an anonymised privacy injunction244.
The injunction was sought by the claimant to restrain publication of details of
his sexual relationship with two other people, on the ground that the
publication would breach his rights to privacy and confidentiality, protected
by Article 8 of ECHR. The UK Supreme Court by majority ruled in favour of the
applicant. Speaking on behalf of the majority, Lord Mance held that: “… having
regard to the nature of the material sought to be published and the identity
and financial circumstances of the appellant, that the appellant’s real concern
is indeed with the invasion of privacy that would be involved in further
disclosure and publication in the English media, and that any award of damages,
however assessed, would be an inadequate remedy.” The HRA has rendered clarity
on the existence of a right to privacy in UK jurisprudence and substantially
resolved conflicting approaches regarding privacy in decided cases. The HRA, by
incorporating the provisions of the European 243 [2016] UKSC 26 244 In English
law, an anonymised injunction is “an interim injunction which restrains a
person from publishing information which concerns the applicant and is said to
be confidential or private where the names of either or both of the parties to
the proceedings are not stated”. See “Report of the Committee on Super-Injunctions:
Super-Injunctions, Anonymised Injunctions and Open Justice” (2011), available
online at
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Reports/super-injunction-report-
20052011.pdf PART K 141 Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), has adopted the
guarantee of the right to privacy into UK domestic law. The Convention,
together with its adoption into domestic legislation, has led to a considerable
change in the development of protection of human privacy in English law. (ii)
US Supreme Court decisions The US Constitution does not contain an express
right to privacy. But American privacy jurisprudence reflects that it has been
protected under several amendments245 of the US Constitution. As early as 1886,
in Boyd v United States246 , the question before the US Supreme Court was
whether compulsory production of a person’s private papers to be used in
evidence against him in a judicial proceeding, is an unreasonable search and
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Bradley delivered
the opinion of the Court and held as follows: “The principles laid down in this
opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security… they
apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of
his doors and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essence of the
offence, but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty, and private property, -- it is the invasion of this sacred
right ... 245The concept of privacy plays a major role in the jurisprudence of
the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The Ninth Amendment
has also been interpreted to justify broadly reading the Bill of Rights to
protect privacy in ways not specifically provided in the first eight
amendments. 246 116 US 616 (1886) PART K 142 And any compulsory discovery by
extorting the party's oath, or compelling the production of his private books
and papers, to convict him of crime or to forfeit his property, is contrary to
the principles of a free government... It may suit the purposes of despotic
power, but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and
personal freedom.” (emphasis supplied) In two decisions in the 1920s, the Court
read the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty to prohibit states from making laws
interfering with the private decisions of parents and educators to shape the
education of their children. In Meyer v Nebraska247 (1923), the Court struck
down a state law that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to students
that had not yet completed the eighth grade. The Court in a 7:2 decision,
written by Justice McReynolds, concluded that the state failed to show a
compelling need to infringe upon the rights of parents and teachers to decide
on the best course of education for young students. On liberty, Justice
McReynolds held: “Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men. The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered
with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action
which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the
competency of the State to effect.” 247 262 US 390 (1923) PART K 143 Two years
later, in Pierce v Society of Sisters248 (1925), the Court, relying upon Mayer
v Nebraska, struck down the Oregon Compulsory Education Act, which mandated all
children (between eight and sixteen years) to attend public schools. It was
held the said statute is an “unreasonable interference with the liberty of the
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing of the children, and in that
respect violates the Fourteenth Amendment”. In Olmstead v United States249
(1928), the question before the Court was whether the use of evidence of
private telephone conversations, intercepted by means of wiretapping amounted
to a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. In a 5:4 decision, it was
held that there was no violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Chief
Justice Taft wrote the majority judgment, holding that: “The Amendment itself
shows that the search is to be of material things -- the person, the house, his
papers, or his effects…. The Amendment does not forbid what was done here.
There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the
use of the sense of hearing, and that only. There was no entry of the houses or
offices of the defendants.” However, Justice Louis Brandeis wrote a dissenting
opinion and observed that: “… time works changes, brings into existence new
conditions and purposes." Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading
privacy have become available to the Government. Discovery and invention have
made it possible for the Government, by means far more effective than
stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in
the closet. Moreover, “in the 248 (268) US 510 (1925) 249 277 US 438 (1928)
PART K 144 application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of
what has, been but of what may be.” The progress of science in furnishing the
Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping. Ways
may someday be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from
secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to
expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the
psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs,
thoughts and emotions…” (emphasis supplied) He questioned whether the
Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual
security. Justice Brandeis answers this question in a celebrated passage: “The
makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone -- the most comprehensive of rights, and
the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment...” (emphasis supplied) The Court, in the case of Griswold v
Connecticut250 (1965), invalidated a state law prohibiting the possession,
sale, and distribution of contraceptives to married couples, for the reason
that the law violated the right to marital privacy. Justice Douglas, who
delivered the main opinion, observed that this right emanated from “penumbras”
of the fundamental constitutional guarantees and rights in the Bill of Rights,
which together create “zones of privacy”. Accordingly, it was held that: 250
381 US 479 (1965) PART K 145 “The present case, then concerns a relationship
lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees… Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms of telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is
repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”
Justice Goldberg wrote in the concurring opinion that: “The fact that no
particular provision of the Constitution explicitly forbids the State from
disrupting the traditional relation of the family -- a relation as old and as
fundamental as our entire civilization -- surely does not show that the
Government was meant to have the power to do so. Rather, as the Ninth Amendment
expressly recognizes, there are fundamental personal rights such as this one,
which are protected from abridgment by the Government, though not specifically
mentioned in the Constitution.” The 1967 decision in Katz v United States251
(“Katz”) overruled Olmstead v United States (supra) and revolutionized the
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment regarding the extent to which a
constitutional right to privacy applies against government interference. In
this case, Charles Katz was a gambler who used a public telephone booth to
transmit illegal wagers. Unbeknownst to Katz, the FBI which was investigating
Katz’s activity, was recording his conversations via an electronic
eavesdropping device attached to the exterior of the phone booth. Subsequently,
Katz was convicted based on these recordings. He challenged his conviction,
arguing that the recordings were obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights. The constitutional question in the case was whether the 4th Amendment
protection from ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ was restricted to the
search and seizure of 251 389 US 347 (1967) PART K 146 tangible property, or
did it extend to intangible areas such as conversations overheard by others. It
was held that the Government's eavesdropping activities violated the privacy,
upon which petitioner justifiably relied, while using the telephone booth, and
thus constituted a “search and seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, and that the Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible
items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements. Prior to 1967
when determining the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ for purposes of
discussing Fourth Amendment violations, the analysis was focused on whether the
authority had trespassed on a private location. This ‘trespass doctrine’ was
the prevailing test until Katz, which extended the protection of the Fourth
Amendment from ‘places’ to ‘people’, affording individuals more privacy even in
public. The ‘trespass doctrine’ applied in Olmstead v United States (supra) was
held to be no longer relevant. Justice Stewart wrote the majority (7:1) opinion
and held that: “One who occupies it [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind
him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to
the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role
that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.” (emphasis
supplied) Justice Harlan wrote the concurring judgment holding that: “a) that
an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home… a person has a
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy; (b) that
electronic, as well as physical, PART K 147 intrusion into a place that is in
this sense private may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment....”
(emphasis supplied) The reasonable expectation of privacy test was formulated
as follows: “....the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." The
question, however, is what protection it affords to those people. Generally, as
here, the answer to that question requires reference to a "place." My
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there
is a twofold requirement, first that a person has exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus, a man's
home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects,
activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of
outsiders are not "protected," because no intention to keep them to
himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the open would
not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under
the circumstances would be unreasonable.” (emphasis supplied) In Stanley v
Georgia252 (1969), the Court analyzed the constitutionality of a statute imposing
criminal sanctions upon the knowing possession of obscene matter. The Court, in
a unanimous decision, held that mere private possession of obscene matter
cannot constitutionally be made a crime: “For also fundamental is the right to
be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental
intrusions into one's privacy... [T]he rights that the appellant is asserting
in the case before us...the right to read or observe what he pleases -- the
right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own
home…..the right to be free from state inquiry into the contents of his
library... 252 394 US 557 (1969) PART K 148 Whatever the power of the state to
control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it
cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling
a person's private thoughts.” Seven years after Griswold, the Court expanded
the right to privacy beyond the ‘marital bedroom’ to include unmarried persons.
In Eisenstadt v Baird253 (1972), the Court invalidated a law prohibiting the
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons, ruling that it violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution: “It is true that in Griswold
the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the
marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own,
but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.” The decision in Paris Adult Theatre I v
Slaton254 (1973), upheld a state court's injunction against the showing of
obscene films in a movie theatre, restricted to consenting adults. The Court
distinguished the case from Stanley v Georgia (supra), on the ground that the
privacy of the home in Stanley was not the same as the commercial exhibition of
obscene movies in a theatre. Chief Justice Burger observed that the prior
decisions of the Supreme Court on the right to privacy only included those
personal rights that were “fundamental" or “implicit in the concept of
ordered 253 405 US 438 (1972) 254 413 US 49 (1973) PART K 149 liberty” such as
“the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood,
procreation and childbearing” and held that: “Nothing, however, in this Court's
decisions intimates that there is any "fundamental" privacy right
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" to watch obscene movies
in places of public accommodation… The idea of a "privacy" right and
a place of public accommodation are, in this context, mutually exclusive.” In
the landmark decision on the right to abortion, Roe v Wade255 (1973), the Court
dealt with the question of the right of an unmarried pregnant woman to
terminate her pregnancy by abortion. The constitutionality of a Texas Statute
prohibiting abortions except with respect to those procured or admitted by
medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother was challenged
on the ground that the law improperly invaded the right and the choice of a
pregnant woman to terminate her pregnancy and was violative of the “liberty”
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to privacy recognized
in Griswold. The Court ruled 7:2 that a right to privacy under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extended to a woman's decision to have an
abortion, but that this right must be balanced against the state's interests in
regulating abortions. Justice Blackmun delivered the majority judgment and held
that: “The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a
line of decisions, however, the Court has recognised that a right of personal
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under
the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have,
indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment; in the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights; in the Ninth 255 410 US 113 (1973) PART K 150
Amendment; or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment... This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” (emphasis
supplied) The right to privacy in bank records was analysed by the US Supreme
Court in United States v Miller256 (1976). In this case federal agents were
investigating the defendant for his involvement in a bootlegging conspiracy.
The agents subpoenaed two banks and received his bank records. As a result, he
was indicted. The question was whether an individual reasonably can expect that
records kept incidental to his personal banking transactions will be protected
from uncontrolled government inspection. In a 6:3 opinion, the Supreme Court
held that a bank depositor has no Fourth Amendment interest in the records that
his bank is required to keep in compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970,
and that Miller had no right to privacy in his bank records. Writing for the
majority, Justice Lewis F. Powell asserted that the “documents subpoenaed...
are not [Miller’s] ‘private papers’,” but instead, part of the bank’s business
records. It was held: “There is no legitimate "expectation of
privacy" in the contents of the original checks and deposit slips, since
the checks are not confidential communications, but negotiable instruments to
be used in commercial transactions, and all the documents obtained contain only
information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in
the ordinary course of business. 256 425 US 435 (1976) PART K 151 The Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities. The Act's recordkeeping
requirements do not alter these considerations so as to create a protectable
Fourth Amendment interest of a bank depositor in the bank's records of his
account.” However, Justice Brennan dissented and held that: “A bank customer's
reasonable expectation is that, absent a compulsion by legal process, the
matters he reveals to the bank will be utilized by the bank only for internal
banking purposes... [A] depositor reveals many aspects of his personal affairs,
opinions, habits, associations. Indeed, the totality of bank records provides a
virtual current biography…Development of...sophisticated instruments have
accelerated the ability of the government to intrude into areas which a person
normally chooses to exclude from prying eyes and inquisitive minds.
Consequently, judicial interpretations of the constitutional protection of
individual privacy must keep pace with the perils created by these new
devices.” Continuing its trend of expansion of individual rights in the 1960s
and 1970s, particularly in the domain of reproductive health - the right to
contraceptives as well as the right to abortion, the decision in Carey v
Population Services International257 (1977) expanded these rights from adults
to also include minors. In this case, a New York law banning sale of even
non-prescription contraceptives by persons other than licensed pharmacists;
sale or distribution to minors under sixteen; and contraceptive display and
advertising was declared unconstitutional. Justice Brennan delivered the
majority opinion of the Court and held that the Fourteenth Amendment is not for
“adults alone” and “Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution”: 257 431 US 678 (1977) PART K 152 “This right of personal privacy
includes "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions." ... While the outer limits of this aspect of privacy
have not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an
individual may make without unjustified government interference are personal
decisions "relating to marriage...; procreation...; contraception...;
family relationships...; and childrearing and education...” It was further held
that: “The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very
heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices... This is
understandable, for in a field that, by definition, concerns the most intimate
of human activities and relationships, decisions whether to accomplish or to
prevent conception are among the most private and sensitive…” The Court also
held that the right to privacy may be limited by a regulation, which is
governed by a sufficient ‘compelling state interest’. In Smith v Maryland258
(1979), it was held that installation and use of a ‘pen register’ was not a
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and hence no warrant was
required. Justice Blackmun delivered the majority (5: 4) opinion and held that
the petitioner’s claim that he had a “legitimate expectation of privacy” could
not be sustained: “First, we doubt that people in general entertain any actual
expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial. All telephone users realize
that they must "convey" phone numbers to the telephone company, since
it is through telephone company 258 442 US 735 (1979) PART K 153 switching
equipment that their calls are completed. All subscribers realize, moreover,
that the phone company has facilities for making permanent records of the
numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on
their monthly bills. In fact, pen registers and similar devices are routinely
used by telephone companies "for the purposes of checking billing
operations, detecting fraud, and preventing violations of law." (emphasis
supplied) The majority adopted the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test as
formulated by Justice Harlan in Katz and held as follows: “[The] inquiry, as
Mr. Justice Harlan aptly noted in his Katz concurrence, normally embraces two
discrete questions. The first is whether the individual, by his conduct, has
"exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy"...
whether... the individual has shown that "he seeks to preserve [something]
as private"... The second question is whether the individual's subjective
expectation of privacy is "one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable,'"... whether... the individual's expectation, viewed
objectively, is "justifiable" under the circumstances. Since the pen
register was installed on telephone company property at the telephone company's
central offices, petitioner obviously cannot claim that his
"property" was invaded or that police intruded into a
"constitutionally protected area." Thus the Court held that the petitioner
in all probability entertained no actual expectation of privacy in the phone
numbers he dialled, and that, even if he did, his expectation was not
“legitimate.” However, the judgment also noted the limitations of the Katz
test: “Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz' twopronged inquiry
would provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment protection… In such
circumstances, where an individual's subjective expectations had been
"conditioned" by influences alien to well recognized Fourth Amendment
freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful PART
K 154 role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was. “
Justice Stewart wrote the dissent, joined by Justice Brennan and held that
there was a legitimate expectation of privacy in this case: “...the numbers
dialled from a private telephone -- like the conversations that occur during a
call -- are within the constitutional protection recognized in Katz. It seems
clear to me that information obtained by pen register surveillance of a private
telephone is information in which the telephone subscriber has a legitimate
expectation of privacy. The information captured by such surveillance emanates
from private conduct within a person's home or office -- locations that without
question are entitled to Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protection. Further,
that information is an integral part of the telephonic communication that,
under Katz, is entitled to constitutional protection…” Justice Marshal
dissented and opined on the dangers of permitting such surveillance, holding:
“The use of pen registers, I believe, constitutes such an extensive intrusion.
To hold otherwise ignores the vital role telephonic communication plays in our
personal and professional relationships, as well as the First and Fourth
Amendment interests implicated by unfettered official surveillance. Privacy in
placing calls is of value not only to those engaged in criminal activity. The
prospect of unregulated governmental monitoring will undoubtedly prove
disturbing even to those with nothing illicit to hide. Many individuals,
including members of unpopular political organizations or journalists with
confidential sources, may legitimately wish to avoid disclosure of their
personal contacts... Permitting governmental access to telephone records on
less than probable cause may thus impede certain forms of political affiliation
and journalistic endeavor that are the hallmark of a truly free society.
Particularly given the Government's previous reliance on warrantless telephonic
surveillance to trace reporters' sources and monitor protected political
activity... PART K 155 I am unwilling to insulate use of pen registers from
independent judicial review.” (emphasis supplied) In Planned Parenthood v
Casey259 (1992), several Pennsylvania state statutory provisions regarding
abortion such as spousal consent were challenged. The Court reaffirmed- what it
called- the “essential holding”260 of Roe v Wade (supra), and observed: “...Our
precedents “have respected the private realm of family life which the state
cannot enter.” ... These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed
under compulsion of the State… The woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy
before viability is the most central principle of Roe v. Wade. It is a rule of
law and a component of liberty we cannot renounce.” In Minnesota v Carter261
(1998), the question was whether the Fourth Amendment protected against the
viewing by an outside police officer, through a drawn window blind, of the
defendants’ bagging cocaine in an apartment. The Court answered this question
in the negative. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion of the
259 505 US 833 (1992) 260 The essential holding of Roe, as summarized in
Planned Parenthood, comprised of the following three parts: (1) a recognition
of a woman's right to choose to have an abortion before foetal viability and to
obtain it without undue interference from the State, whose pre-viability
interests are not strong enough to support an abortion prohibition or the
imposition of substantial obstacles to the woman's effective right to elect the
procedure; (2) a confirmation of the State's power to restrict abortions after
viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies endangering a woman's
life or health; and (3) the principle that the State has legitimate interests
from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the
life of the fetus that may become a child. 261 525 US 83 (1998) PART K 156
Court noting that “[t]he text of the Amendment suggests that its protections
extend only to people in “their” houses.” The case was distinguished from Minnesota
v Olson262 (1990), where the Supreme Court decided that an overnight guest in a
house had the sort of expectation of privacy that the Fourth Amendment
protects. The Court was of the view that while an overnight guest in a home may
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, one who is merely present with
the consent of the householder may not. The respondents, in this case, were not
overnight guests, but were present for a business transaction and were only in
the home for a few hours. The Court held: “Property used for commercial
purposes is treated differently for Fourth Amendment purposes from residential
property. "An expectation of privacy in commercial premises, however, is
different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual's
home."... And while it was a "home" in which respondents were
present, it was not their home… the purely commercial nature of the transaction
engaged in here, the relatively short period of time on the premises, and the
lack of any previous connection between respondents and the householder, all
lead us to conclude .... any search which may have occurred did not violate
their Fourth Amendment rights.” (emphasis supplied) Justice Ginsburg wrote the
dissenting opinion joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Souter, and held that:
“Our decisions indicate that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their homes in part because they have the prerogative 262 495 US 91 (1990) PART
K 157 to exclude others… Through the host’s invitation, the guest gains a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the home. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U. S. 91
(1990), so held with respect to an overnight guest. The logic of that decision
extends to shorter term guests as well.” In Kyllo v United States263 (2001),
the Court held (5:4 majority) that the thermal imaging of the house of a person
suspected of growing marijuana was a violation of the right to privacy. Justice
Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court and held that there is no distinction
between “off-the-wall” and “through-the-wall” surveillance as both lead to an
intrusion into an individual’s privacy: “Limiting the prohibition of thermal
imaging to “intimate details” would not only be wrong in principle; it would be
impractical in application, failing to provide “a workable accommodation
between the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment,”… We…would have to develop a jurisprudence specifying which home
activities are “intimate” and which are not. And even when (if ever) that jurisprudence
were fully developed, no police officer would be able to know in advance
whether his through-the-wall surveillance picks up “intimate” details–and thus
would be unable to know in advance whether it is constitutional…” (emphasis
supplied) It was concluded that even though no “significant” compromise of the
homeowner’s privacy had occurred due to the thermal imaging, “the long view,
from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment” must be taken forward. 263
533 US 27 (2001) PART K 158 In Lawrence v Texas264 , the Court in a 6:3
decision struck down the sodomy law in Texas and by extension invalidated
sodomy laws in 13 other states, making samesex sexual activity legal in every
state and territory of the United States. The Court overturned its previous
ruling on the same issue in the 1986 case, Bowers v Hardwick265 (1986), where
it upheld a challenged Georgia statute and did not find a constitutional
protection of sexual privacy. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority
opinion (6: 3 decision) and held that: “The petitioners are entitled to respect
for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control
their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime… It is a promise
of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter… The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of
the individual.” Informational privacy was the core issue in NASA v Nelson266 (2011).
The Court held unanimously that NASA’s background checks of contract employees
did not violate any constitutional privacy right. The employees had argued that
their constitutional right to privacy as envisaged in previous US Supreme Court
judgments namely Whalen v Roe267 (1977) and Nixon v Administrator of General
Services268 (1977), 264 539 US 558 (2003) 265 478 US 186 (1986) 266 562 US 134
(2011) 267 429 US 589 (1977). In this case, for the first time, the Court
explicitly recognized an individual’s interest in nondisclosure of information.
The Court chose to address the status of privacy in the Constitution,
underlining that the constitutional right to privacy remains largely undefined
and then identified the types of constitutionally protected privacy interests
as follows: “The cases sometimes characterized as protecting ‘privacy’ have in
fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.” 268
433 US 425 (1977). In this case, the former President of US, Nixon, was
challenging the Presidential Recordings and Material Preservation Act, 1974 on
the ground that it violated his right of privacy, as there would PART K 159 was
violated by background checks. The majority judgment delivered by Justice
Alito, decided the case assuming that there existed a constitutional right to
privacy. The Court held that: “We hold, however, that the challenged portions
of the Government’s background check do not violate this right in the present
case. The Government’s interests as employer and proprietor in managing its
internal operations, combined with the protections against public dissemination
provided by the Privacy Act of 1974, satisfy any “interest in avoiding
disclosure” that may “arguably ha[ve] its roots in the Constitution… The
Government has good reason to ask employees about their recent illegal-drug
use.” The majority also rejected all the contentions regarding the misuse of
collected data and held: “… the mere possibility that security measures will
fail provides no “proper ground” for a broad-based attack on government
information-collection practices. Ibid. Respondents also cite a portion of
SF–85 that warns of possible disclosure “[t]o the news media or the general
public.” App. 89. By its terms, this exception allows public disclosure only
where release is “in the public interest” and would not result in “an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Ibid. Respondents have not cited any
example of such a disclosure, nor have they identified any plausible scenario
in which their information might be unduly disclosed under this exception… In
light of the protection provided by the Privacy Act’s nondisclosure
requirement, and because the challenged portions of the forms consist of
reasonable inquiries in an employment background check, we conclude that the
Government’s inquiries do not violate a constitutional right to informational
privacy.” (emphasis supplied) be intrusion through the screening of his
documents. Nixon’s plea was rejected by the Court, which held held that “any
intrusion [against privacy] must be weighed against the public interest”. PART
K 160 Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Thomas, agreed
that the background checks did not violate any constitutional rights, but
argued that the Court should have settled the constitutional privacy question
in the negative. The view held was that there exists no constitutional right to
informational privacy. Scalia J. criticized the Court's decision to evade the
constitutional question, stating that: “If, on the other hand, the Court
believes that there is a constitutional right to informational privacy, then I
fail to see the minimalist virtues in delivering a lengthy opinion analyzing
that right while coyly noting that the right is “assumed” rather than
“decided”… The Court decides that the Government did not violate the right to
informational privacy without deciding whether there is a right to
informational privacy, and without even describing what hypothetical standard
should be used to assess whether the hypothetical right has been violated.”
(emphasis supplied) In United States v Jones269 (2012), it was held unanimously
that installing a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device on a vehicle
and using the device to monitor the vehicle's movements constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment. However, the judges were split 5:4 as to the
fundamental reasons behind the conclusion. Justice Scalia delivered the
majority judgment, applying the trespass test. It was held that the
Government’s physical intrusion onto the defendant's car for the purpose of
obtaining information constituted trespass and therefore a “search”. Justice
269 565 US 400 (2012) PART K 161 Scalia, however, left unanswered the question
surrounding the privacy implications of a warrantless use of GPS data without
physical intrusion. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, concurred with Justice Scalia, but
addressed the privacy aspects of the judgment. Justice Sotomayor agreed with
Justice Alito’s concurrence that “physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many
forms of surveillance”, and held that “[i]n cases of electronic or other novel
modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on property,
the majority opinion’s trespassory test may provide little guidance”. It was
further observed: “GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of
a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.
Disclosed in [GPS] data… will be trips the indisputably private nature of which
takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon,
the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal
defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque,
synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on… The Government can store such
records and efficiently mine them for information years into the future… And
because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance
techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary
checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: “limited police
resources and community hostility”… The net result is that GPS monitoring—by
making available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of
intimate information about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered
discretion, chooses to track—may “alter the relationship between citizen and
government in a way that is inimical to democratic society”.” (emphasis
supplied) Justice Sotomayor concluded, by stating: PART K 162 “[I] doubt that
people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the
Government of a list of every Web site they had visited [or phone numbers
dialled]... I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to
some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone,
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.” In Florida v Jardines270 (2013),
the Court held that police use of a trained detection dog to sniff for
narcotics on the front porch of a private home is a “search” within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution, and therefore, without consent,
requires both probable cause and a search warrant. Justice Scalia who delivered
the opinion of the Court held as follows: “We… regard the area “immediately
surrounding and associated with the home”—…..as “part of the home itself for
Fourth Amendment purposes.” ….This area around the home is “intimately linked
to the home, both physically and psychologically,” and is where “privacy
expectations are most heightened”.” (emphasis supplied) Justice Kagan, in a
concurring opinion, wrote: “Like the binoculars, a drug-detection dog is a
specialized device for discovering objects not in plain view (or plain smell).
And as in the hypothetical above, that device was aimed here at a home— the
most private and inviolate (or so we expect) of all the places and things the
Fourth Amendment protects… the device is not “in general public use,” training
it on a home violates our “minimal expectation of privacy”—an expectation “that
exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable”.” (emphasis supplied) 270
569 US 1 (2013) PART K 163 Three years ago, in Riley v California271 (2014),
the Court unanimously held that the warrantless search and seizure of digital
contents of a cell phone during an arrest is unconstitutional. Chief Justice
Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court and commented on the impact on
privacy in an era of cell phones: “Before cell phones, a search of a person was
limited by physical realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only
a narrow intrusion on privacy...the possible intrusion on privacy is not
physically limited in the same way when it comes to cell phones…Data on a cell
phone can also reveal where a person has been. Historic location information is
a standard feature on many smart phones and can reconstruct someone’s specific
movements down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular
building… Mobile application software on a cell phone, or “apps,” offer a range
of tools for managing detailed information about all aspects of a person’s
life… Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With
all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans “the
privacies of life”... The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry
such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of
the protection for which the Founders fought. Our answer to the question of
what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest
is accordingly simple— get a warrant.” (emphasis supplied) In Obergefell v
Hodges272, the Court held in a 5:4 decision that the fundamental right to marry
is guaranteed to same-sex couples by both the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Kennedy authored the
majority opinion (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotamayor and Kagan):
271 573 US __ (2014) 272 576 US __ (2015) PART K 164 “Indeed, the Court has
noted it would be contradictory to recognize a right of privacy with respect to
other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the
relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.” (emphasis
supplied) The development of the jurisprudence on the right to privacy in the
United States of America shows that even though there is no explicit mention of
the word ‘privacy’ in the Constitution, the courts of the country have not only
recognised the right to privacy under various Amendments of the Constitution
but also progressively extended the ambit of protection under the right to
privacy. In its early years, the focus was on property and protection of
physical spaces that would be considered private such as an individual’s home.
This ‘trespass doctrine’ became irrelevant when it was held that what is
protected under the right to privacy is “people, not places”. The ‘reasonable
expectation of privacy’ test has been relied on subsequently by various other
jurisdictions while developing the right to privacy. Having located the right
to privacy in the ‘person’, American jurisprudence on the right to privacy has
developed to shield various private aspects of a person’s life from
interference by the state - such as conscience, education, personal
information, communications and conversations, sexuality, marriage,
procreation, contraception, individual beliefs, thoughts and emotions,
political and other social groups. Various judgments of the Court have also
analysed technological developments which have made surveillance more pervasive
and affecting citizens’ privacy. In all these cases, the Court has tried to
balance the interests of the individual in maintaining the right to privacy
with the interest of the State in maintaining law and order. Decisions of the
Supreme Court decriminalizing PART K 165 consensual sexual activity between
homosexuals and guaranteeing same-sex couples the right to marry indicate that
the right to privacy is intrinsic to the constitutional guarantees of liberty
and equal protection of laws. (iii) Constitutional right to privacy in South
Africa In South Africa, the right to privacy has been enshrined in Section 14
of the Bill of Rights in the 1996 Constitution. Section 14 provides that: “14.
Privacy.-Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have-
(a) their person or home searched; (6) their property searched; (c) their
possessions seized; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” In
National Media Ltd v Jooste273 (1996), Justice Harms defined privacy in the
following terms: “Privacy is an individual condition of life characterised by
exclusion from the public and publicity. The condition embraces all those
personal facts which a person concerned has determined him to be excluded from
the knowledge of outsiders and in respect of which he has the will that they be
kept private” On the ambit of the right to privacy, the Court held that: “A
right to privacy encompasses the competence to determine the destiny of private
facts… The individual concerned is entitled to dictate the ambit of disclosure
... 273 1996 (3) SA 262 (A) PART K 166 the purpose and method [of] the
disclosure... when and under what conditions private facts may be made public.
A contrary view will place undue constraints upon the individual's so-called
“absolute rights of personality”… It will also mean that rights of personality
are of a lower order than real or personal rights”. In Bernstein v Bester and
Others274 (1996), the South African Supreme Court decided on a challenge to the
constitutionality of certain sections of the Companies Act, on the ground that
examination under these sections violated the general right to personal privacy
(section 13). It was held that the provisions were not in breach of the
Constitution. Justice Ackermann expounded upon the concept of privacy as
follows: “The scope of privacy has been closely related to the concept of
identity and ... [that] the right… [is] based on a notion of the unencumbered
self, but on the notion of what is necessary to have one’s own autonomous
identity”. The Court observed that like every other right, the right to privacy
also has its limits: “[67] In the context of privacy it is only the inner
sanctum of a person, such as his/her family life, sexual preference and home
environment, which is shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of the
community. This implies that community rights and the rights of fellow members
place a corresponding obligation on a citizen, thereby shaping the abstract
notion of individualism towards identifying a concrete member of civil society.
Privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a person moves into
communal relations and activities such as business and social interaction, the
scope of personal space shrinks accordingly.” 274 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) PART K
167 The constitutional validity of laws making sodomy an offence was challenged
in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice275
(1999). It was held that the common law offence of sodomy was inconsistent with
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Ackermann J. described
how discrimination leads to invasion of privacy and held that: “Privacy
recognises that we all have a right to a sphere of private intimacy and
autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture human relationships without
interference from the outside community. The way in which we give expression to
our sexuality is at the core of this area of private intimacy. If, in
expressing our sexuality, we act consensually and without harming one another,
invasion of that precinct will be a breach of our privacy…” Sachs J. discussed
the interrelation between equality and privacy and held that: “...equality and
privacy cannot be separated, because they are both violated simultaneously by
anti-sodomy laws. In the present matter, such laws deny equal respect for
difference, which lies at the heart of equality, and become the basis for the
invasion of privacy. At the same time, the negation by the state of different
forms of intimate personal behaviour becomes the foundation for the repudiation
of equality.” On the meaning of ‘autonomy’, the Court observed that: “Autonomy
must mean far more than the right to occupy an envelope of space in which a
socially detached individual can act freely from interference by the state.
What is crucial is the nature of the activity, not its site. While recognising
the unique worth of each person, the Constitution does not presuppose that a
holder of rights is as an isolated, lonely and abstract figure possessing a
disembodied and socially disconnected self. It acknowledges that people live in
their bodies, their communities, their cultures, their places and their times.
...It is not for the state to choose or to arrange the choice 275 1999 (1) SA 6
(CC) PART K 168 of partner, but for the partners to choose themselves.”
(emphasis supplied) Justice Sachs noted that the motif which links and unites
equality and privacy, and which runs right through the protections offered by
the Bill of Rights, is dignity. In Investigating Directorate: Serious Offences
v Hyundai Motor Distributors Ltd276 (2001), the Court was concerned with the
constitutionality of the provisions of the National Prosecuting Authority Act
that authorised the issuing of warrants of search and seizure for purposes of a
“preparatory investigation”. Langa J. delivered judgment on the right to
privacy of juristic persons and held that: “... privacy is a right which
becomes more intense the closer it moves to the intimate personal sphere of the
life of human beings, and less intense as it moves away from that core. This
understanding of the right flows... from the value placed on human dignity by
the Constitution. Juristic persons are not the bearers of human dignity. Their
privacy rights, therefore, can never be as intense as those of human beings.
However, this does not mean that juristic persons are not protected by the
right to privacy. Exclusion of juristic persons would lead to the possibility
of grave violations of privacy in our society, with serious implications for
the conduct of affairs.” Highlighting the need to balance interests of the
individual and the State, it was held that: “[54] ...Search and seizure
provisions, in the context of a preparatory investigation, serve an important
purpose in the fight against crime. That the state has a pressing interest
which involves the security and freedom of the community as a whole is beyond
question. It is an objective which is sufficiently important to justify the
limitation of the 276 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) PART K 169 right to privacy of an individual
in certain circumstances….On the other hand, state officials are not entitled
without good cause to invade the premises of persons for purposes of searching
and seizing property; ...A balance must therefore be struck between the
interests of the individual and that of the state, a task that lies at the
heart of the inquiry into the limitation of rights.” (emphasis supplied) In
Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another277 (2006), the
Constitutional Court of South Africa ruled unanimously that same-sex couples
have a constitutional right to marry. The judgment delivered by Justice Sachs,
held that: “Section 9(1) of the Constitution provides: “Everyone is equal
before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.”...
Sections 9(1) and 9(3) cannot be read as merely protecting same-sex couples
from punishment or stigmatisation. They also go beyond simply preserving a
private space in which gay and lesbian couples may live together without
interference from the state. Indeed, what the applicants in this matter seek is
not the right to be left alone, but the right to be acknowledged as equals and
to be embraced with dignity by the law… It is demeaning to adoptive parents to
suggest that their family is any less a family and any less entitled to respect
and concern than a family with procreated children. It is even demeaning of a
couple who voluntarily decide not to have children or sexual relations with one
another; this being a decision entirely within their protected sphere of
freedom and privacy...” (emphasis supplied) In NM and Others v Smith and
Others278 (2007), the names of three women who were HIV positive were disclosed
in a biography. They alleged that the publication, without their prior consent,
violated their rights to privacy, dignity and psychological integrity. The
Court by majority held that the respondents were aware that the applicants had
not given their express consent but had published their names, thereby 277 2006
(1) SA 524 (CC). 278 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC). PART K 170 violating their privacy
and dignity rights. Justice Madala delivered the majority judgment on the basis
of the value of privacy and confidentiality in medical information and held
that: “Private and confidential medical information contains highly sensitive
and personal information about individuals. The personal and intimate nature of
an individual’s health information, unlike other forms of documentation,
reflects delicate decisions and choices relating to issues pertaining to bodily
and psychological integrity and personal autonomy… Individuals value the
privacy of confidential medical information because of the vast number of
people who could have access to the information and the potential harmful
effects that may result from disclosure. The lack of respect for private
medical information and its subsequent disclosure may result in fear
jeopardising an individual’s right to make certain fundamental choices that
he/she has a right to make. There is therefore a strong privacy interest in
maintaining confidentiality.” The decision of the Court was that there must be
a pressing social need for the right to privacy to be interfered with and that
there was no such compelling public interest in this case. In the dissenting
opinion, Justice O’Regan held that the publication of the names and HIV status
of the women was neither intentional nor negligent. In that view, the
respondents had assumed that consent was given because the applicants’ names
and HIV status were published in a publication, with no disclaimer regarding
their consent to the contrary. While elaborating on the constitutional right of
privacy, the Court held that: “... although as human beings we live in a
community and are in a real sense both constituted by and constitutive of that
community, PART K 171 we are nevertheless entitled to a personal sphere from
which we may and do exclude that community. In that personal sphere, we
establish and foster intimate human relationships and live our daily lives.
This sphere in which to pursue our own ends and interests in our own ways,
although often mundane, is intensely important to what makes human life
meaningful.” According to the decision, there are two inter-related reasons for
the constitutional protection of privacy- one flows from the “constitutional
conception of what it means to be a human being” and the second from the
“constitutional conception of the state”: “An implicit part of [the first]
aspect of privacy is the right to choose what personal information of ours is
released into the public space. The more intimate that information, the more
important it is in fostering privacy, dignity and autonomy that an individual
makes the primary decision whether to release the information. That decision
should not be made by others. This aspect of the right to privacy must be
respected by all of us, not only the state. …Secondly, we value privacy as a
necessary part of a democratic society and as a constraint on the power of the
state... In authoritarian societies, the state generally does not afford such
protection. People and homes are often routinely searched and the possibility
of a private space from which the state can be excluded is often denied. The
consequence is a denial of liberty and human dignity. In democratic societies,
this is impermissible.” (emphasis supplied) The limits of the right to privacy
and the need to balance it with other rights emerge from the following
observations: “Recognition of legitimate limits on the inviolability of
personal space, however, does not mean that the space is not worthy of
protection. The Constitution seeks to ensure that rights reinforce one another
in a constructive manner in order to promote human rights generally. At times
our Constitution recognises that a balance has to be found to provide
protection for the different rights.” PART K 172 On the inter-relationship
between the right to privacy, liberty and dignity, the Court observed that:
“The right to privacy recognises the importance of protecting the sphere of our
personal daily lives from the public. In so doing, it highlights the
inter-relationship between privacy, liberty and dignity as the key
constitutional rights which construct our understanding of what it means to be
a human being. All these rights are therefore inter-dependent and mutually
reinforcing. We value privacy for this reason at least – that the
constitutional conception of being a human being asserts and seeks to foster
the possibility of human beings choosing how to live their lives within the
overall framework of a broader community.” (emphasis supplied) The interim as
well as the Final Constitution of South Africa contain explicit provisions
guaranteeing the right to privacy. The Judges of South African Supreme Court
have given an expansive meaning to the right, making significant inter-linkages
between equality, privacy and dignity. In doing so, it has been acknowledged
that the right to privacy does not exist in a vacuum, its contravention having
a significant bearing on other citizen rights as well. Such an interpretation
may prove to have a catalytic effect on a country transitioning from an
apartheid state to a democratic nation. (iv) Constitutional right to privacy in
Canada Although the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 (“the
Charter”) does not explicitly provide for a right to privacy, certain sections
of the Charter have been relied on by the Supreme Court of Canada to recognize
a right to privacy. Most PART K 173 notably, Section 8279 (the Canadian version
of the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution) has been employed in this
respect. Privacy issues have also been recognized in respect of Section 7280 of
the Charter. In 1983, the Privacy Act was enacted to regulate how federal
government collects, uses and discloses personal information.281 The Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) governs how
private sector organisations collect, use and disclose personal information in
the course of commercial activities One of the landmark cases on the right to
privacy was Hunter v Southam Inc282 (1984). This was also the first Supreme
Court of Canada decision to consider Section 8 of the Charter. In this case,
the Combines Investigation Act had authorized several civil servants to enter
the offices of Southam Inc and examine documents. The company claimed that this
Act violated Section 8 of the Canadian Charter. The Court unanimously held that
the Combines Investigation Act violated the Charter as it did not provide an
appropriate standard for administering warrants. Dickson J. wrote the opinion
of the Court and observed that the Canadian Charter is a “purposive document”
whose purpose is to “guarantee and to protect, within the limits of reason, the
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms it enshrines” and to 279 Section 8 of the Charter
provides as follows: “Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable
search or seizure.” 280 Section 7 of the Canadian Charter deals with life,
liberty and security of person and states that: “Everyone has the right to
life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” 281
In Lavigne v. Canada (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages), [2002]
2 SCR 773, the Supreme Court of Canada recognised the Privacy Act as having a
"quasi-constitutional" status, as it is “closely linked to the values
and rights set out in the Constitution”. The Court also stated that the
"The Privacy Act is a reminder of the extent to which the protection of
privacy is necessary to the preservation of a free and democratic society”. 282
[1984] 2 SCR 145 PART K 174 constrain governmental action inconsistent with
those rights and freedoms. The Court held that since Section 8 is an entrenched
constitutional provision, it was “not vulnerable to encroachment by legislative
enactments in the same way as common law protections.” The Court held that the
purpose of Section 8 is to protect an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy but right to privacy must be balanced against the government’s duty to
enforce the law. It was further held that: “The guarantee of security from
unreasonable search and seizure only protects a reasonable expectation. This
limitation on the right guaranteed by s. 8, whether it is expressed negatively
as freedom from "unreasonable" search and seizure, or positively as
an entitlement to a "reasonable" expectation of privacy, indicates
that an assessment must be made as to whether in a particular situation the
public's interest in being left alone by government must give way to the
government's interest in intruding on the individual's privacy in order to
advance its goals, notably those of law enforcement.” In Her Majesty, The Queen
v Brandon Roy Dyment283 (1988), a patient had met with an accident on a
highway. A doctor collected a sample of blood from his wound. The blood sample
was taken for medical purposes but was given to a police officer. As a result
of an analysis carried out by the police officer, the patient was charged with
impaired driving. The Court held that the seizing of blood taken for medical
purposes was a violation of Section 8 of the Charter and that the spirit of the
Charter “must not be constrained by narrow legalistic classifications based on
notions of property”. It was further held: 283 [1988] 2 SCR 417 PART K 175
“[L]egal claims to privacy in this sense were largely confined to the home.
But… [t]o protect privacy only in the home ... is to shelter what has become,
in modern society, only a small part of the individual's daily environmental
need for privacy... Privacy is at the heart of liberty in a modern
state...Grounded in man's physical and moral autonomy, privacy is essential for
the well-being of the individual. For this reason alone, it is worthy of
constitutional protection, but it also has profound significance for the public
order. The restraints imposed on government to pry into the lives of the
citizen go to the essence of a democratic state.” (emphasis supplied) On the
importance of informational privacy, it was held: “This notion of privacy
derives from the assumption that all information about a person is in a
fundamental way his own, for him to communicate or retain for himself as he
sees fit... In modern society, especially, retention of information about oneself
is extremely important. We may, for one reason or another, wish or be compelled
to reveal such information, but situations abound where the reasonable
expectations of the individual that the information shall remain confidential
to the persons to whom, and restricted to the purposes for which it is
divulged, must be protected.” Justice La Forest wrote on the importance of
consent and held that “the use of a person's body without his consent to obtain
information about him, invades an area of personal privacy essential to the
maintenance of his human dignity.” The Court found that the patient had a
“well-founded” and “reasonable” expectation of privacy that his blood sample,
collected by the doctor, would be used for medical purposes only and that such
expectation “is intended to protect people not things”. It was held that: PART
K 176 “In the present case, however, the respondent may, for some purposes
perhaps, be deemed to have impliedly consented to a sample being taken for
medical purposes, but he retained an expectation that his privacy interest in
the sample continue past the time of its taking…Under these circumstances, the
sample was surrounded by an aura of privacy meriting Charter protection. For
the state to take it in violation of a patient's right to privacy constitutes a
seizure for the purposes of s. 8.” R v Plant284 (1993) is a leading decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada on the protection of personal information under the
Charter. In this case, a police officer, on the basis of information that
marijuana was being grown in an area, accessed the electrical utility’s
computer system and discovered that a particular house was consuming an
extremely high amount of electricity. Two officers then performed a warrantless
perimeter search of the property and observed that the basement windows were
covered with something opaque and a that a vent had been blocked using a
plastic bag. On the basis of this information, the police obtained a warrant to
search the home and discovered over a hundred seedling marijuana plants. The
accused was charged with cultivation of marijuana and possession for the
purpose of trafficking. The issue was whether the warrantless perimeter search
of his home and the seizure of electricity consumption records violated his right
against unreasonable search and seizure under section 8 of the Charter. 284
[1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 PART K 177 The judgment delivered by Justice Sopinka relied
on a part of the United States v Miller285 decision, that in order to be
constitutionally protected the information must be of a “personal and
confidential” nature and held that: “In fostering the underlying values of
dignity, integrity and autonomy, it is fitting that s. 8 of the Charter should
seek to protect a biographical core of personal information which individuals
in a free and democratic society would wish to maintain and control from
dissemination to the state. This would include information which tends to
reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the
individual.” The Court held that the perimeter search violated the Charter and
that the seizure of consumption records was not in violation of Section 8. This
decision was based on the ground that the pattern of electricity consumption
revealed as a result of computer investigations could not be said to reveal
intimate details since “electricity consumption reveals very little about the
personal lifestyle or private decisions.” In Her Majesty, The Queen v Walter
Tessling286 (2004), the Supreme Court of Canada held that the use of thermal
imaging by the police in the course of an investigation of a suspect's property
did not constitute a violation of the accused's right to a reasonable
expectation of privacy under Section 8 of the Canadian Charter. On the
reasonable expectation of privacy, it was held that the totality of
circumstances need to be considered with particular emphasis on both the
existence of a subjective expectation of privacy, and the objective
reasonableness of the expectation. The Court ruled that the cases of privacy
interests (protected by S. 8 of the Canadian 285 425 US 435 (1976) 286 (2004)
SCC 67 PART K 178 Charter) need to be distinguished between personal privacy,
territorial privacy and informational privacy.” The Court relied on Justice
Sopinka’s understanding of the scope of the protection of informational privacy
in R v Plant (supra) and held that the information generated by FLIR imaging
did not reveal a “biographical core of personal information” or “intimate
details of [his] lifestyle”, and therefore section 8 had not been violated. The
decision in R v Spencer287 (2014) was related to informational privacy. In this
case, the appellant used an online software to download child pornography onto
a computer and shared it publicly. The police requested subscriber information
associated with an IP address from the appellant’s Internet Service Provider
and on the basis of it, searched the computer used by him. The Canadian Supreme
Court unanimously ruled that the request for an IP address infringed the Charter's
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. It was held that the
appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy. In doing so, it assessed
whether there is a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the “totality of the
circumstances”, which includes “the nature of the privacy interests implicated
by the state action” and “factors more directly concerned with the expectation
of privacy, both subjectively and objectively viewed, in relation to those
interests”. It was further held: “...factors that may be considered in
assessing the reasonable expectation of privacy can be grouped under four main
headings for analytical convenience: (1) the subject matter of the alleged
search; (2) the claimant's interest in the subject matter; (3) the claimant's subjective
expectation of privacy in the subject 287 (2014) SCC 43 PART K 179 matter; and
(4) whether this subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable,
having regard to the totality of the circumstances.” (emphasis supplied) The
issue in the case was whether there is a privacy interest in subscriber
information with respect to computers used in homes for private purposes. The
Court applied a broad approach in understanding the online privacy interests
and held that: “Privacy is admittedly a "broad and somewhat evanescent
concept"... [T]he Court has described three broad types of privacy
interests - territorial, personal, and informational - which, while often
overlapping, have proved helpful in identifying the nature of the privacy
interest or interests at stake in particular situations…” The Court found that
the nature of appellant’s privacy interest in subscriber information relating
to a computer used privately was primarily an informational one and held: “...
the identity of a person linked to their use of the Internet must be recognized
as giving rise to a privacy interest beyond that inherent in the person’s name,
address and telephone number found in the subscriber information.” It then set
out three key elements of informational privacy: privacy as secrecy, privacy as
control, and privacy as anonymity. It further emphasised on the importance of
anonymity in informational privacy, particularly in the age of the Internet and
held that: “... anonymity may, depending on the totality of the circumstances,
be the foundation of a privacy interest that engages constitutional protection
against unreasonable search and seizure...” PART K 180 Though the Court stopped
short of recognizing an absolute right to anonymity, it held that “anonymous
Internet activity engages a high level of informational privacy”. The Court
further held that: “The disclosure of this information will often amount to the
identification of a user with intimate or sensitive activities being carried
out online, usually on the understanding that these activities would be
anonymous. A request by a police officer that an ISP voluntarily disclose such
information amounts to a search.” The Canadian Supreme Court has used
provisions of the Charter to expand the scope of the right to privacy, used
traditionally to protect individuals from an invasion of their property rights,
to an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy”. The right to privacy
has been held to be more than just a physical right as it includes the privacy
in information about one’s identity. Informational privacy has frequently been
addressed under Section 8 of the Charter. Canadian privacy jurisprudence has
developed with the advent of technology and the internet. Judicial decisions
have significant implications for internet/digital privacy. (v) Privacy under
The European Convention on Human Rights and the European Charter In Europe,
there are two distinct but related frameworks to ensure the protection of the
right of privacy. The first is the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
an international agreement to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in
Europe. The second is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(CFREU), a treaty enshrining certain political, social, and economic rights for
the PART K 181 European Union. Under ECHR (“the Convention”), the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), also known as the ‘Strasbourg Court’, is the
adjudicating body, which hears complaints by individuals on alleged breaches of
human rights by signatory states. Similarly, under CFREU (“the Charter), the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), also called the ‘Luxembourg
Court’, is the chief judicial authority of the European Union and oversees the
uniform application and interpretation of European Union law, in co-operation
with the national judiciary of the member states. Article 8 of the ECHR
provides that: “Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has
the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.” Under the Charter, the relevant provisions are: Article 7
Respect for private and family life Everyone has the right to respect for his
or her private and family life, home and communications. Article 8 Protection
of personal data 1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data
concerning him or her. PART K 182 2. Such data must be processed fairly for
specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or
some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access
to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have
it rectified. 3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an
independent authority. Article 52 Scope of guaranteed rights 1. Any limitation
on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be
provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.
Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if
they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interests
recognised by the Union of the need to protect the rights and freedoms of
others. 2. Rights recognised by this Charter which are based on the Community
Treaties or the Treaty on European Union shall be exercised under the
conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties. 3. In so far as
this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the
Convention of the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the
said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more
extensive protection. Article 52(3) provides for the ECHR as a minimum standard
of human rights in the EU. Article 52(3) thus leads the EU to be indirectly
bound by the ECHR as it must always be obeyed when restricting fundamental
rights in the EU. Moreover, in the preCharter era, the protection of privacy
was held to form part of the right to privacy in line with how the ECtHR in
Strasbourg interprets Art. 8 of ECHR till date288 . 288 In the case of J McB v
LE, Case C-400/10 PPU, [2010] ECR I-nyr, the CJEU ruled that where Charter
rights paralleled ECHR rights, the Court of Justice should follow any
consistent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, elucidating
that: “It is clear that the said Article 7 [of the EU Charter] contains rights
corresponding to those guaranteed by Article 8(1) of the ECHR. Article 7 of the
Charter must therefore be given the same meaning and the same scope as Article
8(1) of the ECHR...” Reference can be passed to a case before ECtHR, PART K 183
Thus, in order to understand the protection extended to the right to privacy in
EU, the jurisprudence of Article 8 of the Convention and Article 7 of the
Charter need to be analyzed. The term ‘private life’ is an essential ingredient
of both these provisions and has been interpreted to encompass a wide range of
interests. In the case of Niemietz v Germany289 (1992), the ECtHR observed
that: “The Court does not consider it possible or necessary to attempt an
exhaustive definition of the notion of "private life". However, it
would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an "inner circle" in
which the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to
exclude therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within that
circle. Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the
right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings.”
Similarly, in Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom290 (1993), the ECtHR stated
that “the notion of "private life" is a broad one” and “is not
susceptible to exhaustive definition”. This broad approach is also present in
the recent cases of European jurisprudence. In S and Marper v United Kingdom291
(2008), the ECtHR held, with respect to right to respect for private life, that
: “...the concept of “private life”... covers the physical and psychological
integrity of a person... It can therefore embrace multiple aspects of the
person's physical and social identity... Elements such as, for example, gender
identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the
personal sphere protected by Article 8... Beyond a person's Varec SA v. État
belge, Case C-450/06, [2008] ECR I-581, where it was observed that that:
“...the right to respect for private life, enshrined in Article 8 of the ECHR,
which flows from the common constitutional traditions of the Member States....
is restated in Article 7 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European
Union”. 289 Application no. 13710/88, judgment dated 16 September 1992. 290
Application no. 13134/87, judgment dated 25 March 1993. 291 [2008] ECHR 1581
PART K 184 name, his or her private and family life may include other means of
personal identification and of linking to a family... Information about the
person's health is an important element of private life... The Court
furthermore considers that an individual's ethnic identity must be regarded as
another such element... The concept of private life moreover includes elements
relating to a person's right to their image…” In Uzun v Germany292 (2010), the
European Court of Human Rights while examining an application claiming
violation of Article 8 observed that: “Article 8 protects, inter alia, a right
to identity and personal development, and the right to establish and develop
relationships with other human beings and the outside world. There is,
therefore, a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public
context, which may fall within the scope of “private life”... There are a
number of elements relevant to a consideration of whether a person's private
life is concerned by measures effected outside a person's home or private
premises. Since there are occasions when people knowingly or intentionally
involve themselves in activities which are or may be recorded or reported in a
public manner, a person's reasonable expectations as to privacy may be a
significant, although not necessarily conclusive, factor…” Thus, the
determination of a complaint by an individual under Article 8 of the Convention
necessarily involves a two-stage test293, which can be summarized as below:
“Stage 1: Article 8 para. 1 1.1 Does the complaint fall within the scope of one
of the rights protected by Article 8 para 1? 1.2 If so, is there a positive
obligation on the State to respect an individual’s right and has it been
fulfilled? Stage 2: Article 8 para. 2 2.1 Has there been an interference with
the Article 8 right? 2.2 If so, 292 Application No. 35623/05 293 Ursula
Kilkelly, “The right to respect for private and family life: A guide to the implementation
of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights”, Council of Europe
(2001), at page 9 PART K 185 2.2.1 is it in accordance with law? 2.2.2 does it
pursue a legitimate aim? 2.2.3 is it necessary in a democratic society? This
test is followed by the Court each time it applies Article 8 in a given case.”
In other words, a fair balance is struck between the general interest of the
community and the interests of the individual. The Grand Chamber of 18 judges
at the ECtHR, in S and Marper v United Kingdom (supra), examined the claim of
the applicants that their Right to Respect for Private Life under Article 8 was
being violated as their fingerprints, cell samples and DNA profiles were
retained in a database after successful termination of criminal proceedings
against them. The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 of
the Convention. Finding that the retention at issue had constituted a
disproportionate interference with the applicants’ right to respect for private
life, the Court held that “the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the powers
of retention of the fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles of
persons...fails to strike a fair balance between the competing public and
private interests and that the respondent State has overstepped any acceptable
margin of appreciation”. It was further held that: “The mere storing of data
relating to the private life of an individual amounts to an interference within
the meaning of Article 8. However, in determining whether the personal
information retained by the authorities involves any of the private-life
aspects mentioned above, the Court will have due regard to the specific context
in which the information at issue has been recorded and retained, the nature of
the records, the way in which these records are used and processed and the
results that may be obtained.” PART K 186 Applying the above principles, it was
held that: “The Court notes at the outset that all three categories of the
personal information retained by the authorities in the present cases, namely
fingerprints, DNA profiles and cellular samples, constitute personal data
within the meaning of the Data Protection Convention as they relate to
identified or identifiable individuals. The Government accepted that all three
categories are “personal data” within the meaning of the Data Protection Act
1998 in the hands of those who are able to identify the individual.” Regarding
the retention of cellular samples and DNA profiles, it was held that: “Given
the nature and the amount of personal information contained in cellular
samples, their retention per se must be regarded as interfering with the right
to respect for the private lives of the individuals concerned. That only a
limited part of this information is actually extracted or used by the
authorities through DNA profiling and that no immediate detriment is caused in
a particular case does not change this conclusion… [T]he DNA profiles' capacity
to provide a means of identifying genetic relationships between individuals… is
in itself sufficient to conclude that their retention interferes with the right
to the private life of the individuals concerned... The possibility the DNA
profiles create for inferences to be drawn as to ethnic origin makes their
retention all the more sensitive and susceptible of affecting the right to
private life.” Regarding retention of fingerprints, it was held that:
“...fingerprints objectively contain unique information about the individual
concerned allowing his or her identification with precision in a wide range of
circumstances. They are thus capable of affecting his or her private life and
retention of this information without the consent of the individual concerned
cannot be regarded as neutral or insignificant…” In Uzun v Germany (supra), the
ECtHR examined an application claiming violation of Article 8 of European
Convention of Human Rights where the applicant’s data was PART K 187 obtained
via the Global Positioning System (GPS) by the investigation agencies and was
used against him in a criminal proceeding. In this case, the applicant was
suspected of involvement in bomb attacks by the left-wing extremist movement.
The Court unanimously concluded that there had been no violation of Article 8
and held as follows: “GPS surveillance of Mr Uzun had been ordered to
investigate several counts of attempted murder for which a terrorist movement
had claimed responsibility and to prevent further bomb attacks. It therefore
served the interests of national security and public safety, the prevention of
crime and the protection of the rights of the victims. It had only been ordered
after less intrusive methods of investigation had proved insufficient, for a
relatively short period of time – three months – and it had affected Mr Uzun
only when he was travelling with his accomplice’s car. Therefore, he could not
be said to have been subjected to total and comprehensive surveillance. Given
that the investigation concerned very serious crimes, the Court found that the
GPS surveillance of Mr Uzun had been proportionate.” The decision of the CJEU
in the case Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito
(ASNEF) v Spain294 relied upon the Article 7 right to respect for private life
and Article 8(1) of the Charter to find that the implementation in Spain of the
Data Protection Directive was defective in that it applied only to information
kept in a specified public data bank rather than more generally to public and
private databases, on the basis that “the processing of data appearing in
non-public sources necessarily implies that information relating to the data
subject’s private life will thereafter be known by the data controller and, as
the case may be, by the third party or parties to whom the data is disclosed.
This more serious infringement of the data 294 C-468/10, 24 November, [2011]
ECR I-nyr PART K 188 subject’s rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the
Charter must be properly taken into account”. In Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v
Minister295 (2014), the CJEU examined the validity of a Data Protection
Directive, which required telephone and internet service providers to retain
details of internet and call data for 6 to 24 months, as well as related data
necessary to identify the subscriber or user, so as to ensure that the data is
available for the purpose of prevention, investigation, detection and
prosecution of serious crimes. The Court ruled that the Directive is
incompatible with Article 52(1) of the Charter, because the limitations which
the said Directive placed were “not accompanied by the necessary principles for
governing the guarantees needed to regulate access to the data and their use”.
It was held that: “To establish the existence of an interference with the
fundamental right to privacy, it does not matter whether the information on the
private lives concerned is sensitive or whether the persons concerned have been
inconvenienced in any way.” While stating that data relating to the use of
electronic communications is particularly important and therefore a valuable
tool in the prevention of offences and the fight against crime, in particular
organised crime, the Court looked into the proportionality of the interference
with the right to privacy and held that: “As regards the necessity for the
retention of data required by Directive 2006/24, it must be held that the fight
against serious crime, in particular against organised crime and terrorism, is
indeed of the utmost importance in order to ensure public security and its 295
C-293/12 PART K 189 effectiveness may depend to a great extent on the use of
modern investigation techniques. However, such an objective of general
interest, however fundamental it may be, does not, in itself, justify a
retention measure such as that established by Directive 2006/24 being
considered to be necessary for the purpose of that fight...” Highlighting that
the said Directive does not provide for sufficient safeguards, it was held that
by adopting the Directive, the EU “exceeded the limits imposed by compliance
with the principle of proportionality in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 52(1)
of the Charter.” In RE v The United Kingdom296 (2015), the applicant was
arrested and detained on three occasions in relation to the murder of a police
officer. He claimed violation of Article 8 under the regime of covert
surveillance of consultations between detainees and their lawyers, medical
advisors and appropriate adults297 sanctioned by the existing law. The ECtHR
held that: “The Court…considers that the surveillance of a legal consultation
constitutes an extremely high degree of intrusion into a person’s right to
respect for his or her private life and correspondence... Consequently, in such
cases it will expect the same safeguards to be in place to protect individuals
from arbitrary interference with their Article 8 rights... Surveillance of
“appropriate adult”-detainee consultations were not subject to legal privilege
and therefore a detainee would not have the same expectation of privacy.…The
relevant domestic provisions, insofar as they related to the possible
surveillance of consultations between detainees and “appropriate adults”, were
accompanied by “adequate safeguards against abuse”, notably as concerned the
authorisation, review and record keeping. Hence, there is no violation of
Article 8.” 296 Application No. 62498/11 297 As per the facts of the case, an
“appropriate adults” could be a relative or guardian, or a person experienced
in dealing with mentally disordered or mentally vulnerable people. PART K 190
In Roman Zakharov v Russia298 (2015), ECtHR examined an application claiming
violation of Article 8 of the Convention alleging that the mobile operators had
permitted unrestricted interception of all telephone communications by the
security services without prior judicial authorisation, under the prevailing
national law. The Court observed that: “Mr Zakharov was entitled to claim to be
a victim of a violation of the European Convention, even though he was unable
to allege that he had been the subject of a concrete measure of surveillance.
Given the secret nature of the surveillance measures provided for by the
legislation, their broad scope (affecting all users of mobile telephone
communications) and the lack of effective means to challenge them at national
level… Russian law did not meet the “quality of law” requirement and was
incapable of keeping the interception of communications to what was “necessary
in a democratic society”. There had accordingly been a violation of Article 8
of the Convention.” Both the ECtHR and the CJEU, while dealing with the application
and interpretation of Article 8 of ECHR and Article 7 of the Charter, have kept
a balanced approached between individual interests and societal interests. The
two-step test in examining an individual claim related to a Convention right
has strictly been followed by ECtHR. (vi) Decisions of the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights deals
with the Right to Privacy. The provision is extracted below: “1. Everyone has
the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized. 298
Application No. 47143/06 PART K 191 2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or
abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his
correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation. 3. Everyone
has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.” The decision in Artavia Murillo ET AL. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v
Costa Rica299 (2012), addressed the question of whether the State’s prohibition
on the practice of in vitro fertilisation constituted an arbitrary interference
with the right to private life. The Court held that: “The scope of the
protection of the right to private life has been interpreted in broad terms by
the international human rights courts, when indicating that this goes beyond
the right to privacy. The protection of private life encompasses a series of
factors associated with the dignity of the individual, including, for example,
the ability to develop his or her own personality and aspirations, to determine
his or her own identity and to define his or her own personal relationships.
The concept of private life encompasses aspects of physical and social
identity, including the right to personal autonomy, personal development and
the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and
with the outside world. The effective exercise of the right to private life is
decisive for the possibility of exercising personal autonomy on the future
course of relevant events for a person’s quality of life. Private life includes
the way in which individual views himself and how he decides to project this
view towards others, and is an essential condition for the free development of
the personality… Furthermore, the Court has indicated that motherhood is an
essential part of the free development of a woman’s personality. Based on the
foregoing, the Court considers that the decision of whether or not to become a
parent is part of the right to private life and includes, in this case, the decision
of whether or not to become a mother or father in the genetic or biological
sense.” (emphasis supplied) 299 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 257 PART K 192
In Escher et al v Brazil300 (2009), telephonic interception and monitoring of
telephonic lines was carried out by the military police of the State between
April and June 1999. The Court found that the State violated the American
Convention on Human Rights and held that: “Article 11 applies to telephone
conversations irrespective of their content and can even include both the
technical operations designed to record this content by taping it and listening
to it, or any other element of the communication process; for example, the
destination or origin of the calls that are made, the identity of the speakers,
the frequency, time and duration of the calls, aspects that can be verified
without the need to record the content of the call by taping the conversation…
Article 11 of the Convention recognizes that every person has the right to
respect for his honor, prohibits an illegal attack against honor and
reputation, and imposes on the States the obligation to provide legal
protection against such attacks. In general, the right to honor relates to
self-esteem and self-worth, while reputation refers to the opinion that others
have of a person… [O]wing to the inherent danger of abuse in any monitoring
system, this measure must be based on especially precise legislation with
clear, detailed rules. The American Convention protects the confidentiality and
inviolability of communications from any kind of arbitrary or abusive
interference from the State or individuals; consequently, the surveillance,
intervention, recording and dissemination of such communications is prohibited,
except in the cases established by law that are adapted to the objects and
purposes of the American Convention.” Like other international jurisdictions,
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights dealt with the concept of privacy and
private life in broad terms which enhance the value of liberty and freedom. 300
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 200 PART L 193 The development of the law on
privacy in these jurisdictions has drawn sustenance from the importance and
sanctity attributed to individual freedom and liberty. Constitutions which,
like the Indian Constitution, contain entrenched rights place the dignity of
the individual on a high pedestal. Despite cultural differences and disparate
histories, a study of comparative law provides reassurance that the path which
we have charted accords with a uniform respect for human values in the
constitutional culture of the jurisdictions which we have analysed. These
values are universal and of enduring character. L Criticisms of the privacy
doctrine 135 The Attorney General for India, leading the arguments before this
Court on behalf of Union of India, has been critical of the recognition being
given to a general right of privacy. The submission has several facets, among
them being: (i) there is no general or fundamental right to privacy under the
Constitution; (ii) no blanket right to privacy can be read as part of the
fundamental rights and where some of the constituent facets of privacy are
already covered by the enumerated guarantees in Part III, those facets will be
protected in any case; (iii) where specific species of privacy are governed by
the protection of liberty in Part III of the Constitution, they are subject to
reasonable restrictions in the public interest as recognized in several
decisions of this Court ; PART L 194 (iv) privacy is a concept which does not
have any specific meaning or definition and the expression is inchoate; and (v)
the draftsmen of the Constitution specifically did not include such a right as
part of the chapter on fundamental rights and even the ambit of the expression
liberty which was originally sought to be used in the draft Constitution was
pruned to personal liberty. These submissions have been buttressed by Mr Aryama
Sundaram, learned senior counsel. 136 Criticism and critique lie at the core of
democratic governance. Tolerance of dissent is equally a cherished value. In
deciding a case of such significant dimensions, the Court must factor in the
criticisms voiced both domestically and internationally. These, as we notice,
are based on academic, philosophical and practical considerations. 137 The
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy adverts to “several sceptical and critical
accounts of privacy”. The criticism is set out thus: “There are several
sceptical and critical accounts of privacy. According to one well known argument
there is no right to privacy and there is nothing special about privacy,
because any interest protected as private can be equally well explained and
protected by other interests or rights, most notably rights to property and
bodily security (Thomson, 1975). Other critiques argue that privacy interests
are not distinctive because the personal interests they protect are
economically inefficient (Posner, 1981) or that they are not grounded in any
adequate legal doctrine (Bork, 1990). Finally, there is the feminist critique
of privacy, that granting special status PART L 195 to privacy is detrimental
to women and others because it is used as a shield to dominate and control
them, silence them, and cover up abuse (MacKinnon, 1989).”301 138 In a 2013
article published in the Harvard Law Review, a professor of law at Georgetown
Law Center, Georgetown University, described privacy as having an “image
problem”302. Privacy, as she notes, has been cast as “old-fashioned at best and
downright harmful at worst - anti-progressive, overly costly, and inimical to
the welfare of the body politic”303. The consequences in her view are
predictable: “…when privacy and its purportedly outdated values must be
balanced against the cutting-edge imperatives of national security, efficiency,
and entrepreneurship, privacy comes up the loser. The list of privacy
counterweights is long and growing. The recent additions of social media,
mobile platforms, cloud computing, data mining, and predictive analytics now
threaten to tip the scales entirely, placing privacy in permanent opposition to
the progress of knowledge.”304 The article proceeds to explain that the
perception of privacy as antiquated and socially retrograde is wrong.
Nonetheless, this criticism has relevance to India. The nation aspires to move
to a knowledge based economy. Information is the basis of knowledge. The scales
must, according to this critique, tip in favour of the paramount national need
for knowledge, innovation and development. These concerns cannot be discarded
and must be factored in. They are based on the need to provide economic growth
and social welfare to large swathes of an impoverished society. 301 “Privacy” ,
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2002) , available at
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/privacy/ 302 Julie E Cohen, “What Privacy Is
For”, Harvard Law Review (2013), Vol. 126, at page 1904 303 Ibid 304 Ibid, at
pages 1904-1905. PART L 196 139 Another criticism, which is by Robert Bork,
questions the choice of fundamental values of the Constitution by judges of the
US Supreme Court and the theory (propounded by Justice Douglas in Griswold) of
the existence of ‘penumbras’ or zones of privacy created by the Bill of Rights
as a leap of judicial interpretation.305 140 The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
seeks to offer an understanding of the literature on privacy in terms of two
concepts: reductionism and coherentism.306 Reductionists are generally critical
of privacy while the Coherentists defend fundamental values of privacy
interests. The criticisms of privacy have been broadly summarised as consisting
of the following : a Thomson’s Reductionism307 Judith Jarvis Thomson, in an
article published in 1975, noted that while there is little agreement on the
content of privacy, ultimately privacy is a cluster of rights which overlap
with property rights or the right to bodily security. In her view, the right to
privacy is derivative in the sense that a privacy violation is better
understood as violation of a more basic right. 305 For this criticism, see :
Robert H Bork, “Neutral Principles and some First Amendment Problems”, Indiana
Law Journal (Fall 1971), Vol. 47(1), at pages 8-9 306 Supra note 301 307 Judith
Jarvis Thomson, “The Right to Privacy” , Philosophy and Public Affairs (1975),
Vol. 4, at pages 295- 314, as cited in Supra note 301 PART L 197 b Posner’s
Economic critique308 Richard Posner, in ‘the Economics of Justice’ published in
1981, argued that privacy is protected in ways that are economically
inefficient. In his view, privacy should be protected only when access to
information would reduce its value such as when a student is allowed access to
a letter of recommendation for admission, rendering such a letter less
reliable. According to Posner, privacy when manifested as control over information
about oneself, is utilised to mislead or manipulate others. c Bork’s critique
Robert Bork, in ‘The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law’
309 , has been severe in his criticism of the protection of privacy by the US
Supreme Court. In his view, Justice Douglas in Griswold did not derive privacy
from some pre-existing right but sought to create a new right which has no
foundation in the Bill of Rights, thereby overstepping the bounds of a judge by
making new law and not by interpreting it. Many theorists urge that the
constitutional right to privacy is more correctly regarded as a right to
liberty. The powerful counter argument to these criticisms is that while
individuals possess multiple liberties under the Constitution, read in isolation,
many of them are not related to the kinds of concerns that emerge in privacy
issues. In this view, liberty is a concept 308 Richard Posner, The Economics of
Justice, Harvard University Press (1981), as cited in Supra note 301 309 Robert
Bork, The Tempting of America : The Political Seduction of the Law, Simon and
Schuster (1990), as cited in Supra note 301 PART L 198 which is broader than
privacy and issues or claims relating to privacy are a sub-set of claims to
liberty.310 Hence it has been argued that privacy protects liberty and that
“privacy protection gains for us the freedom to define ourselves and our
relations to others”311. This rationale understands the relationship between
liberty and privacy by stipulating that while liberty is a broader notion,
privacy is essential for protecting liberty. Recognizing a constitutional right
to privacy is a reaffirmation of the individual interest in making certain
decisions crucial to one’s personality and being. d Feminist critique Many
writers on feminism express concern over the use of privacy as a veneer for
patriarchal domination and abuse of women. Patriarchal notions still prevail in
several societies including our own and are used as a shield to violate core
constitutional rights of women based on gender and autonomy. As a result,
gender violence is often treated as a matter of “family honour” resulting in
the victim of violence suffering twice over – the physical and mental trauma of
her dignity being violated and the perception that it has cause an affront to
“honour”. Privacy must not be utilised as a cover to conceal and assert
patriarchal mindsets. Catherine MacKinnon in a 1989 publication titled ‘Towards
a Feminist Theory of the State’ 312 adverts to the dangers of privacy when it
is used to cover up physical harm done to women by perpetrating their
subjection. Yet, it must also be noticed 310 Supra note 301 311 Ibid 312
Catherine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, Harvard University
Press (1989), as cited in Supra note 301 PART L 199 that women have an
inviolable interest in privacy. Privacy is the ultimate guarantee against
violations caused by programmes not unknown to history, such as state imposed
sterilization programmes or mandatory state imposed drug testing for women. The
challenge in this area is to enable the state to take the violation of the
dignity of women in the domestic sphere seriously while at the same time
protecting the privacy entitlements of women grounded in the identity of gender
and liberty. 141 The submission that privacy has no accepted or defined
connotation can be analysed with reference to the evolution of the concept in
the literature on the subject. Some of the leading approaches which should be
considered for an insight into the ambit and content of privacy: (i) Alan
Westin313 defined four basic states of privacy which reflect on the nature and
extent of the involvement of the individual in the public sphere. At the core
is solitude – the most complete state of privacy involving the individual in an
“inner dialogue with the mind and conscience”.314 The second state is the state
of intimacy which refers not merely to intimate relations between spouses or
partners but also between family, friends and colleagues. The third state is of
anonymity where an individual seeks freedom from identification despite being
in a public space. The fourth state is described as a state of reservation
which is expressed as “the need to 313 Westin’s categorization of privacy is
based on the specific values which it sub-serves. Westin has drawn support from
the distinction made in 1960 by William L. Prosser for the purposes of civil
privacy violations or torts, Westin adopted a value based approach, unlike the
harms based approach of Prosser. For Prosser’s work, see William L. Prosser,
“Privacy”, California Law Review (1960), Vol. 48(3), pages 383-423. 314
Bert-Jaap Koops et al., “A Typology of Privacy”, University of Pennsylvania
Journal of International Law (2017), Vol. 38, Issue 2, at page 496 PART L 200
hold some aspects of ourselves back from others, either as too personal and
sacred or as too shameful and profane to express”315 . (ii) Roger Clarke has
developed a classification of privacy on Maslow’s pyramid of values316 . The
values described in Maslow’s pyramid are: self-actualization, selfesteem, love
or belonging, safety and physiological or biological need. Clarke’s categories
include (a) privacy of the person also known as bodily privacy. Bodily privacy
is violated by compulsory extraction of samples of body fluids and body tissue
and compulsory sterilization; (b) privacy of personal behaviour which is part
of a private space including the home; (c) Privacy of personal communications
which is expressed as the freedom of communication without interception or
routine monitoring of one’s communication by others; (d) Privacy of personal
data which is linked to the concept of informational privacy. (iii) Anita Allen
has, in a 2011 publication, developed the concept of “unpopular privacy”317.
According to her, governments must design “unpopular” privacy laws and duties
to protect the common good, even if privacy is being forced on individuals who
may not want it. Individuals under this approach are not permitted to waive
their privacy rights. Among the component elements which she notices are : (a)
physical or spatial privacy – illustrated by the privacy in the home; (b)
informational privacy including information data or facts about persons or
their communications; (c) 315 Ibid, at page 497 316 Ibid, at 498 317 Ibid, at
500 PART L 201 decisional privacy which protects the right of citizens to make
intimate choices about their rights from intrusion by the State; (d)
proprietary privacy which relates to the protection of one’s reputation; (e)
associational privacy which protects the right of groups with certain defined
characteristics to determine whom they may include or exclude.318 Privacy has
distinct connotations including (i) spatial control; (ii) decisional autonomy;
and (iii) informational control.319 Spatial control denotes the creation of
private spaces. Decisional autonomy comprehends intimate personal choices such
as those governing reproduction as well as choices expressed in public such as
faith or modes of dress. Informational control empowers the individual to use privacy
as a shield to retain personal control over information pertaining to the
person. With regard to informational privacy, it has been stated that :
“…perhaps the most convincing conception is proposed by Helen Nissenbaum who
argues that privacy is the expectation that information about a person will be
treated appropriately. This theory of “contextual integrity” believes people do
not want to control their information or become inaccessible as much as they
want their information to be treated in accordance with their expectation
(Nissenbaum 2004, 2010, 2011).” 320 Integrated together, the fundamental
notions of privacy have been depicted in a seminal article published in 2017
titled “A Typology of privacy” 321 in the University 318 Ibid, at pages 500-501
319 Bhairav Acharya, “The Four Parts of Privacy in India”, Economic &
Political Weekly (2015), Vol. 50 Issue 22, at page 32 320 Ibid, at page 34 321
Bert-Jaap Koops et al., “A Typology of Privacy”, University of Pennsylvania
Journal of International Law (2017), Vol. 38 Issue 2, at page 566 PART L 202 of
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law. The article contains an excellent
visual depiction of privacy, which is presented in the following format : 142
The above diagrammatical representation presents two primary axes: a horizontal
axis consisting of four zones of privacy and a vertical axis which emphasises
two aspects of freedom: the freedom to be let alone and the freedom for
self-development. The nine primary types of privacy are, according to the above
depiction: (i) bodily privacy which reflects the privacy of the physical body.
Implicit in this is the negative freedom of being able to prevent others from
violating one’s body or from restraining the freedom of bodily movement; (ii)
spatial privacy which is reflected in the privacy of a private space through
which access of others can be restricted to the space; intimate relations and
family life are an apt illustration of spatial privacy; (iii) communicational
privacy which is reflected in enabling an individual to (emphasis on) Freedom
to be let alone” (emphasis on) Freedom to “selfdevelopment” personal zone
intimate zone semi-private zone “secrecy” public zone “inconspicuousness”
behavioural privacy associational privacy decisional privacy intellectual
privacy bodily privacy spatial privacy communicational Privacy proprietary
Privacy in f orm at io n a l p r iva c y PART M 203 restrict access to
communications or control the use of information which is communicated to third
parties; (iv) proprietary privacy which is reflected by the interest of a
person in utilising property as a means to shield facts, things or information
from others; (v) intellectual privacy which is reflected as an individual
interest in the privacy of thought and mind and the development of opinions and
beliefs; (vi) decisional privacy reflected by an ability to make intimate
decisions primarily consisting one’s sexual or procreative nature and decisions
in respect of intimate relations; (vii) associational privacy which is reflected
in the ability of the individual to choose who she wishes to interact with;
(viii) behavioural privacy which recognises the privacy interests of a person
even while conducting publicly visible activities. Behavioural privacy
postulates that even when access is granted to others, the individual is
entitled to control the extent of access and preserve to herself a measure of
freedom from unwanted intrusion; and (ix) informational privacy which reflects
an interest in preventing information about the self from being disseminated
and controlling the extent of access to information. M Constituent Assembly and
privacy: limits of originalist interpretation 143 The founding fathers of the
Constitution, it has been urged, rejected the notion of privacy being a fundamental
right. Hence it has been submitted that it would be outside the realm of
constitutional adjudication for the Court to declare a fundamental right to
privacy. The argument merits close consideration. PART M 204 144 On 17 March
1947, K M Munshi submitted Draft articles on the fundamental rights and duties
of citizens to the Sub-committee on fundamental rights. Among the rights of
freedom proposed in clause 5 were the following322 : “…(f) the right to the
inviolability of his home, (g) the right to the secrecy of his correspondence,
(h) the right to maintain his person secure by the law of the Union from
exploitation in any manner contrary to law or public authority…” 145 On 24
March 1947, Dr Ambedkar submitted a Memorandum and Draft articles on the rights
of states and minorities. Among the draft articles on fundamental rights of
citizens was the following323 : “…10. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized…” 146 The draft report
of the Sub-committee submitted on 3 April 1947 contained a division between the
fundamental rights into justiciable and non-justiciable rights. Clause 9(d) and
Clause 10 provided as follows324 : “9(d) The right of every citizen to the
secrecy of his correspondence. Provision may be made by law to regulate the
interception or detention of articles and messages in course of transmission by
post, telegraph or otherwise on the occurrence of any public emergency or in
the interests of public safety or tranquillity… 322 B. Shiva Rao, The Framing
of India’s Constitution, Indian Institute of Public Administration (1967), Vol.
2, at page 75 323 Ibid, at page 87 324 Ibid, at page 139 PART M 205 10. The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized” 147 Dr B N Rau in his notes on the draft report had reservations
about clause 10 which were expressed thus325: “Clause 10. If this means that
there is to be no search without a court’s warrant, it may seriously affect the
powers of investigation of the police. Under the existing law, eg., Criminal
Procedure Code, section 165 (relevant extracts given below), the police have
certain important powers. Often in the course of investigation, a police
officer gets information that stolen property has been secreted in a certain
place. If he searches it at once, as he can at present, there is a chance of
his recovering it; but he has to apply for a court’s warrant, giving full
details, the delay involved, under Indian conditions of distance and lack of
transport in the interior may be fatal.” A note was submitted by Sir Alladi
Krishnaswamy Iyer on 10 April 1947 objecting to the ‘secrecy of correspondence’
mentioned in clause 9(d) and the protection against unreasonable searches in
clause 10326 : “Clause (d). In regard to secrecy of correspondence I raised a
point during the discussions that it need not find a place in chapter on
fundamental rights and it had better be left to the protection afforded by the
ordinary law of the land contained in the various enactments. There is no such
right in the American Constitution. Such a provision finds a place only in the
post-First World War constitutions. The effect of the clauses upon the sections
of the Indian Evidence Act bearing upon privilege will have to be considered.
Restrictions -vide chapter 9, s 120-127. The result of 325 Ibid, at page 152
326 Ibid, at pages 158-159 PART M 206 this clause will be that every private
correspondence will assume the rank of a State paper, or, in the language of s.
123 and 124, a record relating to the affairs of State. A clause like this
might checkmate the prosecution in establishing any case of conspiracy or
abetment, the plaintiff being helpless to prove the same by placing before the
court the correspondence that passed between the parties which in all these
cases would furnish the most material evidence. The opening words of the clause
“public order and morality” would not be of any avail in such cases. On a very
careful consideration of the whole subject I feel that inclusion of such a
clause in the chapter on fundamental rights will lead to endless complications
and difficulties in the administration of justice. It will be for the committee
to consider whether a reconsideration of the clause is called for in the above
circumstances. Clause 10. Unreasonable searches, In regard to this subject I
pointed out the difference between the conditions obtaining in America at the
time when the American Constitution was drafted and the conditions in India
obtaining at present after the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code in this
behalf have been in force for nearly a century. The effect of the clause, as it
is, will be to abrogate some of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code
and to leave it to the Supreme Court in particular cases to decide whether the
search is reasonable or unreasonable. While I am averse to reagitating the
matter I think it may not be too late for the committee to consider this
particular clause.” During the course of the comments and suggestions on the
draft Constitution, Jaya Prakash Narayan suggested the inclusion of the secrecy
of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications. Such an inclusion was,
however, objected to on the following grounds327 : “…It is also hardly
necessary to include secrecy of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications
as a fundamental right in the Constitution itself as that might lead to
practical difficulties in 327 B. Shiva Rao, The Framing of India’s
Constitution: A Study, Indian Institute of Public Administration (1968), at
pages 219-220 PART M 207 the administration of the posts and telegraph
department. The relevant laws enacted by the Legislature on the subject (the
Indian Post Office Act, 1898 and the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885) permit
interception of communications sent through post, telegraph or telephone only
in specified circumstances, such as, on the occurrence of an emergency and in
the interests of public safety.” Eventually, clause 9(d) and clause 10 were
dropped from the chapter dealing with fundamental rights. 148 This discussion
would indicate that there was a debate during the course of the drafting of the
Constitution on the proposal to guarantee to every citizen the right to secrecy
of correspondence in clause 9(d) and the protection to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures in their persons houses, papers and assets.
The objection to clause 9(d) was set out in the note of dissent of Sir Alladi
Krishnaswamy Iyer and it was his view that the guarantee of secrecy of
correspondence may lead to every private correspondence becoming a state paper.
There was also a feeling that this would affect the prosecution especially in
cases of conspiracy or abetment. Similarly, his objection to clause 10 was that
it would abrogate some of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. B N
Rau likewise stated that this would seriously affect the powers of
investigation of the police. The clause protecting the secrecy of
correspondence was thus dropped on the ground that it would constitute a
serious impediment in prosecutions while the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures was deleted on the ground that there were provisions in
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 covering the area. The debates of the
Constituent Assembly indicate PART M 208 that the proposed inclusion (which was
eventually dropped) was in two specific areas namely correspondence and
searches and seizures. From this, it cannot be concluded that the Constituent
Assembly had expressly resolved to reject the notion of the right to privacy as
an integral element of the liberty and freedoms guaranteed by the fundamental
rights. 149 The Constitution has evolved over time, as judicial interpretation,
led to the recognition of specific interests and entitlements. These have been
subsumed within the freedoms and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.
Article 21 has been interpreted by this Court to mean that life does not mean
merely a physical existence. It includes all those faculties by which life is
enjoyed. The ambit of ‘the procedure established by law’ has been interpreted
to mean that the procedure must be fair, just and reasonable. The coalescence
of Articles 14, 19 and 21 has brought into being a jurisprudence which
recognises the inter-relationship between rights. That is how the requirements
of fairness and non-discrimination animate both the substantive and procedural
aspects of Article 21. These constitutional developments have taken place as
the words of the Constitution have been interpreted to deal with new exigencies
requiring an expansive reading of liberties and freedoms to preserve human
rights under the rule of law. India’s brush with a regime of the suspension of
life and personal liberty in the not too distant past is a grim reminder of how
tenuous liberty can be, if the judiciary is not vigilant. The interpretation of
the Constitution cannot be frozen by its original understanding. The
Constitution has evolved and must continuously evolve PART M 209 to meet the
aspirations and challenges of the present and the future. Nor can judges
foresee every challenge and contingency which may arise in the future. This is
particularly of relevance in an age where technology reshapes our fundamental
understanding of information, knowledge and human relationships that was
unknown even in the recent past. Hence as Judges interpreting the Constitution
today, the Court must leave open the path for succeeding generations to meet
the challenges to privacy that may be unknown today. 150 The impact of the
decision in Cooper is to establish a link between the fundamental rights guaranteed
by Part III of the Constitution. The immediate consequence of the decision is
that a law which restricts the personal liberties contained in Article 19 must
meet the test of permissible restrictions contemplated by Clauses 2 to 6 in
relation to the fundamental freedom which is infringed. Moreover, since the
fundamental rights are inter-related, Article 21 is no longer to be construed
as a residue of rights which are not specifically enumerated in Article 19.
Both sets of rights overlap and hence a law which affects one of the personal
freedoms under Article 19 would, in addition to the requirement of meeting the
permissible restrictions contemplated in clauses 2 to 6, have to meet the
parameters of a valid ‘procedure established by law’ under Article 21 where it
impacts on life or personal liberty. The law would be assessed not with
reference to its object but on the basis of its effect and impact on the
fundamental rights. Coupled with the breakdown of the theory that the
fundamental rights are water-tight compartments, the post Maneka jurisprudence
infused the test of fairness and reasonableness in determining whether the
‘procedure PART M 210 established by law’ passes muster under Article 21. At a
substantive level, the constitutional values underlying each article in the
Chapter on fundamental rights animate the meaning of the others. This
development of the law has followed a natural evolution. The basis of this
development after all is that every aspect of the diverse guarantees of
fundamental rights deals with human beings. Every element together with others
contributes in the composition of the human personality. In the very nature of
things, no element can be read in a manner disjunctive from the composite
whole. The close relationship between each of the fundamental rights has led to
the recognition of constitutional entitlements and interests. Some of them may
straddle more than one, and on occasion several, fundamental rights. Yet others
may reflect the core value upon which the fundamental rights are founded. Even
at the birth of the Constitution, the founding fathers recognised in the
Constituent Assembly that, for instance, the freedom of speech and expression
would comprehend the freedom of the press. Hence the guarantee of free speech and
expression has been interpreted to extend to the freedom of the press.
Recognition of the freedom of the press does not create by judicial fiat, a new
fundamental right but is an acknowledgment of that, which lies embedded and
without which the guarantee of free speech and expression would not be
complete. Similarly, Article 21 has been interpreted to include a spectrum of
entitlements such as a right to a clean environment, the right to public
health, the right to know, the right to means of communication and the right to
education, besides a panoply of rights in the context of criminal law and
procedure in matters such as handcuffing and speedy trial. The rights which
have been held to flow out of Article 21 include the following: PART M 211 (i)
The right to go abroad – Satwant Singh Sawhney v D Ramarathnam APO New Delhi
328 . (ii) The right against solitary confinement – Sunil Batra v Delhi
Administration329 . (iii) The right of prisoners against bar fetters – Charles
Sobraj v Supdt. Central Jail330 . (iv) The right to legal aid – M H Hoskot v
State of Maharashtra331 . (v) The right to speedy trial – Hussainara Khatoon v
Home Secretary, State of Bihar332 . (vi) The right against handcuffing – Prem
Shankar Shukla v Delhi Administration333 . (vii) The right against custodial
violence – Sheela Barse v State of Maharashtra334 . (viii) The right against
public hanging – A G of India v Lachma Devi335 . (ix) Right to doctor’s
assistance at government hospitals – Paramanand Katara v Union of India336 .
(x) Right to shelter – Shantistar Builders v N K Totame337 . (xi) Right to a
healthy environment – Virender Gaur v State of Haryana338 . (xii) Right to
compensation for unlawful arrest – Rudal Sah v State of Bihar339 . 328 (1967) 3
SCR 525 329 (1978) 4 SCC 494 330 (1978) 4 SCC 104 331 (1978) 3 SCC 544 332
(1980) 1 SCC 81 333 (1980) 3 SCC 526 334 (1983) 2 SCC 96 335 (1989) Suppl.(1)
SCC 264 336 (1989) 4 SCC 286 337 (1990) 1 SCC 520 338 (1995) 2 SCC 577 339
(1983) 4 SCC 141 PART M 212 (xiii) Right to freedom from torture – Sunil Batra
v Delhi Administration340 . (xiv) Right to reputation – Umesh Kumar v State of
Andhra Pradesh341 . (xv) Right to earn a livelihood – Olga Tellis v Bombay
Municipal Corporation342 . Neither is this an exercise in constitutional
amendment brought about by judicial decision nor does it result in the creation
of a new set of fundamental rights. The exercise has been one of interpreting
existing rights guaranteed by the Constitution and while understanding the core
of those rights, to define the ambit of what the right comprehends. both global and-151
The draftsmen of the Constitution had a sense of history domestic– as they
attempted to translate their vision of freedom into guarantees against
authoritarian behaviour. The Constitution adopted a democratic form of
government based on the rule of law. The framers were conscious of the
widespread abuse of human rights by authoritarian regimes in the two World Wars
separated over a period of two decades. The framers were equally conscious of
the injustice suffered under a colonial regime and more recently of the horrors
of partition. The backdrop of human suffering furnished a reason to preserve a
regime of governance based on the rule of law which would be subject to
democratic accountability against a violation of fundamental freedoms. The
content of the fundamental rights evolved over the 340(1978) 4 SCC 494 341
(2013) 10 SCC 591 342 (1985) 3 SCC 545 PART M 213 course of our constitutional history
and any discussion of the issues of privacy, together with its relationship
with liberty and dignity, would be incomplete without a brief reference to the
course of history as it unravels in precedent. By guaranteeing the freedoms and
liberties embodied in the fundamental rights, the Constitution has preserved
natural rights and ring-fenced them from attempts to attenuate their existence.
Technology, as we experience it today is far different from what it was in the
lives of the generation which drafted the Constitution. Information technology
together with the internet and the social media and all their attendant
applications have rapidly altered the course of life in the last decade.
Today’s technology renders models of application of a few years ago
obsolescent. Hence, it would be an injustice both to the draftsmen of the
Constitution as well as to the document which they sanctified to constrict its
interpretation to an originalist interpretation. Today’s problems have to be
adjudged by a vibrant application of constitutional doctrine and cannot be
frozen by a vision suited to a radically different society. We describe the
Constitution as a living instrument simply for the reason that while it is a
document which enunciates eternal values for Indian society, it possesses the
resilience necessary to ensure its continued relevance. Its continued relevance
lies precisely in its ability to allow succeeding generations to apply the
principles on which it has been founded to find innovative solutions to intractable
problems of their times. In doing so, we must equally understand that our
solutions must continuously undergo a process of re-engineering. PART N 214 N
Is the statutory protection to privacy reason to deny a constitutional right?
152 The Union government and some of the States which have supported it have
urged this Court that there is a statutory regime by virtue of which the right
to privacy is adequately protected and hence it is not necessary to read a
constitutional right to privacy into the fundamental rights. This submission is
sought to be fortified by contending that privacy is merely a common law right
and the statutory protection is a reflection of that position. 153 The
submission betrays lack of understanding of the reason why rights are protected
in the first place as entrenched guarantees in a Bill of Rights or, as in the
case of the Indian Constitution, as part of the fundamental rights. Elevating a
right to the position of a constitutionally protected right places it beyond
the pale of legislative majorities. When a constitutional right such as the
right to equality or the right to life assumes the character of being a part of
the basic structure of the Constitution, it assumes inviolable status:
inviolability even in the face of the power of amendment. Ordinary legislation
is not beyond the pale of legislative modification. A statutory right can be
modified, curtailed or annulled by a simple enactment of the legislature. In
other words, statutory rights are subject to the compulsion of legislative
majorities. The purpose of infusing a right with a constitutional element is
precisely to provide it a sense of immunity from popular opinion and, as its
reflection, from legislative annulment. Constitutionally protected rights
embody the liberal belief that personal liberties of the individual are so
sacrosanct that it is necessary to ensconce them in a PART O 215 protective
shell that places them beyond the pale of ordinary legislation. To negate a
constitutional right on the ground that there is an available statutory
protection is to invert constitutional theory. As a matter of fact, legislative
protection is in many cases, an acknowledgment and recognition of a
constitutional right which needs to be effectuated and enforced through protective
laws. For instance, the provisions of Section 8(1)(j) of the Right to
Information Act, 2005 which contain an exemption from the disclosure of
information refer to such information which would cause an unwarranted invasion
of the privacy of the individual. But the important point to note is that when
a right is conferred with an entrenched constitutional status in Part III, it
provides a touchstone on which the validity of executive decision making can be
assessed and the validity of law can be determined by judicial review.
Entrenched constitutional rights provide the basis of evaluating the validity
of law. Hence, it would be plainly unacceptable to urge that the existence of
law negates the rationale for a constitutional right or renders the constitutional
right unnecessary. O Not an elitist construct 154 The Attorney General argued
before us that the right to privacy must be forsaken in the interest of welfare
entitlements provided by the State. In our view, the submission that the right
to privacy is an elitist construct which stands apart from the PART O 216 needs
and aspirations of the large majority constituting the rest of society, is
unsustainable. This submission betrays a misunderstanding of the constitutional
position. Our Constitution places the individual at the forefront of its focus,
guaranteeing civil and political rights in Part III and embodying an aspiration
for achieving socio- economic rights in Part IV. The refrain that the poor need
no civil and political rights and are concerned only with economic well-being
has been utilised though history to wreak the most egregious violations of
human rights. Above all, it must be realised that it is the right to question,
the right to scrutinize and the right to dissent which enables an informed
citizenry to scrutinize the actions of government. Those who are governed are
entitled to question those who govern, about the discharge of their
constitutional duties including in the provision of socio-economic welfare
benefits. The power to scrutinize and to reason enables the citizens of a
democratic polity to make informed decisions on basic issues which govern their
rights. The theory that civil and political rights are subservient to
socio-economic rights has been urged in the past and has been categorically
rejected in the course of constitutional adjudication by this Court. 155 Civil
and political rights and socio-economic rights do not exist in a state of
antagonism. The conditions necessary for realising or fulfilling socio-economic
rights do not postulate the subversion of political freedom. The reason for
this is simple. Socio-economic entitlements must yield true benefits to those
for whom they are intended. This can be achieved by eliminating rent-seeking
behaviour and by PART O 217 preventing the capture of social welfare benefits
by persons who are not entitled to them. Capture of social welfare benefits can
be obviated only when political systems are transparent and when there is a
free flow of information. Opacity enures to the benefit of those who monopolize
scarce economic resources. On the other hand, conditions where civil and
political freedoms flourish ensure that governmental policies are subjected to
critique and assessment. It is this scrutiny which sub-serves the purpose of
ensuring that socio-economic benefits actually permeate to the underprivileged
for whom they are meant. Conditions of freedom and a vibrant assertion of civil
and political rights promote a constant review of the justness of
socio-economic programmes and of their effectiveness in addressing deprivation
and want. Scrutiny of public affairs is founded upon the existence of freedom.
Hence civil and political rights and socio-economic rights are complementary
and not mutually exclusive. 156 Some of these themes have been addressed in the
writings of the Nobel laureate, Amartya Sen. Sen compares the response of many
non-democratic regimes in critical situations such as famine with the responses
of democratic societies in similar situations.343 His analysis reveals that the
political immunity enjoyed by government leaders in authoritarian states
prevents effective measures being taken to address such conditions: “For
example, Botswana had a fall in food production of 17 percent and Zimbabwe one
of 38 percent between 1979-1981 and 1983- 1984, in the same period in which the
food production decline 343 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, Oxford
University Press (2000), at page 178-179 PART O 218 amounted to a relatively
modest 11 or 12 percent in Sudan and Ethiopia. But while Sudan and Ethiopia,
with comparatively smaller declines in food output, had massive famines,
Botswana and Zimbabwe had none, and this was largely due to timely and
extensive famine prevention policies by these latter countries. Had the
governments in Botswana and Zimbabwe failed to undertake timely action, they
would have been under severe criticism and pressure from the opposition and
would have gotten plenty of flak from newspapers. In contrast, the Ethiopian
and Sudanese governments did not have to reckon with those prospects, and the
political incentives provided by democratic institutions were thoroughly absent
in those countries. Famines in Sudan and Ethiopia – and in many other countries
in sub-Saharan Africa – were fed by the political immunity enjoyed by
governmental leaders in authoritarian countries. This would seem to apply to
the present situation in North Korea as well.”344 In the Indian context, Sen
points out that the Bengal famine of 1943 “was made viable not only by the lack
of democracy in colonial India but also by severe restrictions on reporting and
criticism imposed on the Indian press, and the voluntary practice of ‘silence’
on the famine that the British-owned media chose to follow”345. Political
liberties and democratic rights are hence regarded as ‘constituent components’
of development.346 In contrast during the drought which took place in
Maharashtra in 1973, food production failed drastically and the per capita food
output was half of that in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet there was no famine in
Maharashtra where five million people were employed in rapidly organized public
projects while there were 344 Ibid, at page 179 345 Amartya Sen, The Idea of
Justice, Penguin Books (2009), at page 339 346 Ibid, at page 347 PART O 219
substantial famines in sub-Saharan Africa. This establishes what he terms as
“the protective role of democracy”. Sen has analysed the issue succinctly: “The
causal connection between democracy and the nonoccurrence of famines is not
hard to seek. Famines kill millions of people in different countries in the
world, but they don’t kill the rulers. The kings and the presidents, the
bureaucrats and the bosses, the military leaders and the commanders never are
famine victims. And if there are no elections, no opposition parties, no scope
for uncensored public criticism, then those in authority don’t have to suffer
the political consequences of their failure to prevent famines. Democracy, on
the other hand, would spread the penalty of famines to the ruling groups and
political leaders as well. This gives them the political incentive to try to
prevent any threatening famine, and since famines are in fact easy to prevent
(the economic argument clicks into the political one at this stage), the
approaching famines are firmly prevented.”347 There is, in other words, an
intrinsic relationship between development and freedom: “…development cannot
really be seen merely as the process of increasing inanimate objects of
convenience, such as raising the GNP per head, or promoting industrialization
or technological advance or social modernization. These accomplishments are, of
course, valuable – often crucially important – but their value must depend on
what they do to the lives and freedoms of the people involved. For adult human
beings, with responsibility for choice, the focus must ultimately be on whether
they have the freedom to do what they have reason to value. In this sense,
development consists of expansion of people’s freedom.”348 347 Amartya Sen,
Development as Freedom, Oxford University Press (2000), at page 180 348 Amartya
Sen, “The Country of First Boys”, Oxford University Press, Pg.80-81 PART O 220
In an article recently published in July 2017 in Public Law, titled “The
Untapped Potential of the Mandela Constitution”349, Justice Edwin Cameron, a
distinguished judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, has provided a
telling example. President Mbeki of South Africa doubted the medical science
underlying AIDS and effectively obstructed a feasible ARV programme. This posture
of AIDS denialism plunged South Africa into a crisis of public health as a
result of which the drug Nevirapine which was offered to the South African
government free of charge was refused. Eventually it was when the South African
Constitutional Court intervened in the Treatment Action Campaign decision350
that it was held that the government had failed the reasonableness test. The
article notes that as a result of the decision, the drug became available and
“hundreds and thousands, perhaps millions, of lives have been saved”. Besides,
the article notes that the judgment changed the public discourse of AIDS and
“cut-through the obfuscation of denials and in doing so, dealt it a fatal
blow”351 . Examples can be multiplied on how a state sanctioned curtain of
misinformation or state mandated black-outs of information can cause a serious
denial of socioeconomic rights. The strength of Indian democracy lies in the
foundation provided by 349 Edwin Cameron and Max Taylor, “The Untapped
Potential of the Mandela Constitution”, Public Law (2017), at page 394 350
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign, (2002) 5 SA 721 (CC) 351 Edwin
Cameron and Max Taylor, “The Untapped Potential of the Mandela Constitution”,
Public Law (2017), at page 395 PART P 221 the Constitution to liberty and
freedom. Liberty and freedom are values which are intrinsic to our
constitutional order. But they also have an instrumental value in creating
conditions in which socio-economic rights can be achieved. India has no iron
curtain. Our society prospers in the shadow of its drapes which let in sunshine
and reflect a multitude of hues based on language, religion, culture and
ideologies. 157 We need also emphasise the lack of substance in the submission
that privacy is a privilege for the few. Every individual in society
irrespective of social class or economic status is entitled to the intimacy and
autonomy which privacy protects. It is privacy as an intrinsic and core feature
of life and personal liberty which enables an individual to stand up against a
programme of forced sterilization. Then again, it is privacy which is a
powerful guarantee if the State were to introduce compulsory drug trials of
non-consenting men or women. The sanctity of marriage, the liberty of
procreation, the choice of a family life and the dignity of being are matters
which concern every individual irrespective of social strata or economic well
being. The pursuit of happiness is founded upon autonomy and dignity. Both are
essential attributes of privacy which makes no distinction between the birth
marks of individuals. P Not just a common law right 158 There is also no merit
in the defence of the Union and the States that privacy is merely a common law
right. The fact that a right may have been afforded protection at common law
does not constitute a bar to the constitutional recognition of the right. PART
P 222 The Constitution recognises the right simply because it is an incident of
a fundamental freedom or liberty which the draftsperson considered to be so
significant as to require constitutional protection. Once privacy is held to be
an incident of the protection of life, personal liberty and of the liberties
guaranteed by the provisions of Part III of the Constitution, the submission
that privacy is only a right at common law misses the wood for the trees. The
central theme is that privacy is an intrinsic part of life, personal liberty
and of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III which entitles it to protection as a
core of constitutional doctrine. The protection of privacy by the Constitution
liberates it, as it were, from the uncertainties of statutory law which, as we
have noted, is subject to the range of legislative annulments open to a
majoritarian government. Any abridgment must meet the requirements prescribed by
Article 21, Article 19 or the relevant freedom. The Constitutional right is
placed at a pedestal which embodies both a negative and a positive freedom. The
negative freedom protects the individual from unwanted intrusion. As a positive
freedom, it obliges the State to adopt suitable measures for protecting
individual privacy. An apt description of this facet is contained in the Max
Planck Encyclopaedia of Comparative Constitutional Law, in its section on the
right to privacy352 : “2. The right to privacy can be both negatively and
positively defined. The negative right to privacy entails the individuals are
protected from unwanted intrusion by both the state and private actors into
their private life, especially features that define their personal identity such
as sexuality, religion and political affiliation, ie the inner core of a
person’s private life…. 352 Anna Jonsson Cornell, “Right to Privacy”, Max
Planck Encyclopaedia of Comparative Constitutional Law (2015) PART Q 223 The
positive right to privacy entails an obligation of states to remove obstacles
for an autonomous shaping of individual identities.” Q Substantive Due Process
159 During the course of the hearing, Mr Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the State of Gujarat submitted that the requirement of a
valid law with reference to Article 21 is not conditioned by the notion of
substantive due process. Substantive due process, it was urged is a concept
which has been evolved in relation to the US Constitution but is inapposite in
relation to the Indian Constitution. The history surrounding the drafting of
Article 21 indicates a conscious decision by the Constituent Assembly not to
introduce the expression “due process of law” which is incorporated in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution. The draft Constitution
which was prepared by the Drafting Committee chaired by Dr B R Ambedkar
contained a ‘due process’ clause to the effect that ‘nor any State shall
deprive any person of life, liberty and property without due process of law’.
The clause as originally drafted was subjected to three important changes in
the Constituent Assembly. Firstly, the reference to property was deleted from
the above clause of the draft Constitution. The members of the Constituent
Assembly perceived that retaining the right to property as part of the due
process clause would pose a serious impediment to legislative reform
particularly with the redistribution of property. The second important change
arose from a meeting which Shri B N Rau had with Justice PART Q 224 Felix
Frankfurter in the US. In the US particularly in the years around the Great
Depression, American Courts had utilised the due process clause to invalidate
social welfare legislation. In the Lochner353 era, the US Supreme Court
invalidated legislation such as statutes prohibiting employers from making
their employees work for more than ten hours a day or sixty hours a week on the
supposition that this infringed the liberty of contract. Between 1899 and 1937
(excluding the civil rights cases), 159 US Supreme Court decisions held state
statutes unconstitutional under the due process and equal protection clauses.
Moreover, 25 other statutes were struck down under the due process clause
together with other provisions of the American Constitution.354 Under the due
process clause, the US Supreme Court struck down labour legislation prohibiting
employers from discriminating on the grounds of union activity; regulation of
wages; regulation of prices for commodities and services; and legislation
denying entry into business.355 These decisions were eventually distinguished
or overruled in 1937 and thereafter.356 160 The Constituent Assembly, in this
background, made a second important change in the original draft by qualifying
the expression ‘liberty’ with the word ‘personal’. Shri B N Rau suggested that
if this qualification were not to be introduced, 353 Lochner v New York, 198 US
45 (1905) 354 William B Lockhart, et al, Constitutional Law: Cases-
Comments-Questions, West Publishing Co. (1986), 6th edition, at page 394 355
Adair v United States, 208 US 161, 28 S. Ct. 277, 52 L.Ed. 436 (1908) (fifth
amendment); Adkins v Children’s Hosp. 261 US 525, 43 S.Ct. 22, 70 L.Ed (1923)
(fifth amendment); Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 US 418, 47 S.Ct. 426, 71
L.Ed. 718 (1927); and New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 US 262, 52 S Ct. 371,
76 L.Ed. 747 (1932) 356 NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Stell Corp. (1937); West
Coast Hotel Co. v Parrish, 300 US 379, 57 S. Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937) PART
Q 225 even price control legislation would be interpreted as interfering with
the opportunity of contract between seller and buyer (see in this context B
Shiva Rao’s ‘The Framing of India’s Constitution: A Study’357). 161 The third
major change which the Constituent Assembly made was that the phrase ‘due
process of law’ was deleted from the text of the draft Constitution. Following
B N Rau’s meeting with Justice Frankfurter, the Drafting Committee deleted the
phrase ‘due process of law’ and replaced it with ‘procedure established by
law’. Granville Austin refers to the interaction between Frankfurter and B N
Rau and the reason for the deletion358 : “Soon after, Rau began his trip to the
United States, Canada, Eire, and England to talk with justices,
constitutionalists, and statesmen about the framing of the Constitution. In the
United States he met Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, who told him that
he considered the power of judicial review implied in the due process clause
both undemocratic – because a few judges could veto legislation enacted by the
representatives of a nation – and burdensome to the Judiciary. Frankfurter had
been strongly influenced by the Harvard Law School’s great constitutional
lawyer, James Bradley Thayer, who also feared that too great a reliance on due
process as a protection against legislative oversight or misbehaviour might
weaken the democratic process. Thayer’s views had impressed Rau even before he
met Frankfurter. In his Constitutional Precedents, Rau had pointed out that
Thayer and others had ‘drawn attention to the dangers of attempting to find in
the Supreme Court – instead of in the lessons of experience – a safeguard
against the mistakes of the representatives of people’.” 357 B. Shiva Rao, The
Framing of India’s Constitution: A Study, Indian Institute of Public
Administration (1968), at page 235. See also B. Shiva Rao, The Framing of
India’s Constitution, Vol. 2, at pages 20-36, 147-153 358 Granville Austin, The
Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford University Press (1966),
at page103 PART Q 226 Though several members of the Constituent Assembly spoke
against the deletion, Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar supported the move on the
ground that the expression ‘due process’ would operate as a great handicap for
all social legislation and introduce “judicial vagaries into the moulding of
law”359. In his words360 : “…In the development of the doctrine of ‘due
process’ the United States Supreme Court has not adopted a consistent view at
all and the decisions are conflicting… The Minimum Wage Law or a Restraint on
Employment have in some cases been regarded as an invasion of personal liberty
and freedom, by the United States Supreme Court in its earlier decisions, the
theory being that it is an essential part of personal liberty that every person
in the world be she a woman, be he a child over fourteen years of age or be he
a labourer, has the right to enter into any contract he or she liked and it is
not the province of other people to interfere with that liberty. On that ground,
in the earlier decisions of Supreme Court it has been held that the Minimum
Wages Laws are invalid as invading personal liberty… The clause may serve as a
great handicap for all social legislation, and for the protection of women… I
trust that the House will take into account the various aspects of this
question, the future progress of India, the well-being and the security of the
States, the necessity of maintaining a minimum of liberty, the need for
co-ordinating social control and personal liberty, before coming to a decision.
One thing also will have to be taken into account, viz., that the security of
the State is far from being so secure as we are imagining at present…” On the
other hand, several members of the Constituent Assembly preferred the retention
of the phrase ‘due process’, among them being Dr Sitaramayya, T T
Krishnamachari, K Santhanam, M A Ayyangar, Dr B V Keskar, S L Saksena, Thakur
359 Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 7 (6th December 1948), available at
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol7p20b.htm 360 Ibid PART Q 227 Das
Bhargava, Hukam Singh and four members of the Muslim League.361 K M Munshi
stated that362 : “…a substantive interpretation of due process could not apply
to liberty of contract – the basis on which the United States Supreme Court
had, at the beginning of the century, declared some social legislation to be an
infringement of due process and hence unconstitutional – but only to liberty of
person, because ‘personal’ had been added to qualify liberty. ‘When a law has
been passed which entitles the government to take away the personal liberty of
an individual, Munshi said, ‘the court will consider whether the law which has
been passed is such as is required by the exigencies of the case and therefore,
as I said, the balance will be struck between individual liberty and social
control. Other Assembly members agreed: whilst not wishing to impede the
passage of social reform legislation they sought to protect the individual’s
personal liberty against prejudicial action by an arbitrary Executive.” Dr B R
Ambedkar in an insightful observation, presented the merits and demerits of the
rival viewpoints dispassionately. In his words363 : “There are two views on
this point. One view is this; that the legislature may be trusted not to make
any law which would abrogate the fundamental rights of man, so to say, the
fundamental rights which apply to every individual, and consequently, there is
no danger arising from the introduction of the phrase ‘due process’. Another
view is this : that it is not possible to trust the legislature; the
legislature is likely to err, is likely to be led away by passion, by party
prejudice, by party considerations, and the legislature may make a law which
may abrogate what may be regarded as the fundamental principles which safeguard
the individual rights of a citizen. We are therefore placed in two difficult
positions. One is to give the judiciary the authority to sit in judgment over
the will of the legislature and to question the law made by the legislature on
the ground that it is not good law, in consonance with fundamental principles.
Is that a desirable principle? The second position is that 361 Granville Austin
(Supra note 358), at page 105 362 Ibid, at pages 105-106 363 Constituent Assembly
Debates, Vol. 7 (13th December 1948), available at
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol7p25a.htm PART Q 228 the
legislature ought to be trusted not to make bad laws. It is very difficult to
come to any definite conclusion. There are dangers on both sides. For myself I
cannot altogether omit the possibility of a Legislature packed by party men
making laws which may abrogate or violate what we regard as certain fundamental
principles affecting the life and liberty of an individual. At the same time, I
do not see how five or six gentlemen sitting in the Federal or Supreme Court
examining laws made by the Legislature and by dint of their own individual
conscience or their bias or their prejudices be trusted to determine which law
is good and which law is bad. It is rather a case where a man has to sail
between Charybdis and Scylla and I therefor would not say anything. I would
leave it to the House to decide in any way it likes.” The amendments proposed
by some members to reintroduce ‘due process’ were rejected on 13 December 1948
and the phrase “due process of law” was deleted from the original draft
Constitution. However, Article 22 was introduced into the Constitution to
protect against arbitrary arrest and detention by incorporating several safeguards.
162 In Gopalan, the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 was challenged on the ground
that it denied significant procedural safeguards against arbitrary detention.
The majority rejected the argument that the expression ‘procedure established
by law’ meant procedural due process. Chief Justice Kania noted that Article 21
of our Constitution had consciously been drawn up by the draftsmen so as to not
use the word ‘due process’ which was used in the American Constitution. Hence
it was impermissible to read the expression ‘procedure established by law’ to
mean ‘procedural due process’ or as requiring compliance with natural justice.
Justice Patanjali Sastri held that reading the expression ‘due process of law’
into the Constitution was impermissible since it would lead to those ‘subtle
and elusive criteria’ PART Q 229 implied in the phrase which it was the
deliberate purpose of the framers of our Constitution to avoid. Similarly,
Justice Das also observed that our Constitution makers had deliberately
declined to adopt “the uncertain and shifting American doctrine of due process
of law” which could not, therefore, be read into Article 21. Hence, the view of
the majority was that once the procedure was established by a validly enacted
law, Article 21 would not be violated. 163 In his celebrated dissent, Justice
Fazl Ali pointed out that the phrase ‘procedure established by law’ was
borrowed from the Japanese Constitution (which was drafted under American
influence at the end of the Second World War) and hence the expression means
‘procedural due process’. In Justice Fazl Ali’s view the deprivation of life
and personal liberty under Article 21, had to be preceded by (i) a notice; (ii)
an opportunity of being heard; (iii) adjudication by an impartial tribunal; and
(iv) an orderly course of procedure. Formulating these four principles, Justice
Fazl Ali held thus: “…Article 21 purports to protect life and personal liberty,
and it would be a precarious protection and a protection not worth having, if
the elementary principle of law under discussion which, according to Halsbury
is on a par with fundamental rights, is to be ignored and excluded. In the
course of his arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner repeatedly
asked whether the Constitution would permit a law being enacted, abolishing the
mode of trial permitted by the existing law and establishing the procedure of
trial by battle or trial by ordeal which was in vogue in olden times in
England. The question envisages something which is not likely to happen, but it
does raise a legal problem which can perhaps be met only in this way that if
the expression “procedure established by law” simply means any procedure
established or enacted by statute it will be difficult to give a negative
answer to the question, but if the word “law” includes what I have endeavoured
to show it does, such an answer may be justified. It seems to me that there is
nothing PART Q 230 revolutionary in the doctrine that the words “procedure
established by law” must include the four principles set out in Professor
Willis’ book, which, as I have already stated, are different aspects of the
same principle and which have no vagueness or uncertainty about them. These
principles, as the learned author points out and as the authorities show, are
not absolutely rigid principles but are adaptable to the circumstances of each
case within certain limits. I have only to add that it has not been seriously
controverted that “law” in this article means valid law and “procedure” means
certain definite rules of proceeding and not something which is a mere pretence
for procedure.”364 In Maneka, where the passport of the petitioner was
impounded without furnishing reasons, a majority of judges found that the
expression ‘procedure established by law’ did not mean any procedure howsoever
arbitrary or fanciful. The procedure had to be fair, just and reasonable. The
views of Justices Chandrachud, Bhagwati and Krishna Iyer emerge from the
following brief extracts: “Chandrachud, J.: …But the mere prescription of some
kind of procedure cannot ever meet the mandate of Article 21. The procedure
prescribed by law has to be fair, just and reasonable, not fanciful, oppressive
or arbitrary.”365 “Bhagwati, J.: The principle of reasonableness, which legally
as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or
nonarbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the
procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in
order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be “right and just and fair”
and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure
at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied.”366 364
Gopalan (Supra note 3), at pages 60-61 (para 77) 365 Maneka (Supra note 5), at
page 323 (para 48) 366 Ibid, at page 284 (para 7) PART Q 231 “Krishna Iyer, J.:
…So I am convinced that to frustrate Article 21 by relying on any formal
adjectival statute, however, flimsy or fantastic its provisions be, is to rob
what the constitution treasures. …To sum up, “procedure” in Article 21 means
fair, not formal procedure. “Law” is reasonable law, not any enacted piece.”367
Soon after the decision in Maneka, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to
the provisions for solitary confinement under Section 30(2) of the Prisons Act,
1894 which stipulated that a prisoner “under sentence of death” is to be kept
in a cell apart from other prisoners. In Sunil Batra v Delhi Administration368,
the Court pointed out that Sections 73 and 74 of the Penal Code which contain a
substantive punishment by way of solitary confinement was not under challenge.
Section 30(2) of the Prisons Act was read down by holding that the expression
“under sentence of death” would apply only after the entire process of remedies
had been exhausted by the convict and the clemency petition had been denied.
Justice D A Desai, speaking for the majority, held that: “…the word “law” in
the expression “procedure established by law” in Article 21 has been
interpreted to mean in Maneka Gandhi’s case that the law must be right, just
and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive.”369 367 Ibid, at page 338
(paras 82 and 85) 368 (1978) 4 SCC 494 369 Ibid, at pages 574-575 (para 228)
PART Q 232 Justice Krishna Iyer took note of the fact that our Constitution
does not contain a due process clause and opined that after the decision in
Maneka, the absence of such a clause would make no difference: “…true, our
Constitution has no ‘due process’ clause or the VIIIth Amendment; but, in this
branch of law, after Cooper and Maneka Gandhi the consequence is the same.”370
164 A substantive challenge to the constitutional validity of the death penalty
on a conviction on a charge of murder was raised in Bachan Singh371. The
judgment noted: “136. Article 21 reads as under: “No person shall be deprived
of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by
law.” If this Article is expanded in accordance with the interpretative
principle indicated in Maneka Gandhi, it will read as follows: “No person shall
be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to fair, just and
reasonable procedure established by valid law." In the converse positive
form, the expanded Article will read as below: “A person may be deprived of his
life or personal liberty in accordance with fair, just and reasonable procedure
established by valid law.””372 Bachan Singh clearly involved a substantive
challenge to the constitutional validity of a statutory provision. The majority
adjudicated upon the constitutional challenge under Article 21 and held that it
did not suffer from substantive or procedural invalidity. 370 Ibid, at page 518
(para 52) 371 (1980) 2 SCC 684 372 Ibid, at page 730 (para 136) PART Q 233 In
his dissent373, Justice Bhagwati significantly observed that the word
“procedure” under Article 21 would cover the entire process by which
deprivation is effected and that would include not only “the adjectival” but
also substantive part of law. In the view of the Court: “The word ‘procedure’
in Article 21 is wide enough to cover the entire process by which deprivation
is effected and that would include not only the adjectival but also the
substantive part of law.”374 In Mithu v State of Punjab375 (“Mithu”), a
Constitution Bench considered the validity of Section 303 of the Penal Code
which provided for a mandatory death penalty where a person commits murder
while undergoing a sentence of life imprisonment. Section 303 excluded the
procedural safeguards under Section 235(2) and 354(3) of the Criminal Procedure
Code under which the accused is required to be heard on the question of
sentence and “special reasons” need to be adduced for imposing the death
sentence. In the course of the judgment, Chandrachud C J indicated examples of
situations where a substantive enactment could be challenged on the touchstone
of Articles 14 and 21. The observations of the Court, which are extracted below
would indicate that while the Court did not use the expression “substantive due
process” it recognised that a law would be amenable to challenge under Article
21 not only on the ground that the procedure which it prescribes is not fair,
just and reasonable but 373 (1982) 3 SCC 24 374 Ibid, at page 55 (para 17) 375
(1983) 2 SCC 277 PART Q 234 on the touchstone of having imposed a penalty which
is savage or, as the Court held, an anathema of civilised jurisprudence :
“These decisions have expanded the scope of Article 21 in a significant way and
it is now too late in the day to contend that it is for the legislature to
prescribe the procedure and for the courts to follow it; that it is for the
legislature to provide the punishment and for the courts to impose it. Two
instances, undoubtedly extreme, may be taken by way of illustration for the
purpose of showing how the courts are not bound, and are indeed not free, to
apply a fanciful procedure by a blind adherence to the letter of the law or to
impose a savage sentence. A law providing that an accused shall not be allowed
to lead evidence in self-defence will be hit by Articles 14 and 21. Similarly,
if a law were to provide that the offence of theft will be punishable with the
penalty of the cutting of hands, the law will be bad as violating Article 21. A
savage sentence is anathema to the civilized jurisprudence of Article 21. These
are, of course, extreme illustrations and we need have no fear that our
legislatures will ever pass such laws. But these examples serve to illustrate
that the last word on the question of justice and fairness does not rest with
the legislature. Just as reasonableness of restrictions under clauses (2) to
(6) of Article 19 is for the courts to determine, so is it for the courts to
decide whether the procedure prescribed by a law for depriving a person of his
life or liberty is fair, just and reasonable. The question which then arises
before us is whether the sentence of death, prescribed by Section 303 of the
Penal Code for the offence of murder committed by a person who is under a
sentence of life imprisonment, is arbitrary and oppressive so as to be violative
of the fundamental right conferred by Article 21.”376 (emphasis supplied) In A
K Roy v Union of India377, dealing with the question of preventive detention, a
Constitution Bench of this Court adverted to the conscious decision in the
Constituent 376 Ibid, at pages 284-285 (para 6) 377 (1982) 1 SCC 271 PART Q 235
Assembly to delete the expression ‘due process of law’ from Article 21. The
Court held that: “The fact that England and America do not resort to preventive
detention in normal times was known to our Constituent Assembly and yet it
chose to provide for it, sanctioning its use for specified purposes. The
attitude of two other well-known democracies to preventive detention as a means
of regulating the lives and liberties of the people was undoubtedly relevant to
the framing of our Constitution. But the framers having decided to adopt and
legitimise it, we cannot declare it unconstitutional by importing our notions
of what is right and wrong. The power to judge the fairness and justness of
procedure established by a law for the purposes of Article 21 is one thing:
that power can be spelt out from the language of that article. Procedural
safeguards are the handmaids of equal justice and since, the power of the
government is colossal as compared with the power of an individual, the freedom
of the individual can be safe only if he has a guarantee that he will be
treated fairly. The power to decide upon the justness of the law itself is
quite another thing: that power springs from a ‘due process’ provision such as
is to be found in the 5th and 14th Amendments of the American Constitution by
which no person can be deprived of life, liberty or property “without due
process of law”.”378 (emphasis supplied) In Saroj Rani v Sudarshan Kumar379 ,
this Court upheld the constitutional validity of the provision for restitution
of conjugal rights contained in Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The
Court found that the provision served a social purpose of preventing the
breakdown of marriages and contained safeguards against its being used
arbitrarily. 378 Ibid, at page 301 (para 35) 379 (1984) 4 SCC 90 PART Q 236 In
Mohd. Arif v Supreme Court380, a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the
expression “reasonable procedure” in the context of Article 21 would encompass
an oral hearing of review petitions arising out of death penalties. Tracing the
history of the evolution of Article 21, Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman, speaking
for the majority in the Constitution Bench, observed as follows: “The wheel has
turned full circle. Substantive due process is now to be applied to the
fundamental right to life and liberty.”381 More recently, Justice Chelameswar,
speaking for a Bench of two judges in Rajbala v State of Haryana382 , has
struck a note of caution, by drawing attention to the position that the
expression ‘due process of law’ was consciously deleted in the drafting process
after the framing of the Constitution. Hence, in the view of the learned Judge,
it would be inappropriate to incorporate notions of substantive due process
adopted in the US while examining the constitutionality of Indian legislation.
The Court observed: “From the above extract from McDowell & Co. case it is
clear that the courts in this country do not undertake the task of declaring a
piece of legislation unconstitutional on the ground that the legislation is
“arbitrary” since such an exercise implies a value judgment and courts do not
examine the wisdom of some specific provision of the Constitution. To undertake
such an examination would amount to virtually importing the doctrine of
“substantive due process” employed by the American Supreme Court at an earlier
point of time while examining the constitutionality of Indian legislation. As
pointed out in the above extract, even in United States the doctrine is
currently of doubtful legitimacy. This Court long back in A.S. 380 (2014) 9 SCC
737 381 Ibid, at page 756 (para 28) 382 (2016) 2 SCC 445 PART Q 237 Krishna v.
State of Madras [1957 SCR 399] declared that the doctrine of due process has no
application under the Indian Constitution. As pointed out by Frankfurter, J.
arbitrariness became a mantra.”383 (emphasis supplied) The constitutional
history surrounding the drafting of Article 21 contains an abundant reflection
of a deliberate and studied decision of the Constituent Assembly to delete the
expression ‘due process of law’ from the draft Constitution when the
Constitution was adopted. In the Constituent Assembly, the Drafting Committee
chaired by Dr B R Ambedkar had included the phrase but it came to be deleted
after a careful evaluation of the vagaries of the decision making process in
the US involving interpretation of the due process clause. Significantly,
present to the mind of the framers of our Constitution was the invalidation of
social welfare legislation in the US on the anvil of the due process clause on
the ground that it violated the liberty of contract of men, women and children
to offer themselves for work in a free market for labour. This model evidently
did not appeal to those who opposed the incorporation of a similar phrase into
the Indian Constitution. Yet the debates in the Constituent Assembly indicate
that there was a substantial body of opposition to the deletion of the due
process clause, which eventually led Dr B R Ambedkar to objectively sum up the
rival view points for decision by the House. Evidently ‘due process’ was
substituted with the expression ‘procedure established by law’. ‘Liberty’ was
qualified by ‘personal’. 383 Ibid, at page 481 (para 64) PART Q 238 Having noticed
this, the evolution of Article 21, since the decision in Cooper indicates two
major areas of change. First, the fundamental rights are no longer regarded as
isolated silos or water tight compartments. In consequence, Article 14 has been
held to animate the content of Article 21. Second, the expression ‘procedure
established by law’ in Article 21 does not connote a formalistic requirement of
a mere presence of procedure in enacted law. That expression has been held to
signify the content of the procedure and its quality which must be fair, just
and reasonable. The mere fact that the law provides for the deprivation of life
or personal liberty is not sufficient to conclude its validity and the
procedure to be constitutionally valid must be fair, just and reasonable. The
quality of reasonableness does not attach only to the content of the procedure
which the law prescribes with reference to Article 21 but to the content of the
law itself. In other words, the requirement of Article 21 is not fulfilled only
by the enactment of fair and reasonable procedure under the law and a law which
does so may yet be susceptible to challenge on the ground that its content does
not accord with the requirements of a valid law. The law is open to substantive
challenge on the ground that it violates the fundamental right. In dealing with
a substantive challenge to a law on the ground that it violates a fundamental
right, there are settled principles of constitutional interpretation which hold
the field. The first is the presumption of constitutionality384 which is based
on the 384 Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41 ; Ram
Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 ; Burrakur Coal
Co. Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1961 SC 954 ; Pathumma v. State of Kerala (1970)
2 SCR 537 ; R.K. Garg v. Union of India, (1981) 4 SCC 675 ; State of Bihar v.
Bihar Distillery Limited, AIR 1997 SC 1511 ; State of Andhra Pradesh v. K.
Purushottam Reddy (2003) 9 SCC 564, ; Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India,
(2004) 4 SCC 311 ; State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, PART
Q 239 foundational principle that the legislature which is entrusted with the
duty of law making best understands the needs of society and would not readily
be assumed to have transgressed a constitutional limitation. The burden lies on
the individual who asserts a constitutional transgression to establish it.
Secondly, the Courts tread warily in matters of social and economic policy
where they singularly lack expertise to make evaluations. Policy making is
entrusted to the state.385 The doctrine of separation of powers requires the
Court to allow deference to the legislature whose duty it is to frame and enact
law and to the executive whose duty it is to enforce law. The Court would not,
in the exercise of judicial review, substitute its own opinion for the wisdom
of the law enacting or law enforcing bodies. In the context of Article 19, the
test of reasonableness was explained in the erudite words of Chief Justice
Patanjali Sastri in State of Madras v V G Row386, where the learned Chief
Justice held thus: “It is important in this context to bear in mind that the
test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each
individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of
reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the
right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the
restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied
thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the
time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. In evaluating 2005 (8) SCC
534 ; Bhanumati v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 12 SCC 1 ; K.T. Plantation
Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v.
Rakesh Kohli, (2012) 6 SCC 312 ; Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC
745 385 R.K. Garg v. Union of India, (1981) 4 SCC 675; Maharashtra State Board
of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupesh Kurmarsheth,
AIR 1984 SC 1543; State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell, (1996) 3 SCC 709 ; Union
of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2004) 10 SCC 1 ; State of U.P. v. Jeet S.
Bisht, (2007) 6 SCC 586 ; K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka,
(2011) 9 SCC 1 ; Bangalore Development Authority v. The Air Craft Employees
Cooperative Society Ltd., 2012 (1) SCALE 646 386 (1952) SCR 597 PART Q 240 such
elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all
the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy
and the scale of values of the judges participating in the decision should play
an important part, and the limit of their interference with legislative
judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility
and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant
not only for people of their way of thinking but for all, and that the majority
of the elected representatives of the people have, in authorizing the
imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable.”387 (emphasis
supplied) 165 The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, is
unquestionably vested with the constitutional power to adjudicate upon the
validity of a law. When the validity of a law is questioned on the ground that
it violates a guarantee contained in Article 21, the scope of the challenge is
not confined only to whether the procedure for the deprivation of life or
personal liberty is fair, just and reasonable. Substantive challenges to the
validity of laws encroaching upon the right to life or personal liberty has
been considered and dealt with in varying contexts, such as the death penalty
(Bachan Singh) and mandatory death sentence (Mithu), among other cases. A
person cannot be deprived of life or personal liberty except in accordance with
the procedure established by law. Article 14, as a guarantee against
arbitrariness, infuses the entirety of Article 21. The inter-relationship
between the guarantee against arbitrariness and the protection of life and
personal liberty operates in a multi-faceted plane. First, it ensures that the
procedure for deprivation must be fair, just and reasonable. Second, Article 14
impacts both the procedure and the expression “law”. 387 Ibid, at page 607 PART
Q 241 A law within the meaning of Article 21 must be consistent with the norms
of fairness which originate in Article 14. As a matter of principle, once
Article 14 has a connect with Article 21, norms of fairness and reasonableness
would apply not only to the procedure but to the law as well. 166 Above all, it
must be recognized that judicial review is a powerful guarantee against
legislative encroachments on life and personal liberty. To cede this right
would dilute the importance of the protection granted to life and personal
liberty by the Constitution. Hence, while judicial review in constitutional
challenges to the validity of legislation is exercised with a conscious regard
for the presumption of constitutionality and for the separation of powers
between the legislative, executive and judicial institutions, the
constitutional power which is vested in the Court must be retained as a vibrant
means of protecting the lives and freedoms of individuals. 167 The danger of construing
this as an exercise of ‘substantive due process’ is that it results in the
incorporation of a concept from the American Constitution which was consciously
not accepted when the Constitution was framed. Moreover, even in the country of
its origin, substantive due process has led to vagaries of judicial
interpretation. Particularly having regard to the constitutional history
surrounding the deletion of that phrase in our Constitution, it would be
inappropriate to equate the jurisdiction of a Constitutional Court in India to
entertain a substantive challenge to the validity of a law with the exercise of
substantive due process under the US Constitution. Reference to substantive due
process in some of the judgments is PART R 242 essentially a reference to a
substantive challenge to the validity of a law on the ground that its
substantive (as distinct from procedural) provisions violate the Constitution.
R Essential nature of privacy 168 What, then, does privacy postulate? Privacy
postulates the reservation of a private space for the individual, described as
the right to be let alone. The concept is founded on the autonomy of the
individual. The ability of an individual to make choices lies at the core of
the human personality. The notion of privacy enables the individual to assert
and control the human element which is inseparable from the personality of the
individual. The inviolable nature of the human personality is manifested in the
ability to make decisions on matters intimate to human life. The autonomy of
the individual is associated over matters which can be kept private. These are
concerns over which there is a legitimate expectation of privacy. The body and
the mind are inseparable elements of the human personality. The integrity of
the body and the sanctity of the mind can exist on the foundation that each
individual possesses an inalienable ability and right to preserve a private
space in which the human personality can develop. Without the ability to make
choices, the inviolability of the personality would be in doubt. Recognizing a
zone of privacy is but an acknowledgment that each individual must be entitled
to chart and pursue the course of development of personality. Hence privacy is
a postulate of human dignity itself. Thoughts and behavioural patterns which
are intimate to an individual are entitled to a zone of privacy where one is
free of social expectations. In that zone of privacy, an individual PART R 243
is not judged by others. Privacy enables each individual to take crucial decisions
which find expression in the human personality. It enables individuals to
preserve their beliefs, thoughts, expressions, ideas, ideologies, preferences
and choices against societal demands of homogeneity. Privacy is an intrinsic
recognition of heterogeneity, of the right of the individual to be different
and to stand against the tide of conformity in creating a zone of solitude.
Privacy protects the individual from the searching glare of publicity in
matters which are personal to his or her life. Privacy attaches to the person
and not to the place where it is associated. Privacy constitutes the foundation
of all liberty because it is in privacy that the individual can decide how
liberty is best exercised. Individual dignity and privacy are inextricably linked
in a pattern woven out of a thread of diversity into the fabric of a plural
culture. 169 Privacy of the individual is an essential aspect of dignity.
Dignity has both an intrinsic and instrumental value. As an intrinsic value,
human dignity is an entitlement or a constitutionally protected interest in
itself. In its instrumental facet, dignity and freedom are inseparably
inter-twined, each being a facilitative tool to achieve the other. The ability
of the individual to protect a zone of privacy enables the realization of the
full value of life and liberty. Liberty has a broader meaning of which privacy
is a subset. All liberties may not be exercised in privacy. Yet others can be
fulfilled only within a private space. Privacy enables the individual to retain
the autonomy of the body and mind. The autonomy of the individual is the
ability to make decisions on vital matters of concern to life. Privacy has not
been couched as an independent fundamental right. But that does not detract
from the constitutional protection afforded PART R 244 to it, once the true
nature of privacy and its relationship with those fundamental rights which are
expressly protected is understood. Privacy lies across the spectrum of
protected freedoms. The guarantee of equality is a guarantee against arbitrary
state action. It prevents the state from discriminating between individuals.
The destruction by the state of a sanctified personal space whether of the body
or of the mind is violative of the guarantee against arbitrary state action.
Privacy of the body entitles an individual to the integrity of the physical
aspects of personhood. The intersection between one’s mental integrity and
privacy entitles the individual to freedom of thought, the freedom to believe
in what is right, and the freedom of self-determination. When these guarantees
intersect with gender, they create a private space which protects all those
elements which are crucial to gender identity. The family, marriage,
procreation and sexual orientation are all integral to the dignity of the
individual. Above all, the privacy of the individual recognises an inviolable
right to determine how freedom shall be exercised. An individual may perceive
that the best form of expression is to remain silent. Silence postulates a realm
of privacy. An artist finds reflection of the soul in a creative endeavour. A
writer expresses the outcome of a process of thought. A musician contemplates
upon notes which musically lead to silence. The silence, which lies within,
reflects on the ability to choose how to convey thoughts and ideas or interact
with others. These are crucial aspects of personhood. The freedoms under
Article 19 can be fulfilled where the individual is entitled to decide upon his
or her preferences. Read in conjunction with Article 21, liberty enables the
individual to have a choice of preferences on various facets of life including
what and how one will eat, the way one will dress, the faith one will espouse
and a myriad other PART R 245 matters on which autonomy and self-determination
require a choice to be made within the privacy of the mind. The constitutional
right to the freedom of religion under Article 25 has implicit within it the
ability to choose a faith and the freedom to express or not express those
choices to the world. These are some illustrations of the manner in which
privacy facilitates freedom and is intrinsic to the exercise of liberty. The
Constitution does not contain a separate article telling us that privacy has
been declared to be a fundamental right. Nor have we tagged the provisions of
Part III with an alpha suffixed right of privacy: this is not an act of
judicial redrafting. Dignity cannot exist without privacy. Both reside within
the inalienable values of life, liberty and freedom which the Constitution has
recognised. Privacy is the ultimate expression of the sanctity of the
individual. It is a constitutional value which straddles across the spectrum of
fundamental rights and protects for the individual a zone of choice and
self-determination. Privacy represents the core of the human personality and
recognizes the ability of each individual to make choices and to take decisions
governing matters intimate and personal. Yet, it is necessary to acknowledge
that individuals live in communities and work in communities. Their
personalities affect and, in turn are shaped by their social environment. The
individual is not a hermit. The lives of individuals are as much a social
phenomenon. In their interactions with others, individuals are constantly
engaged in behavioural patterns and in relationships impacting on the rest of
society. Equally, the life of the individual is being consistently shaped by
cultural and social values imbibed from living in the community. This state of
flux which represents a PART S 246 constant evolution of individual personhood
in the relationship with the rest of society provides the rationale for
reserving to the individual a zone of repose. The lives which individuals lead
as members of society engender a reasonable expectation of privacy. The notion
of a reasonable expectation of privacy has elements both of a subjective and
objective nature. Privacy at a subjective level is a reflection of those areas
where an individual desire to be left alone. On an objective plane, privacy is defined
by those constitutional values which shape the content of the protected zone
where the individual ought to be left alone. The notion that there must exist a
reasonable expectation of privacy ensures that while on the one hand, the
individual has a protected zone of privacy, yet on the other, the exercise of
individual choices is subject to the rights of others to lead orderly lives.
For instance, an individual who possesses a plot of land may decide to build
upon it subject to zoning regulations. If the building bye laws define the area
upon which construction can be raised or the height of the boundary wall around
the property, the right to privacy of the individual is conditioned by
regulations designed to protect the interests of the community in planned
spaces. Hence while the individual is entitled to a zone of privacy, its extent
is based not only on the subjective expectation of the individual but on an
objective principle which defines a reasonable expectation. S Informational
privacy 170 Ours is an age of information. Information is knowledge. The old
adage that “knowledge is power” has stark implications for the position of the
individual where PART S 247 data is ubiquitous, an all-encompassing presence.
Technology has made life fundamentally interconnected. The internet has become
all pervasive as individuals spend more and more time online each day of their
lives. Individuals connect with others and use the internet as a means of
communication. The internet is used to carry on business and to buy goods and
services. Individuals browse the web in search of information, to send e-mails,
use instant messaging services and to download movies. Online purchases have
become an efficient substitute for the daily visit to the neighbouring store.
Online banking has redefined relationships between bankers and customers.
Online trading has created a new platform for the market in securities. Online
music has refashioned the radio. Online books have opened up a new universe for
the bibliophile. The old-fashioned travel agent has been rendered redundant by
web portals which provide everything from restaurants to rest houses, airline
tickets to art galleries, museum tickets to music shows. These are but a few of
the reasons people access the internet each day of their lives. Yet every
transaction of an individual user and every site that she visits, leaves
electronic tracks generally without her knowledge. These electronic tracks
contain powerful means of information which provide knowledge of the sort of
person that the user is and her interests388. Individually, these information
silos may seem inconsequential. In aggregation, they disclose the nature of the
personality: food habits, language, health, hobbies, sexual preferences,
friendships, ways of dress and political affiliation. In 388 See Francois
Nawrot, Katarzyna Syska and Przemyslaw Switalski, “Horizontal application of
fundamental rights – Right to privacy on the internet”, 9 th Annual European
Constitutionalism Seminar (May 2010), University of Warsaw, available at
http://en.zpc.wpia.uw.edu.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2010/04/9_Horizontal_Application_of_Fundamental_Rights.pdf
PART S 248 aggregation, information provides a picture of the being: of things
which matter and those that don’t, of things to be disclosed and those best
hidden. 171 Popular websites install cookie files by the user’s browser.
Cookies can tag browsers for unique identified numbers, which allow them to
recognise rapid users and secure information about online behaviour.
Information, especially the browsing history of a user is utilised to create
user profiles. The use of algorithms allows the creation of profiles about
internet users. Automated content analysis of e-mails allows for reading of
user e-mails. An e-mail can be analysed to deduce user interests and to target
suitable advertisements to a user on the site of the window. The books which an
individual purchases on-line provide footprints for targeted advertising of the
same genre. Whether an airline ticket has been purchased on economy or business
class, provides vital information about employment profile or spending
capacity. Taxi rides booked on-line to shopping malls provide a profile of
customer preferences. A woman who purchases pregnancy related medicines on-line
would be in line to receive advertisements for baby products. Lives are open to
electronic scrutiny. To put it mildly, privacy concerns are seriously an issue
in the age of information. 172 A Press Note released by the Telecom Regulatory
Authority of India on 3 July, 2017389 is indicative of the prevalence of
telecom services in India as on 31 December, 2016. The total number of
subscribers stood at 1151.78 million, reflecting a 11.13 389 Press Release
45/2017, available at http://trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/PR_No.45of2017.pdf
PART S 249 percent change over the previous year. There were 683.14 million
urban subscribers and 468.64 million rural subscribers. The total number of
internet subscribers stood at 391.50 million reflecting an 18.04 per cent
change over the previous quarter. 236.09 million were broadband subscribers.
370 million is the figure of wireless internet subscribers. The total internet
subscribers per 100 population stood at 30.56; urban internet subscribers were
68.86 per 100 population; and rural internet subscribers being 13.08. The
figures only increase. 173 The age of information has resulted in complex
issues for informational privacy. These issues arise from the nature of
information itself. Information has three facets: it is nonrivalrous, invisible
and recombinant390. Information is nonrivalrous in the sense that there can be
simultaneous users of the good – use of a piece of information by one person
does not make it less available to another. Secondly, invasions of data privacy
are difficult to detect because they can be invisible. Information can be
accessed, stored and disseminated without notice. Its ability to travel at the
speed of light enhances the invisibility of access to data, “information
collection can be the swiftest theft of all”391. Thirdly, information is
recombinant in the sense that data output can be used as an input to generate
more data output. 390 Christina P. Moniodis, “Moving from Nixon to NASA:
Privacy ‘s Second Strand- A Right to Informational Privacy”, Yale Journal of Law
and Technology (2012), Vol. 15 (1), at page 153 391 Ibid PART S 250 174 Data
Mining processes together with knowledge discovery can be combined to create
facts about individuals. Metadata and the internet of things have the ability
to redefine human existence in ways which are yet fully to be perceived. This,
as Christina Moniodis states in her illuminating article results in the
creation of new knowledge about individuals; something which even she or he did
not possess. This poses serious issues for the Court. In an age of rapidly
evolving technology it is impossible for a judge to conceive of all the
possible uses of information or its consequences: “…The creation of new
knowledge complicates data privacy law as it involves information the
individual did not possess and could not disclose, knowingly or otherwise. In
addition, as our state becomes an “information state” through increasing
reliance on information – such that information is described as the “lifeblood
that sustains political, social, and business decisions. It becomes impossible
to conceptualize all of the possible uses of information and resulting harms.
Such a situation poses a challenge for courts who are effectively asked to
anticipate and remedy invisible, evolving harms.” 392 The contemporary age has
been aptly regarded as “an era of ubiquitous dataveillance, or the systematic
monitoring of citizen’s communications or actions through the use of
information technology”393. It is also an age of “big data” or the collection
of data sets. These data sets are capable of being searched; they have linkages
with other data sets; and are marked by their exhaustive scope and the
permanency of collection.394 The challenges which big data poses to privacy
interests emanate from 392 Ibid, at page 154 393 Yvonne McDermott,
“Conceptualizing the right to data protection in an era of Big Data”, Big Data
and Society (2017), at page 1 394 Ibid, at pages 1 and 4 PART S 251 State and
non-State entities. Users of wearable devices and social media networks may not
conceive of themselves as having volunteered data but their activities of use
and engagement result in the generation of vast amounts of data about
individual lifestyles, choices and preferences. Yvonne McDermott speaks about
the quantified self in eloquent terms: “…The rise in the so-called ‘quantified
self’, or the self-tracking of biological, environmental, physical, or
behavioural information through tracking devices, Internet-of-things devices,
social network data and other means (?Swan.2013) may result in information
being gathered not just about the individual user, but about people around them
as well. Thus, a solely consent-based model does not entirely ensure the
protection of one’s data, especially when data collected for one purpose can be
repurposed for another.”395 175 Daniel J Solove deals with the problem of
“aggregation”. Businesses and governments often aggregate a variety of
information fragments, including pieces of information which may not be viewed
as private in isolation to create a detailed portrait of personalities and
behaviour of individuals.396 Yet, it is now a universally accepted fact that
information and data flow are “increasingly central to social and economic
ordering”397. Individuals are identified with reference to tax records, voting
eligibility, and government-provided entitlements. There is what is now
described as “‘veillant panoptic assemblage’, where data gathered through the
ordinary citizen’s veillance 395 Ibid, at page 4 396 Christina P. Moniodis,
“Moving from Nixon to NASA: Privacy ‘s Second Strand- A Right to Informational
Privacy”, Yale Journal of Law and Technology (2012), Vol. 15 (1), at page 159.
The article attributes Daniel Solove’s work on privacy as- Daniel J. Solove,
Understanding Privacy 70 (2008). 397 Ibid, at page 156 PART S 252 practices
finds its way to state surveillance mechanisms, through the corporations that
hold that data”398 . 176 The balance between data regulation and individual
privacy raises complex issues requiring delicate balances to be drawn between
the legitimate concerns of the State on one hand and individual interest in the
protection of privacy on the other. 177 The sphere of privacy stretches at one
end to those intimate matters to which a reasonable expectation of privacy may
attach. It expresses a right to be left alone. A broader connotation which has
emerged in academic literature of a comparatively recent origin is related to
the protection of one’s identity. Data protection relates closely with the
latter sphere. Data such as medical information would be a category to which a
reasonable expectation of privacy attaches. There may be other data which falls
outside the reasonable expectation paradigm. Apart from safeguarding privacy,
data protection regimes seek to protect the autonomy of the individual. This is
evident from the emphasis in the European data protection regime on the
centrality of consent. Related to the issue of consent is the requirement of
transparency which requires a disclosure by the data recipient of information
pertaining to data transfer and use. 178 Another aspect which data protection
regimes seek to safeguard is the principle of non-discrimination which ensures
that the collection of data should be carried out 398 Yvonne McDermott,
“Conceptualizing the right to data protection in an era of Big Data”, Big Data
and Society (2017), at page 4. PART S 253 in a manner which does not
discriminate on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, political or religious
beliefs, genetic or health status or sexual orientation. 179 Formulation of a
regime for data protection is a complex exercise which needs to be undertaken
by the State after a careful balancing of the requirements of privacy coupled
with other values which the protection of data sub-serves together with the
legitimate concerns of the State. One of the chief concerns which the
formulation of a data protection regime has to take into account is that while
the web is a source of lawful activity-both personal and commercial, concerns
of national security intervene since the seamless structure of the web can be
exploited by terrorists to wreak havoc and destruction on civilised societies.
Cyber attacks can threaten financial systems. Richard A Posner, in an
illuminating article, has observed: “Privacy is the terrorist’s best friend,
and the terrorist’s privacy has been enhanced by the same technological
developments that have both made data mining feasible and elicited vast
quantities of personal information from innocents: the internet, with its
anonymity, and the secure encryption of digitized data which, when combined
with that anonymity, make the internet a powerful tool of conspiracy. The
government has a compelling need to exploit digitization in defense of national
security…”399 Posner notes that while “people value their informational
privacy”, yet “they surrender it at the drop of a hat” by readily sharing
personal data in the course of simple daily transactions. The paradox, he
observes, can be resolved by noting that as long as 399 Richard A. Posner, “Privacy,
Surveillance, and Law”, The University of Chicago Law Review (2008), Vol.75, at
page 251 PART S 254 people do not expect that the details of their health,
intimacies and finances among others will be used to harm them in interaction
with other people, they are content to reveal those details when they derive
benefits from the revelation.400 As long as intelligence personnel can be
trusted to use the knowledge gained only for the defence of the nation, “the
public will be compensated for the costs of diminished privacy in increased
security from terrorist attacks”401. Posner’s formulation would indicate that
the State does have a legitimate interest when it monitors the web to secure
the nation against cyber attacks and the activities of terrorists. 180 While it
intervenes to protect legitimate state interests, the state must nevertheless
put into place a robust regime that ensures the fulfilment of a three-fold
requirement. These three requirements apply to all restraints on privacy (not
just informational privacy). They emanate from the procedural and content-based
mandate of Article 21. The first requirement that there must be a law in
existence to justify an encroachment on privacy is an express requirement of
Article 21. For, no person can be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The existence of
law is an essential requirement. Second, the requirement of a need, in terms of
a legitimate state aim, ensures that the nature and content of the law which
imposes the restriction falls within the zone of reasonableness mandated by
Article 14, which is a guarantee against arbitrary state action. The pursuit of
a legitimate state aim ensures that the law does not suffer from 400 Ibid 401
Ibid PART S 255 manifest arbitrariness. Legitimacy, as a postulate, involves a
value judgment. Judicial review does not re-appreciate or second guess the
value judgment of the legislature but is for deciding whether the aim which is
sought to be pursued suffers from palpable or manifest arbitrariness. The third
requirement ensures that the means which are adopted by the legislature are
proportional to the object and needs sought to be fulfilled by the law.
Proportionality is an essential facet of the guarantee against arbitrary state
action because it ensures that the nature and quality of the encroachment on
the right is not disproportionate to the purpose of the law. Hence, the
three-fold requirement for a valid law arises out of the mutual
inter-dependence between the fundamental guarantees against arbitrariness on
the one hand and the protection of life and personal liberty, on the other. The
right to privacy, which is an intrinsic part of the right to life and liberty,
and the freedoms embodied in Part III is subject to the same restraints which
apply to those freedoms. 181 Apart from national security, the state may have
justifiable reasons for the collection and storage of data. In a social welfare
state, the government embarks upon programmes which provide benefits to
impoverished and marginalised sections of society. There is a vital state
interest in ensuring that scarce public resources are not dissipated by the
diversion of resources to persons who do not qualify as recipients. Allocation
of resources for human development is coupled with a legitimate concern that
the utilisation of resources should not be siphoned away for extraneous
purposes. Data mining with the object of ensuring that resources are properly
deployed to legitimate beneficiaries is a valid ground for the state to insist
on the PART S 256 collection of authentic data. But, the data which the state
has collected has to be utilised for legitimate purposes of the state and ought
not to be utilised unauthorizedly for extraneous purposes. This will ensure
that the legitimate concerns of the state are duly safeguarded while, at the
same time, protecting privacy concerns. Prevention and investigation of crime
and protection of the revenue are among the legitimate aims of the state.
Digital platforms are a vital tool of ensuring good governance in a social
welfare state. Information technology – legitimately deployed is a powerful
enabler in the spread of innovation and knowledge. 182 A distinction has been
made in contemporary literature between anonymity on one hand and privacy on
the other.402 Both anonymity and privacy prevent others from gaining access to
pieces of personal information yet they do so in opposite ways. Privacy
involves hiding information whereas anonymity involves hiding what makes it
personal. An unauthorised parting of the medical records of an individual which
have been furnished to a hospital will amount to an invasion of privacy. On the
other hand, the state may assert a legitimate interest in analysing data borne
from hospital records to understand and deal with a public health epidemic such
as malaria or dengue to obviate a serious impact on the population. If the
State preserves the anonymity of the individual it could legitimately assert a
valid state interest in the preservation of public health to design appropriate
policy interventions on the basis of the data available to it. 402 See in this
connection, Jeffrey M. Skopek, “Reasonable Expectations of Anonymity”, Virginia
Law Review (2015), Vol.101, at pages 691-762 PART S 257 183 Privacy has been
held to be an intrinsic element of the right to life and personal liberty under
Article 21 and as a constitutional value which is embodied in the fundamental
freedoms embedded in Part III of the Constitution. Like the right to life and
liberty, privacy is not absolute. The limitations which operate on the right to
life and personal liberty would operate on the right to privacy. Any
curtailment or deprivation of that right would have to take place under a
regime of law. The procedure established by law must be fair, just and
reasonable. The law which provides for the curtailment of the right must also
be subject to constitutional safeguards. 184 The Union government constituted a
Group of Experts on privacy under the auspices of the erstwhile Planning
Commission. The Expert Group in its Report403 (dated 16 October 2012) proposed
a framework for the protection of privacy concerns which, it was expected,
would serve as a conceptual foundation for legislation protecting privacy. The
framework suggested by the expert group was based on five salient features: (i)
Technological neutrality and interoperability with international standards;
(ii) Multi-Dimensional privacy; (iii) Horizontal applicability to state and
nonstate entities; (iv) Conformity with privacy principles; and (v) A
co-regulatory enforcement regime. After reviewing international best practices,
the Expert Group proposed nine privacy principles. They are: 403 “Report of the
Group of Experts on Privacy” (16 October, 2012), Government of India, available
at http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/rep_privacy.pdf PART S 258
(i) Notice: A data controller shall give simple-to-understand notice of its
information practices to all individuals in clear and concise language, before
personal information is collected; (ii) Choice and Consent: A data controller
shall give individuals choices (opt-in/optout) with regard to providing their
personal information, and take individual consent only after providing notice
of its information practices; (iii) Collection Limitation: A data controller
shall only collect personal information from data subjects as is necessary for
the purposes identified for such collection, regarding which notice has been
provided and consent of the individual taken. Such collection shall be through
lawful and fair means; (iv) Purpose Limitation: Personal data collected and
processed by data controllers should be adequate and relevant to the purposes
for which it is processed. A data controller shall collect, process, disclose,
make available, or otherwise use personal information only for the purposes as
stated in the notice after taking consent of individuals. If there is a change
of purpose, this must be notified to the individual. After personal information
has been used in accordance with the identified purpose it should be destroyed
as per the identified procedures. Data retention mandates by the government
should be in compliance with the National Privacy Principles; (v) Access and
Correction: Individuals shall have access to personal information about them
held by a data controller; shall be able to seek correction, amendments, or
deletion of such information where it is inaccurate; be able to confirm that a
data controller holds or is processing information about them; be PART S 259
able to obtain from the data controller a copy of the personal data. Access and
correction to personal information may not be given by the data controller if
it is not, despite best efforts, possible to do so without affecting the privacy
rights of another person, unless that person has explicitly consented to
disclosure; (vi) Disclosure of Information: A data controller shall not
disclose personal information to third parties, except after providing notice
and seeking informed consent from the individual for such disclosure. Third
parties are bound to adhere to relevant and applicable privacy principles.
Disclosure for law enforcement purposes must be in accordance with the laws in
force. Data controllers shall not publish or in any other way make public
personal information, including personal sensitive information; (vii) Security:
A data controller shall secure personal information that they have either
collected or have in their custody, by reasonable security safeguards against loss,
unauthorised access, destruction, use, processing, storage, modification,
deanonymization, unauthorized disclosure [either accidental or incidental] or
other reasonably foreseeable risks; (viii) Openness: A data controller shall
take all necessary steps to implement practices, procedures, policies and
systems in a manner proportional to the scale, scope, and sensitivity to the
data they collect, in order to ensure compliance with the privacy principles,
information regarding which shall be made in an intelligible form, using clear
and plain language, available to all individuals; and (ix) Accountability: The
data controller shall be accountable for complying with measures which give
effect to the privacy principles. Such measures should PART T 260 include
mechanisms to implement privacy policies; including tools, training, and
education; external and internal audits, and requiring organizations or
overseeing bodies extend all necessary support to the Privacy Commissioner and
comply with the specific and general orders of the Privacy Commissioner. 185
During the course of the hearing of these proceedings, the Union government has
placed on the record an Office Memorandum dated 31 July 2017 by which it has
constituted a committee chaired by Justice B N Srikrishna, former Judge of the
Supreme Court of India to review inter alia data protection norms in the
country and to make its recommendations. The terms of reference of the
Committee are : a) To study various issues relating to data protection in
India; b) To make specific suggestions for consideration of the Central
Government on principles to be considered for data protection in India and
suggest a draft data protection bill. Since the government has initiated the
process of reviewing the entire area of data protection, it would be
appropriate to leave the matter for expert determination so that a robust
regime for the protection of data is put into place. We expect that the Union
government shall follow up on its decision by taking all necessary and proper steps.
T Our Conclusions 1 The judgment in M P Sharma holds essentially that in the
absence of a provision similar to the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution,
the right to privacy cannot PART T 261 be read into the provisions of Article
20 (3) of the Indian Constitution. The judgment does not specifically
adjudicate on whether a right to privacy would arise from any of the other
provisions of the rights guaranteed by Part III including Article 21 and
Article 19. The observation that privacy is not a right guaranteed by the
Indian Constitution is not reflective of the correct position. M P Sharma is
overruled to the extent to which it indicates to the contrary. 2 Kharak Singh
has correctly held that the content of the expression ‘life’ under Article 21 means
not merely the right to a person’s “animal existence” and that the expression
‘personal liberty’ is a guarantee against invasion into the sanctity of a
person’s home or an intrusion into personal security. Kharak Singh also
correctly laid down that the dignity of the individual must lend content to the
meaning of ‘personal liberty’. The first part of the decision in Kharak Singh
which invalidated domiciliary visits at night on the ground that they violated
ordered liberty is an implicit recognition of the right to privacy. The second
part of the decision, however, which holds that the right to privacy is not a
guaranteed right under our Constitution, is not reflective of the correct
position. Similarly, Kharak Singh’s reliance upon the decision of the majority
in Gopalan is not reflective of the correct position in view of the decisions
in Cooper and in Maneka. Kharak Singh to the extent that it holds that the
right to privacy is not protected under the Indian Constitution is overruled.
PART T 262 3 (A) Life and personal liberty are inalienable rights. These are
rights which are inseparable from a dignified human existence. The dignity of
the individual, equality between human beings and the quest for liberty are the
foundational pillars of the Indian Constitution; (B) Life and personal liberty
are not creations of the Constitution. These rights are recognised by the
Constitution as inhering in each individual as an intrinsic and inseparable
part of the human element which dwells within; (C) Privacy is a constitutionally
protected right which emerges primarily from the guarantee of life and personal
liberty in Article 21 of the Constitution. Elements of privacy also arise in
varying contexts from the other facets of freedom and dignity recognised and
guaranteed by the fundamental rights contained in Part III; (D) Judicial
recognition of the existence of a constitutional right of privacy is not an
exercise in the nature of amending the Constitution nor is the Court embarking
on a constitutional function of that nature which is entrusted to Parliament;
(E)Privacy is the constitutional core of human dignity. Privacy has both a
normative and descriptive function. At a normative level privacy sub-serves
those eternal values upon which the guarantees of life, liberty and freedom are
founded. At a descriptive level, privacy postulates a bundle of entitlements
and interests which lie at the foundation of ordered liberty; PART T 263
(F)Privacy includes at its core the preservation of personal intimacies, the
sanctity of family life, marriage, procreation, the home and sexual
orientation. Privacy also connotes a right to be left alone. Privacy safeguards
individual autonomy and recognises the ability of the individual to control
vital aspects of his or her life. Personal choices governing a way of life are
intrinsic to privacy. Privacy protects heterogeneity and recognises the
plurality and diversity of our culture. While the legitimate expectation of
privacy may vary from the intimate zone to the private zone and from the private
to the public arenas, it is important to underscore that privacy is not lost or
surrendered merely because the individual is in a public place. Privacy
attaches to the person since it is an essential facet of the dignity of the
human being; (G) This Court has not embarked upon an exhaustive enumeration or
a catalogue of entitlements or interests comprised in the right to privacy. The
Constitution must evolve with the felt necessities of time to meet the
challenges thrown up in a democratic order governed by the rule of law. The
meaning of the Constitution cannot be frozen on the perspectives present when
it was adopted. Technological change has given rise to concerns which were not
present seven decades ago and the rapid growth of technology may render
obsolescent many notions of the present. Hence the interpretation of the
Constitution must be resilient and flexible to allow future generations to
adapt its content bearing in mind its basic or essential features; PART T 264
(H)Like other rights which form part of the fundamental freedoms protected by
Part III, including the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21,
privacy is not an absolute right. A law which encroaches upon privacy will have
to withstand the touchstone of permissible restrictions on fundamental rights.
In the context of Article 21 an invasion of privacy must be justified on the
basis of a law which stipulates a procedure which is fair, just and reasonable.
The law must also be valid with reference to the encroachment on life and
personal liberty under Article 21. An invasion of life or personal liberty must
meet the three-fold requirement of (i) legality, which postulates the existence
of law; (ii) need, defined in terms of a legitimate state aim; and (iii)
proportionality which ensures a rational nexus between the objects and the
means adopted to achieve them; and (I) Privacy has both positive and negative
content. The negative content restrains the state from committing an intrusion
upon the life and personal liberty of a citizen. Its positive content imposes
an obligation on the state to take all necessary measures to protect the
privacy of the individual. 4 Decisions rendered by this Court subsequent to
Kharak Singh, upholding the right to privacy would be read subject to the above
principles. 5 Informational privacy is a facet of the right to privacy. The
dangers to privacy in an age of information can originate not only from the
state but from non-state actors as well. We commend to the Union Government the
need to examine and put into place a robust regime for data protection. The
creation of such a regime requires PART T 265 a careful and sensitive balance
between individual interests and legitimate concerns of the state. The
legitimate aims of the state would include for instance protecting national
security, preventing and investigating crime, encouraging innovation and the
spread of knowledge, and preventing the dissipation of social welfare benefits.
These are matters of policy to be considered by the Union government while
designing a carefully structured regime for the protection of the data. Since
the Union government has informed the Court that it has constituted a Committee
chaired by Hon’ble Shri Justice B N Srikrishna, former Judge of this Court, for
that purpose, the matter shall be dealt with appropriately by the Union
government having due regard to what has been set out in this judgment. 6 The
reference is answered in the above terms.
...........................................CJI [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR] ..............................................J
[R K AGRAWAL] ..............................................J [Dr D Y
CHANDRACHUD] PART T 266 .............................................J [S ABDUL
NAZEER] New Delhi; Dated : 24, August 2017 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.494 OF 2012 Justice
K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Another … Petitioners Versus Union of India &
Others … Respondents WITH TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO.151 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED
CASE (CIVIL) NO.152 OF 2013 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 833 OF 2013 WRIT PETITION
(CIVIL) NO. 829 OF 2013 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 932 OF 2013 CONTEMPT PETITION
(CIVIL) NO. 144 OF 2014 IN WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 494 OF 2012 TRANSFER
PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 313 OF 2014 TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 312 OF 2014
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 2524 OF 2014 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 37
OF 2015 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 220 OF 2015 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 674
OF 2015 IN 2 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 829 OF 2013 TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL)
NO. 921 OF 2015 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 470 OF 2015 IN WRIT PETITION
(CIVIL) NO. 494 OF 2012 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 444 OF 2016 IN WRIT
PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 494 OF 2012 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 608 OF 2016 IN
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 494 OF 2012 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 797 OF 2016
CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 844 OF 2017 IN WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 494 OF
2012 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 342 OF 2017 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 372 OF
2017 J U D G M E N T Chelameswar, J. 1. I have had the advantage of reading the
opinion of my learned brothers Justice Nariman and Justice Chandrachud. Both of
them in depth dealt with various questions that are required to be examined by
this Bench, to answer the reference. The factual background in which these
questions arise and the history of the 3 instant litigation is set out in the
judgments of my learned brothers. There is no need to repeat. Having regard to
the importance of the matter, I am unable to desist recording few of my views
regarding the various questions which were debated in this matter. 2. The
following three questions, in my opinion, constitute the crux of the enquiry;
(i) Is there any Fundamental Right to Privacy under the Constitution of India?
(ii) If it exists, where is it located? (iii) What are the contours of such
Right? 3. These questions arose because Union of India and some of the
respondents took a stand that, in view of two larger bench judgments of this
Court1, no fundamental right of privacy is guaranteed under the Constitution.
4. Therefore, at the outset, it is necessary to examine whether it is the ratio
decidendi of M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh that under our Constitution there is
no Fundamental Right of Privacy; and if that be indeed the ratio of either of
the two rulings whether they were rightly decided? The issue which fell for the
consideration of 1 M.P. Sharma & Others v. Satish Chandra & Others, AIR
1954 SC 300 and Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. & Others, AIR 1963 SC 1295,
(both decisions of Constitution Bench of Eight and Six Judges respectively). 4
this Court in M.P. Sharma was – whether seizure of documents from the custody
of a person accused of an offence would amount to “testimonial compulsion”
prohibited under Article 20(3) of our Constitution? 5. The rule against the
“testimonial compulsion” is contained in Article 20(3)2 of our Constitution.
The expression “testimonial compulsion” is not found in that provision. The
mandate contained in Article 20(3) came to be described as the rule against
testimonial compulsion. The rule against self-incrimination owes its origin to
the revulsion against the inquisitorial methods adopted by the Star Chamber of
England3 and the same was incorporated in the Fifth Amendment of the American
Constitution.4 2 “Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India: “No person
accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” 3
“In English law, this principle of protection against self-incrimination had a
historical origin. It resulted from a feeling of revulsion against the
inquisitorial methods adopted and the barbarous sentences imposed, by the Court
of Star Chamber, in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction. This came to a
head in the case of John Lilburn, 3 State Trials 1315, which brought about the
abolition of the Star Chamber and the firm recognition of the principle that
the accused should not be put on oath and that no evidence should be taken from
him. This principle, in course of time, developed into its logical extensions,
by way of privilege of witnesses against self-incrimination, when called for
giving oral testimony or for production of documents. A change was introduced
by the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898 by making an accused a competent witness
on his own behalf, if he applied for it. But so far as the oral testimony of
witnesses and the production of documents are concerned, the protection against
self-incrimination continued as before. (See Phipson on Evidence, 9th Edition,
pages 215 and 474). These principles, as they were before the statutory change
in 1898, were carried into the American legal system and became part of its
common law. (See Wigmore on Evidence, Vol.VIII, pages 301 to 303). This was
later on incorporated into their Constitution by virtue of the Fifth Amendment thereof.”
4 “Amendment V of the American Constitution: "No person ……..shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law …" 5 6. Does the
rule against “testimonial compulsion”, entrenched as a fundamental right under
our Constitution create a right of privacy? - is a question not examined in
M.P. Sharma. It was argued in M.P. Sharma “that a search to obtain documents
for investigation into an offence is a compulsory procuring of incriminatory
evidence from the accused himself and is, therefore, hit by Article 20(3) …” by
necessary implication flowing from “certain canons of liberal construction”.
Originally the rule was invoked only against oral evidence. But the judgment in
Boyd v. United States5, extended the rule even to documents procured during the
course of a constitutionally impermissible search6. This Court refused to read
the principle enunciated in Boyd into Article 20(3) on the ground: “we have
nothing in our Constitution corresponding to the Fourth Amendment”. This Court
held that the power of search and seizure is “an overriding power of the State
for the protection of social security”. It further held that such power (1) “is
necessarily regulated by law”; and (2) Since the Constitution makers have not
made any provision “analogous to the 5 116 US 616 6 A search in violation of
the safeguards provided under the Fourth Amendment – “The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.” 6 American Fourth Amendment”, such a requirement could not be read
into Article 20(3). It was in the said context that this Court referred to the
right of privacy: “A power of search and seizure is in any system of
jurisprudence an overriding power of the State for the protection of social
security and that power is necessarily regulated by law. When the Constitution
makers have thought fit not to subject such regulation to Constitutional
limitations by recognition of a fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the
American Fourth Amendment, we have no justification to import it, into a
totally different fundamental right, by some process of strained construction.”
7. I see no warrant for a conclusion (which is absolute) that their lordships
held that there is no right of privacy under our Constitution. All that, in my
opinion, their Lordships meant to say was that contents of the U.S. Fourth
Amendment cannot be imported into our Constitution, while interpreting Article
20(3). That is the boundary of M.P. Singh’s ratio. Such a conclusion, in my
opinion, requires a further examination in an appropriate case since it is now
too well settled that the text of the Constitution is only the primary source
for understanding the Constitution and the silences of the Constitution are
also to be ascertained to understand the Constitution. Even according to the
American Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment is not the 7 sole repository of
the right to privacy7. Therefore, values other than those informing the Fourth
Amendment can ground a right of privacy if such values are a part of the Indian
Constitutional framework, and M.P. Sharma does not contemplate this possibility
nor was there an occasion, therefore as the case was concerned with Article
20(3). Especially so as the Gopalan era compartmentalization ruled the roost
during the time of the M.P. Sharma ruling and there was no Maneka Gandhi
interpretation of Part III as a cohesive and fused code as is presently.
Whether the right of privacy is implied in any other fundamental right
guaranteed under Articles 21, 14, 19 or 25 etc. was not examined in M.P Sharma.
The question whether a fundamental right of privacy is implied from these
Articles, is therefore, res integra and M.P. Sharma is no authority on that
aspect. I am, therefore, of the opinion that M.P. Sharma is not an authority
for an absolute proposition that there is no right of privacy under our
Constitution; and such is not the ratio of that judgment. 7 In Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 US 479, Douglas, J who delivered the opinion of the Court
opined that the I, II, IV, V and IX Amendments creates zones of privacy.
Goldberg, J. opined that even the XIV Amendment creates a zone of privacy. This
undoubtedly grounds a right of privacy beyond the IV amendment. Even after
Griswold, other cases like Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) have made this
point amply clear by sourcing a constitutional right of privacy from sources
other than the IV amendment. 8 8. The issue in Kharak Singh was the
constitutionality of police regulations of UP which inter alia provided for
‘surveillance’ of certain categories of people by various methods, such as,
domiciliary visits at night’, ‘verification of movements and absences’ etc. Two
judgments (4:2) were delivered. Majority took the view that the impugned
regulation insofar as it provided for ‘domiciliary visits at night’ is
unconstitutional whereas the minority opined the impugned regulation is in its
entirety unconstitutional. The Court was invited to examine whether the
impugned regulations violated the fundamental rights of Kharak Singh guaranteed
under Articles 21 and 19(1)(d). In that context, this Court examined the scope
of the expression ‘personal liberty’ guaranteed under Article 21. Majority
declared that the expression “personal liberty” occurring under Article 21: “is
used in the Article as compendious term to include within itself all the
varieties of rights which go to make up the “personal liberties” of man other
than those dealt with in several clauses of Article 19(1)”. In other words,
while Article 19(1) deals with particular species or attributes of that
freedom, personal liberty in Article 21 takes in and comprises the residue.” 9.
The Kharak Singh majority opined that the impugned regulation insofar as it
provided for ‘domiciliary visits’ is plainly 9 “violative of Article 21”. The
majority took note of the American decision in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 US 25
wherein it was held that State lacks the authority to sanction “incursion into
privacy” of citizens. Such a power would run counter to the guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment8 and against the “very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty”. 9 The majority judgment in Kharak Singh noticed that the conclusion
recorded in Wolf v. Colorado is based on the prohibition contained in the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and a corresponding provision is
absent in our Constitution. Nonetheless, their Lordships concluded that the
impugned regulation insofar as it sanctioned domiciliary visits is plainly
violative of Article 21. For this conclusion, their Lordships relied upon the
English Common Law maxim that “every man's house is his castle"10. In
substance domiciliary visits violate liberty guaranteed under Article 21. The
twin conclusions recorded, viz., that Article 21 takes within its sweep various
rights other than mere freedom from physical restraint; and domiciliary visits
by police violate the right of Kharak Singh guaranteed under Article 21, are a
great leap from 8 Frankfurter, J. 9 Murphy, J. 10 See (1604) 5 Coke 91 –
Semayne’s case 10 the law declared by this Court in Gopalan11 - much before
R.C. Cooper12 and Maneka Gandhi13 cases. The logical inconsistency in the
judgment is that while on the one hand their Lordships opined that the maxim
“every man’s house is his castle” is a part of the liberty under Article 21,
concluded on the other, that absence of a provision akin to the U.S. Fourth
Amendment would negate the claim to the right of privacy. Both statements are
logically inconsistent. In the earlier part of the judgment their Lordships
noticed14 that it is the English Common Law which formed the basis of the U.S.
Fourth Amendment and is required to be read into Article 21; but nevertheless
declined to read the right of privacy into Article 21. This is the incongruence.
10. Interestingly as observed by Justice Nariman, when it came to the
constitutionality of the other provisions impugned in Kharak Singh, their
Lordships held that such provisions are not violative of Article 21 since there
is no right to privacy under our 11 A.K. Gopalan Vs. State of Madras AIR 1950
SC 27 12 RC Cooper Vs. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248 13 Maneka Gandhi Vs.
Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 14 See F/N 3 (supra) 11 Constitution15. I
completely endorse the view of my learned brother Nariman in this regard. 11. I
now proceed to examine the salient features of the minority view. (i)
Disagreement with the majority on the conclusion that Article 21 contains those
aspects of personal liberty excluding those enumerated under Article 19(1); (ii)
after noticing that Gopalan held that the expression “personal liberty”
occurring under Article 21 is only the antithesis of physical restraint or
coercion, opined that in modern world coercion need not only be physical
coercion but can also take the form of psychological coercion; (iii) “further
the right to personal liberty takes in not only a right to be free from
restrictions placed on his movements, but also free from encroachments on his
private life.”; 15 Nor do we consider that Article 21 has any relevance in the
context as was sought to be suggested by learned Counsel for the petitioner. As
already pointed out, the right of privacy is not a guaranteed right under our
Constitution and therefore the attempt to ascertain the movements of an
individual which is merely a manner in which privacy is invaded is not an
infringement of a fundamental right guaranteed by Part III. 12 (iv) Though “our
Constitution does not expressly declare the right to privacy as a fundamental
right”, “the said right is an essential ingredient of personal liberty”. In
substance Kharak Singh declared that the expression “personal liberty” in
Article 21 takes within its sweep a bundle of rights. Both the majority and
minority are ad idem on that conclusion. The only point of divergence is that
the minority opined that one of the rights in the bundle is the right of
privacy. In the opinion of the minority the right to privacy is “an essential
ingredient of personal liberty”. Whereas the majority opined that “the right of
privacy is not a guaranteed right under our Constitution”, and therefore the
same cannot be read into Article 21.16 12. I am of the opinion that the
approach adopted by the majority is illogical and against settled principles of
interpretation of even an ordinary statute; and wholly unwarranted in the
context of constitutional interpretation. If a right is recognised by the
express language of a statute, no question of implying such a right from 16
Kharak Singh v. The State of U.P. & Others, (1962) 1 SCR 332 at page 351 “…
Nor do we consider that Article 21 has any relevance in the context as was
sought to be suggested by learned Counsel for the petitioner. As already
pointed out, the right of privacy is not a guaranteed right under our
Constitution and therefore the attempt to ascertain the movements of an
individual which is merely a manner in which privacy is invaded is not an
infringement of a fundamental right guaranteed by Part III.” 13 some provision
of such statute arises. Implications are logical extensions of stipulations in
the express language of the statute and arise only when a statute is silent on
certain aspects. Implications are the product of the interpretative process, of
silences of a Statute. It is by now well settled that there are implications
even in written Constitutions.17 The scope and amplitude of implications are to
be ascertained in the light of the scheme and purpose sought to be achieved by
a statute. The purpose of the statute is to be ascertained from the overall
scheme of the statute. Constitution is the fundamental law adumbrating the
powers and duties of the various organs of the State and rights of the
SUBJECTS18 and limitations thereon, of the State. In my opinion, provisions
purportedly conferring power on the State are in fact limitations on the State
power to infringe on the liberty of SUBJECTS. In the context of the
interpretation of a Constitution 17 (1947) 74 CLR 31 – The Melbourne
Corporation v. The Commonwealth “ ... Thus, the purpose of the Constitution,
and the scheme by which it is intended to be given effect, necessarily give
rise to implications as to the manner in which the Commonwealth and the States
respectively may exercise their powers, vis-Ã -vis each other.” Also see: His
Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala & Another,
(1973) 4 SCC 225 18 Citizens and non-citizens who are amenable to the
Constitutional authority of the State 14 the intensity of analysis to ascertain
the purpose is required to be more profound.19 The implications arising from the
scheme of the Constitution are “Constitution’s dark matter” and are as
important as the express stipulations in its text. The principle laid down by
this Court in Kesvananda20, that the basic structure of the Constitution cannot
be abrogated is the most outstanding and brilliant exposition of the ‘dark
matter’ and is a part of our Constitution, though there is nothing in the text
suggesting that principle. The 19 Two categories of Constitutional
interpretation - textualist and living constitutionalist approach are well
known. The former, as is illustrated by the Gopalan case, focuses on the text
at hand i.e. the language of the relevant provision. The text and the intent of
the original framers are determinative under the textualist approach. The
living constitutionalist approach, while acknowledging the importance of the
text, takes into account a variety of factors as aids to interpret the text.
Depending on the nature of factor used, academics have added further nuance to
the this approach of interpretation (For instance, in his book titled
‘Constitutional Interpretation’ (which builds on his earlier work titled
‘Constitutional Fate’), Philip Bobbitt categorizes the six approaches to
interpretation of Constitutions as historical, textual, prudential, doctrinal,
structural, and ethical. The latter four approaches treat the text as less
determinative than the former two approaches). This court has progressively
adopted a living constitutionalist approach. Varyingly, it has interpreted the
Constitutional text by reference to Constitutional values (liberal democratic
ideals which form the bedrock on which our text sits); a mix of cultural,
social, political and historical ethos which surround our Constitutional text;
a structuralist technique typified by looking at the structural divisions of
power within the Constitution and interpreting it as an integrated whole etc.
This court need not, in the abstract, fit a particular interpretative technique
within specific pigeonholes of a living constitutionalist interpretation.
Depending on which particular source is most useful and what the matter at hand
warrants, the court can resort to variants of a living constitutionalist
interpretation. This lack of rigidity allows for an enduring constitution. The
important criticisms against the living constitutionalist approach are that of
uncertainty and that it can lead to arbitrary exercise of judicial power. The
living constitutionalist approach in my view is preferable despite these
criticisms, for two reasons. First, adaptability cannot be equated to lack of
discipline in judicial reasoning. Second, it is still the text of the
constitution which acquires the requisite interpretative hues and therefore, it
is not as if there is violence being perpetrated upon the text if one resorts
to the living constitutionalist approach. 20 His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati
Sripadagalvaru & Others. v. State of Kerala & Another (1973) 4 SCC 225
15 necessity of probing seriously and respectfully into the invisible portion
of the Constitution cannot be ignored without being disrespectful to the hard
earned political freedom and the declared aspirations of the liberty of ‘we the
people of India’. The text of enumerated fundamental rights is “only the
primary source of expressed information” as to what is meant by liberty
proclaimed by the preamble of the Constitution. 13. To embrace a rule that the
text of the Constitution is the only material to be looked at to understand the
purpose and scheme of the Constitution would not only be detrimental to
liberties of SUBJECTS but could also render the administration of the State
unduly cumbersome. Fortunately, this Court did not adopt such a rule of
interpretation barring exceptions like Gopalan (supra) and ADM Jabalpur21.
Else, this Court could not have found the freedom of press under Article
19(1)(a) and the other rights22 which were 21 ADM Jabalpur Vs. S.S. Shukla AIR
1976 SC 1207 22 Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Others etc. v. Union of India, AIR
1962 SC 305 at page 311 “Para 28. It must be borne in mind that the
Constitution must be interpreted in a broad way and not in a narrow and
pedantic sense. Certain rights have been enshrined in our Constitution as
fundamental and, therefore, while considering the nature and content of those
rights the Court must not be too astute to interpret the language of the
Constitution in so literal a sense as to whittle them down. On the other hand
the Court must interpret the Constitution in a manner which would enable the
citizen to enjoy the rights guaranteed by it in the fullest measure subject, of
course, to permissible restrictions. Bearing this principle in mind it would be
clear that the right to freedom of speech and expression carries with it the
right to publish and circulate one's ideas, opinions and views with complete
freedom and by resorting to any available means of publication, subject again
to such restrictions as could be legitimately imposed under clause (2) of
Article 19. The first decision of this Court in which this was recognized is
Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.. There, this Court held that
16 held to be flowing from the guarantee under Article 21. Romesh Thappar23 and
Sakal Papers (supra) are the earliest acknowledgment by this Court of the
existence of Constitution’s dark matter. The series of cases in which this
Court subsequently perceived various rights in the expression ‘life’ in Article
21 is a resounding confirmation of such acknowledgment. 14. The U.S. VIth
Amendment confers a “right to speedy and public trial” to the accused, the
right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation”, the right to
have the “assistance of counsel for his defence” etc. None of those rights are
expressed in the text of our Constitution. Nonetheless, this Court declared
these rights as implicit in the text of Articles 14 or 21. The VIIIth
Amendment24 of the American Constitution contains stipulations prohibiting
excessive bails, fines, cruel and unusual punishments etc. Cruel punishments
were not unknown to this country. They were in vogue in the middle ages.
Flaying a man alive was one of the freedom of speech and expression includes
freedom of propagation of ideas and that this freedom is ensured by the freedom
of circulation. In that case this Court has also pointed out that freedom of speech
and expression are the foundation of all democratic organisations and are
essential for the proper functioning of the processes of democracy. ...” 23
Romesh Thappar Vs. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124 24“VIII Amendment to the
American Constitution: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” 17 favoured
punishments of some of the Rulers of those days. I only hope that this Court
would have no occasion to hear an argument that the Parliament or State
legislatures would be constitutionally competent to prescribe cruel punishments
like amputation or blinding or flaying alive of convicts merely an account of a
prescription akin to the VIIIth Amendment being absent in our Constitution.25
15. This Court by an interpretive process read the right to earn a
livelihood26, the right to education27, the right to speedy trial28, the right
to protect one’s reputation29 and the right to have an environment free of
pollution30 in the expression ‘life’ under Article 21 of the Indian
Constitution. Similarly, the right to go abroad31 and the right to speedy trial
of criminal cases32 were read into the expression liberty occurring 25 Mithu
Etc. Vs. State of Punjab Etc. Etc., AIR 1983 SC 473 - “If a law were to provide
that the offence of theft will be punishable with the penalty of the cutting of
hands, the law will be bad as violating Article 21. A savage sentence is
anathema to the civilized jurisprudence of Article 21.” 26 Olga Tellis Vs.
Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545 27 Mohini Jain Vs. State of
Karnataka (1992) 3 SCC 666, Unnikrishnan J.P. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
(1993) 1 SCC 645 28 Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan Vs. State of Gujarat (1997) 7
SCC 622 29 State of Bihar Vs. Lal Krishna Advani (2003) 8 SCC 361 30 Shantistar
Builders Vs. Narayan Khimalal Totame (1990) 1 SCC 520, M.C. Mehta Vs. Kamal
Nath (2000) 6 SCC 2013 31 Satwant Singh Sawhney Vs. Asst. Passport Officer 1967
(3) SCR 525, 32 In Re. Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. Vs. Home Secretary, Home
Secretary, Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81 18 under Article 21. This court found delayed
execution of capital punishment violated both the rights of life and ‘liberty’
guaranteed under Article 2133 and also perceived reproductive rights and the
individual’s autonomy regarding sterilization to being inherent in the rights
of life and liberty under Art. 2134. 16. None of the above-mentioned rights are
to be found anywhere in the text of the Constitution. 17. To sanctify an
argument that whatever is not found in the text of the Constitution cannot
become a part of the Constitution would be too primitive an understanding of
the Constitution and contrary to settled cannons of constitutional
interpretation. Such an approach regarding the rights and liberties of citizens
would be an affront to the collective wisdom of our people and the wisdom of
the members of the Constituent Assembly. The fact that some of the members
opined during the course of debates in that Assembly, that the right of privacy
need not find an express mention in the Constitution, would not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that they were oblivious to the importance of the right
to privacy. 33 Vatheeswaran, T.V. Vs. State of T.N. (1983) 2 SCC 68 34 Devika
Biswas Vs. Union of India (2016) 10 SCC 726 19 Constituent Assembly was not a
seminar on the right to privacy and its amplitude. A close scrutiny of the
debates reveals that the Assembly only considered whether there should be an
express provision guaranteeing the right of privacy in the limited context of
‘searches’ and ‘secrecy of correspondence’. Dimensions of the right of privacy
are much larger and were not fully examined. The question whether the
expression ‘liberty’ in Article 21 takes within its sweep the various aspects
of the right of privacy was also not debated. The submissions before us revolve
around these questions. Petitioners assert that the right to privacy is a part
of the rights guaranteed under Article 19 and 21 and other Articles. 18. The
Constitution of any country reflects the aspirations and goals of the people of
that country voiced through the language of the few chosen individuals
entrusted with the responsibility of framing its Constitution. Such aspirations
and goals depend upon the history of that society. History invariably is a
product of various forces emanating from religious, economic and political
events35. 35 However, various forces which go into the making of history are
dynamic. Those who are entrusted with the responsibility of the working of the
Constitution must necessarily keep track of the dynamics of such forces.
Evolution of science and growth of technology is another major factor in the
modern world which is equally a factor to be kept in mind to successfully work
the constitution. 20 The degree of refinement of the Constitution depends upon
the wisdom of the people entrusted with the responsibility of framing the
Constitution. Constitution is not merely a document signed by 284 members of
the Constituent Assembly. It is a politically sacred instrument created by men
and women who risked lives and sacrificed their liberties to fight alien rulers
and secured freedom for our people, not only of their generation but
generations to follow. The Constitution cannot be seen as a document written in
ink to replace one legal regime by another. It is a testament created for
securing the goals professed in the Preamble36. Part-III of the Constitution is
incorporated to ensure achievement of the objects contained in the Preamble.37
‘We the People’ of this country are the intended beneficiaries38 of the
Constitution. It must be seen as a document written in the blood of innumerable
martyrs of 36 Kesavananda Bharati (supra) “Para 91. … Our Preamble outlines the
objectives of the whole constitution. It expresses “what we had thought or
dreamt for so long”.” 37 In re, The Kerala Education Bill, 1957, AIR 1958 SC
956 “… To implement and fortify these supreme purposes set forth in the
Preamble, Part III of our Constitution has provided for us certain fundamental
rights.” 38 Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India & Others, AIR 1956 SC 479 at
page 487 “Para 23. After all, for whose benefit was the Constitution enacted?
What was the point of making all this other about fundamental rights? I am
clear that the Constitution is not for the exclusive benefit governments and
States; it is not only for lawyers and politicians and officials and those
highly placed. It also exists for the common man, for the poor and the humble,
for those who have businesses at stake, for the “butcher, the baker and the
candlestick maker”. It lays down for this land “a rule of law” as understood in
the free democracies of the world. It constitutes India into a Sovereign
Republic and guarantees in every page rights and freedom to the side by side
and consistent with the overriding power of the State to act for the common
good of all. 21 Jalianwala Bagh and the like. Man is not a creature of the
State. Life and liberty are not granted by the Constitution. Constitution only
stipulates the limitations on the power of the State to interfere with our life
and liberty. Law is essential to enjoy the fruits of liberty; it is not the
source of liberty and emphatically not the exclusive source. 19. To comprehend
whether the right to privacy is a Fundamental Right falling within the sweep of
any of the Articles of Part-III, it is necessary to understand what
“fundamental right” and the “right of privacy” mean conceptually. Rights arise
out of custom, contract or legislation, including a written Constitution. The
distinction between an ordinary legislation and an enacted Constitution is that
the latter is believed and expected to be a relatively permanent piece of
legislation which cannot be abrogated by a simple majority of representatives
elected for a limited tenure to legislative bodies created thereby. The
Constitution of any country is a document which contains provisions specifying
the rules of governance in its different aspects. It defines the powers of the
legislature and the procedures for law making, the powers of the executive to
administer the State by enforcing the law made by the legislature 22 and the
powers of the judiciary. The underlying belief is that the Constitution of any
country contains certain core political values and beliefs of the people of
that country which cannot normally be tinkered with lightly, by transient
public opinion. 20. The Constitution of India is one such piece of legislation.
Comparable are constitutions of United States of America, Canada and Australia
to mention only some. All such Constitutions apart from containing provisions
for administration of the State, contain provisions specifying or identifying
certain rights of citizens and even some of the rights of non-citizens (both
the classes of persons could be collectively referred to as SUBJECTS for the
sake of convenience). Such rights came to be described as “basic”,
“primordial”, “inalienable” or “fundamental” rights. Such rights are a
protective wall against State’s power to destroy the liberty of the SUBJECTS.
Irrespective of the nomenclature adopted in different countries, such rights
are believed in all democratic countries39 to 39 Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of
India & Others, AIR 1956 SC 479 Para 24. I make no apology for turning to
older democracies and drawing inspiration from them, for though our law is an
amalgam drawn from many sources, its firmest foundations are rooted in the
freedoms of other lands where men are free in the democratic sense of the term.
England has no fundamental rights as such and its Parliament is supreme but the
liberty of the subject is guarded there as jealously as the supremacy of
Parliament.” 23 be rights which cannot be abridged or curtailed totally by
ordinary legislation and unless it is established that it is so necessary to
abridge or curtail those rights in the larger interest of the society. Several
Constitutions contain provisions stipulating various attendant conditions which
any legislation intending to abridge such (fundamental) rights is required to
comply with. 21. Provisions of any written Constitution create rights and
obligations, belonging either to individuals or the body politic as such. For
example, the rights which are described as fundamental rights in Chapter-III of
our Constitution are rights of individuals whereas provisions of dealing with
elections to legislative bodies create rights collectively in the body politic
mandating periodic elections. They also create rights in favour of individuals
to participate in such electoral process either as an elector or to become an
elected representative of the people/voters. 22. Though each of the rights
created by a Constitution is of great importance for sustenance of a democratic
form of Government chosen by us for achieving certain objectives declared in
the 24 Preamble, the framers of our Constitution believed that some of the
rights enshrined in the Constitution are more crucial to the pursuit of
happiness of the people of India and, therefore, called them fundamental
rights. The belief is based on the study of human history and the Constitution
of other nations which in turn are products of historical events. The scheme of
our Constitution is that the power of the State is divided along a vertical
axis between the Union and the States and along the horizontal axis between the
three great branches of governance, the legislative, the executive and the
judiciary. Such division of power is believed to be conducive to preserving the
liberties of the people of India. The very purpose of creating a written
Constitution is to secure justice, liberty and equality to the people of India.
Framers of the Constitution believed that certain freedoms are essential to
enjoy the fruits of liberty and that the State shall not be permitted to
trample upon those freedoms except for achieving certain important and
specified objectives in the larger interests of society. Therefore, the
authority of the State for making a law inconsistent with fundamental rights,
is cabined within constitutionally proclaimed limitations. 25 23. Provisions
akin to the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under our Constitution exist in
American Constitution also40. They are anterior to our Constitution. 24. The
inter-relationship of various fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of
the Constitution and more specifically between Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the
Constitution has been a matter of great deal of judicial discourse starting
from A.K. Gopalan. The march of the law in this regard is recorded by Justices
Nariman and Chandrachud in detail. 25. R.C. Cooper and Maneka Gandhi gave a
different orientation to the topic. Justice Bhagwati in Maneka Gandhi speaking
for the majority opined41 that in view of the later decision of this Court in
40 The first 8 amendments to the Constitution are some of them. 41 5. ....It
was in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors. that the question as to the,
proper scope and meaning of the expression personal liberty' came up pointedly
for consideration for the first time before this Court. The majority of the
Judges took the view "that personal liberty' is used in the article as a
compendious term to include within itself all the varieties of rights which go
to make up the ‘personal liberties' of man other than those dealt with in the
several clauses of Article 19(1). In other words, while Article 19(1) deals
with particular species or attributes of that freedom, 'personal liberty' in
Article 21 takes in and comprises the residue". The minority judges,
however, disagreed with this view taken by the majority and explained their
position in the following words : "No doubt the expression 'personal
liberty' is a comprehensive one and the right to move freely is an attribute of
personal liberty. It is said that the freedom to move freely is carved out of
personal liberty and, therefore, the expression 'personal liberty' in Article
21 excludes that attribute. In our view, this is not a correct approach. Both
are independent fundamental rights, though there is overlapping. There is no
question of one being carved out of another. The fundamental right of life and personal
liberty has many attributes and some of them are found in Article 19. If a
person's fundamental right under Article 21 is infringed, the State can rely
upon a law to sustain the action, but that cannot be a complete answer unless
the said law satisfies the test laid down in Article 19(2) so far as the
attributes covered by Article 19(1) are concerned". There can be no doubt
that in view of the decision of this Court in R. C. 26 R.C. Cooper, the
minority view (in Kharak Singh) must be regarded as correct and the majority
view must be held to be overruled. Consequently, it was held that any law which
deprives any person of the liberty guaranteed under Article 21 must not only be
just, fair and reasonable, but must also satisfy that it does not at the same
time violate one or some of the other fundamental rights enumerated under
Article 19, by demonstrating that the law is strictly in compliance with one of
the corresponding clauses 2 to 6 of Article 19.42 26. In Kharak Singh,
Ayyangar, J. speaking for the majority held that the expression ‘personal
liberty’ used in Article 21 is a “compendious term to include within itself all
varieties of rights which” Cooper v. Union of India(2) the minority view must
be regarded as correct and the majority view must be held to have been
overruled……. 42 6. …..The law, must, therefore, now be taken to be well settled
that Article 21 does not exclude Article 19 and that even if there is a law
prescribing a procedure for depriving a person of 'personal liberty' and there is
consequently no infringement of the fundamental right conferred by Article 21,
such law, in so far as it abridges or takes away any fundamental right under
Article 19 would have to meet the challenge of that article. This proposition
can no longer be disputed after the decisions in R. C. Cooper's case, Shambhu
Nath Sarkar's case and Haradhan Saha's case. Now, if a law depriving a person
of 'personal liberty' and prescribing a procedure for that purpose within the
meaning of Article 21 has to stand the test of one or more of the fundamental
rights conferred under Article 19 which may be applicable in a given situation,
ex hypothesi it must also be liable to be tested with reference to Article 14.
This was in fact not disputed by the learned Attorney General and indeed he
could not do so in view of the clear and categorical statement made by
Mukharjea, J., in A. K. Gopalan's case that Article 21 "presupposes that
the law is a valid and binding law under the provisions of the Constitution
having regard to the competence of the legislature and the subject it relates
to and does not infringe any of the fundamental rights which the Constitution
provides for", including Article 14..... 27 constitute the “personal
liberties of a man other than those specified in the several clauses of Article
19(1).” In other words, Article 19(1) deals with particular “species or
attributes of personal liberty” mentioned in Article 21. “Article 21 takes in
and comprises the residue.” Such a construction was not accepted by the minority.
The minority opined that both Articles 19 and 21 are independent fundamental
rights but they are overlapping.43 27. An analysis of Kharak Singh reveals that
the minority opined that the right to move freely is an attribute of personal
liberty. Minority only disputed the correctness of the proposition that by
enumerating certain freedoms in Article 19(1), the makers of the Constitution
excluded those freedoms from the expression liberty in Article 21. The minority
opined that both the freedoms enumerated in Article 19(1) and 21 are
independent fundamental rights, though there is “overlapping”. The expression
‘liberty’ is capable of taking within its sweep not only the right to move
freely, guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d); 43 No doubt the expression “personal
liberty” is a comprehensive one and the right to move freely is an attribute of
personal liberty. It is said that the freedom to move freely is carved out of
personal liberty and, therefore, the expression “personal liberty” in Art. 21
excludes that attribute. In our view, this is not a correct approach. Both are
independent fundamental rights, though there is overlapping. 28 but also each
one of the other freedoms mentioned under Article 19(1). Personal liberty takes
within its sweep not only the right not to be subjected to physical restraints,
but also the freedom of thought, belief, emotion and sensation and a variety of
other freedoms. The most basic understanding of the expression liberty is the
freedom of an individual to do what he pleases. But the idea of liberty is more
complex than that. Abraham Lincoln’s statement44 that our nation “was conceived
in liberty” is equally relevant in the context of the proclamation contained in
our Preamble; and as evocatively expressed in the words of Justice Brandies;
“Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to
make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both
as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness
and courage to be the secret of liberty.” – Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 375 28. The question now arises as to what is the purpose the framers of
the Constitution sought to achieve by specifically enumerating some of the
freedoms which otherwise would form part of the expression ‘liberty’. To my
mind the answer is that the Constituent 44 Gettysburg Speech 29 Assembly
thought it fit that some aspects of liberty require a more emphatic declaration
so as to restrict the authority of the State to abridge or curtail them. The
need for such an emphatic declaration arose from the history of this nation. In
my opinion, the purpose sought to be achieved is two-fold. Firstly, to place
the expression ‘liberty’ beyond the argumentative process45 of ascertaining the
meaning of the expression liberty, and secondly, to restrict the authority of
the State to abridge those enumerated freedoms only to achieve the purposes
indicated in the corresponding clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19.46 It must be
remembered that the authority of the 45 That was exactly the State’s submission
in A.K. Gopalan’s case which unfortunately found favour with this Court. 46 (2)
Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any
existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law
imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the
said sub clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the
security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order,
decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or
incitement to an offence (3) Nothing in sub clause (b) of the said clause shall
affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent
the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and
integrity of India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of
the right conferred by the said sub clause (4) Nothing in sub clause (c) of the
said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it
imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of
the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable
restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause (5)
Nothing in sub clauses (d) and (e) of the said clause shall affect the
operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State
from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of
the rights conferred by the said sub clauses either in the interests of the
general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe
(6) Nothing in sub clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of
any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any
law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions
on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause, and, in
particular, nothing in the said sub clause shall affect the operation of any
existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any
law relating to, (i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for
practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by
the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the
exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise 30 State to deprive
any person of the fundamental right of liberty is textually unlimited as the
only requirement to enable the State to achieve that result is to make a ‘law’.
When it comes to deprivation of the freedoms under Article 19(1), the
requirement is: (a) that there must not only be a law but such law must be
tailored to achieve the purposes indicated in the corresponding sub-Article47;
and (b) to declare that the various facets of liberty enumerated in Article
19(1) are available only to the citizens of the country but not all SUBJECTS.48
As it is now clearly held by this Court that the rights guaranteed under
Articles 14 and 21 are not confined only to citizens but available even to
non-citizens aliens or incorporated bodies even if they are incorporated in
India etc. 29. The inter-relationship of Article 19 and 21, if as understood by
me, as stated in para 28, the authority of the State to deprive any person of
his liberty is circumscribed by certain factors; (1) It can only be done under
the authority of law 47 That was exactly the State’s submission in A.K.
Gopalan’s case which unfortunately found favour with this Court. 48 See Hans
Muller of Nurenburg Vs. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta and Others
AIR 1955 SC 367, (Paras 34 and 38) State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. Vs.
The Commercial Tax Officer and Others, AIR 1963 SC 1811, Para 20 Indo-China
Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. Vs. Jasjit Singh, Additional Collector of Customs,
Calcutta and Others, AIR 1964 SC 1140, (Para 35) Charles Sobraj Vs. Supdt.
Central Jail, Tihar, New Delhi, AIR 1978 SC 104, (Para 16 ) Louis De Raedt Vs.
Union of India and Others, (1991) 3 SCC 554, (Para 13) 31 (2) ‘law’ in the
context means a valid legislation. (3) If the person whose liberty is sought to
be deprived is a citizen and that liberty happens to be one of the freedoms
enumerated in Article 19(1), such a law is required to be a reasonable within
the parameters stipulated in clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19, relevant to the
nature of the entrenched freedom/s, such law seeks to abridge. (4) If the
person whose liberty is sought to be deprived of is a non-citizen or even if a
citizen is with respect to any freedom other than those specified in Articles
19(1), the law should be just, fair and reasonable. 30. My endeavour qua the
aforesaid analysis is only to establish that the expression liberty in Article
21 is wide enough to take in not only the various freedoms enumerated in
Article 19(1) but also many others which are not enumerated. I am of the
opinion that a better view of the whole scheme of the chapter on fundamental
rights is to look at each one of the guaranteed fundamental rights not as a
series of isolated points, but as a rational continuum of the legal concept of
liberty i.e. freedom from all substantial, arbitrary 32 encroachments and
purposeless restraints sought to be made by the State. Deprivation of liberty
could lead to curtailment of one or more of freedoms which a human being
possesses, but for interference by the State. 31. Whether it is possible to
arrive at a coherent, integrated and structured statement explaining the right
of privacy is a question that has been troubling scholars and judges in various
jurisdictions for decades.49 Considerable amount of literature both academic
and judicial came into existence. In this regard various taxonomies50 have been
proposed suggesting that there are a number of interests and values into which
the right to privacy could be dissected. 32. Claims for protection of privacy
interests can arise against the State and its instrumentalities and against
non-State entities – such as, individuals acting in their private capacity and
bodies corporate or unincorporated associations etc., without any element of
State participation. Apart from academic literature, different 49 Gobind v.
State of Madhya Pradesh & Another, (1975) 2 SCC 148 “Para 23. … The most
serious advocate of privacy must confess that there are serious problems of
defining the essence and scope of the right. …” 50 For a detailed account of
the taxonomy of the constitutional right to privacy in India see, Mariyam
Kamil, ‘The Structure of the Right to Privacy in India’ (MPhil thesis,
University of Oxford, 2015). 33 claims based on different asserted privacy
interests have also found judicial support. Cases arose in various
jurisdictions in the context of privacy interests based on (i) Common Law; (ii)
statutory recognition; and (iii) constitutionally protected claims of the right
of privacy. 33. I am of the opinion that for answering the present reference,
this Court is only concerned with the question whether SUBJECTS who are
amenable to the laws of this country have a Fundamental Right of Privacy
against the State51. The text of the Constitution is silent in this regard.
Therefore, it is required to examine whether such a right is implied in any one
or more of the Fundamental Rights in the text of the Constitution. 34. To
answer the above question, it is necessary to understand conceptually identify
the nature of the right to privacy. 35. My learned brothers have discussed
various earlier decisions of this Court and of the Courts of other countries,
dealing with the claims of the Right of Privacy. International Treaties and
Conventions have been referred to to establish the existence and 51 It is a
settled principle of law that some of the Fundamental Rights like 14 and 29 are
guaranteed even to noncitizens 34 recognition of the right to privacy in the
various parts of the world, and have opined that they are to be read into our Constitution
in order to conclude that there exists a Fundamental Right to privacy under our
Constitution. While Justice Nariman opined – “94. This reference is answered by
stating that the inalienable fundamental right to privacy resides in Article 21
and other fundamental freedoms contained in Part III of the Constitution of
India. M.P. Sharma (supra) and the majority in Kharak Singh (supra), to the
extent that they indicate to the contrary, stand overruled. The later judgments
of this Court recognizing privacy as a fundamental right do not need to be
revisited. These cases are, therefore, sent back for adjudication on merits to
the original Bench of 3 honourable Judges of this Court in light of the
judgment just delivered by us.” Justice Chandrachud held : “(C) Privacy is a
constitutionally protected right which emerges primarily from the guarantee of
life and personal liberty in Article 21 of the Constitution. Elements of
privacy also arise in varying contexts from the other facets of freedom and
dignity recognised and guaranteed by the fundamental rights contained in Part
III;” 36. One of the earliest cases where the constitutionality of State’s
action allegedly infringing the right of privacy fell for the consideration of
the US Supreme Court is Griswold et al v. Connecticut, 381 US 479. The Supreme
Court of the United States sustained a claim of a privacy interest on the
theory that the Constitution itself creates certain zones of privacy - ‘repose’
and 35 ‘intimate decision.52 Building on this framework, Bostwick53 suggested
that there are in fact, three aspects of privacy – “repose”, “sanctuary” and
“intimate decision”. “Repose” refers to freedom from unwarranted stimuli,
“sanctuary” to protection against intrusive observation, and “intimate
decision” to autonomy with respect to the most personal life choices. Whether
any other facet of the right of privacy exists cannot be divined now. In my
opinion, there is no need to resolve all definitional concerns at an abstract
level to understand the nature of the right to privacy. The ever growing
possibilities of technological and psychological intrusions by the State into
the liberty of SUBJECTS must leave some doubt in this context. Definitional
uncertainty is no reason to not recognize the existence of the right of
privacy. For the purpose of this case, it is sufficient to go by the
understanding that the right to privacy consists of three facets i.e. repose,
sanctuary and intimate decision. Each of these facets is so essential for the
liberty of human beings that I see no reason to doubt that the right to privacy
is part of the liberty guaranteed by our Constitution. 52Griswold v Connecticut
381 US 479 (1965) 487. 53 Gary Bostwick, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose,
Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision’ (1976) 64 California Law Review 1447. 36 37.
History abounds with examples of attempts by governments to shape the minds of
SUBJECTS. In other words, conditioning the thought process by prescribing what
to read or not to read; what forms of art alone are required to be appreciated
leading to the conditioning of beliefs; interfering with the choice of people
regarding the kind of literature, music or art which an individual would prefer
to enjoy.54 Such conditioning is sought to be achieved by screening the source
of information or prescribing penalties for making choices which governments do
not approve.55 Insofar as religious beliefs are concerned, a good deal of the
misery our species suffer owes its existence to and centres around competing
claims of the right to propagate religion. Constitution of India protects the
liberty of all SUBJECTS guaranteeing56 the freedom of 54 Stanley Vs. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969) - that the mere private possession of obscene matter cannot
constitutionally be made a crime…. ……State has no business telling a man,
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may
watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving
government the power to control men’s minds. 55 (1986) 3 SCC 615, Bijoe Emmanuel
& Ors vs State Of Kerala & Others 56 25. Freedom of conscience and free
profession, practice and propagation of religion.- (1) Subject to public order,
morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are
equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess,
practise and propagate religion. (2) Nothing in this article shall affect the
operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law- (a)
regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular
activity which may be associated with religious practice; (b) providing for
social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions
of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. Explanation I.-
The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the
profession of the Sikh religion. 37 conscience and right to freely profess,
practice and propagate religion. While the right to freely “profess, practice
and propagate religion” may be a facet of free speech guaranteed under Article
19(1)(a), the freedom of the belief or faith in any religion is a matter of
conscience falling within the zone of purely private thought process and is an
aspect of liberty. There are areas other than religious beliefs which form part
of the individual’s freedom of conscience such as political belief etc. which
form part of the liberty under Article 21. 38. Concerns of privacy arise when
the State seeks to intrude into the body of SUBJECTS.57 Corporeal punishments
were not unknown to India, their abolition is of a recent vintage. Forced
feeding of certain persons by the State raises concerns of privacy. An
individual’s rights to refuse life prolonging medical treatment or terminate
his life is another freedom which fall within the zone of the right of privacy.
I am conscious of the fact that the issue is pending before this Court. But in
various other jurisdictions, there Explanation II.- In sub-clause (b) of clause
(2), the reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to
persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference to
Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly.\ 57 Skinner Vs.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) - There are limits to the extent to which a
legislatively represented majority may conduct biological experiments at the
expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers of a minority – even
those who have been guilty of what the majority defines as crimes - Jackson, J.
38 is a huge debate on those issues though it is still a grey area.58 A woman’s
freedom of choice whether to bear a child or abort her pregnancy are areas
which fall in the realm of privacy. Similarly, the freedom to choose either to
work or not and the freedom to choose the nature of the work are areas of
private decision making process. The right to travel freely within the country
or go abroad is an area falling within the right of privacy. The text of our
Constitution recognised the freedom to travel throughout the country under
Article 19(1)(d). This Court has already recognised that such a right takes
within its sweep the right to travel abroad.59 A person’s freedom to choose the
place of his residence once again is a part of his right of privacy60
recognised by the Constitution of India under Article 19(1)(e) though the
predominant purpose of enumerating the above mentioned two freedoms in Article
19(1) is to disable both the federal and State Governments from creating
barriers which are incompatible with the federal nature of our country and its
Constitution. The choice 58 For the legal debate in this area in US, See
Chapter 15.11 of the American Constitutional Law by Laurence H. Tribe – 2nd
Edition. 59 Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 60 Williams Vs.
Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900) – Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to
remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of
personal liberty,……. 39 of appearance and apparel are also aspects of the right
of privacy. The freedom of certain groups of SUBJECTS to determine their
appearance and apparel (such as keeping long hair and wearing a turban) are
protected not as a part of the right of privacy but as a part of their
religious belief. Such a freedom need not necessarily be based on religious
beliefs falling under Article 25. Informational traces are also an area which
is the subject matter of huge debate in various jurisdictions falling within
the realm of the right of privacy, such data is as personal as that of the choice
of appearance and apparel. Telephone tappings and internet hacking by State, of
personal data is another area which falls within the realm of privacy. The
instant reference arises out of such an attempt by the Union of India to
collect bio-metric data regarding all the residents of this country. The
above-mentioned are some of the areas where some interest of privacy exists.
The examples given above indicate to some extent the nature and scope of the
right of privacy. 40. I do not think that anybody in this country would like to
have the officers of the State intruding into their homes or private property
at will or soldiers quartered in their houses without their 40 consent. I do
not think that anybody would like to be told by the State as to what they
should eat or how they should dress or whom they should be associated with
either in their personal, social or political life. Freedom of social and
political association is guaranteed to citizens under Article 19(1)(c).
Personal association is still a doubtful area.61 The decision making process
regarding the freedom of association, freedoms of travel and residence are
purely private and fall within the realm of the right of privacy. It is one of
the most intimate decisions. All liberal democracies believe that the State
should not have unqualified authority to intrude into certain aspects of human
life and that the authority should be limited by parameters constitutionally
fixed. Fundamental rights are the only constitutional firewall to prevent State’s
interference with those core freedoms constituting liberty of a human being.
The right to privacy is certainly one of the core freedoms which is to be 61
The High Court of AP held that Article 19(1)(c) would take within its sweep the
matrimonial association in T. Sareetha Vs. T. Venkata Subbaiah, AIR 1983 AP
356. However, this case was later overruled by this Court in Saroj Rani Vs.
Sudarshan Kumar Chadha, AIR 1984 SC 1562 41 defended. It is part of liberty
within the meaning of that expression in Article 21. 41. I am in complete
agreement with the conclusions recorded by my learned brothers in this regard.
42. It goes without saying that no legal right can be absolute. Every right has
limitations. This aspect of the matter is conceded at the bar. Therefore, even
a fundamental right to privacy has limitations. The limitations are to be
identified on case to case basis depending upon the nature of the privacy
interest claimed. There are different standards of review to test infractions
of fundamental rights. While the concept of reasonableness overarches Part III,
it operates differently across Articles (even if only slightly differently
across some of them). Having emphatically interpreted the Constitution’s
liberty guarantee to contain a fundamental right of privacy, it is necessary
for me to outline the manner in which such a right to privacy can be limited. I
only do this to indicate the direction of the debate as the nature of
limitation is not at issue here. 42 43. To begin with, the options canvassed for
limiting the right to privacy include an Article 14 type reasonableness
enquiry62; limitation as per the express provisions of Article 19; a just, fair
and reasonable basis (that is, substantive due process) for limitation per
Article 21; and finally, a just, fair and reasonable standard per Article 21
plus the amorphous standard of ‘compelling state interest’. The last of these
four options is the highest standard of scrutiny63 that a court can adopt. It
is from this menu that a standard of review for limiting the right of privacy
needs to be chosen. 44. At the very outset, if a privacy claim specifically
flows only from one of the expressly enumerated provisions under Article 19,
then the standard of review would be as expressly provided under Article 19.
However, the possibility of a privacy claim being entirely traceable to rights
other than Art. 21 is bleak. Without discounting that possibility, it needs to
be noted that Art. 21 is the bedrock of 62A challenge under Article 14 can be
made if there is an unreasonable classification and/or if the impugned measure
is arbitrary. The classification is unreasonable if there is no intelligible
differentia justifying the classification and if the classification has no
rational nexus with the objective sought to be achieved. Arbitrariness, which
was first explained at para 85 of E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974
SC 555, is very simply the lack of any reasoning. 63A tiered level of scrutiny
was indicated in what came to be known as the most famous footnote in
Constitutional law that is Footnote Four in United States v. Carolene Products,
304 U.S. 144 (1938). Depending on the graveness of the right at stake, the
court adopts a correspondingly rigorous standard of scrutiny. 43 the privacy
guarantee. If the spirit of liberty permeates every claim of privacy, it is
difficult if not impossible to imagine that any standard of limitation, other
than the one under Article 21 applies. It is for this reason that I will
restrict the available options to the latter two from the above described four.
45. The just, fair and reasonable standard of review under Article 21 needs no
elaboration. It has also most commonly been used in cases dealing with a
privacy claim hitherto.64 Gobind resorted to the compelling state interest
standard in addition to the Article 21 reasonableness enquiry. From the United
States where the terminology of ‘compelling state interest’ originated, a
strict standard of scrutiny comprises two things- a ‘compelling state interest’
and a requirement of ‘narrow tailoring’ (narrow tailoring means that the law
must be narrowly framed to achieve the objective). As a term, compelling state
interest does not have definite contours in the US. Hence, it is critical that
this standard be adopted with some clarity as to when and in what types of
privacy claims it is to be used. Only in privacy claims which deserve 64
District Registrar & Collector, Hyderabad v Canara Bank AIR 2005 SC 186;
State of Maharashtra v Bharat Shanti Lal Shah (2008) 13 SCC 5. 44 the strictest
scrutiny is the standard of compelling State interest to be used. As for
others, the just, fair and reasonable standard under Article 21 will apply.
When the compelling State interest standard is to be employed must depend upon
the context of concrete cases. However, this discussion sets the ground rules
within which a limitation for the right of privacy is to be found.
..….....................................J. (J. CHELAMESWAR) New Delhi August
24, 2017. 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No.494 OF 2012 JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY
(RETD.) AND ANR. …. PETITIONERS VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. …. RESPONDENTS
WITH T.C. (CIVIL) No. 151 OF 2013 T.C. (CIVIL) No. 152 OF 2013 W.P. (CIVIL) No.
833 OF 2013 W.P. (CIVIL) No. 829 OF 2013 W.P. (CIVIL) No. 932 OF 2013 CONMT.
PET. (CIVIL) No.144 OF 2014 IN W.P.(C) NO.494/2012 T.P. (CIVIL) No. 313 OF 2014
T.P. (CIVIL) No. 312 OF 2014 S.L.P. (CRL) No.2524 OF 2014 W.P. (CIVIL) No. 37
OF 2015 W.P. (CIVIL) No. 220 OF 2015 CONMT. PET. (CIVIL) No.674 OF 2015 IN
W.P.(C) NO.829/2013 T.P. (CIVIL) No. 921 OF 2015 2 CONMT. PET. (C) No.470 OF
2015 IN W.P.(C) NO.494/2012 CONMT. PET. (C) No.444 OF 2016 IN W.P.(C)
NO.494/2012 CONMT. PET. (C) No.608 OF 2016 IN W.P.(C) NO.494/2012 W.P.(CIVIL)
NO.797/2016 CONMT. PET. (CIVIL) No.844 OF 2017 IN W.P.(C) NO.494/2012 AND W.P.
(CIVIL) No. 342 OF 2017 W.P. (CIVIL) No. 372 OF 2017 JUDGMENT S. A. BOBDE, J.
The Origin of the Reference 1. This reference calls on us to answer questions
that would go to the very heart of the liberty and freedom protected by the
Constitution of India. It arises in the context of a constitutional challenge
to the Aadhaar project, which aims to build a database of personal identity and
biometric information covering every Indian – the world’s largest endeavour of
its kind. To the Petitioners’ argument therein that Aadhaar would violate the
right to privacy, the Union of India, through its Attorney General, raised the
objection that Indians could claim no 3 constitutional right of privacy in view
of a unanimous decision of 8 Judges of this Court in M.P. Sharma v. Satish
Chandra1 and a decision by a majority of 4 Judges in Kharak Singh v. State of
Uttar Pradesh2 . 2. The question, which was framed by a Bench of three of us
and travels to us from a Bench of five, was the following: “12. We are of the
opinion that the cases on hand raise far-reaching questions of importance
involving interpretation of the Constitution. What is at stake is the amplitude
of the fundamental rights including that precious and inalienable right under
Article 21. If the observations made in MP Sharma and Kharak Singh are to be
read literally and accepted as the law of this country, the fundamental rights
guaranteed under the Constitution of India and more particularly right to
liberty under Article 21 would be denuded of vigour and vitality. At the same
time, we are also of the opinion that the institutional integrity and judicial
discipline require that pronouncements made by larger Benches of this Court
cannot be ignored by smaller Benches without appropriately explaining the
reasons for not following the pronouncements made by such larger Benches. With
due respect to all the learned Judges who rendered subsequent judgments – where
right to privacy is asserted or referred to their Lordships concern for the
liberty of human beings, we are of the humble opinion that there appears to be
certain amount of apparent unresolved contradiction in the law declared by this
Court. 13. Therefore, in our opinion to give quietus to the kind of controversy
raised in this batch of cases once and for all, it is better that the ratio
decidendi of MP Sharma and Kharak Singh is scrutinized and the 1 MP Sharma v.
Satish Chandra, 1954 SCR 1077 2 Kharak Singh v. State of UttarPradesh, AIR 1963
SC 1295 4 jurisprudential correctness of the subsequent decisions of this Court
where the right to privacy is either asserted or referred be examined and
authoritatively decided by a Bench of appropriate strength3 .” 3. We have had
the benefit of submissions from Shri Soli Sorabjee, Shri Gopal Subramanium,
Shri Shyam Divan, Shri Arvind Datar, Shri Anand Grover, Shri Sajan Poovayya,
Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Shri Kapil Sibal, Shri P.V. Surendranath and Ms. Aishwarya
Bhati for the Petitioners, and Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned Attorney General
for the Union of India, Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General
for the Union, Shri Aryama Sundaram for the State of Maharashtra, Shri Rakesh
Dwivedi for the State of Gujarat, Shri Arghya Sengupta for the State of
Haryana, Shri Jugal Kishore for the State of Chattisgarh and Shri Gopal
Sankaranarayanan for an intervenor supporting the Respondents. We would like to
record our appreciation for their able assistance in a matter of such great import
as the case before us. 3 Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, W.P.
(Civil) No. 494 of 2012, Order dated 11 August 2015 5 The Effect of M.P. Sharma
and Kharak Singh 4. The question of whether Article 21 encompasses a
fundamental right to privacy did not fall for consideration before the 8 Judges
in the M.P. Sharma Court. Rather, the question was whether an improper search
and seizure operation undertaken against a company and its directors would
violate the constitutional bar against testimonial compulsion contained in
Article 20(3) of the Constitution. This Court held that such a search did not
violate Article 20(3). Its reasoning proceeded on the footing that the absence
of a fundamental right to privacy analogous to the Fourth Amendment to the
United States’ constitution in our own constitution suggested that the
Constituent Assembly chose not to subject laws providing for search and seizure
to constitutional limitations. Consequently, this Court had no defensible
ground on which to import such a right into Article 20(3), which was, at any
event, a totally different right. 5. M.P. Sharma is unconvincing not only
because it arrived at its conclusion without enquiry into whether a privacy
right could exist in our Constitution on an independent footing or not, but
because it 6 wrongly took the United States Fourth Amendment – which in itself
is no more than a limited protection against unlawful surveillance – to be a
comprehensive constitutional guarantee of privacy in that jurisdiction. 6. Neither
does the 4:2 majority in Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) furnish
a basis for the proposition that no constitutional right to privacy exists.
Ayyangar, J.’s opinion for the majority found that Regulation 236 (b) of the
Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations, which inter alia enabled the police to make
domiciliary visits at night was “plainly violative of Article 21”4 . In
reasoning towards this conclusion, the Court impliedly acknowledged a
constitutional right to privacy. In particular, it began by finding that though
India has no like guarantee to the Fourth Amendment, “an unauthorised intrusion
into a person’s home and the disturbance caused to him thereby, is as it were
the violation of a common law right of a man – an ultimate essential of ordered
liberty, if not of the very concept of civilization” 5 . It proceeded to affirm
that the statement in Semayne’s case6 that “the house of everyone is to him as
4 Id., at p. 350 5 Id., at p. 349 6 (1604) 5 Coke 91 7 his castle and fortress
as well as for his defence against injury and violence as for his repose”
articulated an “abiding principle which transcends mere protection of property
rights and expounds a concept of “personal liberty.” Thus far, the Kharak Singh
majority makes out the case of the Attorney General. But, in its final
conclusion, striking down Regulation 236 (b) being violative of Article 21
could not have been arrived at without allowing that a right of privacy was
covered by that guarantee. 7. The M.P. Sharma Court did not have the benefit of
two interpretative devices that have subsequently become indispensable tools in
this Court’s approach to adjudicating constitutional cases. The first of these
devices derives from R.C. Cooper v. Union of India7 and its progeny – including
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India8 – which require us to read Part III’s
guarantees of rights together. Unlike AK Gopalan v. State of Madras9 which held
the field in M.P. Sharma’s time, rights demand to be read as overlapping rather
than in silos, so that Part III is now conceived as a constellation of
harmonious and mutually reinforcing 7 (1970) 1 SCC 248 8 (1978) 1 SCC 248 9 AIR
1950 SC 27 8 guarantees. Part III does not attempt to delineate rights
specifically. I take the right to privacy, an indispensable part of personal
liberty, to have this character. Such a view would have been wholly untenable
in the AK Gopalan era. 8. M.P. Sharma also predates the practice of the
judicial enumeration of rights implicit in a guarantee instantiated in the
constitutional text. As counsel for the Petitioners correctly submitted, there
is a whole host of rights that this court has derived from Article 21 to
evidence that enumeration is a well-embedded interpretative practice in
constitutional law. Article 21’s guarantee to the right to ‘life’ is home to
such varied rights as the right to go abroad (Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India),
the right to livelihood (Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation10) and the
right to medical care (Paramanand Katara v. Union of India11). 9. Therefore,
nothing in M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh supports the conclusion that there is
no fundamental right to privacy in our 10 (1985) 3 SCC 545 11 (1989) 4 SCC 286
9 Constitution. These two decisions and their inconclusiveness on the question
before the Court today have been discussed in great detail in the opinions of
Chelameswar J., Nariman J., and Chandrachud J., I agree with their conclusion
in this regard. To the extent that stray observations taken out of their
context may suggest otherwise, the shift in our understanding of the nature and
location of various fundamental rights in Part III brought about by R.C. Cooper
and Maneka Gandhi has removed the foundations of M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh.
10. Petitioners submitted that decisions numbering atleast 30 – beginning with
Mathews, J.’s full-throated acknowledgement of the existence and value of a
legal concept of privacy in Gobind v. State of M.P.12 – form an unbroken line
of cases that affirms the existence of a constitutional right to privacy. In view
of the foregoing, this view should be accepted as correct. The Form of the
Privacy Right 11. It was argued for the Union by Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned
Attorney General that the right of privacy may at best be a common law 12
(1975) 2 SCC 148 10 right, but not a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution. This submission is difficult to accept. In order to properly
appreciate the argument, an exposition of the first principles concerning the
nature and evolution of rights is necessary. 12. According to Salmond, rights
are interests protected by ‘rules of right’, i.e., by moral or legal rules13.
When interests are worth protecting on moral grounds, irrespective of the
existence of a legal system or the operation of law, they are given the name of
a natural right. Accordingly, Roscoe Pound refers to natural law as a theory of
moral qualities inherent in human beings, and to natural rights as deductions
demonstrated by reason from human nature14. He defines natural rights, and
distinguishes them from legal rights (whether at common law or under
constitutions) in the following way: “Natural rights mean simply interests
which we think ought to be secured demands which human beings may make which we
think ought to be satisfied. It is perfectly true that neither law nor state
creates them. But it is fatal to all sound thinking to treat them as legal
conceptions. For legal rights, the devices which law employs to secure such of
these 13 PJ FITZGERALD, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 217 (Twelfth Edition, 1966) 14
ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 88 (1921) 11 interests as it is
expedient to recognize, are the work of the law and in that sense the work of
the state.” 15 Privacy, with which we are here concerned, eminently qualifies
as an inalienable natural right, intimately connected to two values whose
protection is a matter of universal moral agreement: the innate dignity and
autonomy of man. 13. Legal systems, which in India as in England, began as
monarchies, concentrated the power of the government in the person of the king.
English common law, whether it is expressed in the laws of the monarch and her
Parliament, or in the decisions of the Courts, is the source of what the
Attorney General correctly takes to be our own common law. Semayne’s case16 ,
in which it was affirmed that a man’s home is his castle and that even the law
may only enter it with warrant, clearly shows that elements of the natural
right of privacy began to be received into the common law as early as in 1604.
Where a natural law right could not have been enforced at law, the common law
right is 15 Id., at p. 92 16 (1604) 5 Coke 91 12 evidently an instrument by
which invasions into the valued interest in question by one’s fellow man can be
addressed. On the very same rationale as Seymayne, Chapter 17 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860, treats trespass against property as a criminal offence17 .
14. With the advent of democracy and of limited constitutional government came
the state, a new actor with an unprecedented capacity to interfere with natural
and common law rights alike. The state differs in two material ways from the
monarch, the previous site in which governmental power (including the power to
compel compliance through penal laws) was vested. First, the state is an
abstract and diffuse entity, while the monarch was a tangible, single entity.
Second, the advent of the state came with a critical transformation in the
status of the governed from being subjects under the monarch to becoming
citizens, 17 Several other pre-constitutional enactments which codify the
common law also acknowledge a right to privacy, both as between the individuals
and the government, as well as between individuals inter se. These include: 1.
S. 126-9, The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (protecting certain classes of communication
as privileged) 2. S. 4, The Indian Easements Act, 1882 (defining ‘easements’ as
the right to choose how to use and enjoy a given piece of land) 3. S. 5(2), The
Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 (specifying the permissible grounds for the
Government to order the interception of messages) 4. S. 5 and 6, The Bankers
Books (Evidence) Act, 1891 (mandating a court order for the production and
inspection of bank records) 5. S. 25 and 26, The Indian Post Office Act, 1898
(specifying the permissible grounds for the interception of postal articles) 13
and themselves becoming agents of political power qua the state. Constitutions
like our own are means by which individuals – the Preambular ‘people of India’
– create ‘the state’, a new entity to serve their interests and be accountable
to them, and transfer a part of their sovereignty to it. The cumulative effect
of both these circumstances is that individuals governed by constitutions have
the new advantage of a governing entity that draws its power from and is accountable
to them, but they face the new peril of a diffuse and formless entity against
whom existing remedies at common law are no longer efficacious. 15.
Constitutions address the rise of the new political hegemon that they create by
providing for a means by which to guard against its capacity for invading the
liberties available and guaranteed to all civilized peoples. Under our
constitutional scheme, these means – declared to be fundamental rights – reside
in Part III, and are made effective by the power of this Court and the High
Courts under Articles 32 and 226 respectively. This narrative of the
progressive expansion of the types of rights available to individuals seeking
to defend their liberties from invasion – from natural rights to common law
rights and finally to 14 fundamental rights – is consistent with the account of
the development of rights that important strands in constitutional theory
present18 . 16. This court has already recognized the capacity of constitutions
to be the means by which to declare recognized natural rights as applicable qua
the state, and of constitutional courts to enforce these declarations. In
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala19 , Mathew, J. borrows from Roscoe Pound
to explain this idea in the following terms: “While dealing with natural
rights, Roscoe Pound states on p. 500 of Vol. I of his Jurisprudence: “Perhaps
nothing contributed so much to create and foster hostility to courts and law
and constitutions as this conception of the courts as guardians of individual natural
rights against the State and against society; this conceiving of the law as a
final and absolute body of doctrine declaring these individual natural rights;
this theory of constitutions as declaratory of common law principles, which are
also natural-law principles, anterior to the State and of superior validity to
enactments by the authority of the state; this theory of Constitutions as
having for their purpose to guarantee and maintain the natural rights of
individuals against the Government and all its agencies.In effect, it set up
the received traditional social, political, and economic ideals of the legal
profession as a superconstitution, beyond the reach of any agency but judicial
decision.” (Emphasis supplied) 18 MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC
LAW 344-46 (2010) 19 (1973) 4 SCC 225, 1461 at p. 783 15 This Court also
recognizes the true nature of the relation between the citizen and the state as
well as the true character and utility of Part III. Accordingly, in People’s
Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India20 , it has recently been affirmed
that the objective of Part III is to place citizens at centre stage and make
the state accountable to them. In Society for Unaided Private Schools of
Rajasthan v. Union of India21 , it was held that “[f]undamental rights have two
aspects, firstly, they act as fetter on plenary legislative powers, and
secondly, they provide conditions for fuller development of our people
including their individual dignity.” 17. Once we have arrived at this understanding
of the nature of fundamental rights, we can dismantle a core assumption of the
Union’s argument: that a right must either be a common law right or a
fundamental right. The only material distinctions between the two classes of
right – of which the nature and content may be the same – lie in the incidence
of the duty to respect the right and in the forum in which a failure to do so
can be redressed. Common law rights are horizontal in 20 (2005) 2 SCC 436 21
(2012) 6 SCC 1 at 27 16 their operation when they are violated by one’s fellow
man, he can be named and proceeded against in an ordinary court of law.
Constitutional and fundamental rights, on the other hand, provide remedy
against the violation of a valued interest by the ‘state’, as an abstract entity,
whether through legislation or otherwise, as well as by identifiable public
officials, being individuals clothed with the powers of the state. It is
perfectly possible for an interest to simultaneously be recognized as a common
law right and a fundamental right. Where the interference with a recognized
interest is by the state or any other like entity recognized by Article 12, a
claim for the violation of a fundamental right would lie. Where the author of
an identical interference is a non-state actor, an action at common law would
lie in an ordinary court. 18. Privacy has the nature of being both a common law
right as well as a fundamental right. Its content, in both forms, is identical.
All that differs is the incidence of burden and the forum for enforcement for
each form. 17 The Content of the Right of Privacy 19. It might be broadly
necessary to determine the nature and content of privacy in order to consider
the extent of its constitutional protection. As in the case of ‘life’ under
Article 21, a precise definition of the term ‘privacy’ may not be possible.
This difficulty need not detain us. Definitional and boundary-setting
challenges are not unique to the rights guaranteed in Article 21. This feature
is integral to many core rights, such as the right to equality. Evidently, the
expansive character of any right central to constitutional democracies like
ours has nowhere stood in the way of recognizing a right and treating it as
fundamental where there are strong constitutional grounds on which to do so.
20. The existence of zones of privacy is felt instinctively by all civilized
people, without exception. The best evidence for this proposition lies in the
panoply of activities through which we all express claims to privacy in our
daily lives. We lock our doors, clothe our bodies and set passwords to our
computers and phones to signal that we intend for our places, persons and
virtual lives to be private. An early case in the 18 Supreme Court of Georgia
in the United States describes the natural and instinctive recognition of the
need for privacy in the following terms: “The right of privacy has its
foundation in the instincts of nature. It is recognized intuitively,
consciousness being the witness that can be called to establish its existence.
Any person whose intellect is in a normal condition recognizes at once that as
to each individual member of society there are matters private and there are
matters public so far as the individual is concerned. Each individual as
instinctively resents any encroachment by the public upon his rights which are
of a private nature as he does the withdrawal of those of his rights which are
of a public nature22”. The same instinctive resentment is evident in the
present day as well. For instance, the non-consensual revelation of personal
information such as the state of one’s health, finances, place of residence,
location, daily routines and so on efface one’s sense of personal and financial
security. In District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank23 , this Court observed
what the jarring reality of a lack of privacy may entail: “ ...If the right is
to be held to be not attached to the person, then “we would not shield our
account balances, income figures and personal telephone and address books from
the public eye, but might instead go about with the information written on our
‘foreheads or our bumper stickers’. ” 22 Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance
co. et al., 50 S.E. 68 (Supreme Court of Georgia) 23 (2005) 1 SCC 496 at 48 19
21. ‘Privacy’ is “[t]he condition or state of being free from public attention
to intrusion into or interference with one’s acts or decisions” 24 . The right
to be in this condition has been described as ‘the right to be let alone’25.
What seems to be essential to privacy is the power to seclude oneself and keep
others from intruding it in any way. These intrusions may be physical or
visual, and may take any of several forms including peeping over one’s shoulder
to eavesdropping directly or through instruments, devices or technological aids.
22. Every individual is entitled to perform his actions in private. In other
words, she is entitled to be in a state of repose and to work without being
disturbed, or otherwise observed or spied upon. The entitlement to such a
condition is not confined only to intimate spaces such as the bedroom or the
washroom but goes with a person wherever he is, even in a public place. Privacy
has a deep affinity with seclusion (of our physical persons and things) as well
as such ideas as repose, solitude, confidentiality and secrecy (in our
communications), and 24 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Bryan Garner, ed.) 3783 (2004)
25 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890) 20 intimacy. But this is not to suggest that solitude is always
essential to privacy. It is in this sense of an individual’s liberty to do
things privately that a group of individuals, however large, is entitled to
seclude itself from others and be private. In fact, a conglomeration of
individuals in a space to which the rights of admission are reserved – as in a
hotel or a cinema hall –must be regarded as private. Nor is the right to
privacy lost when a person moves about in public. The law requires a specific
authorization for search of a person even where there is suspicion26 . Privacy
must also mean the effective guarantee of a zone of internal freedom in which
to think. The disconcerting effect of having another peer over one’s shoulder
while reading or writing explains why individuals would choose to retain their
privacy even in public. It is important to be able to keep one’s work without
publishing it in a condition which may be described as private. The vigour and
vitality of the various expressive freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution
depends on the existence of a corresponding guarantee of cognitive freedom. 26
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, s. 42 21 23. Even in the
ancient and religious texts of India, a well-developed sense of privacy is
evident. A woman ought not to be seen by a male stranger seems to be a
well-established rule in the Ramayana. Grihya Sutras prescribe the manner in
which one ought to build one’s house in order to protect the privacy of its
inmates and preserve its sanctity during the performance of religious rites, or
when studying the Vedas or taking meals. The Arthashastra prohibits entry into
another’s house, without the owner’s consent27. There is still a denomination
known as the Ramanuj Sampradaya in southern India, members of which continue to
observe the practice of not eating and drinking in the presence of anyone else.
Similarly in Islam, peeping into others’ houses is strictly prohibited28. Just
as the United States Fourth Amendment guarantees privacy in one’s papers and
personal effects, the Hadith makes it reprehensible to read correspondence
between others. In Christianity, we find the aspiration to live without
interfering in the affairs of others in the text of the Bible29. Confession of
one’s sins is a private act30 . 27 KAUTILYA’S ARTHASHASTRA189-90 (R.
Shamasastri, trans., 1915) 28 AA MAUDUDI, HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM 27 (1982) 29
Thessalonians 4:11 THE BIBLE 22 Religious and social customs affirming privacy
also find acknowledgement in our laws, for example, in the Civil Procedure
Code’s exemption of a pardanashin lady’s appearance in Court31 . 24. Privacy,
that is to say, the condition arrived at after excluding other persons, is a
basic pre-requisite for exercising the liberty and the freedom to perform that
activity. The inability to create a condition of selective seclusion virtually
denies an individual the freedom to exercise that particular liberty or freedom
necessary to do that activity. 25. It is not possible to truncate or isolate
the basic freedom to do an activity in seclusion from the freedom to do the
activity itself. The right to claim a basic condition like privacy in which
guaranteed fundamental rights can be exercised must itself be regarded as a
fundamental right. Privacy, thus, constitutes the basic, irreducible condition
necessary for the exercise of ‘personal liberty’ and freedoms guaranteed by the
Constitution. It is the inarticulate major premise in Part III of the
Constitution. 30 James 5:16 THE BIBLE 31 Code of Civil Procedure, 1989, S. 132
23 Privacy’s Connection to Dignity and Liberty 26. Undoubtedly, privacy exists,
as the foregoing demonstrates, as a verifiable fact in all civilized societies.
But privacy does not stop at being merely a descriptive claim. It also embodies
a normative one. The normative case for privacy is intuitively simple. Nature
has clothed man, amongst other things, with dignity and liberty so that he may
be free to do what he will consistent with the freedom of another and to
develop his faculties to the fullest measure necessary to live in happiness and
peace. The Constitution, through its Part III, enumerates many of these
freedoms and their corresponding rights as fundamental rights. Privacy is an
essential condition for the exercise of most of these freedoms. Ex facie, every
right which is integral to the constitutional rights to dignity, life, personal
liberty and freedom, as indeed the right to privacy is, must itself be regarded
as a fundamental right. 27. Though he did not use the name of ‘privacy’, it is
clear that it is what J.S. Mill took to be indispensable to the existence of
the general reservoir of liberty that democracies are expected to reserve to
their 24 citizens. In the introduction to his seminal On Liberty (1859), he
characterized freedom in the following way: “This, then, is the appropriate
region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of
consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive
sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and
sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or
theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall
under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an
individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance
as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same
reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires
liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own
character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow:
without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not
harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or
wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty,
within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for
any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed
to be of full age, and not forced or deceived. No society in which these
liberties are not, on the whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its form
of government; and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute
and unqualified. The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing
our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of
theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of
his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater
gainers by suffering 25 each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by
compelling each to live as seems good to the rest. Though this doctrine is
anything but new, and, to some persons, may have the air of a truism, there is
no doctrine which stands more directly opposed to the general tendency of
existing opinion and practice. Society has expended fully as much effort in the
attempt (according to its lights) to compel people to conform to its notions of
personal, as of social excellence.”32 (Emphasis supplied) 28. The first and
natural home for a right of privacy is in Article 21 at the very heart of
‘personal liberty’ and life itself. Liberty and privacy are integrally
connected in a way that privacy is often the basic condition necessary for
exercise of the right of personal liberty. There are innumerable activities
which are virtually incapable of being performed at all and in many cases with
dignity unless an individual is left alone or is otherwise empowered to ensure
his or her privacy. Birth and death are events when privacy is required for
ensuring dignity amongst all civilized people. Privacy is thus one of those
rights “instrumentally required if one is to enjoy”33 rights specified and
enumerated in the constitutional text. 32 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND
OTHER ESSAYS 15-16 (Stefan Collini ed., 1989) (1859) 33 Laurence H. Tribe and
Michael C. Dorf, Levels Of Generality In The Definition Of Rights, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1057 (1990) at 1068 26 29. This Court has endorsed the view that ‘life’
must mean “something more than mere animal existence”34 on a number of
occasions, beginning with the Constitution Bench in Sunil Batra (I) v. Delhi
Administration35. Sunil Batra connected this view of Article 21 to the
constitutional value of dignity. In numerous cases, including Francis Coralie
Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi36 , this Court has viewed
liberty as closely linked to dignity. Their relationship to the effect of
taking into the protection of ‘life’ the protection of “faculties of thinking
and feeling”, and of temporary and permanent impairments to those faculties. In
Francis Coralie Mullin, Bhagwati, J. opined as follows37: “Now obviously, the
right to life enshrined in Article 21 cannot be restricted to mere animal
existence. It means something much more than just physical survival. In Kharak
Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Subba Rao J. quoted with approval the
following passage from the judgment of Field J. in Munn v. Illinois to
emphasize the quality of life covered by Article 21: “By the term “life” as
here used something more is meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition 34
Munn v. Illinois, (1877) 94 US 113 (Per Field, J.) as cited In Kharak Singh at
p. 347-8 35 (1978) 4 SCC 494 36 (1981) 1 SCC 608 37 Francis Coralie Mullin at 7
27 against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which
life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body or
amputation of an arm or leg or the putting out of an eye or the destruction of
any other organ of the body through which the soul communicates with the outer
world.” and this passage was again accepted as laying down the correct law by
the Constitution Bench of this Court in the first Sunil Batra case (supra).
Every limb or faculty through which life is enjoyed is thus protected by
Article 21 and a fortiori, this would include the faculties of thinking and
feeling. Now deprivation which is inhibited by Article 21 may be total or
partial, neither any limb or faculty can be totally destroyed nor can it be
partially damaged. Moreover it is every kind of deprivation that is hit by
Article 21, whether such deprivation be permanent or temporary and,
furthermore, deprivation is not an act which is complete once and for all: it
is a continuing act and so long as it lasts, it must be in accordance with
procedure established by law. It is therefore clear that any act which damages
or injures or interferes with the use of, any limb or faculty of a person,
either permanently or even temporarily, would be within the inhibition of Article
21.” (Emphasis supplied) Privacy is therefore necessary in both its mental and
physical aspects as an enabler of guaranteed freedoms. 30. It is difficult to
see how dignity – whose constitutional significance is acknowledged both by the
Preamble and by this Court in its exposition of Article 21, among other rights
– can be assured to the 28 individual without privacy. Both dignity and privacy
are intimately intertwined and are natural conditions for the birth and death
of individuals, and for many significant events in life between these events.
Necessarily, then, the right of privacy is an integral part of both ‘life’ and
‘personal liberty’ under Article 21, and is intended to enable the rights
bearer to develop her potential to the fullest extent made possible only in
consonance with the constitutional values expressed in the Preamble as well as
across Part III. Privacy as a Travelling Right 31. I have already shown that
the right of privacy is as inalienable as the right to perform any
constitutionally permissible act. Privacy in all its aspects constitutes the
springboard for the exercise of the freedoms guaranteed by Article 19(1).
Freedom of speech and expression is always dependent on the capacity to think,
read and write in private and is often exercised in a state of privacy, to the
exclusion of those not intended to be spoken to or communicated with. A
peaceful assembly requires the exclusion of elements who may not be peaceful or
who may have a different agenda. The freedom to associate must necessarily be
the 29 freedom to associate with those of one’s choice and those with common
objectives. The requirement of privacy in matters concerning residence and
settlement is too well-known to require elaboration. Finally, it is not
possible to conceive of an individual being able to practice a profession or
carry on trade, business or occupation without the right to privacy in
practical terms and without the right and power to keep others away from his
work. 32. Ex facie, privacy is essential to the exercise of freedom of
conscience and the right to profess, practice and propagate religion vide
Article 25. The further right of every religious denomination to maintain
institutions for religious and charitable purposes, to manage its own affairs
and to own and administer property acquired for such purposes vide Article 26
also requires privacy, in the sense of non-interference from the state. Article
28(3) expressly recognizes the right of a student attending an educational
institution recognized by the state, to be left alone. Such a student cannot be
compelled to take part in any religious instruction imparted in any such
institution unless his guardian has consented to it. 30 33. The right of
privacy is also integral to the cultural and educational rights whereby a group
having a distinct language, script or culture shall have the right to conserve
the same. It has also always been an integral part of the right to own property
and has been treated as such in civil law as well as in criminal law vide all the
offences and torts of trespass known to law. 34. Therefore, privacy is the
necessary condition precedent to the enjoyment of any of the guarantees in Part
III. As a result, when it is claimed by rights bearers before constitutional
courts, a right to privacy may be situated not only in Article 21, but also
simultaneously in any of the other guarantees in Part III. In the current state
of things, Articles 19(1), 20(3), 25, 28 and 29 are all rights helped up and
made meaningful by the exercise of privacy. This is not an exhaustive list.
Future developments in technology and social ordering may well reveal that
there are yet more constitutional sites in which a privacy right inheres that
are not at present evident to us. 31 Judicial Enumeration of the Fundamental
Right to Privacy 35. There is nothing unusual in the judicial enumeration of
one right on the basis of another under the Constitution. In the case of
Article 21’s guarantee of ‘personal liberty’, this practice is only natural if
Salmond’s formulation of liberty as “incipient rights”38 is correct. By the
process of enumeration, constitutional courts merely give a name and specify
the core of guarantees already present in the residue of constitutional
liberty. Over time, the Supreme Court has been able to imply by its
interpretative process, that several fundamental rights including the right to
privacy emerge out of expressly stated Fundamental Rights. In Unni Krishnan,
J.P. v. State of A.P. 39, a Constitution Bench of this Court held that “several
unenumerated rights fall within Article 21 since personal liberty is of widest
amplitude” 40 on the way to affirming the existence of a right to education. It
went on to supply the following indicative list of such rights, which included
the right to privacy: “30. The following rights are held to be covered under
Article 21: 38 SALMOND, at p. 228 39 (1993) SCC 1 645 40 Id. at 29 32 1. The
right to go abroad. Satwant Singh v. D. Ramarathnam A.P. O., New Delhi (1967) 3
SCR 525. 2. The right to privacy. Gobind v. State of M.P.., (1975)2 SCC 148. In
this case reliance was placed on the American decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 US 479 at 510. 3. The right against solitary confinement.
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1978) 4 SCC 494 at 545. 4. The right against
bar fetters. Charles Sobhraj v. Supdt. (Central Jail0, (1978)4 SCR 104 5. The
right to legal aid. MH Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, (1978) 3 SCC 544. 6. The
right to speedy trial. Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secy, State of Bihar, (1980)1
SCC81 7. The right against hand cuffing. Prem Shankar v. Delhi Administration
(1980) 3 SCC 526 8. The right against delayed execution. TV Vatheeswaran v.
State of Tamil Nadu, (1983) 2 SCC 68. 9. The right against custodial violence.
Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, (1983) 2 SCC 96. 10. The Right against
public hanging. A.G. of India v. Lachmadevi, (1989) Supp. 1 SCC264 11. Doctor’s
Assistance. Paramananda Katra v. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 286. 12. Shelter.
Santistar Builder v. N.KI. Totame, (1990) 1 SCC 520” In the case of privacy,
the case for judicial enumeration is especially strong. It is no doubt a fair
implication from Article 21, but also more. Privacy is be a right or condition,
“logically presupposed”41 by rights expressly recorded in the constitutional
text, if they are to make sense. 41 Laurence H. Tribe And Michael C. Dorf,
Levels Of Generality In The Definition Of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057
(1990) at p. 1068 33 As a result, privacy is more than merely a derivative
constitutional right. It is the necessary and unavoidable logical entailment of
rights guaranteed in the text of the constitution. 36. Not recognizing
character of privacy as a fundamental right is likely to erode the very
sub-stratum of the personal liberty guaranteed by the constitution. The decided
cases clearly demonstrate that particular fundamental rights could not have
been exercised without the recognition of the right of privacy as a fundamental
right. Any derecognition or diminution in the importance of the right of
privacy will weaken the fundamental rights which have been expressly conferred.
37. Before proceeding to the question of how constitutional courts are to
review whether a violation of privacy is unconstitutional, three arguments from
the Union and the states deserve to be dealt with expressly. 38. The Learned
Attorney General relied on cases holding that there is no fundamental right to
trade in liquor to submit by analogy that there can be no absolute right to
privacy. Apprehensions that the recognition of privacy would create
complications for the state in its exercise of 34 powers is not well-founded.
The declaration of a right cannot be avoided where there is good constitutional
ground for doing so. It is only after acknowledging that the right of privacy
is a fundamental right, that we can consider how it affects the plenary powers
of the state. In any event, the state can always legislate a reasonable
restriction to protect and effectuate a compelling state interest, like it may
while restricting any other fundamental right. There is no warrant for the
assumption or for the conclusion that the fundamental right to privacy is an
absolute right which cannot be reasonably restricted given a sufficiently
compelling state interest. 39. Learned Additional Solicitor General, Shri
Tushar Mehta listed innumerable statutes which protect the right of privacy
wherever necessary and urged that it is neither necessary nor appropriate to
recognize privacy as a fundamental right. This argument cannot be accepted any
more in the context of a fundamental right to privacy than in the context of
any other fundamental right. Several legislations protect and advance
fundamental rights, but their existence does not make the existence of a
corresponding fundamental right redundant. 35 This is obviously so because
legislations are alterable and even repealable unlike fundamental rights,
which, by design, endure. 40. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, appearing for the State of
Gujarat, while referring to several judgments of the Supreme Court of the United
States, submitted that only those privacy claims which involve a ‘reasonable
expectation of privacy’ be recognized as protected by the fundamental right. It
is not necessary for the purpose of this case to deal with the particular
instances of privacy claims which are to be recognized as implicating a
fundamental right. Indeed, it would be premature to do. The scope and ambit of
a constitutional protection of privacy can only be revealed to us on a
case-by-case basis. The Test for Privacy 41. One way of determining what a core
constitutional idea is, could be by considering its opposite, which shows what
it is not. Accordingly, we understand justice as the absence of injustice, and
freedom as the absence of restraint. So too privacy may be understood as the
antonym of publicity. In law, the distinction between what is considered a
private trust as opposed to a public trust illuminates what I take to be core
and 36 irreducible attributes of privacy. In Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar42 , four
judges of this Court articulated the distinction in the following terms: “The
distinction between a private trust and a public trust is that whereas in the
former the beneficiaries are specific individuals, in the latter they are the
general public or a class thereof. While in the former the beneficiaries are
persons who are ascertained or capable of being ascertained, in the latter they
constitute a body which is incapable of ascertainment.” This same feature,
namely the right of a member of public as such to enter upon or use such
property, distinguishes private property from public property and private ways
from public roads. 42. Privacy is always connected, whether directly or through
its effect on the actions which are sought to be secured from interference, to
the act of associating with others. In this sense, privacy is usually best
understood as a relational right, even as its content frequently concerns the
exclusion of others from one’s society. 43. The trusts illustration also offers
us a workable test for determining when a constitutionally cognizable privacy
claim has been made, and the basis for acknowledging that the existence of such
a claim 42 (1956) SCR 756 37 is context-dependent. To exercise one’s right to
privacy is to choose and specify on two levels. It is to choose which of the
various activities that are taken in by the general residue of liberty
available to her she would like to perform, and to specify whom to include in
one’s circle when performing them. It is also autonomy in the negative, and
takes in the choice and specification of which activities not to perform and
which persons to exclude from one’s circle. Exercising privacy is the signaling
of one’s intent to these specified others – whether they are one’s
coparticipants or simply one’s audience – as well as to society at large, to
claim and exercise the right. To check for the existence of an actionable claim
to privacy, all that needs to be considered is if such an intent to choose and
specify exists, whether directly in its manifestation in the rights bearer’s
actions, or otherwise. 44. Such a formulation would exclude three recurring red
herrings in the Respondents’ arguments before us. Firstly, it would not admit
of arguments that privacy is limited to property or places. So, for example,
taking one or more persons aside to converse at a whisper even in a public
place would clearly signal a claim to privacy, just as broadcasting 38 one’s
words by a loudspeaker would signal the opposite intent. Secondly, this
formulation would not reduce privacy to solitude. Reserving the rights to
admission at a large gathering place, such as a cinema hall or club, would
signal a claim to privacy. Finally, neither would such a formulation require us
to hold that private information must be information that is inaccessible to
all others. Standards of Review of Privacy Violations 45. There is no doubt
that privacy is integral to the several fundamental rights recognized by Part
III of the Constitution and must be regarded as a fundamental right itself. The
relationship between the right of privacy and the particular fundamental right
(or rights) involved would depend on the action interdicted by a particular
law. At a minimum, since privacy is always integrated with personal liberty,
the constitutionality of the law which is alleged to have invaded into a rights
bearer’s privacy must be tested by the same standards by which a law which
invades personal liberty under Article 21 is liable to be tested. Under Article
21, the standard test at present is the rationality review expressed in Maneka
Gandhi’s case. This requires that any procedure by 39 which the state
interferes with an Article 21 right to be “fair, just and reasonable, not
fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary” 43 . 46. Once it is established that privacy
imbues every constitutional freedom with its efficacy and that it can be
located in each of them, it must follow that interference with it by the state
must be tested against whichever one or more Part III guarantees whose
enjoyment is curtailed. As a result, privacy violations will usually have to
answer to tests in addition to the one applicable to Article 21. Such a view
would be wholly consistent with R.C. Cooper v. Union of India. Conclusion 47.
In view of the foregoing, I answer the reference before us in the following
terms: a. The ineluctable conclusion must be that an inalienable constitutional
right to privacy inheres in Part III of the Constitution. M.P. Sharma and the
majority opinion in Kharak Singh must stand overruled to the extent that they
indicate to the contrary. 43 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248
at para 48 40 b. The right to privacy is inextricably bound up with all
exercises of human liberty – both as it is specifically enumerated across Part
III, and as it is guaranteed in the residue under Article 21. It is distributed
across the various articles in Part III and, mutatis mutandis, takes the form
of whichever of their enjoyment its violation curtails. c. Any interference
with privacy by an entity covered by Article 12’s description of the ‘state’
must satisfy the tests applicable to whichever one or more of the Part III
freedoms the interference affects. ................................. J. [S. A.
BOBDE] New Delhi; August 24, 2017 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL/APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT
PETITION (CIVIL) NO.494 OF 2012 JUSTICE K.S. PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) AND ANR.
…PETITIONERS VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. …RESPONDENTS WITH TRANSFERRED CASE
(CIVIL) NO.151 OF 2013 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO.152 OF 2013 WRIT PETITION
(CIVIL) NO.833 OF 2013 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.829 OF 2013 WRIT PETITION
(CIVIL) NO.932 OF 2013 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.144 OF 2014 IN WRIT
PETITION (CIVIL) NO.494 OF 2012 TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 313 OF 2014
TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 312 OF 2014 2 SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL)
NO.2524 OF 2014 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.37 OF 2015 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)
NO.220 OF 2015 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.674 OF 2015 IN WRIT PETITION
(CIVIL) NO.829 OF 2013 TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 921 OF 2015 CONTEMPT
PETITION (CIVIL) NO.470 OF 2015 IN WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.494 OF 2012
CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.444 OF 2016 IN WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.494 OF
2012 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.608 OF 2016 IN WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.494
OF 2012 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.797 OF 2016 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.844
OF 2017 IN WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.494 OF 2012 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.342 OF
2017 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.372 OF 2017 3 J U D G M E N T R.F. Nariman, J. Prologue
1. The importance of the present matter is such that whichever way it is
decided, it will have huge repercussions for the democratic republic that we
call “Bharat” i.e. India. A Bench of 9-Judges has been constituted to look into
questions relating to basic human rights. A 3-Judge Bench of this Court was
dealing with a scheme propounded by the Government of India popularly known as
the Aadhar card scheme. Under the said scheme, the Government of India collects
and compiles both demographic and biometric data of the residents of this
country to be used for various purposes. One of the grounds of attack on the
said scheme is that the very collection of such data is violative of the “Right
to Privacy”. After hearing the learned Attorney General, Shri Gopal Subramanium
and Shri Shyam Divan, a 3-Judge Bench opined as follows: “12. We are of the
opinion that the cases on hand raise far reaching questions of importance
involving interpretation of the Constitution. What is at stake is the amplitude
of the fundamental rights including 4 that precious and inalienable right under
Article 21. If the observations made in M.P. Sharma (supra) and Kharak Singh
(supra) are to be read literally and accepted as the law of this country, the
fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India and more
particularly right to liberty under Article 21 would be denuded of vigour and
vitality. At the same time, we are also of the opinion that the institutional
integrity and judicial discipline require that pronouncement made by larger
Benches of this Court cannot be ignored by the smaller Benches without
appropriately explaining the reasons for not following the pronouncements made
by such larger Benches. With due respect to all the learned Judges who rendered
the subsequent judgments—where right to privacy is asserted or referred to
their Lordships concern for the liberty of human beings, we are of the humble
opinion that there appears to be certain amount of apparent unresolved
contradiction in the law declared by this Court. 13. Therefore, in our opinion
to give a quietus to the kind of controversy raised in this batch of cases once
for all, it is better that the ratio decidendi of M.P. Sharma (supra) and
Kharak Singh (supra) is scrutinized and the jurisprudential correctness of the
subsequent decisions of this Court where the right to privacy is either
asserted or referred be examined and authoritatively decided by a Bench of
appropriate strength.” 2. The matter was heard by a Bench of 5 learned Judges
on July 18, 2017, and was thereafter referred to 9 learned Judges in view of
the fact that the judgment in M.P. Sharma and others v. Satish Chandra,
District Magistrate, Delhi, and 5 others, 1954 SCR 1077, was by a Bench of 8
learned Judges of this Court. 3. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners,
Shri Gopal Subramanium, Shri Shyam Divan, Shri Arvind Datar, Shri Sajan
Poovayya, Shri Anand Grover and Miss Meenakshi Arora, have argued that the
judgments contained in M.P. Sharma (supra) and Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., (1964)
1 SCR 332, which was by a Bench of 6 learned Judges, should be overruled as
they do not reflect the correct position in law. In any case, both judgments
have been overtaken by R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248, and
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, and therefore require a
revisit at our end. According to them, the right to privacy is very much a
fundamental right which is co-terminus with the liberty and dignity of the
individual. According to them, this right is found in Articles 14, 19, 20, 21
and 25 when read with the Preamble of the Constitution. Further, it was also
argued that several international covenants have stated that the right to
privacy is fundamental to the development of the human personality and that these
international covenants need to be read into the 6 fundamental rights chapter
of the Constitution. Also, according to them, the right to privacy should be
evolved on a case to case basis, and being a fundamental human right should
only yield to State action if such State action is compelling, necessary and in
public interest. A large number of judgments were cited by all of them. They
also invited this Court to pronounce upon the fact that the right to privacy is
an inalienable natural right which is not conferred by the Constitution but
only recognized as such. 4. Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel on behalf
of the States of Karnataka, West Bengal, Punjab and Puducherry broadly
supported the petitioners. According to him, the 8- Judge Bench and the 6-Judge
Bench decisions have ceased to be relevant in the context of the vastly changed
circumstances of today. Further, according to him, State action that violates
the fundamental right to privacy must contain at least four elements, namely: •
“The action must be sanctioned by law; • The proposed action must be necessary
in a democratic society for a legitimate aim; 7 • The extent of such
interference must be proportionate to the need for such interference; • There
must be procedural guarantees against abuse of such interference.” 5. Shri P.V.
Surendra Nath, appearing on behalf of the State of Kerala, also supported the
petitioners and stated that the constitutional right to privacy very much
exists in Part III of the Constitution. 6. Appearing on behalf of the Union of
India, Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned Attorney General for India, has argued that
the conclusions arrived at in the 8-Judge Bench and the 6- Judge Bench
decisions should not be disturbed as they are supported by the fact that the
founding fathers expressly rejected the right to privacy being made part of the
fundamental rights chapter of the Constitution. He referred in copious detail
to the Constituent Assembly debates for this purpose. Further, according to
him, privacy is a common law right and all aspects of privacy do not elevate
themselves into being a fundamental right. If at all, the right to privacy can
only be one amongst 8 several varied rights falling under the umbrella of the
right to personal liberty. According to him, the right to life stands above the
right to personal liberty, and any claim to privacy which would destroy or
erode this basic foundational right can never be elevated to the status of a
fundamental right. He also argued that the right to privacy cannot be claimed when
most of the aspects which are sought to be protected by such right are already
in the public domain and the information in question has already been parted
with by citizens. 7. Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General of
India, appearing for UIDAI and the State of Madhya Pradesh, generally supported
and adopted the arguments of the learned Attorney General. According to him,
privacy is an inherently vague and subjective concept and cannot, therefore, be
accorded the status of a fundamental right. Further, codified statutory law in
India already confers protection to the individual’s right to privacy.
According to him, no further expansion of the rights contained in Part III of
our Constitution is at all warranted. Also, the position under English Law is
that there is no common law right to privacy. He cited before us 9 examples of
other countries in the world where privacy is protected by legislation and not
by or under the Constitution. 8. Shri Aryama Sundaram, appearing for the State
of Maharashtra, also supported the arguments made by the learned Attorney
General. According to him, there is no separate “privacy” right and violation
of a fundamental right should directly be traceable to rights expressly
protected by Part III of the Constitution. Further, privacy is a vague and
inchoate expression. He also referred to the Constituent Assembly debates to
buttress the same proposition that the right to privacy was expressly
discountenanced by the framers of the Constitution. He went on to state that
“personal liberty” in Article 21 is liberty which is circumscribed – i.e. it
relates only to the person of the individual and is smaller conceptually than
“civil liberty”. According to him, the ratio of Kharak Singh (supra) is that
there is no fundamental right to privacy, but any fundamental right that is
basic to ordered liberty would certainly be included as a fundamental right.
According to him, Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1975) 2 SCC 148, did not
state that there was any fundamental right to privacy and the later 10
judgments which referred only to Gobind (supra) as laying down such a right are
incorrect for this reason. 9. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel
appearing for the State of Gujarat, has argued that both the petitioners as
well as the learned Attorney General have taken extreme positions. According to
him, the petitioners state that in the case of every invasion of a privacy
right, howsoever trivial, the fundamental right to privacy gets attracted,
whereas according to the learned Attorney General, there is no fundamental
right to privacy at all. He asked us to adopt an intermediate position –
namely, that it is only if the U.S. Supreme Court’s standard that a petitioner
before a Court satisfies the test of “reasonable expectation of privacy” that
such infraction of privacy can be elevated to the level of a fundamental right.
According to Shri Dwivedi, individual personal choices made by an individual
are already protected under Article 21 under the rubric “personal liberty”. It
is only when individuals disclose certain personal information in order to
avail a benefit that it could be said that they have no reasonable expectation
of privacy as they have voluntarily and freely parted with such information.
Also, 11 according to him, it is only specialized data, if parted with, which
would require protection. As an example, he stated that a person’s name and
mobile number, already being in the public domain, would not be reasonably
expected by that person to be something private. On the other hand, what is
contained in that person’s bank account could perhaps be stated to be
information over which he expects a reasonable expectation of privacy and
would, if divulged by the bank to others, constitute an infraction of his
fundamental right to privacy. According to him: “…when a claim of privacy seeks
inclusion in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the Court needs to apply
the reasonable expectation of privacy test. It should see:– (i) What is the
context in which a privacy law is set up. (ii) Does the claim relate to private
or family life, or a confidential relationship. (iii) Is the claim serious one
or is it trivial. (iv) Is the disclosure likely to result in any serious or
significant injury and the nature and the extent of disclosure. (v) Is
disclosure for identification purpose or relates to personal and sensitive
information of an identified person. 12 (vi) Does disclosure relate to
information already disclosed publicly to third parties or several parties
willingly and unconditionally. Is the disclosure in the course of e commerce or
social media? Assuming, that in a case that it is found that a claim for
privacy is protected by Article 21 of the Constitution, the test should be
following:- (i) the infringement should be by legislation. (ii) the legislation
should be in public interest. (iii) the legislation should be reasonable and
have nexus with the public interest. (iv) the State would be entitled to adopt
that measure which would most efficiently achieve the objective without being
excessive. (v) if apart from Article 21, the legislation infringes any other
specified Fundamental Right then it must stand the test in relation to that
specified Fundamental Right. (vi) Presumption of validity would attach to the
legislations.” 10. Shri A. Sengupta, appearing on behalf of the State of
Haryana, has supported the arguments of the learned Attorney General and has
gone on to state that even the U.S. Supreme Court no longer uses the right to
privacy to test laws that were earlier tested on this ground. Any right to
privacy is 13 conceptually unsound, and only comprehensive data protection
legislation can effectively address concerns of data protection and privacy.
The Government of India is indeed alive to the need for such a law. He further
argued that privacy as a concept is always marshaled to protect liberty and,
therefore, argued that the formulation that should be made by this Court is
whether a liberty interest is at all affected; is such liberty “personal
liberty” or other liberty that deserves constitutional protection and is there
a countervailing legitimate State interest. 11. Shri Jugal Kishore, appearing
on behalf of the State of Chhattisgarh, has also broadly supported the stand of
the learned Attorney General. 12. Shri Gopal Sankaranarayanan, appearing on
behalf of the Centre for Civil Society, argued that M.P. Sharma (supra) and
Kharak Singh (supra) are correctly decided and must be followed as there has
been no change in the constitutional context of privacy from Gopalan (supra)
through R.C. Cooper (supra) and Maneka Gandhi (supra). He further argued that
being incapable of precise definition, privacy ought not to be 14 elevated in
all its aspects to the level of a fundamental right. According to him, the
words “life” and “personal liberty” in Article 21 have already been widely
interpreted to include many facets of what the petitioners refer to as privacy.
Those facets which have statutory protection are not protected by Article 21.
He also argued that we must never forget that when recognizing aspects of the
right to privacy as a fundamental right, such aspects cannot be waived and this
being the case, a privacy interest ought not to be raised to the level of a
fundamental right. He also cautioned us against importing approaches from
overseas out of context. Early Views on Privacy 13. Any discussion with regard
to a right of privacy of the individual must necessarily begin with Semayne’s
case, 77 ER 194. This case was decided in the year 1603, when there was a change
of guard in England. The Tudor dynasty ended with the death of Elizabeth I, and
the Stuart dynasty, a dynasty which hailed from Scotland took over under James
VI of Scotland, 15 who became James I of England.1 James I was an absolute
monarch who ruled believing that he did so by Divine Right. Semayne’s case
(supra) was decided in this historical setting. 14. The importance of Semayne’s
case (supra) is that it decided that every man’s home is his castle and
fortress for his defence against injury and violence, as well as for his
repose. William Pitt, the Elder, put it thus: “The poorest man may in his
cottage bid defiance to all the force of the Crown. It may be frail — its roof
may shake — the wind may blow through it — the storm may enter, the rain may enter
— but the King of England cannot enter — all his force dare not cross the
threshold of the ruined tenement.” A century and a half later, pretty much the
same thing was said in Huckle v. Money, 95 ER 768 (1763), in which it was held
that Magistrates cannot exercise arbitrary powers which violated the Magna
Carta (signed by King John, conceding certain rights to his barons in 1215),
and if they did, exemplary damages must be given for the same. It was stated 1
It is interesting to note that from 1066 onwards, England has never been ruled
by a native Anglo-Saxon. The Norman French dynasty which gave way to the
Plantagenet dynasty ruled from 1066-1485; the Welsh Tudor dynasty then ruled
from 1485-1603 AD; the Stuart dynasty, a Scottish dynasty, then ruled from
1603; and barring a minor hiccup in the form of Oliver Cromwell, ruled up to
1714. From 1714 onwards, members of a German dynasty from Hanover have been
monarchs of England and continue to be monarchs in England. 16 that, “To enter
a man’s house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence is
worse than the Spanish Inquisition, a law under which no Englishman would wish
to live an hour.” 15. This statement of the law was echoed in Entick v.
Carrington, 95 ER 807 (1765), in which Lord Camden held that an illegal search
warrant was “subversive of all the comforts of society” and the issuance of
such a warrant for the seizure of all of a man’s papers, and not only those
alleged to be criminal in nature, was “contrary to the genius of the law of
England.” A few years later, in Da Costa v. Jones, 98 ER 1331 (1778), Lord
Mansfield upheld the privacy of a third person when such privacy was the
subject matter of a wager, which was injurious to the reputation of such third
person. The wager in that case was as to whether a certain Chevalier D’eon was
a cheat and imposter in that he was actually a woman. Such wager which violated
the privacy of a third person was held to be injurious to the reputation of the
third person for which damages were awarded to the third person. These early
judgments did much to uphold the inviolability of the person of a citizen. 17
16. When we cross the Atlantic Ocean and go to the United States, we find a
very interesting article printed in the Harvard Law Review in 1890 by Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis [(4 Harv. L. Rev. 193)]. The opening paragraph of
the said article is worth quoting: “THAT the individual shall have full
protection in person and in property is a principle as old as the common law;
but it has been found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact
nature and extent of such protection. Political, social, and economic changes
entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth,
grows to meet the demands of society. Thus, in very early times, the law gave a
remedy only for physical interference with life and property, for trespasses vi
et armis. Then the “right to life” served only to protect the subject from
battery in its various forms; liberty meant freedom from actual restraint; and
the right to property secured to the individual his lands and his cattle.
Later, there came a recognition of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and
his intellect. Gradually the scope of these legal rights broadened; and now the
right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life,— the right to be let
alone; the right to liberty secures the exercise of extensive civil privileges;
and the term “property” has grown to comprise every form of possession—
intangible, as well as tangible.” 17. This article is of great importance for
the reason that it spoke of the right of the individual “to be let alone”. It
stated in unmistakable terms that this right is not grounded as a property 18
right, but is grounded in having the right of an “inviolate personality”.
Limitations on this right were also discussed in some detail, and remedies for
the invasion of this right of privacy were suggested, being an action of tort
for damages in all cases and perhaps an injunction in some. The right of privacy
as expounded in this article did not explore the ramifications of the said
right as against State action, but only explored invasions of this right by
private persons. Three Great Dissents 18. When the Constitution of India was
framed, the fundamental rights chapter consisted of rights essentially of
citizens and persons against the State. Article 21, with which we are directly
concerned, was couched in negative form in order to interdict State action that
fell afoul of its contours. This Article, which houses two great human rights,
the right to life and the right to personal liberty, was construed rather
narrowly by the early Supreme Court of India. But then, there were Judges who
had vision and dissented from their colleagues. This judgment will refer to
three great dissents by Justices Fazl Ali, Subba Rao and Khanna. 19 19. Charles
Evans Hughes, before he became the Chief Justice of the United States and while
he was still a member of the New York Court of Appeals, delivered a set of six
lectures at Columbia University.2 The famous passage oft quoted in many
judgments comes from his second lecture. In words that resonate even today, he
stated: “A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding
spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision
may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the
court to have been betrayed…..” 20. Brandeis, J. had a somewhat different view.
He cautioned that “in most matters it is more important that the applicable
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.” [See Burnet v. Coronado
Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 at 406 (1932)]. John P. Frank wrote, in 1958,
of the Brandeis view as follows: “Brandeis was a great institutional man. He
realized that …. random dissents …. weaken the institutional impact of the
Court and handicap it in the doing of its fundamental job. Dissents …. need to
be saved for major matters if the Court is not to appear indecisive and
quarrelsome….. To have discarded some of his separate opinions is a supreme
example of Brandeis’s sacrifice to the strength and consistency of the Court.
And he had his reward: 2 See, E. Gaffney Jr., “The Importance of Dissent and
the Imperative of Judicial Civility” (1994) 28 Val. U.L. Rev 583. 20 his shots
were all the harder because he chose his ground.”3 21. Whichever way one looks
at it, the foresight of Fazl Ali, J. in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950
SCR 88, simply takes our breath away. The subject matter of challenge in the
said case was the validity of certain provisions of the Preventive Detention
Act of 1950. In a judgment which anticipated the changes made in our
constitutional law twenty years later, this great Judge said: “To my mind, the
scheme of the Chapter dealing with the fundamental rights does not contemplate
what is attributed to it, namely, that each article is a code by itself and is
independent of the others. In my opinion, it cannot be said that articles 19,
20, 21 and 22 do not to some extent overlap each other. The case of a person
who is convicted of an offence will come under articles 20 and 21 and also
under article 22 so far as his arrest and detention in custody before trial are
concerned. Preventive detention, which is dealt with in article 22, also
amounts to deprivation of personal liberty which is referred to in article 21,
and is a violation of the right of freedom of movement dealt with in article
19(1)(d). That there are other instances of overlapping of articles in the
Constitution may be illustrated by reference to article 19(1)(f) and article 31
both of which deal with the right to property and to some extent overlap each
other.” (at page 148) 3 John P. Frank, Book Review, 10 J. Legal Education 401,
404 (1958). 21 He went on thereafter to hold that the fact that “due process”
was not actually used in Article 21 would be of no moment. He said: “It will
not be out of place to state here in a few words how the Japanese Constitution
came into existence. It appears that on the 11th October, 1945, General
McArthur directed the Japanese Cabinet to initiate measures for the preparation
of the Japanese Constitution, but, as no progress was made, it was decided in
February, 1946, that the problem of constitutional reform should be taken over
by the Government Section of the Supreme Commander’s Headquarters. Subsequently
the Chief of this Section and the staff drafted the Constitution with the help
of American constitutional lawyers who were called to assist the Government
Section in the task. This Constitution, as a learned writer has remarked, bore
on almost every page evidences of its essentially Western origin, and this
characteristic was especially evident in the preamble “particularly reminiscent
of the American Declaration of Independence, a preamble which, it has been
observed, no Japanese could possibly have conceived or written and which few
could even understand” [See Ogg and Zink’s “Modern Foreign Governments”]. One
of the characteristics of the Constitution which undoubtedly bespeaks of direct
American influence is to be found in a lengthy chapter, consisting of 31
articles, entitled “Rights and Duties of the People,” which provided for the
first time an effective “Bill of Rights” for the Japanese people. The usual
safeguards have been provided there against apprehension without a warrant and
against arrest or detention without being informed of the charges or without
adequate cause (articles 33 and 34). 22 Now there are two matters which deserve
to be noticed:- (1) that the Japanese Constitution was framed wholly under
American influence; and (2) that at the time it was framed the trend of
judicial opinion in America was in favour of confining the meaning of the
expression “due process of law” to what is expressed by certain American
writers by the somewhat quaint but useful expression “procedural due process.”
That there was such a trend would be clear from the following passage which I
quote from Carl Brent Swisher’s “The Growth of Constitutional Power in the
United States” (page 107):- “The American history of its interpretation falls
into three periods. During the first period, covering roughly the first century
of government under the Constitution, due process was interpreted principally
as a restriction upon procedure—and largely the judicial procedure—by which the
government exercised its powers. During the second period, which, again roughly
speaking, extended through 1936, due process was expanded to serve as a
restriction not merely upon procedure but upon the substance of the activities
in which the government might engage. During the third period, extending from
1936 to date, the use of due process as a substantive restriction has been
largely suspended or abandoned, leaving it principally in its original status
as a restriction upon procedure.” In the circumstances mentioned, it seems
permissible to surmise that the expression “procedure established by law” as
used in the Japanese Constitution represented the current trend 23 of American
judicial opinion with regard to “due process of law,” and, if that is so, the
expression as used in our Constitution means all that the American writers have
read into the words “procedural due process.” But I do not wish to base any
conclusions upon mere surmise and will try to examine the whole question on its
merits. The word “law” may be used in an abstract or concrete sense. Sometimes
it is preceded by an article such as “a” or “the” or by such words as “any,”
“all,” etc., and sometimes it is used without any such prefix. But, generally,
the word “law” has a wider meaning when used in the abstract sense without
being preceded by an article. The question to be decided is whether the word
“law” means nothing more than statute law. Now whatever may be the meaning of
the expression “due process of law,” the word “law” is common to that
expression as well as “procedure established by law” and though we are not
bound to adopt the construction put on “law” or “due process of law” in
America, yet since a number of eminent American Judges have devoted much
thought to the subject, I am not prepared to hold that we can derive no help
from their opinions and we should completely ignore them.” (at pages 159-161)
He also went on to state that “law” in Article 21 means “valid law”. On all
counts, his words were a cry in the wilderness. Insofar as his vision that
fundamental rights are not in distinct watertight compartments but do overlap,
it took twenty years for 24 this Court to realize how correct he was, and in
R.C. Cooper (supra), an 11-Judge Bench of this Court, agreeing with Fazl Ali,
J., finally held: “52. In dealing with the argument that Article 31(2) is a
complete code relating to infringement of the right to property by compulsory
acquisition, and the validity of the law is not liable to be tested in the
light of the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed thereby, it is
necessary to bear in mind the enunciation of the guarantee of fundamental
rights which has taken different forms. In some cases it is an express
declaration of a guaranteed right: Articles 29(1), 30(1), 26, 25 & 32; in
others to ensure protection of individual rights they take specific forms of
restrictions on State action— legislative or executive—Articles 14, 15, 16, 20,
21, 22(1), 27 and 28; in some others, it takes the form of a positive
declaration and simultaneously enunciates the restriction thereon: Articles
19(1) and 19(2) to (6); in some cases, it arises as an implication from the
delimitation of the authority of the State, e.g., Articles 31(1) and 31(2); in
still others, it takes the form of a general prohibition against the State as
well as others: Articles 17, 23 and 24. The enunciation of rights either
express or by implication does not follow a uniform pattern. But one thread
runs through them: they seek to protect the rights of the individual or groups
of individuals against infringement of those rights within specific limits.
Part III of the Constitution weaves a pattern of guarantees on the texture of
basic human rights. The guarantees delimit the protection of those rights in
their allotted fields: they do not attempt to enunciate distinct rights. 53. We
are therefore unable to hold that the challenge to the validity of the
provision for 25 acquisition is liable to be tested only on the ground of
non-compliance with Article 31(2). Article 31(2) requires that property must be
acquired for a public purpose and that it must be acquired under a law with
characteristics set out in that Article. Formal compliance with the conditions
under Article 31(2) is not sufficient to negative the protection of the
guarantee of the right to property. Acquisition must be under the authority of
a law and the expression “law” means a law which is within the competence of
the Legislature, and does not impair the guarantee of the rights in Part III.
We are unable, therefore, to agree that Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(2) are
mutually exclusive.”4 (at page 289) 22. Insofar as the other part of Fazl Ali,
J.’s judgment is concerned, that “due process” was an elastic enough expression
to comprehend substantive due process, a recent judgment in Mohd. Arif v.
Registrar, Supreme Court of India & Ors., (2014) 9 SCC 737, by a
Constitution Bench of this Court, has held:- “27. The stage was now set for the
judgment in Maneka Gandhi (1978) 1 SCC 248. Several judgments were delivered,
and the upshot of all of 4 Shri Gopal Sankaranarayanan has argued that the
statement contained in R.C. Cooper (supra) that 5 out of 6 learned Judges had
held in Gopalan (supra) that Article 22 was a complete code and was to be read
as such, is incorrect. He referred to various extracts from the judgments in
Gopalan (supra) to demonstrate that this was, in fact, incorrect as Article 21
was read together with Article 22. While Shri Gopal Sankaranarayanan may be
correct, it is important to note that at least insofar as Article 19 was
concerned, none of the judgments except that of Fazl Ali, J. were prepared to
read Articles 19 and 21 together. Therefore, on balance, it is important to
note that R.C. Cooper (supra) cleared the air to state that none of the
fundamental rights can be construed as being mutually exclusive. 26 them was
that Article 21 was to be read along with other fundamental rights, and so read
not only has the procedure established by law to be just, fair and reasonable,
but also the law itself has to be reasonable as Articles 14 and 19 have now to
be read into Article 21. [See: at SCR pp. 646-648 per Beg, CJ., at SCR pp. 669,
671-674 and 687 per Bhagwati, J. and at SCR pp. 720-723 per Krishna Iyer, J.].
Krishna Iyer, J. set out the new doctrine with remarkable clarity thus (SCR
p.723, para 85): “85. To sum up, ‘procedure’ in Article 21 means fair, not
formal procedure. ‘Law’ is reasonable law, not any enacted piece. As Article 22
specifically spells out the procedural safeguards for preventive and punitive
detention, a law providing for such detentions should conform to Article 22. It
has been rightly pointed out that for other rights forming part of personal
liberty, the procedural safeguards enshrined in Article 21 are available.
Otherwise, as the procedural safeguards contained in Article 22 will be
available only in cases of preventive and punitive detention, the right to
life, more fundamental than any other forming part of personal liberty and
paramount to the happiness, dignity and worth of the individual, will not be
entitled to any procedural safeguard save such as a legislature’s mood
chooses.” 28. Close on the heels of Maneka Gandhi case came Mithu vs. State of
Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 277, in which case the Court noted as follows: (SCC pp.
283-84, para 6) 27 “6…In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1978) 4 SCC 494,
while dealing with the question as to whether a person awaiting death sentence
can be kept in solitary confinement, Krishna Iyer J. said that though our
Constitution did not have a “due process” clause as in the American
Constitution; the same consequence ensued after the decisions in the Bank
Nationalisation case (1970) 1 SCC 248, and Maneka Gandhi case (1978) 1 SCC
248.… In Bachan Singh (Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684) which
upheld the constitutional validity of the death penalty, Sarkaria J., speaking
for the majority, said that if Article 21 is understood in accordance with the
interpretation put upon it in Maneka Gandhi, it will read to say that: (SCC
p.730, para 136) “136. No person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except according to fair, just and reasonable procedure established by
valid law.” The wheel has turned full circle. Substantive due process is now to
be applied to the fundamental right to life and liberty.”5 5 Shri Rakesh
Dwivedi has argued before us that in Maneka Gandhi (supra), Chandrachud, J.
had, in paragraph 55 of the judgment, clearly stated that substantive due
process is no part of the Constitution of India. He further argued that Krishna
Iyer, J.’s statement in Sunil Batra (supra) that a due process clause as
contained in the U.S. Constitution is now to be read into Article 21, is a
standalone statement of the law and that “substantive due process” is an
expression which brings in its wake concepts which do not fit into the
Constitution of India. It is not possible to accept this contention for the
reason that in the Constitution Bench decision in Mithu (supra), Chandrachud,
C.J., did not refer to his concurring judgment in Maneka Gandhi (supra), but
instead referred, with approval, to Krishna Iyer, J.’s statement of the law in
paragraph 6. It is this statement that is reproduced in paragraph 28 of Mohd.
Arif (supra). Also, “substantive due process” in our context only means that a
law can be 28 (at pages 755-756) 23. The second great dissent, which is of
Subba Rao, J., in Kharak Singh (supra), has a direct bearing on the question to
be decided by us.6 In this judgment, Regulation 237 of the U.P. Police
Regulations was challenged as violating fundamental struck down under Article
21 if it is not fair, just or reasonable on substantive and not merely
procedural grounds. In any event, it is Chandrachud,C.J’s earlier view that is
a standalone view. In Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty,
(1962) 3 SCR 786 at 816, a Constitution Bench of this Court, when asked to
apply certain American decisions, stated the following: “It would be seen that
the decisions proceed on the application of the “due process” clause of the
American Constitution. Though the tests of ‘reasonableness’ laid down by
clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 might in great part coincide with that for
judging of ‘due process’, it must not be assumed that these are identical, for
it has to be borne in mind that the Constitution framers deliberately avoided
in this context the use of the expression ‘due process’ with its
comprehensiveness, flexibility and attendant vagueness, in favour of a somewhat
more definite word “reasonable”, and caution has, therefore, to be exercised
before the literal application of American decisions.” Mathew, J. in
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) Supp. SCR 1 at 824, 825 and 826
commented on this particular passage thus: “When a court adjudges that a
legislation is bad on the ground that it is an unreasonable restriction, it is
drawing the elusive ingredients for its conclusion from several sources. In
fact, you measure the reasonableness of a restriction imposed by law by
indulging in an authentic bit of special legislation [See Learned Hand, Bill of
Rights, p. 26]. “The words ‘reason’ and ‘reasonable’ denote for the common law
lawyer ideas which the ‘Civilians’ and the ‘Canonists’ put under the head of
the ‘law of nature’…” “…The limitations in Article 19 of the Constitution open
the doors to judicial review of legislation in India in much the same manner as
the doctrine of police power and its companion, the due process clause, have
done in the United States. The restrictions that might be imposed by the
Legislature to ensure the public interest must be reasonable and, therefore,
the Court will have to apply the yardstick of reason in adjudging the
reasonableness. If you examine the cases relating to the imposition of
reasonable restrictions by a law, it will be found that all of them adopt a
standard which the American Supreme Court has adopted in adjudging
reasonableness of a legislation under the due process clause..” “…In the light
of what I have said, I am unable to understand how the word ‘reasonable’ is
more definite than the words ‘due process’…" 6 Chief Justice S.R. Das in
his farewell speech had this to say about Subba Rao, J., “Then we have brother
Subba Rao, who is extremely unhappy because all our fundamental rights are
going to the dogs on account of some illconceived judgments of his colleagues
which require reconsideration.” 29 rights under Article 19(1)(d) and Article
21. The Regulation reads as follows:- “Without prejudice to the right of
Superintendents of Police to put into practice any legal measures, such as
shadowing in cities, by which they find they can keep in touch with suspects in
particular localities or special circumstances, surveillance may for most
practical purposes be defined as consisting of one or more of the following
measures:- (a) Secret picketing of the house or approaches to the house of
suspects; (b) domiciliary visits at night; (c) through periodical inquiries by
officers not below the rank of Sub-Inspector into repute, habits, associations,
income, expenses and occupation; (d) the reporting by constables and chaukidars
of movements and absences from home; (e) the verification of movements and
absences by means of inquiry slips; (f) the collection and record on a
history-sheet of all information bearing on conduct.” 24. All 6 Judges struck
down sub-para (b), but Subba Rao, J. joined by Shah, J., struck down the entire
Regulation as violating the individual’s right to privacy in the following
words: “Further, the right to personal liberty takes in not only a right to be
free from restrictions placed on his movements, but also free from
encroachments on his private life. It is true our Constitution does not
expressly declare a right to privacy as a fundamental right, but the said right
is an essential ingredient of personal liberty. Every democratic 30 country
sanctifies domestic life; it is expected to give him rest, physical happiness,
peace of mind and security. In the last resort, a person’s house, where he
lives with his family, is his “castle”: it is his rampart against encroachment
on his personal liberty. The pregnant words of that famous Judge, Frankfurter
J., in Wolf v. Colorado (1949) 338 U.S. 25, pointing out the importance of the
security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police, could have
no less application to an Indian home as to an American one. If physical
restraints on a person’s movements affect his personal liberty, physical
encroachments on his private life would affect it in a larger degree. Indeed,
nothing is more deleterious to a man’s physical happiness and health than a
calculated interference with his privacy. We would, therefore, define the right
of personal liberty in Article 21 as a right of an individual to be free from
restrictions or encroachments on his person, whether those restrictions or
encroachments are directly imposed or indirectly brought about by calculated
measures. If so understood, all the acts of surveillance under Regulation 236
infringe the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 21 of the
Constitution.” (at page 359) The 8 Judge Bench Decision in M.P. Sharma and the
6 Judge Bench Decision in Kharak Singh 25. This takes us to the correctness of
the aforesaid view, firstly in light of the decision of the 8-Judge Bench in
M.P. Sharma (supra). The facts of that case disclose that certain searches were
made as a result of which a voluminous mass of records was seized from various
places. The petitioners prayed 31 that the search warrants which allowed such
searches and seizures to take place be quashed, based on an argument founded on
Article 20(3) of the Constitution which says that no person accused of any
offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The argument which
was turned down by the Court was that since this kind of search would lead to
the discovery of several incriminating documents, a person accused of an
offence would be compelled to be a witness against himself as such documents
would incriminate him. This argument was turned down with reference to the law
of testimonial compulsion in the U.S., the U.K. and in this country. While
dealing with the argument, this Court noticed that there is nothing in our
Constitution corresponding to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
which interdicts unreasonable searches and seizures. In so holding, this Court
then observed: “It is, therefore, clear that there is no basis in the Indian
law for the assumption that a search or seizure of a thing or document is in
itself to be treated as compelled production of the same. Indeed a little
consideration will show that the two are essentially different matters for the
purpose relevant to the present discussion. A notice to produce is addressed to
the party concerned and 32 his production in compliance therewith constitutes a
testimonial act by him within the meaning of article 20(3) as above explained.
But search warrant is addressed to an officer of the Government, generally a
police officer. Neither the search nor the seizure are acts of the occupier of
the searched premises. They are acts of another to which he is obliged to
submit and are, therefore, not his testimonial acts in any sense.” “A power of
search and seizure is in any system of jurisprudence an overriding power of the
State for the protection of social security and that power is necessarily regulated
by law. When the Constitution makers have thought fit not to subject such
regulation to constitutional limitations by recognition of a fundamental right
to privacy, analogous to the American Fourth Amendment, we have no
justification to import it, into a totally different fundamental right, by some
process of strained construction.” (at pages 1096-1097) 26. The first thing
that strikes one on reading the aforesaid passage is that the Court resisted
the invitation to read the U.S. Fourth Amendment into the U.S. Fifth Amendment;
in short it refused to read or import the Fourth Amendment into the Indian
equivalent of that part of the Fifth Amendment which is the same as Article
20(3) of the Constitution of India. Also, the fundamental right to privacy,
stated to be analogous to the Fourth Amendment, was held to be something which
could not be read into Article 20(3). 33 27. The second interesting thing to be
noted about these observations is that there is no broad ratio in the said
judgment that a fundamental right to privacy is not available in Part III of
the Constitution. The observation is confined to Article 20(3). Further, it is
clear that the actual finding in the aforesaid case had to do with the law
which had developed in this Court as well as the U.S. and the U.K. on Article
20(3) which, on the facts of the case, was held not to be violated. Also we
must not forget that this was an early judgment of the Court, delivered in the
Gopalan (supra) era, which did not have the benefit of R.C. Cooper (supra) or
Maneka Gandhi (supra). Quite apart from this, it is clear that by the time this
judgment was delivered, India was already a signatory to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, Article 12 of which states: “No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 34
28. It has always been the law of this Court that international treaties must
be respected. Our Constitution contains Directive Principle 51(c), which reads
as under: “51. The State shall endeavour to— (a) & (b) xxx xxx xxx (c)
foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of
organized peoples with one another;” In order that legislation be effected to
implement an international treaty, Article 253 removes legislative competence
from all the States and entrusts only the Parliament with such legislation.
Article 253 reads as follows: “253. Legislation for giving effect to
international agreements. - Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing
provisions of this Chapter, Parliament has power to make any law for the whole
or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or
convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at any
international conference, association or other body.” We were shown judgments
of the highest Courts in the U.K. and the U.S in this behalf. At one extreme
stands the United Kingdom, which states that international treaties are not a
part of the laws administered in England. At the other end of the spectrum,
Article VI of the U.S. Constitution declares: 35 “xxx xxx xxx This
Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. xxx xxx xxx” It is thus
clear that no succor can be drawn from the experience of either the U.K. or the
U.S. We must proceed in accordance with the law laid down in the judgments of
the Supreme Court of India. 29. Observations of several judgments make it clear
that in the absence of any specific prohibition in municipal law, international
law forms part of Indian law and consequently must be read into or as part of
our fundamental rights. (For this proposition, see: Bachan Singh v. State of
Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 at paragraph 139, Francis Coralie Mullin v.
Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi & Ors., (1981) 1 SCC 608 at
paragraph 8, Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC
241 at paragraph 7 and National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India,
(2014) 5 SCC 438 at 36 paragraphs 51-60). This last judgment is instructive in
that it refers to international treaties and covenants, the Constitution, and
various earlier judgments. The conclusion in paragraph 60 is as follows: “The
principles discussed hereinbefore on TGs and the international conventions,
including Yogyakarta Principles, which we have found not inconsistent with the
various fundamental rights guaranteed under the Indian Constitution, must be
recognized and followed, which has sufficient legal and historical
justification in our country.” (at page 487) 30. In fact, the Protection of
Human Rights Act, 1993, makes interesting reading in this context. Section
2(1)(d) and (f) are important, and read as follows: “2. Definitions. – (1) In
this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, - (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx
xxx (c) xxx xxx xxx (d) “human rights” means the rights relating to life,
liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution
or embodied in the International Covenants and enforceable by courts in India;
(e) xxx xxx xxx (f) “International Covenants” means the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on the 16th December, 1966 and such other Covenant or 37 Convention
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations as the Central Government
may, by notification, specify;” 31. In terms of Section 12(f), one important
function of the National Human Rights Commission is to study treaties and other
international instruments on human rights and make recommendations for their
effective implementation. In a recent judgment delivered by Lokur, J. in Extra
Judl. Exec. Victim Families Association & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.
in W.P.(Crl.) No.129 of 2012 decided on July 14, 2017, this Court highlighted
the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 as follows:- “29. Keeping this in
mind, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Parliament enacted
the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. The Statement of Objects and Reasons
for the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 is of considerable significance
and accepts the importance of issues relating to human rights with a view,
inter alia, to bring accountability and transparency in human rights
jurisprudence. The Statement of Objects and Reasons reads as under:- “1. India
is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights, adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on the 16th December, 1966. The human
rights embodied in the 38 aforesaid covenants stand substantially protected by
the Constitution. 2. However, there has been growing concern in the country and
abroad about issues relating to human rights. Having regard to this, changing
social realities and the emerging trends in the nature of crime and violence, Government
has been reviewing the existing laws, procedures and systems of administration
of justice; with a view to bringing about greater accountability and
transparency in them, and devising efficient and effective methods of dealing
with the situation. 3. Wide ranging discussions were held at various fora such
as the Chief Ministers’ Conference on Human Rights, seminars organized in
various parts of the country and meetings with leaders of various political
parties. Taking into account the views expressed in these discussions, the
present Bill is brought before Parliament.” 30. Under the provisions of the
Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 the NHRC has been constituted as a
high-powered statutory body whose Chairperson is and always has been a retired
Chief Justice of India. Amongst others, a retired judge of the Supreme Court
and a retired Chief Justice of a High Court is and has always been a member of
the NHRC. 31. In Ram Deo Chauhan v. Bani Kanta Das ((2010) 14 SCC 209), this
Court recognized that the words ‘human rights’ though not defined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights have been defined in the Protection of
Human Rights Act, 1993 in very 39 broad terms and that these human rights are
enforceable by courts in India. This is what this Court had to say in this
regard in paragraphs 47-49 of the Report: “Human rights are the basic,
inherent, immutable and inalienable rights to which a person is entitled simply
by virtue of his being born a human. They are such rights which are to be made
available as a matter of right. The Constitution and legislations of a
civilised country recognise them since they are so quintessentially part of
every human being. That is why every democratic country committed to the rule
of law put into force mechanisms for their enforcement and protection. Human
rights are universal in nature. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(hereinafter referred to as UDHR) adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on 10-12-1948 recognises and requires the observance of certain
universal rights, articulated therein, to be human rights, and these are
acknowledged and accepted as equal and inalienable and necessary for the
inherent dignity and development of an individual. Consequently, though the
term “human rights” itself has not been defined in UDHR, the nature and content
of human rights can be understood from the rights enunciated therein. Possibly
considering the wide sweep of such basic rights, the definition of “human
rights” in the 1993 Act has been 40 designedly kept very broad to encompass
within it all the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the
individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the International
Covenants and enforceable by courts in India. Thus, if a person has been
guaranteed certain rights either under the Constitution or under an
International Covenant or under a law, and he is denied access to such a right,
then it amounts to a clear violation of his human rights and NHRC has the
jurisdiction to intervene for protecting it.” 32. It may also be noted that the
“International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communication
Surveillance” (hereinafter referred to as the “Necessary and Proportionate
Principles”), which were launched at the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva in
September 2013, were the product of a year-long consultation process among
civil society, privacy and technology experts. The Preamble to the Necessary
and Proportionate Principles states as follows: “Privacy is a fundamental human
right, and is central to the maintenance of democratic societies. It is
essential to human dignity and it reinforces other rights, such as freedom of
expression and information, and freedom of association, and is recognized under
international human rights law…..” 41 33. Ignoring Article 12 of the 1948
Declaration would by itself sound the death knell to the observations on the
fundamental right of privacy contained in M.P. Sharma (supra). 34. It is
interesting to note that, in at least three later judgments, this judgment was
referred to only in passing in: (1) Sharda v. Dharmpal, (2003) 4 SCC 493 at
513-514: “54. The right to privacy has been developed by the Supreme Court over
a period of time. A bench of eight judges in M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (AIR
1954 SC 300), AIR at pp. 306-07, para 18, in the context of search and seizure
observed that: “When the Constitution-makers have thought fit not to subject
such regulation to constitutional limitations by recognition of a fundamental
right to privacy, analogous to the American Fourth Amendment, we have no
justification to import it, into a totally different fundamental right, by some
process of strained construction.” 55. Similarly in Kharak Singh v. State of
U.P. (AIR 1963 SC 1295), the majority judgment observed thus: (AIR p. 1303,
para 20) “The right of privacy is not a guaranteed right under our Constitution
and therefore the attempt to ascertain the movements of an individual which is
merely a manner in which privacy is invaded is not an infringement of a 42
fundamental right guaranteed by Part III.” 56. With the expansive
interpretation of the phrase “personal liberty”, this right has been read into
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. (See R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N.,
(1994) 6 SCC 632 and People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India,
(1997) 1 SCC 301). In some cases the right has been held to amalgam of various
rights.” (2) District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad & Anr. v. Canara
Bank etc., (2005) 1 SCC 496 at 516, where this Court held: “35. The earliest
case in India to deal with “privacy” and “search and seizure” was M.P. Sharma
v. Satish Chandra (1954 SCR 1077) in the context of Article 19(1)(f) and
Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. The contention that search and
seizure violated Article 19(1)(f) was rejected, the Court holding that a mere
search by itself did not affect any right to property, and though seizure
affected it, such effect was only temporary and was a reasonable restriction on
the right. The question whether search warrants for the seizure of documents
from the accused were unconstitutional was not gone into. The Court, after
referring to the American authorities, observed that in the US, because of the
language in the Fourth Amendment, there was a distinction between legal and
illegal searches and seizures and that such a distinction need not be imported
into our Constitution. The Court opined that a search warrant was addressed to
an officer and not to the accused and did not violate Article 20(3). In the present
discussion the case is of limited help. In fact, the law as to privacy 43 was
developed in later cases by spelling it out from the right to freedom of speech
and expression in Article 19(1)(a) and the right to “life” in Article 21.” And
(3) Selvi v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 7 SCC 263 at 363, this Court held as
follows:- “205. In M.P. Sharma (M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 300:
1954 SCC 1077), it had been noted that the Indian Constitution did not
explicitly include a “right to privacy” in a manner akin to the Fourth
Amendment of the US Constitution. In that case, this distinction was one of the
reasons for upholding the validity of search warrants issued for documents
required to investigate charges of misappropriation and embezzlement.” 35. It
will be seen that different smaller Benches of this court were not unduly
perturbed by the observations contained in M.P. Sharma (supra) as it was an
early judgment of this Court delivered in the Gopalan (supra) era which had
been eroded by later judgments dealing with the inter-relation between
fundamental rights and the development of the fundamental right of privacy as
being part of the liberty and dignity of the individual. 36. Therefore, given
the fact that this judgment dealt only with Article 20(3) and not with other
fundamental rights; given the 44 fact that the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights containing the right to privacy was not pointed out to the Court;
given the fact that it was delivered in an era when fundamental rights had to
be read disjunctively in watertight compartments; and given the fact that
Article 21 as we know it today only sprung into life in the post Maneka Gandhi
(supra) era, we are of the view that this judgment is completely out of harm’s
way insofar as the grounding of the right to privacy in the fundamental rights
chapter is concerned. 37. We now come to the majority judgment of 4 learned
Judges in Kharak Singh (supra). When examining sub-clause (b) of Regulation
236, which endorsed domiciliary visits at night, even the majority had no
hesitation in striking down the aforesaid provision. This Court said that
“life” used in Article 21 must mean something more than mere animal existence
and “liberty” something more than mere freedom from physical restraint. This
was after quoting the judgment of Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113
(1876). The majority judgment, after quoting from Gopalan (supra), then went on
to hold that Article 19(1) and Article 21 are to be read separately, and so 45
read held that Article 19(1) deals with particular species or attributes of
personal liberty, whereas Article 21 takes in and comprises the residue.7 38.
This part of the judgment has been expressly overruled by R.C. Cooper (supra)
as recognized by Bhagwati, J. in Maneka Gandhi (supra): “5. It is obvious that
Article 21, though couched in negative language, confers the fundamental right
to life and personal liberty. So far as the right to personal liberty is
concerned, it is ensured by providing that no one shall be deprived of personal
liberty except according to procedure prescribed by law. The first question
that arises for consideration on the language of Article 21 is: what is the
meaning and content of the words ‘personal liberty’ as used in this article?
This question incidentally came up for discussion in some of the judgments in
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (AIR 1950 SC 27: 1950 SCR 88: 51 Cri LJ 1383)
and the observations made by Patanjali Sastri, J., Mukherjea, J., and S.R. Das,
J., seemed to place a narrow interpretation on the words ‘personal liberty’ so
as to confine the protection of Article 21 to freedom of the person against
unlawful detention. But there was no definite pronouncement made on this point
since the question before the Court was not so much the interpretation of the
words ‘personal liberty’ as the inter-relation between 7 This view of the law
is obviously incorrect. If the Preamble to the Constitution of India is to be a
guide as to the meaning of the expression “liberty” in Article 21, liberty of
thought and expression would fall in Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21 and
belief, faith and worship in Article 25 and Article 21. Obviously, “liberty” in
Article 21 is not confined to these expressions, but certainly subsumes them.
It is thus clear that when Article 21 speaks of “liberty”, it is, atleast, to
be read together with Articles 19(1)(a) and 25. 46 Articles 19 and 21. It was
in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. (AIR 1963 SC 1295: (1964) 1 SCR 332: (1963) 2
Cri LJ 329) that the question as to the proper scope and meaning of the
expression ‘personal liberty’ came up pointedly for consideration for the first
time before this Court. The majority of the Judges took the view “that
‘personal liberty’ is used in the article as a compendious term to include within
itself all the varieties of rights which go to make up the ‘personal liberties’
of man other than those dealt with in the several clauses of Article 19(1). In
other words, while Article 19(1) deals with particular species or attributes of
that freedom, ‘personal liberty’ in Article 21 takes in and comprises the
residue”. The minority Judges, however, disagreed with this view taken by the
majority and explained their position in the following words: “No doubt the
expression ‘personal liberty’ is a comprehensive one and the right to move
freely is an attribute of personal liberty. It is said that the freedom to move
freely is carved out of personal liberty and, therefore, the expression
‘personal liberty’ in Article 21 excludes that attribute. In our view, this is
not a correct approach. Both are independent fundamental rights, though there
is overlapping. There is no question of one being carved out of another. The
fundamental right of life and personal liberty has many attributes and some of
them are found in Article 19. If a person's fundamental right under Article 21
is infringed, the State can rely upon a law to sustain the action, but that
cannot be a complete answer unless the said law satisfies the test laid down in
Article 19(2) so far as the attributes covered by Article 19(1) are concerned.”
There can be no doubt that in view of the decision of this Court in R.C. Cooper
v. Union of India [(1970) 2 SCC 298: (1971) 1 SCR 512] the minority view must
be regarded as correct and the majority view must be held to have been
overruled.” (at pages 278-279) 47 39. The majority judgment in Kharak Singh
(supra) then went on to refer to the Preamble to the Constitution, and stated
that Article 21 contained the cherished human value of dignity of the
individual as the means of ensuring his full development and evolution. A
passage was then quoted from Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) to the effect
that the security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police is
basic to a free society. The Court then went on to quote the U.S. Fourth
Amendment which guarantees the rights of the people to be secured in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Though the Indian Constitution did not expressly confer a like guarantee, the
majority held that nonetheless an unauthorized intrusion into a person’s home
would violate the English Common Law maxim which asserts that every man’s house
is his castle. In this view of Article 21, Regulation 236(b) was struck down.
40. However, while upholding sub-clauses (c), (d) and (e) of Regulation 236,
the Court stated (at page 351): 48 “As already pointed out, the right of
privacy is not a guaranteed right under our Constitution and therefore the
attempt to ascertain the movements of an individual which is merely a manner in
which privacy is invaded is not an infringement of a fundamental right
guaranteed by Part III.” This passage is a little curious in that clause (b)
relating to domiciliary visits was struck down only on the basis of the
fundamental right to privacy understood in the sense of a restraint against the
person of a citizen. It seems that the earlier passage in the judgment which
stated that despite the fact that the U.S. Fourth Amendment was not reflected
in the Indian Constitution, yet any unauthorized intrusion into a person’s
home, which is nothing but a facet of the right to privacy, was given a go by.
41. Peculiarly enough, without referring to the extracted passage in which the
majority held that the right to privacy is not a guaranteed right under our
Constitution, the majority judgment has been held as recognizing a fundamental
right to privacy in Article 21. (See: PUCL v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301
at paragraph 14; Mr. ‘X’ v. Hospital ‘Z’, (1998) 8 SCC 296 at paragraphs 21 and
22; District Registrar and 49 Collector, Hyderabad & Anr. v. Canara Bank,
etc., (2005) 1 SCC 496 at paragraph 36; and Thalappalam Service Cooperative
Bank Limited & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors., (2013) 16 SCC 82 at paragraph
57). 42. If the passage in the judgment dealing with domiciliary visits at
night and striking it down is contrasted with the later passage upholding the
other clauses of Regulation 236 extracted above, it becomes clear that it
cannot be said with any degree of clarity that the majority judgment upholds
the right to privacy as being contained in the fundamental rights chapter or
otherwise. As the majority judgment contradicts itself on this vital aspect, it
would be correct to say that it cannot be given much value as a binding
precedent. In any case, we are of the view that the majority judgment is good
law when it speaks of Article 21 being designed to assure the dignity of the
individual as a most cherished human value which ensures the means of full
development and evolution of a human being. The majority judgment is also
correct in pointing out that Article 21 interdicts unauthorized intrusion into
a person’s home. Where the majority judgment goes wrong is in holding that 50
fundamental rights are in watertight compartments and in holding that the right
of privacy is not a guaranteed right under our Constitution. It can be seen,
therefore, that the majority judgment is like the proverbial curate’s egg –
good only in parts. Strangely enough when the good parts alone are seen, there
is no real difference between Subba Rao, J.’s approach in the dissenting
judgment and the majority judgment. This then answers the major part of the
reference to this 9-Judge Bench in that we hereby declare that neither the
8-Judge nor the 6- Judge Bench can be read to come in the way of reading the
fundamental right to privacy into Part III of the Constitution. 43. However,
the learned Attorney General has argued in support of the 8-Judge Bench and the
6-Judge Bench, stating that the framers of the Constitution expressly rejected
the right to privacy being made part of the fundament rights chapter of the
Constitution. While he may be right, Constituent Assembly debates make
interesting reading only to show us what exactly the framers had in mind when
they framed the Constitution of India. As will be pointed out later in this
judgment, our judgments expressly recognize that the Constitution governs 51
the lives of 125 crore citizens of this country and must be interpreted to
respond to the changing needs of society at different points in time. 44. The
phrase “due process” was distinctly avoided by the framers of the Constitution
and replaced by the colourless expression “procedure established by law”.
Despite this, owing to changed circumstances, Maneka Gandhi (supra) in 1978,
followed by a number of judgments, have read what was expressly rejected by the
framers into Article 21, so that by the time of Mohd. Arif (supra), this Court,
at paragraph 28, was able to say that the wheel has turned full circle and
substantive due process is now part and parcel of Article 21. Given the
technological revolution of the later part of the 20 th century and the
completely altered lives that almost every citizen of this country leads,
thanks to this revolution, the right to privacy has to be judged in today’s
context and not yesterday’s. This argument, therefore, need not detain us. 45.
The learned Attorney General then argued that between the right to life and the
right to personal liberty, the former has 52 primacy and any claim to privacy
which would destroy or erode this basic foundational right can never be
elevated to the status of a fundamental right. Elaborating further, he stated
that in a developing country where millions of people are denied the basic
necessities of life and do not even have shelter, food, clothing or jobs, no
claim to a right to privacy as a fundamental right would lie. First and
foremost, we do not find any conflict between the right to life and the right
to personal liberty. Both rights are natural and inalienable rights of every
human being and are required in order to develop his/her personality to the
fullest. Indeed, the right to life and the right to personal liberty go
hand-in-hand, with the right to personal liberty being an extension of the
right to life. A large number of poor people that Shri Venugopal talks about
are persons who in today’s completely different and changed world have cell
phones, and would come forward to press the fundamental right of privacy, both
against the Government and against other private individuals. We see no
antipathy whatsoever between the rich and the poor in this context. It seems to
us that this argument is made through the prism of the Aadhar (Targeted
Delivery of 53 Financial and other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016,
by which the Aadhar card is the means to see that various beneficial schemes of
the Government filter down to persons for whom such schemes are intended. This
9-Judge Bench has not been constituted to look into the constitutional validity
of the Aadhar Act, but it has been constituted to consider a much larger
question, namely, that the right of privacy would be found, inter alia, in
Article 21 in both “life” and “personal liberty” by rich and poor alike
primarily against State action. This argument again does not impress us and is
rejected. 46. Both the learned Attorney General and Shri Sundaram next argued
that the right to privacy is so vague and amorphous a concept that it cannot be
held to be a fundamental right. This again need not detain us. Mere absence of
a definition which would encompass the many contours of the right to privacy
need not deter us from recognizing privacy interests when we see them. As this
judgment will presently show, these interests are broadly classified into
interests pertaining to the physical realm and interests pertaining to the
mind. As case law, both in 54 the U.S. and India show, this concept has
travelled far from the mere right to be let alone to recognition of a large
number of privacy interests, which apart from privacy of one’s home and
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures have been extended to
protecting an individual’s interests in making vital personal choices such as
the right to abort a fetus; rights of same sex couples- including the right to
marry; rights as to procreation, contraception, general family relationships,
child rearing, education, data protection, etc. This argument again need not
detain us any further and is rejected. 47. As to the argument that if
information is already in the public domain and has been parted with, there is
no privacy right, we may only indicate that the question as to “voluntary”
parting with information has been dealt with, in the judgment in Miller v.
United States, 425 US 435 (1976). This Court in Canara Bank (supra) referred to
the criticism of this judgment as follows: “(A) Criticism of Miller (i) The
majority in Miller, 425 US 435 (1976), laid down that a customer who has
conveyed his affairs to another had thereby lost his privacy rights. Prof. 55
Tribe states in his treatise (see p. 1391) that this theory reveals “alarming
tendencies” because the Court has gone back to the old theory that privacy is
in relation to property while it has laid down that the right is one attached
to the person rather than to property. If the right is to be held to be not
attached to the person, then “we would not shield our account balances, income
figures and personal telephone and address books from the public eye, but might
instead go about with the information written on our ‘foreheads or our bumper
stickers’.” He observes that the majority in Miller, 425 US 435 (1976),
confused “privacy” with “secrecy” and that “even their notion of secrecy is a
strange one, for a secret remains a secret even when shared with those whom one
selects for one's confidence”. Our cheques are not merely negotiable
instruments but yet the world can learn a vast amount about us by knowing how
and with whom we have spent our money. Same is the position when we use the
telephone or post a letter. To say that one assumes great risks by opening a
bank account appeared to be a wrong conclusion. Prof. Tribe asks a very
pertinent question (p. 1392): “Yet one can hardly be said to have assumed a
risk of surveillance in a context where, as a practical matter, one had no
choice. Only the most committed — and perhaps civilly committable — hermit can
live without a telephone, without a bank account, without mail. To say that one
must take a bitter pill with the sweet when one licks a stamp is to exact a
high constitutional price indeed for living in contemporary society.” He
concludes (p. 1400): 56 “In our information-dense technological era, when
living inevitably entails leaving not just informational footprints but parts of
one's self in myriad directories, files, records and computers, to hold that
the Fourteenth Amendment did not reserve to individuals some power to say when
and how and by whom that information and those confidences were to be used,
would be to denigrate the central role that informational autonomy must play in
any developed concept of the self.” (ii) Prof. Yale Kamisar (again quoted by
Prof. Tribe) (p. 1392) says: “It is beginning to look as if the only way
someone living in our society can avoid ‘assuming the risk’ that various
intermediate institutions will reveal information to the police is by engaging
in drastic discipline, the kind of discipline of life under totalitarian
regimes.” (at pages 520-521) It may also be noticed that Miller (supra) was done
away with by a Congressional Act of 1978. This Court then went on to state:
“(B) Response to Miller by Congress We shall next refer to the response by
Congress to Miller, 425 US 435 (1976). (As stated earlier, we should not be
understood as necessarily recommending this law as a model for India.) Soon 57
after Miller, 425 US 435 (1976), Congress enacted the Right to Financial
Privacy Act, 1978 (Public Law No. 95-630) 12 USC with Sections 3401 to 3422).
The statute accords customers of banks or similar financial institutions,
certain rights to be notified of and a right to challenge the actions of
Government in court at an anterior stage before disclosure is made. Section
3401 of the Act contains “definitions”. Section 3402 is important, and it says
that “except as provided by Section 3403(c) or (d), 3413 or 3414, no government
authority may have access to or obtain copies of, or the information contained
in the financial records of any customer from a financial institution unless
the financial records are reasonably described and that (1) such customer has
authorised such disclosure in accordance with Section 3404; (2) such records
are disclosed in response to (a) administrative subpoenas or summons to meet
requirement of Section 3405; (b) the requirements of a search warrant which
meets the requirements of Section 3406; (c) requirements of a judicial subpoena
which meets the requirement of Section 3407; or (d) the requirements of a
formal written requirement under Section 3408. If the customer decides to challenge
the Government’s access to the records, he may file a motion in the appropriate
US District Court, to prevent such access. The Act also provides for certain
specific exceptions.” (at page 522) 48. Shri Sundaram has argued that rights
have to be traced directly to those expressly stated in the fundamental rights
chapter of the Constitution for such rights to receive protection, and privacy
is not one of them. It will be noticed that the dignity of the individual is a
cardinal value, which is expressed in the 58 Preamble to the Constitution. Such
dignity is not expressly stated as a right in the fundamental rights chapter,
but has been read into the right to life and personal liberty. The right to
live with dignity is expressly read into Article 21 by the judgment in Jolly
George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin, (1980) 2 SCC 360 at paragraph 10. Similarly,
the right against bar fetters and handcuffing being integral to an individual’s
dignity was read into Article 21 by the judgment in Charles Sobraj v. Delhi Administration,
(1978) 4 SCC 494 at paragraphs 192, 197-B, 234 and 241 and Prem Shankar Shukla
v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 3 SCC 526 at paragraphs 21 and 22. It is too
late in the day to canvas that a fundamental right must be traceable to express
language in Part III of the Constitution. As will be pointed out later in this
judgment, a Constitution has to be read in such a way that words deliver up
principles that are to be followed and if this is kept in mind, it is clear
that the concept of privacy is contained not merely in personal liberty, but
also in the dignity of the individual. 49. The judgment in Stanley v. Georgia,
22 L.Ed. 2d 542 at 549, 550 and 551 (1969) will serve to illustrate how privacy
is 59 conceptually different from an expressly enumerated fundamental right. In
this case, the appellant before the Court was tried and convicted under a
Georgia statute for knowingly having possession of obscene material in his
home. The U.S. Supreme Court referred to judgments which had held that obscenity
is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech under the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Yet, the Court held: “It is now well
established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and
ideas. “This freedom [of speech and press] … necessarily protects the right to
receive……” Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 US 141, 143, 87 L Ed 1313, 1316, 63
S Ct 862 (1943); see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479, 482, 14 L Ed 2d 510,
513, 85 S Ct 1678 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307-308,
14 L Ed 2d 398, 402, 403, 85 S Ct 1493 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring); cf.
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 69 L Ed 1070, 45 S Ct 571, 39
ALR 468 (1925). This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of
their social worth, see Winters v. New York, 333 US 507, 510, 92 L Ed 840, 847,
68 S Ct 665 (1948), is fundamental to our free society. Moreover, in the
context of this case—a prosecution for mere possession of printed or filmed
matter in the privacy of a person's own home—that right takes on an added
dimension. For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy… 60
These are the rights that appellant is asserting in the case before us. He is
asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases—the right to satisfy his
intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home. He is
asserting the right to be free from state inquiry into the contents of his
library. Georgia contends that appellant does not have these rights, that there
are certain types of materials that the individual may not read or even
possess. Georgia justifies this assertion by arguing that the films in the
present case are obscene. But we think that mere categorization of these films
as “obscene” is insufficient justification for such a drastic invasion of
personal liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Whatever
may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not
think they reach into the privacy of one's own home. If the First Amendment
means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting
alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our
whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the
power to control men's minds.” (Emphasis Supplied) The Court concluded by
stating: “We hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere
private possession of obscene material a crime. Roth and the cases following
that decision are not impaired by today's holding. As we have said, the States
retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to
mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home.” 50. This
case, more than any other, brings out in bold relief, the difference between
the right to privacy and the right to 61 freedom of speech. Obscenity was held
to be outside the freedom of speech amended by the First Amendment, but a
privacy interest which related to the right to read obscene material was
protected under the very same Amendment. Obviously, therefore, neither is
privacy as vague and amorphous as has been argued, nor is it correct to state
that unless it finds express mention in a provision in Part III of the
Constitution, it should not be regarded as a fundamental right. 51. Shri
Sundaram’s argument that personal liberty is different from civil liberty need
not detain us at all for the reason that at least qua the fundament right to
privacy — that right being intimately connected with the liberty of the person
would certainly fall within the expression “personal liberty”. 52. According to
Shri Sundaram, every facet of privacy is not protected. Instances of actions
which, according to him, are not protected are: • “Taxation laws requiring the
furnishing of information; • In relation to a census; 62 • Details and
documents required to be furnished for the purpose of obtaining a passport; •
Prohibitions pertaining to viewing pornography.” 53. We are afraid that this is
really putting the cart before the horse. Taxation laws which require the
furnishing of information certainly impinge upon the privacy of every
individual which ought to receive protection. Indeed, most taxation laws which
require the furnishing of such information also have, as a concomitant
provision, provisions which prohibit the dissemination of such information to
others except under specified circumstances which have relation to some
legitimate or important State or societal interest. The same would be the case
in relation to a census and details and documents required to be furnished for
obtaining a passport. Prohibitions pertaining to viewing pornography have been
dealt with earlier in this judgment. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Stanley (supra) held that such prohibitions would be invalid if the State were
to intrude into the privacy of one’s home. 63 54. The learned Attorney General
drew our attention to a number of judgments which have held that there is no
fundamental right to trade in liquor and cited Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v.
State of Karnataka, (1995) 1 SCC 574. Quite obviously, nobody has the
fundamental right to carry on business in crime. Indeed, in a situation where
liquor is expressly permitted to be sold under a licence, it would be difficult
to state that such seller of liquor would not have the fundamental right to
trade under Article 19(1)(g), even though the purport of some of our decisions
seems to stating exactly that – See the difference in approach between the
earlier Constitution Bench judgment in Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of Jammu
and Kashmir, (1967) 3 SCR 50, and the later Constitution Bench judgment in Har
Shankar v. The Dy. Excise and Taxation Commr., (1975) 1 SCC 737. In any event,
the analogy to be drawn from the cases dealing with liquor does not take us
further for the simple reason that the fundamental right to privacy once
recognized, must yield in given circumstances to legitimate State interests in
combating crime. But this arises only after recognition of the right to 64
privacy as a fundamental right and not before. What must be a reasonable
restriction in the interest of a legitimate State interest or in public
interest cannot determine whether the intrusion into a person’s affairs is or
is not a fundamental right. Every State intrusion into privacy interests which
deals with the physical body or the dissemination of information personal to an
individual or personal choices relating to the individual would be subjected to
the balancing test prescribed under the fundamental right that it infringes
depending upon where the privacy interest claimed is founded. 55. The learned
Attorney General and Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General, in
particular, argued that our statutes are replete with a recognition of the
right to privacy, and Shri Tushar Mehta cited provisions of the Right to
Information Act, 2005, the Indian Easements Act, 1882, the Indian Penal Code,
1860, the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act, 1891,
the Credit Information Companies (Regulation) Act, 2005, the Public Financial
Institutions (Obligation as to Fidelity and Secrecy) Act, 1983, the Payment and
Settlement Systems Act, 2007, the Income 65 Tax Act, 1961, the Aadhaar
(Targeted Delivery of Financial and other Subsidies, Benefits and Services)
Act, 2016, the Census Act, 1948, the Collection of Statistics Act, 2008, the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, the Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and the Information Technology Act,
2000. According to them, since these statutes already protect the privacy
rights of individuals, it is unnecessary to read a fundamental right of privacy
into Part III of the Constitution. 56. Statutory law can be made and also
unmade by a simple Parliamentary majority. In short, the ruling party can, at
will, do away with any or all of the protections contained in the statutes
mentioned hereinabove. Fundamental rights, on the other hand, are contained in
the Constitution so that there would be rights that the citizens of this
country may enjoy despite the governments that they may elect. This is all the
more so when a particular fundamental right like privacy of the individual is
an “inalienable” right which inheres in the individual because he is a human
being. The recognition of such right in the fundamental rights chapter of the
Constitution is only a 66 recognition that such right exists notwithstanding
the shifting sands of majority governments. Statutes may protect fundamental
rights; they may also infringe them. In case any existing statute or any
statute to be made in the future is an infringement of the inalienable right to
privacy, this Court would then be required to test such statute against such
fundamental right and if it is found that there is an infringement of such
right, without any countervailing societal or public interest, it would be the
duty of this Court to declare such legislation to be void as offending the fundamental
right to privacy. This argument, therefore, also merits rejection. 57. Shri
Rakesh Dwivedi referred copiously to the “reasonable expectation of privacy”
test laid down by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. The origin of this test
is to be found in the concurring judgment of Harlan, J. in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Though this test has been applied by several
subsequent decisions, even in the United States, the application of this test
has been criticized. 67 58. In Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 119 S.Ct. 469
at 477 (1998), the concurring judgment of Scalia, J. criticized the application
of the aforesaid test in the following terms: “The dissent believes that “[o]ur
obligation to produce coherent results” requires that we ignore this clear text
and 4-century-old tradition, and apply instead the notoriously unhelpful test
adopted in a “benchmar[k]” decision that is 31 years old. Post, at 110, citing
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). In my
view, the only thing the past three decades have established about the Katz
test (which has come to mean the test enunciated by Justice Harlan’s separate
concurrence in Katz, see id., at 360, 88 S.Ct. 507) is that, unsurprisingly,
those “actual (subjective) expectation[s] of privacy” “that society is prepared
to recognize as ‘reasonable,’ ” id., at 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, bear an uncanny
resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers
reasonable. When that self-indulgent test is employed (as the dissent would
employ it here) to determine whether a “search or seizure” within the meaning
of the Constitution has occurred (as opposed to whether that “search or
seizure” is an “unreasonable” one), it has no plausible foundation in the text
of the Fourth Amendment. That provision did not guarantee some generalized
“right of privacy” and leave it to this Court to determine which particular
manifestations of the value of privacy “society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable’.” Ibid.” In Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038
at 2043 (2001), the U.S. Supreme Court found that the use of a 68 thermal
imaging device, aimed at a private home from a public street, to detect
relative amounts of heat within the private home would be an invasion of the
privacy of the individual. In so holding, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “The
Katz test—whether the individual has an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable—has often been criticized as circular, and
hence subjective and unpredictable. See 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§2.1(d), pp. 393-394 (3d ed. 1996); Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy
by the Supreme Court, 1979 S. Ct. Rev. 173, 188; Carter, supra, at 97, 119 S.
Ct. 469 (SCALIA, J., concurring). But see Rakas, supra, at 143-144, n. 12, 99
S. Ct. 421. While it may be difficult to refine Katz when the search of areas
such as telephone booths, automobiles, or even the curtilage and uncovered
portions of residences are at issue, in the case of the search of the interior
of homes—the prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of protected
privacy—there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the
minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be
reasonable. To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to
permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment. We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have
been obtained without physical “intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area,” Silverman, 365 U.S., at 512, 81 S. Ct. 679 constitutes a search—at least
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use. This
assures preservation of that degree of privacy 69 against government that
existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” 59. It is clear, therefore,
that in the country of its origin, this test though followed in certain
subsequent judgments, has been the subject matter of criticism. There is no
doubt that such a test has no plausible foundation in the text of Articles 14,
19, 20 or 21 of our Constitution. Also, as has rightly been held, the test is
circular in the sense that there is no invasion of privacy unless the
individual whose privacy is invaded had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Whether such individual will or will not have such an expectation ought to
depend on what the position in law is. Also, this test is intrinsically linked
with the test of voluntarily parting with information, inasmuch as if
information is voluntarily parted with, the person concerned can reasonably be
said to have no expectation of any privacy interest. This is nothing other than
reading of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” with the test in Miller
(supra), which is that if information is voluntarily parted with, no right to
privacy exists. As has been held by us, in Canara Bank (supra), this Court
referred to Miller (supra) and the criticism that it has 70 received in the
country of its origin, and refused to apply it in the Indian context. Also, as
has been discussed above, soon after Miller (supra), the Congress enacted the
Right to Financial Privacy Act, 1978, doing away with the substratum of this
judgment. Shri Dwivedi’s argument must, therefore, stand rejected. 60. Shri
Gopal Sankaranarayanan, relying upon the statement of law in Behram Khurshid
Pesikaka v. State of Bombay, (1955) 1 SCR 613, Basheshar Nath v. CIT, (1959)
Supp. (1) SCR 528 and Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC
545, has argued that it is well established that fundamental rights cannot be
waived. Since this is the law in this country, if this Court were to hold that
the right to privacy is a fundamental right, then it would not be possible to
waive any part of such right and consequently would lead to the following
complications: • All the statutory provisions that deal with aspects of privacy
would be vulnerable. 71 • The State would be barred from contractually obtaining
virtually any information about a person, including identification,
fingerprints, residential address, photographs, employment details, etc.,
unless they were all found to be not a part of the right to privacy. • The
consequence would be that the judiciary would be testing what aspects of
privacy could be excluded from Article 21 rather than what can be included in
Article 21. This argument again need not detain us. Statutory provisions that
deal with aspects of privacy would continue to be tested on the ground that
they would violate the fundamental right to privacy, and would not be struck
down, if it is found on a balancing test that the social or public interest and
the reasonableness of the restrictions would outweigh the particular aspect of
privacy claimed. If this is so, then statutes which would enable the State to
contractually obtain information about persons would pass muster in given
circumstances, provided they safeguard the individual right to privacy as well.
A simple example would suffice. If a person was to paste on Facebook 72 vital
information about himself/herself, such information, being in the public
domain, could not possibly be claimed as a privacy right after such disclosure.
But, in pursuance of a statutory requirement, if certain details need to be
given for the concerned statutory purpose, then such details would certainly
affect the right to privacy, but would on a balance, pass muster as the State
action concerned has sufficient inbuilt safeguards to protect this right – viz.
the fact that such information cannot be disseminated to anyone else, save on
compelling grounds of public interest. The Fundamental Right to Privacy 61.
This conclusion brings us to where the right to privacy resides and what its
contours are. But before getting into this knotty question, it is important to
restate a few constitutional fundamentals. 62. Never must we forget the great
John Marshall, C.J.’s admonition that it is a Constitution that we are
expounding. [(see: McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 at 407 (1819)]. Indeed a
Constitution is meant to govern people’s lives, and as 73 people’s lives keep
evolving and changing with the times, so does the interpretation of the
Constitution to keep pace with such changes. This was well expressed in at least
two judgments of this Court. In Ashok Tanwar & Anr. v. State of H.P. &
Ors., (2005) 2 SCC 104, a Constitution Bench stated as follows: “This apart,
the interpretation of a provision of the Constitution having regard to various
aspects serving the purpose and mandate of the Constitution by this Court
stands on a separate footing. A constitution unlike other statutes is meant to
be a durable instrument to serve through longer number of years, i.e., ages
without frequent revision. It is intended to serve the needs of the day when it
was enacted and also to meet needs of the changing conditions of the future.
This Court in R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 324, in
paragraph 124, observed thus: “124. In judicial review of the vires of the
exercise of a constitutional power such as the one under Article 2, the
significance and importance of the political components of the decision deemed
fit by Parliament cannot be put out of consideration as long as the conditions
do not violate the constitutional fundamentals. In the interpretation of a
constitutional document, ‘words are but the framework of concepts and concepts
may change more than words themselves’. The significance of the change of the
concepts themselves is vital and the 74 constitutional issues are not solved by
a mere appeal to the meaning of the words without an acceptance of the line of
their growth. It is aptly said that ‘the intention of a Constitution is rather
to outline principles than to engrave details’.” In the First B.N. Rau Memorial
Lecture on “Judicial Methods” M. Hidayatullah, J. observed: “More freedom
exists in the interpretation of the Constitution than in the interpretation of
ordinary laws. This is due to the fact that the ordinary law is more often
before courts, that there are always dicta of judges readily available while in
the domain of constitutional law there is again and again novelty of situation
and approach.” Chief Justice Marshall while deciding the celebrated McCulloch
v. Maryland [4 Wheaton (17 US) 316 : 4 L Ed 579 (1819)] (Wheaton at p. 407,
L.Ed. at p. 602) made the pregnant remark—“we must never forget that it is the
constitution we are expounding”— meaning thereby that it is a question of new
meaning in new circumstances. Cardozo in his lectures also said: “The great
generalities of the Constitution have a content and a significance that vary
from age to age.” Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland [4 Wheaton
(17 US) 316 : 4 L Ed 579 (1819)] (L.Ed at pp 603-604) declared that the
Constitution was “intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs”. In this regard it is
worthwhile to see the observations made in paragraphs 324 to 326 in Supreme
Court 75 Advocates-on-Record Assn, (1993) 4 SCC 441: (SCC pp. 645-46) “324. The
case before us must be considered in the light of our entire experience and not
merely in that of what was said by the framers of the Constitution. While
deciding the questions posed before us we must consider what is the judiciary
today and not what it was fifty years back. The Constitution has not only to be
read in the light of contemporary circumstances and values, it has to be read
in such a way that the circumstances and values of the present generation are
given expression in its provisions. An eminent jurist observed that
‘constitutional interpretation is as much a process of creation as one of
discovery.’ 325. It would be useful to quote hereunder a paragraph from the
judgment of Supreme Court of Canada in Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1984) 2 SCR 145:
[SCR at p.156 (Can)] ‘It is clear that the meaning of “unreasonable” cannot be
determined by recourse to a dictionary, nor for that matter, by reference to
the rules of statutory construction. The task of expounding a Constitution is
crucially different from that of construing a statute. A statute defines
present rights and obligations. It is easily enacted and as easily repealed. A
Constitution, by contrast, is drafted with an eye to the future. Its function
is to provide a continuing framework for the legitimate 76 exercise of
governmental power and, when joined by a Bill or a Charter of Rights, for the
unremitting protection of individual rights and liberties. Once enacted, its
provisions cannot easily be repealed or amended. It must, therefore, be capable
of growth and development over time to meet new social, political and
historical realities often unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is the
guardian of the Constitution and must, in interpreting its provisions, bear
these considerations in mind. Professor Paul Freund expressed this idea aptly
when he admonished the American Courts “not to read the provisions of the
Constitution like a last will and testament lest it become one”.’ 326. The
constitutional provisions cannot be cut down by technical construction rather
it has to be given liberal and meaningful interpretation. The ordinary rules
and presumptions, brought in aid to interpret the statutes, cannot be made
applicable while interpreting the provisions of the Constitution. In Minister
of Home Affairs v. Fisher [(1979) 3 All ER 21 : 1980 AC 319] dealing with
Bermudian Constitution, Lord Wilberforce reiterated that a Constitution is a
document ‘sui generis, calling for principles of interpretation of its own,
suitable to its character’.” This Court in Aruna Roy v. Union of India, (2002)
7 SCC 368, recalled the famous words of the Chief Justice Holmes that “spirit
of law is not logic but it has been experience” and observed that these words
apply with greater force to constitutional law. 77 In the same judgment this
Court expressed that Constitution is a permanent document framed by the people
and has been accepted by the people to govern them for all times to come and
that the words and expressions used in the Constitution, in that sense, have no
fixed meaning and must receive interpretation based on the experience of the
people in the course of working of the Constitution. The same thing cannot be
said in relation to interpreting the words and expressions in a statute.” (at
pages 114-116) 63. To similar effect is the judgment of a 9-Judge Bench in I.R.
Coelho (dead) by LRs v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (2007) 2 SCC 1, which
states: “42. The Constitution is a living document. The constitutional
provisions have to be construed having regard to the march of time and the
development of law. It is, therefore, necessary that while construing the
doctrine of basic structure due regard be had to various decisions which led to
expansion and development of the law.” (at page 79) 64. It is in this
background that the fundamental rights chapter has been interpreted. We may
also refer to paragraph 19 in M. Nagaraj & Ors. v. Union of India &
Ors., (2006) 8 SCC 212, for the proposition that any true interpretation of
fundamental rights must be expansive, like the universe in which we live. 78
The content of fundamental rights keeps expanding to keep pace with human
activity. 65. It is as a result of constitutional interpretation that after
Maneka Gandhi (supra), Article 21 has been the repository of a vast multitude
of human rights8 . 66. In India, therefore, the doctrine of originalism, which
was referred to and relied upon by Shri Sundaram has no place. According to
this doctrine, the first inquiry to be made is 8 (1) The right to go abroad.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 at paras 5, 48, 90, 171 and
216; (2) The right of prisoners against bar fetters. Charles Sobraj v. Delhi
Administration (1978) 4 SCC 494 at paras 192, 197-B, 234 and 241; (3) The right
to legal aid. M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra (1978) 3 SCC 544 at para 12;
(4) The right to bail. Babu Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1978) 1 SCC 579 at
para 8; (5) The right to live with dignity. Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of
Cochin (1980) 2 SCC 360 at para 10; (6) The right against handcuffing. Prem
Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration (1980) 3 SCC 526 at paras 21 and 22; (7)
The right against custodial violence. Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra
(1983) 2 SCC 96 at para 1; (8) The right to compensation for unlawful arrest.
Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 141 at para 10; (9) The right to earn
a livelihood. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545 at
para 37; (10) The right to know. Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of
Indian Express Newspapers (1988) 4 SCC 592 at para 34; (11) The right against
public hanging. A.G. of India v. Lachma Devi (1989) Supp (1) SCC 264 at para 1;
(12) The right to doctor’s assistance at government hospitals. Paramanand
Katara v. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 286 at para 8; (13) The right to medical
care. Paramanand Katara v. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 286 at para 8; (14) The
right to shelter. Shantistar Builders v. N.K. Totame (1990) 1 SCC 520 at para 9
and 13; (15) The right to pollution free water and air. Subhash Kumar v. State
of Bihar (1991) 1 SCC 598 at para 7; (16) The right to speedy trial. A.R.
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225 at para 86; (17) The right against
illegal detention. Joginder Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1994) 4 SCC 260 at
paras 20 and 21; (18) The right to a healthy environment. Virender Gaur v.
State of Haryana (1995) 2 SCC 577 at para 7; (19) The right to health and
medical care for workers. Consumer Education and Research Centre v. Union of
India (1995) 3 SCC 42 at paras 24 and 25; (20) The right to a clean
environment. Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 647
at paras 13, 16 and 17; (21) The right against sexual harassment. Vishaka and
others v. State of Rajasthan and others (1997) 6 SCC 241 at paras 3 and 7; (22)
The right against noise pollution. In Re, Noise Pollution (2005) 5 SCC 733 at
para 117; (23) The right to fair trial. Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & Anr. v.
State of Gujarat & Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 374 at paras 36 and 38; (24) The right
to sleep. In Re, Ramlila Maidan Incident (2012) 5 SCC 1 at paras 311 and 318;
(25) The right to reputation. Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2013) 10
SCC 591 at para 18; (26) The right against solitary confinement. Shatrugan
Chauhan & Anr. v. Union of India (2014) 3 SCC 1 at para 241. 79 whether the
founding fathers had accepted or rejected a particular right in the
Constitution. According to the learned Attorney General and Shri Sundaram, the
right to privacy has been considered and expressly rejected by our founding
fathers. At the second level, according to this doctrine, it is not open to the
Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution in a manner that will give effect
to a right that has been rejected by the founding fathers. This can only be
done by amending the Constitution. It was, therefore, urged that it was not
open for us to interpret the fundamental rights chapter in such a manner as to
introduce a fundamental right to privacy, when the founding fathers had
rejected the same. It is only the Parliament in its constituent capacity that
can introduce such a right. This contention must be rejected having regard to
the authorities cited above. Further, in our Constitution, it is not left to
all the three organs of the State to interpret the Constitution. When a
substantial question as to the interpretation of the Constitution arises, it is
this Court and this Court alone under Article 145(3) that is to decide what the
interpretation of the Constitution shall 80 be, and for this purpose the
Constitution entrusts this task to a minimum of 5 Judges of this Court. 67.
Does a fundamental right to privacy reside primarily in Article 21 read with
certain other fundamental rights? 68. At this point, it is important to advert
to the U.S. Supreme Court’s development of the right of privacy. The earlier
cases tended to see the right of privacy as a property right as they were part
of what was called the ‘Lochner era’ during which the doctrine of substantive
due process elevated property rights over societal interests9 . Thus in an
early case, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 at 474, 478 and 479 (1928),
the majority of the Court held that wiretaps attached to telephone wires on
public streets did not constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment since
there was no physical entry into any house or office of the defendants. In a
classic dissenting judgment, Louis Brandeis, J. held that this 9 This era
lasted from the early 20th Century till 1937, when the proverbial switch in
time that saved nine was made by Justice Roberts. It was only from 1937 onwards
that President Roosevelt’s New Deal legislations were upheld by a majority of
5:4, having been struck down by a majority of 5:4 previously. 81 was too narrow
a construction of the Fourth Amendment and said in words that were futuristic
that: “Moreover, “in the application of a constitution, our contemplation
cannot be only of what has been but of what may be.” The progress of science in
furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with
wiretapping. Ways may someday be developed by which the Government, without
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which
it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the
home. Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring
unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. “That places the liberty of every
man in the hands of every petty officer” was said by James Otis of much lesser
intrusions than these. To Lord Camden, a far slighter intrusion seemed
“subversive of all the comforts of society.” Can it be that the Constitution
affords no protection against such invasions of individual security?” 69. Also
in a ringing declaration of the right to privacy, that great Judge borrowed
from his own co-authored article, written almost 40 years earlier, in order to
state that the right of privacy is a constitutionally protected right: “The
protection guaranteed by the Amendments is much broader in scope. The makers of
our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his
feelings, and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain,
pleasure and 82 satisfaction of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to
be let alone – the most comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual whatever the means employed, must
be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a
criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a
violation of the Fifth.” Brandeis, J.’s view was held as being the correct view
of the law in Katz (supra). 70. A large number of judgments of the U.S. Supreme
Court since Katz (supra) have recognized the right to privacy as falling in one
or other of the clauses of the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution. Thus,
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Douglas, J.’s majority opinion
found that the right to privacy was contained in the penumbral regions of the
First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Goldberg,
J. found this right to be embedded in the Ninth Amendment which states that
certain rights which are not enumerated are nonetheless recognized as being reserved
to the people. White, J. found this right in the due process clause 83 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits the deprivation of a person’s liberty
without following due process. This view of the law was recognized and applied
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in which a woman’s right to choose for
herself whether or not to abort a fetus was established, until the fetus was
found “viable”. Other judgments also recognized this right of independence of
choice in personal decisions relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967); procreation, Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113-1114, 86 L.Ed. 1655
(1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-454, 92 S.Ct.
1029, 1038-1039, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972), family relationships, Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944); and
child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535,
45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925). 71. In a recent decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), the U.S. Supreme
Court’s majority judgment traces the right of privacy through the 84 labyrinth
of case law in Part II of Scalia, J.’s opinion, and regards it as a
constitutionally protected right. 72. Based upon the prevalent thinking of the
U.S. Supreme Court, a seminal judgment was delivered by Mathew, J. in Gobind
(supra). This judgment dealt with the M.P. Police Regulations, similar to the
Police Regulations contained in Kharak Singh (supra). After setting out the
majority and minority opinions in the said judgment, Mathew, J. went on to
discuss the U.S. Supreme Court judgments in Griswold (supra) and Roe (supra).
In a very instructive passage the learned Judge held: “22. There can be no
doubt that privacy-dignity claims deserve to be examined with care and to be
denied only when an important countervailing interest is shown to be superior.
If the Court does find that a claimed right is entitled to protection as a
fundamental privacy right, a law infringing it must satisfy the compelling
State interest test. Then the question would be whether a State interest is of
such paramount importance as would justify an infringement of the right.
Obviously, if the enforcement of morality were held to be a compelling as well
as a permissible State interest, the characterization of a claimed right as a
fundamental privacy right would be of far less significance. The question
whether enforcement of morality is a State interest sufficient to justify the
infringement of a fundamental privacy right need not 85 be considered for the
purpose of this case and therefore we refuse to enter the controversial thicket
whether enforcement of morality is a function of State. 23. Individual
autonomy, perhaps the central concern of any system of limited government, is
protected in part under our Constitution by explicit constitutional guarantees.
In the application of the Constitution our contemplation cannot only be of what
has been but what may be. Time works changes and brings into existence new
conditions. Subtler and far reaching means of invading privacy will make it
possible to be heard in the street what is whispered in the closet. Yet, too
broad a definition of privacy raises serious questions about the propriety of
judicial reliance on a right that is not explicit in the Constitution. Of
course, privacy primarily concerns the individuals. It therefore relates to and
overlaps with the concept of liberty. The most serious advocate of privacy must
confess that there are serious problems of defining the essence and scope of
the right. Privacy interest in autonomy must also be placed in the context of
other rights and values. 24. Any right to privacy must encompass and protect
the personal intimacies of the home, the family marriage, motherhood,
procreation and child rearing. This catalogue approach to the question is
obviously not as instructive as it does not give analytical picture of
distinctive characteristics of the right of privacy. Perhaps, the only
suggestion that can be offered as unifying principle underlying the concept has
been the assertion that a claimed right must be a fundamental right implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty. 27. There are two possible theories for
protecting privacy of home. The first is that activities in the 86 home harm
others only to the extent that they cause offence resulting from the mere
thought that individuals might be engaging in such activities and that such
‘harm’ is not constitutionally protectable by the State. The second is that
individuals need a place of sanctuary where they can be free from societal
control. The importance of such a sanctuary is that individuals can drop the
mask, desist for a while from projecting on the world the image they want to be
accepted as themselves, an image that may reflect the values of their peers
rather than the realities of their natures. 28. The right to privacy in any
event will necessarily have to go through a process of caseby-case development.
Therefore, even assuming that the right to personal liberty, the right to move
freely throughout the territory of India and the freedom of speech create an
independent right of privacy as an emanation from them which one can characterize
as a fundamental right, we do not think that the right is absolute.” (at pages
155-157) The Police Regulations were, however, not struck down, but were termed
as being perilously close to being unconstitutional. 73. Shri Sundaram has
brought to our notice the fact that Mathew, J. did not declare privacy as a
fundamental right. By this judgment, he reached certain conclusions on the
assumption that it was a fundamental right. He is correct in this submission.
However, this would not take the matter very 87 much further inasmuch as even
though the later judgments have referred to Gobind (supra) as the starting
point of the fundamental right to privacy, in our view, for the reasons given
by us in this judgment, even dehors Gobind (supra) these cases can be supported
on the ground that there exists a fundamental right to privacy. 74. In R.
Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 6 SCC 632, this Court had to decide on
the rights of privacy vis-a-vis the freedom of the press, and in so doing,
referred to a large number of judgments and arrived at the following
conclusion: “26. We may now summarise the broad principles flowing from the
above discussion: (1) The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and
liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a
“right to be let alone”. A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his
own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, childbearing and education
among other matters. None can publish anything concerning the above matters
without his consent—whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or
critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right to privacy of the
person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages. Position may,
however, be different, if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy
or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy. 88 (2) The rule aforesaid is
subject to the exception, that any publication concerning the aforesaid aspects
becomes unobjectionable if such publication is based upon public records
including court records. This is for the reason that once a matter becomes a
matter of public record, the right to privacy no longer subsists and it becomes
a legitimate subject for comment by press and media among others. We are,
however, of the opinion that in the interests of decency [Article 19(2)] an
exception must be carved out to this rule, viz., a female who is the victim of
a sexual assault, kidnap, abduction or a like offence should not further be
subjected to the indignity of her name and the incident being publicised in
press/media. (3) There is yet another exception to the rule in (1)
above—indeed, this is not an exception but an independent rule. In the case of
public officials, it is obvious, right to privacy, or for that matter, the
remedy of action for damages is simply not available with respect to their acts
and conduct relevant to the discharge of their official duties. This is so even
where the publication is based upon facts and statements which are not true, unless
the official establishes that the publication was made (by the defendant) with
reckless disregard for truth. In such a case, it would be enough for the
defendant (member of the press or media) to prove that he acted after a
reasonable verification of the facts; it is not necessary for him to prove that
what he has written is true. Of course, where the publication is proved to be
false and actuated by malice or personal animosity, the defendant would have no
defence and would be liable for damages. It is equally obvious that in matters
not relevant to the discharge of his duties, the public official enjoys the
same protection as any other citizen, as explained in (1) and (2) above. It
needs no reiteration that judiciary, which is protected by the 89 power to
punish for contempt of court and Parliament and legislatures protected as their
privileges are by Articles 105 and 104 respectively of the Constitution of
India, represent exceptions to this rule. (4) So far as the Government, local
authority and other organs and institutions exercising governmental power are
concerned, they cannot maintain a suit for damages for defaming them. (5) Rules
3 and 4 do not, however, mean that Official Secrets Act, 1923, or any similar
enactment or provision having the force of law does not bind the press or
media. (6) There is no law empowering the State or its officials to prohibit,
or to impose a prior restraint upon the press/media.”10 (at pages 649-651) 75.
Similarly, in PUCL v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301, this Court dealt with
telephone tapping as follows: “17. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding
that right to privacy is a part of the right to “life” and “personal liberty”
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. Once the facts in a given case
constitute a right to privacy, Article 21 is attracted. The said right cannot
be curtailed “except according to procedure established by law”. 18. The right
to privacy—by itself—has not been identified under the Constitution. As a
concept it may be too broad and moralistic to define it judicially. Whether
right to privacy can be claimed or has been infringed in a given case would
depend on 10 It will be noticed that this judgment grounds the right of privacy
in Article 21. However, the Court was dealing with the aforesaid right not in
the context of State action, but in the context of press freedom. 90 the facts
of the said case. But the right to hold a telephone conversation in the privacy
of one’s home or office without interference can certainly be claimed as “right
to privacy”. Conversations on the telephone are often of an intimate and
confidential character. Telephone conversation is a part of modern man’s life.
It is considered so important that more and more people are carrying mobile
telephone instruments in their pockets. Telephone conversation is an important
facet of a man’s private life. Right to privacy would certainly include
telephone conversation in the privacy of one’s home or office.
Telephone-tapping would, thus, infract Article 21 of the Constitution of India
unless it is permitted under the procedure established by law.” (at page 311)
The Court then went on to apply Article 17 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 1966 which recognizes the right to privacy and also
referred to Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 which
is in the same terms. It then imported these international law concepts to
interpret Article 21 in accordance with these concepts. 76. In Sharda v.
Dharmpal (supra), this Court was concerned with whether a medical examination
could be ordered by a Court in a divorce proceeding. After referring to some of
the judgments of this Court and the U.K. Courts, this Court held: 91 “81. To
sum up, our conclusions are: 1. A matrimonial court has the power to order a
person to undergo medical test. 2. Passing of such an order by the court would
not be in violation of the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the
Indian Constitution. 3. However, the court should exercise such a power if the
applicant has a strong prima facie case and there is sufficient material before
the court. If despite the order of the court, the respondent refuses to submit
himself to medical examination, the court will be entitled to draw an adverse
inference against him.” (at page 524) In Canara Bank (supra), this Court struck
down Section 73 of the Andhra Pradesh Stamp Act, as it concluded that the
involuntary impounding of documents under the said provision would be violative
of the fundamental right of privacy contained in Article 21. The Court
exhaustively went into the issue and cited many U.K. and U.S. judgments. After
so doing, it analysed some of this Court’s judgments and held: “53. Once we
have accepted in Gobind [(1975) 2 SCC 148 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 468] and in later
cases that the right to privacy deals with “persons and not places”, the
documents or copies of documents of the customer which are in a bank, must
continue to remain confidential vis-a-vis the person, even if they are no
longer at the customer’s house and have been voluntarily sent to a bank. If
that be the correct 92 view of the law, we cannot accept the line of Miller,
425 US 435 (1976), in which the Court proceeded on the basis that the right to
privacy is referable to the right of “property” theory. Once that is so, then
unless there is some probable or reasonable cause or reasonable basis or
material before the Collector for reaching an opinion that the documents in the
possession of the bank tend to secure any duty or to prove or to lead to the
discovery of any fraud or omission in relation to any duty, the search or
taking notes or extracts therefore, cannot be valid. The above safeguards must
necessarily be read into the provision relating to search and inspection and
seizure so as to save it from any unconstitutionality. 56. In Smt. Maneka
Gandhi vs. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, a seven-Judge Bench decision, P.N.
Bhagwati, J. (as His Lordship then was) held that the expression “personal
liberty” in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of
rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man and some of them have
been raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights and given additional
protection under Article 19 (emphasis supplied). Any law interfering with
personal liberty of a person must satisfy a triple test: (i) it must prescribe
a procedure; (ii) the procedure must withstand the test of one or more of the
fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 which may be applicable in a
given situation; and (iii) it must also be liable to be tested with reference
to Article 14. As the test propounded by Article 14 pervades Article 21 as
well, the law and procedure authorizing interference with personal liberty and
right of privacy must also be right and just and fair and not arbitrary,
fanciful or oppressive. If the procedure prescribed does not satisfy the
requirement of Article 14 it would be no procedure at all within the meaning of
Article 21.” (at pages 523 and 524) 93 In Selvi v. State of Karnataka (supra),
this Court went into an in depth analysis of the right in the context of lie
detector tests used to detect alleged criminals. A number of judgments of this
Court were examined and this Court, recognizing the difference between privacy
in a physical sense and the privacy of one’s mental processes, held that both
received constitutional protection. This was stated in the following words:
“224. Moreover, a distinction must be made between the character of restraints
placed on the right to privacy. While the ordinary exercise of police powers
contemplates restraints of a physical nature such as the extraction of bodily
substances and the use of reasonable force for subjecting a person to a medical
examination, it is not viable to extend these police powers to the forcible
extraction of testimonial responses. In conceptualising the “right to privacy”
we must highlight the distinction between privacy in a physical sense and the
privacy of one’s mental processes. 225. So far, the judicial understanding of
privacy in our country has mostly stressed on the protection of the body and
physical spaces from intrusive actions by the State. While the scheme of
criminal procedure as well as evidence law mandates interference with physical
privacy through statutory provisions that enable arrest, detention, search and
seizure among others, the same cannot be the basis for compelling a person “to
impart personal knowledge about a relevant fact”. The theory of
interrelationship of rights mandates that the right against self-incrimination
should also be read as a 94 component of “personal liberty” under Article 21.
Hence, our understanding of the “right to privacy” should account for its
intersection with Article 20(3). Furthermore, the “rule against involuntary
confessions” as embodied in Sections 24, 25, 26 and 27 of the Evidence Act,
1872 seeks to serve both the objectives of reliability as well as voluntariness
of testimony given in a custodial setting. A conjunctive reading of Articles
20(3) and 21 of the Constitution along with the principles of evidence law
leads us to a clear answer. We must recognise the importance of personal
autonomy in aspects such as the choice between remaining silent and speaking.
An individual’s decision to make a statement is the product of a private choice
and there should be no scope for any other individual to interfere with such
autonomy, especially in circumstances where the person faces exposure to
criminal charges or penalties.” (at pages 369-370) 77. All this leads to a
discussion on what exactly is the fundamental right of privacy – where does it
fit in Chapter III of the Constitution, and what are the parameters of its
constitutional protection. 78. In an instructive article reported in Volume 64
of the California Law Review, written in 1976, Gary L. Bostwick suggested that
the right to privacy in fact encompasses three separate and distinct rights.
According to the learned author, these three components are the components of
repose, 95 sanctuary, and intimate decision. The learned author puts it thus
(at pages 1482-1483):- “The extent of constitutional protection is not the only
distinction between the types of privacy. Each zone protects a unique type of
human transaction. Repose maintains the actor’s peace; sanctuary allows an
individual to keep some things private, and intimate decision grants the
freedom to act in an autonomous fashion. Whenever a generalized claim to
privacy is put forward without distinguishing carefully between the
transactional types, parties and courts alike may become hopelessly muddled in
obscure claims. The clear standards that appear within each zone are frequently
ignored by claimants anxious to retain some aspect of their personal liberty
and by courts impatient with the indiscriminate invocation of privacy. Finally,
it should be recognized that the right of privacy is a continually evolving
right. This Comment has attempted to show what findings of fact will lead to
the legal conclusion that a person has a right to privacy. Yet the same
findings of fact may lead to different conclusions of law as time passes and
society’s ideas change about how much privacy is reasonable and what kinds of
decisions are best left to individual choice. Future litigants must look to
such changes in community concerns and national acceptance of ideas as
harbingers of corresponding changes in the contours of the zones of privacy.”
79. Shortly thereafter, in 1977, an instructive judgment is to be found in
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 at 598 and 599 by the U.S. Supreme Court. This case
dealt with a legislation by 96 the State of New York in which the State, in a
centralized computer file, registered the names and addresses of all persons
who have obtained, pursuant to a Doctor’s prescription, certain drugs for which
there is both a lawful and unlawful market. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
statute, finding that it would seem clear that the State’s vital interest in
controlling the distribution of dangerous drugs would support the legislation
at hand. In an instructive footnote – 23 to the judgment, the U.S. Supreme
Court found that the right to privacy was grounded after Roe (supra) in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty. Having thus grounded the
right, the U.S. Supreme Court in a very significant passage stated: “At the
very least, it would seem clear that the State’s vital interest in controlling
the distribution of dangerous drugs would support a decision to experiment with
new techniques for control… …Appellees contend that the statute invades a
constitutionally protected “zone of privacy.” The cases sometimes characterized
as protecting “privacy” have in fact involved at least two different kinds of
interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions.” 97 80. In fact, in the Constitution of South Africa of
1996, which Constitution was framed after apartheid was thrown over by the
South African people, the right to privacy has been expressly declared as a
fundamental freedom as follows: “10. Human dignity Everyone has inherent
dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected. 12.
Freedom and security of the person (1) Everyone has the right to freedom and
security of the person, which includes the right— (a) not to be deprived of
freedom arbitrarily or without just cause; (b) not to be detained without
trial; (c) to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private
sources; (d) not to be tortured in any way; and (e) not to be treated or
punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. (2) Everyone has the right to
bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right— (a) to make
decisions concerning reproduction; (b) to security in and control over their
body; and (c) not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without
their informed consent. 14. Privacy Everyone has the right to privacy, which
includes the right not to have— 98 (a) their person or home searched; (b) their
property searched; (c) their possessions seized; or (d) the privacy of their
communications infringed.” The Constitutional Court of South Africa in NM &
Ors. v. Smith & Ors., 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC), had this to say about the
fundamental right to privacy recognized by the South African Constitution:
“131. The right to privacy recognizes the importance of protecting the sphere
of our personal daily lives from the public. In so doing, it highlights the
inter-relationship between privacy, liberty and dignity as the key
constitutional rights which construct our understanding of what it means to be
a human being. All these rights are therefore interdependent and mutually
reinforcing. We value privacy for this reason at least – that the
constitutional conception of being a human being asserts and seeks to foster
the possibility of human beings choosing how to live their lives within the
overall framework of a broader community. The protection of this autonomy,
which flows from our recognition of individual human worth, presupposes
personal space within which to live this life. 132. This first reason for
asserting the value of privacy therefore lies in our constitutional
understanding of what it means to be a human being. An implicit part of this
aspect of privacy is the right to choose what personal information of ours is
released into the public space. The more 99 intimate that information, the more
important it is in fostering privacy, dignity and autonomy that an individual
makes the primary decision whether to release the information. That decision
should not be made by others. This aspect of the right to privacy must be
respected by all of us, not only the state...” (Emphasis Supplied) 81. In the
Indian context, a fundamental right to privacy would cover at least the
following three aspects: • Privacy that involves the person i.e. when there is
some invasion by the State of a person’s rights relatable to his physical body,
such as the right to move freely; • Informational privacy which does not deal
with a person’s body but deals with a person’s mind, and therefore recognizes
that an individual may have control over the dissemination of material that is
personal to him. Unauthorised use of such information may, therefore lead to
infringement of this right; and • The privacy of choice, which protects an
individual’s autonomy over fundamental personal choices. For instance, we can
ground physical privacy or privacy relating to the body in Articles 19(1)(d)
and (e) read with Article 21; 100 ground personal information privacy under
Article 21; and the privacy of choice in Articles 19(1)(a) to (c), 20(3), 21
and 25. The argument based on ‘privacy’ being a vague and nebulous concept need
not, therefore, detain us. 82. We have been referred to the Preamble of the
Constitution, which can be said to reflect core constitutional values. The core
value of the nation being democratic, for example, would be hollow unless
persons in a democracy are able to develop fully in order to make informed
choices for themselves which affect their daily lives and their choice of how
they are to be governed. 83. In his well-known thesis “On Liberty”, John Stuart
Mill, as far back as in 1859, had this to say: “…. the sole end for which
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number, is selfprotection. That the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to
do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to
do so would be wise, or even right. These are good 101 reasons for remonstrating
with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not
for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To
justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be
calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of any
one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the
part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. (…)
This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first,
the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience in the most
comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of
opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific,
moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may
seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the
conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as
much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on
the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle
requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to
suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as
may follow: without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do
does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish,
perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the
liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to
unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being
supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived. 102 No society in which
these liberties are not, on the whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its
form or government; and none is completely free in which they do not exist
absolute and unqualified. The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of
pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive
others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.” Noting the importance
of liberty to individuality, Mill wrote: “It is not by wearing down into
uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it, and
calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of
others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation;
and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by the same
process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and animating, furnishing
more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and
strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race, by making the
race infinitely better worth belonging to. In proportion to the development of
his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is
therefore capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fullness
of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there
is more in the mass which is composed of them….. The means of development which
the individual loses by being prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the
injury of others, are chiefly obtained at the expense of the development of
other people…. To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others,
develops the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for their
object. But to be restrained in things not affecting their good, by their mere
displeasure, develops nothing valuable, except such force of character as may
unfold itself in resisting the restraint. If acquiesced in, it dulls 103 and
blunts the whole nature. To give any fair play to the nature of each, it is
essential that different persons should be allowed to lead different lives.”
(Emphasis Supplied) 84. “Liberty” in the Preamble to the Constitution, is said
to be of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship. This cardinal value
can be found strewn all over the fundamental rights chapter. It can be found in
Articles 19(1)(a), 20, 21, 25 and 26. As is well known, this cardinal
constitutional value has been borrowed from the Declaration of the Rights of
Man and of the Citizen of 1789, which defined “liberty” in Article 4 as
follows: “Liberty consists in being able to do anything that does not harm
others: thus, the exercise of the natural rights of every man has no bounds
other than those that ensure to the other members of society the enjoyment of
these same rights. These bounds may be determined only by Law.” Even in this
limited sense, privacy begins where liberty ends – when others are harmed, in
one sense, issues relating to reputation, restraints on physical locomotion etc.
set in. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the argument of Shri Gopal 104
Subramanium that “liberty” and “privacy” are interchangeable concepts. Equally,
it is difficult to accept the Respondents’ submission that there is no concept
of “privacy”, but only the constitutional concept of “ordered liberty”.
Arguments of both sides on this score must, therefore, be rejected. 85. But
most important of all is the cardinal value of fraternity which assures the
dignity of the individual.11 The dignity of the individual encompasses the
right of the individual to develop to the full extent of his potential. And
this development can only be if an individual has autonomy over fundamental
personal choices and control over dissemination of personal information which
may be infringed through an unauthorized use of such information. It is clear
that Article 21, more than any of the other Articles in the fundamental rights
chapter, reflects each of 11 In 1834, Jacques-Charles Dupont de l’Eure
associated the three terms liberty, equality and fraternity together in the
Revue Républicaine, which he edited, as follows: “Any man aspires to liberty,
to equality, but he cannot achieve it without the assistance of other men,
without fraternity.” Many of our decisions recognize human dignity as being an
essential part of the fundamental rights chapter. For example, see Prem Shankar
Shukla v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 3 SCC 526 at paragraph 21, Francis
Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi & Ors., (1981) 1
SCC 608 at paragraphs 6, 7 and 8, Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India,
(1984) 3 SCC 161 at paragraph 10, Maharashtra University of Health Sciences v.
Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal, (2010) 3 SCC 786 at paragraph 37, Shabnam v. Union
of India, (2015) 6 SCC 702 at paragraphs 12.4 and 14 and Jeeja Ghosh v. Union
of India, (2016) 7 SCC 761 at paragraph 37. 105 these constitutional values in
full, and is to be read in consonance with these values and with the
international covenants that we have referred to. In the ultimate analysis, the
fundamental right of privacy, which has so many developing facets, can only be
developed on a case to case basis. Depending upon the particular facet that is
relied upon, either Article 21 by itself or in conjunction with other fundamental
rights would get attracted. 86. But this is not to say that such a right is
absolute. This right is subject to reasonable regulations made by the State to
protect legitimate State interests or public interest. However, when it comes
to restrictions on this right, the drill of various Articles to which the right
relates must be scrupulously followed. For example, if the restraint on privacy
is over fundamental personal choices that an individual is to make, State
action can be restrained under Article 21 read with Article 14 if it is
arbitrary and unreasonable; and under Article 21 read with Article 19(1) (a)
only if it relates to the subjects mentioned in Article 19(2) and the tests
laid down by this Court for such legislation or subordinate legislation to pass
muster under the 106 said Article. Each of the tests evolved by this Court, qua
legislation or executive action, under Article 21 read with Article 14; or
Article 21 read with Article 19(1)(a) in the aforesaid examples must be met in
order that State action pass muster. In the ultimate analysis, the balancing
act that is to be carried out between individual, societal and State interests
must be left to the training and expertise of the judicial mind. 87. It is
important to advert to one other interesting argument made on the side of the
petitioner. According to the petitioners, even in British India, the right to
privacy was always legislatively recognized. We were referred to the Indian
Telegraph Act of 1885, vintage and in particular Section 5 thereof which reads
as under:- “5. (1) On the occurrence of any public emergency, or in the
interest of the public safety, the Governor General in Council or a Local
Government, or any officer specially authorized in this behalf by the Governor
General in Council, may– (a) take temporary possession of any telegraph
established, maintained or worked by any person licensed under this Act; or (b)
order that any message or class of messages to or from any person or class of
persons, or 107 relating to any particular subject, brought for transmission by
or transmitted or received by any telegraph, shall not be transmitted, or shall
be intercepted or detained, or shall be disclosed to the Government or an
officer thereof mentioned in the order. (2) If any doubt arises as to the
existence of a public emergency, or whether any act done under sub-section (1)
was in the interest of the public safety, a certificate signed by a Secretary
to the Government of India or to the Local Government shall be conclusive proof
on the point.” We were also referred to Section 26 of the Indian Post Office
Act, 1898 for the same purpose. “26. Power to intercept postal articles for
public good.— (1) On the occurrence of any public emergency, or in the interest
of the public safety or tranquility, the Central Government, or a State
Government, or any officer specially authorized in this behalf by the Central
or the State Government may, by order in writing, direct that any postal
article or class or description of postal articles in course of transmission by
post shall be intercepted or detained, or shall be disposed of in such manner
as the authority issuing the order may direct. (2) If any doubt arises as to
the existence of a public emergency, or as to whether any act done under sub-section
(1) was in the interest of the public safety or tranquility, a certificate of
the Central Government or, as the case may be, of the State Government shall be
conclusive proof on the point.” 108 88. Coming to more recent times, the Right
to Information Act, 2005 in Section 8(1)(j) states as follows:- “8. Exemption
from disclosure of information.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this
Act, there shall be no obligation to give any citizen,— (a) to (i) xxx xxx xxx
(j) information which relates to personal information the disclosure of which
has not relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause
unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual unless the Central Public
Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the appellate
authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that the larger public interest
justifies the disclosure of such information: Provided that the information,
which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied
to any person.” It will be noticed that in this statutory provision, the
expression “privacy of the individual” is specifically mentioned. In an
illuminating judgment, reported as Thalappalam Service Co-operative Bank
Limited & Ors., v. State of Kerala & Ors., (2013) 16 SCC 82, this Court
dealt with the right to information as a facet of the freedom of speech
guaranteed to every individual. In certain instructive passages, this Court
held: 109 “57. The right to privacy is also not expressly guaranteed under the
Constitution of India. However, the Privacy Bill, 2011 to provide for the right
to privacy to citizens of India and to regulate the collection, maintenance and
dissemination of their personal information and for penalization for violation
of such rights and matters connected therewith, is pending. In several
judgments including Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. (AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1963) 2
Cri LJ 329), R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N. (1994) 6 SCC 632, People’s Union for
Civil Liberties v. Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 301 and State of Maharashtra v.
Bharat Shanti Lal Shah (2008) 13 SCC 5, this Court has recognized the right to
privacy as a fundamental right emanating from Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. 58. The right to privacy is also recognized as a basic human right under
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Act, 1948, which states
as follows: “12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, not to attack upon his honour and
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.” 59. Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights Act, 1966, to which India is a party also protects that
right and states as follows: “17. (1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home and correspondence nor to
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.” 110 60. This Court in R.
Rajagopal, (1994) 6 SCC 632 held as follows: (SCC pp. 649-50, para 26) “(1)…
The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to
the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a ‘right to be let alone’. A
citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage,
procreation, motherhood, child bearing and education among other matters.” 62.
The public authority also is not legally obliged to give or provide information
even if it is held, or under its control, if that information falls under clause
(j) of sub-section (1) of Section 8. Section 8(1)(j) is of considerable
importance so far as this case is concerned, hence given below, for ready
reference:- “8. Exemption from disclosure of information – (1) Notwithstanding
anything contained in this Act, there shall be no obligation to give any
citizen – (a) to (i) xxx xxx xxx (j) information which relates to personal
information the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity
or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the
individual unless the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public
Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may be, is
satisfied that the larger public interest 111 justifies the disclosure of such
information: Provided that the information which cannot be denied to Parliament
or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any person.” 63. Section 8 begins
with a non obstante clause, which gives that section an overriding effect, in
case of conflict, over the other provisions of the Act. Even if, there is any
indication to the contrary, still there is no obligation on the public
authority to give information to any citizen of what has been mentioned in
clauses (a) to (j). The public authority, as already indicated, cannot access
all the information from a private individual, but only those information which
he is legally obliged to pass on to a public authority by law, and also only
those information to which the public authority can have access in accordance with
law. Even those information, if personal in nature, can be made available only
subject to the limitations provided in Section 8(j) of the RTI Act. Right to be
left alone, as propounded in Olmstead v. United States [72 L Ed 944 : 277 US
438 (1928)], is the most comprehensive of the rights and most valued by
civilized man. 64. Recognizing the fact that the right to privacy is a
sacrosanct facet of Article 21 of the Constitution, the legislation has put a
lot of safeguards to protect the rights under Section 8(j), as already
indicated. If the information sought for is personal and has no relationship
with any public activity or interest or it will not subserve larger public
interest, the public authority or the officer concerned is not legally obliged
to provide those information. Reference may be made to a recent judgment of
this Court in Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information Commissioner
(2013) 1 SCC 212, 112 wherein this Court held that since there is no bona fide
public interest in seeking information, the disclosure of said information
would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of the individual under Section
8(1)(j) of the Act. Further, if the authority finds that information sought for
can be made available in the larger public interest, then the officer should
record his reasons in writing before providing the information, because the
person from whom information is sought for, has also a right to privacy
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.” (at page 112-114) 89. There
can be no doubt that counsel for the petitioners are right in their submission
that the legislature has also recognized the fundamental right of privacy and,
therefore, it is too late in the day to go back on this. Much water has indeed
flowed under the bridge since the decisions in M.P. Sharma (supra) and Kharak
Singh (supra). The Inalienable Nature of the Right to Privacy 90. Learned
counsel for the petitioners also referred to another important aspect of the
right of privacy. According to learned counsel for the petitioner this right is
a natural law right which is inalienable. Indeed, the reference order itself,
in paragraph 12, refers to this aspect of the fundamental right contained. It
was, therefore, argued before us that given the 113 international conventions
referred to hereinabove and the fact that this right inheres in every
individual by virtue of his being a human being, such right is not conferred by
the Constitution but is only recognized and given the status of being
fundamental. There is no doubt that the petitioners are correct in this
submission. However, one important road block in the way needs to be got over.
91. In Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. S.S. Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC
521, a Constitution Bench of this Court arrived at the conclusion (by majority)
that Article 21 is the sole repository of all rights to life and personal
liberty, and, when suspended, takes away those rights altogether. A remarkable
dissent was that of Khanna,J.12 12 Khanna, J. was in line to be Chief Justice of
India but was superseded because of this dissenting judgment. Nani Palkhivala
in an article written on this great Judge’s supersession ended with a poignant
sentence, “To the stature of such a man, the Chief Justiceship of India can add
nothing.” Seervai, in his monumental treatise “Constitutional Law of India” had
to this to say: “53. If in this Appendix the dissenting judgment of Khanna J.
has not been considered in detail, it is not for lack of admiration for the
judgment, or the courage which he showed in delivering it regardless of the
cost and consequences to himself. It cost him the Chief Justiceship of India,
but it gained for him universal esteem not only for his courage but also for
his inflexible judicial independence. If his judgment is not considered in
detail it is because under the theory of precedents which we have adopted, a
dissenting judgment, however valuable, does not lay down the law and the object
of a critical examination of the majority judgments in this Appendix was to
show that those judgments are untenable in law, productive of grave public
mischief and ought to be overruled at the earliest opportunity. The conclusion
which Justice Khanna has reached on the effect of the suspension of Article 21
is correct. His reminder that the rule of law did not merely mean giving effect
to an enacted law was timely, and was reinforced by his reference to the mass
murders of millions of Jews in Nazi concentration camps under an enacted law.
114 The learned Judge held:- “525. The effect of the suspension of the right to
move any court for the enforcement of the right conferred by Article 21, in my
opinion, is that when a petition is filed in a court, the court would have to
proceed upon the basis that no reliance can be placed upon that article for obtaining
relief from the court during the period of emergency. Question then arises as
to whether the rule that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty without the authority of law still survives during the period of
emergency despite the Presidential Order suspending the right to move any court
for the enforcement of the right contained in Article 21. The answer to this
question is linked with the answer to the question as to whether Article 21 is
the sole repository of the right to life and personal liberty. After giving the
matter my earnest consideration, I am of the opinion that Article 21 cannot be
considered to be the sole repository of the right to life and personal liberty.
The right to life and personal liberty is the most precious right of human
beings in civilised societies governed by the rule of law. Many modern
Constitutions incorporate certain fundamental rights, including the one
relating to personal freedom. According to Blackstone, the absolute rights of
Englishmen were the rights of personal security, personal liberty and private
property. The American Declaration of Independence (1776) states that all men
are created equal, and among their inalienable rights are life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness. The Second Amendment to the US Constitution refers
inter alia to security of person, while the Fifth Amendment prohibits inter
alia deprivation of life However, the legal analysis in this Chapter confirms
his conclusion though on different grounds from those which he has given.” (at
Appendix pg. 2229). 115 and liberty without due process, of law. The different
Declarations of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms have all laid stress upon
the sanctity of life and liberty. They have also given expression in varying
words to the principle that no one shall be derived of his life or liberty
without the authority of law. The International Commission of Jurists, which is
affiliated to UNESCO, has been attempting with, considerable success to give
material content to “the rule of law”, an expression used in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. One of its most notable achievements was the
Declaration of Delhi, 1959. This resulted from a Congress held in New Delhi
attended by jurists from more than 50 countries, and was based on a
questionnaire circulated to 75,000 lawyers. “Respect for the supreme value of
human personality” was stated to be the basis of all law (see page 21 of the
Constitutional and Administrative Law by O. Hood Phillips, 3rd Ed.). 531. I am
unable to subscribe to the view that when right to enforce the right under
Article 21 is suspended, the result would be that there would be no remedy
against deprivation of a person’s life or liberty by the State even though such
deprivation is without the authority of law or even in flagrant violation of
the provisions of law. The right not to be deprived of one’s life or liberty
without the authority of law was not the creation of the Constitution. Such
right existed before the Constitution came into force. The fact that the
framers of the Constitution made an aspect of such right a part of the
fundamental rights did not have the effect of exterminating the independent
identity of such right and of making Article 21 to be the sole repository of
that right. Its real effect was to ensure that a law under which a person can
be deprived of his life or personal liberty should prescribe a procedure for
such deprivation 116 or, according to the dictum laid down by Mukherjea, J. in
Gopalan’s case, such law should be a valid law not violative of fundamental
rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. Recognition as fundamental
right of one aspect of the preconstitutional right cannot have the effect of
making things less favourable so far as the sanctity of life and personal liberty
is concerned compared to the position if an aspect of such right had not been
recognised as fundamental right because of the vulnerability of fundamental
rights accruing from Article 359. I am also unable to agree that in view of the
Presidential Order in the matter of sanctity of life and liberty, things would
be worse off compared to the state of law as it existed before the coming into
force of the Constitution.” (at pages 747 and 751) 92. According to us this is
a correct enunciation of the law for the following reasons: (i) It is clear
that the international covenants and declarations to which India was a party,
namely, the 1948 Declaration and the 1966 Covenant both spoke of the right to
life and liberty as being “inalienable”. Given the fact that this has to be
read as being part of Article 21 by virtue of the judgments referred to supra,
it is clear that Article 21 would, therefore, not be the sole repository of
these human rights but only reflect the fact that they were 117 “inalienable”;
that they inhere in every human being by virtue of the person being a human
being; (ii) Secondly, developments after this judgment have also made it clear
that the majority judgments are no longer good law and that Khanna, J.’s
dissent is the correct version of the law. Section 2(1)(d) of the Protection of
Human Rights Act, 1993 recognises that the right to life, liberty, equality and
dignity referable to international covenants and enforceable by Courts in India
are “human rights”. And international covenants expressly state that these
rights are ‘inalienable’ as they inhere in persons because they are human
beings. In I.R. Coelho (supra), this Court noticed in paragraph 29 that, “The
decision in ADM Jabalpur, (1976) 2 SCC 521, about the restrictive reading of
the right to life and liberty stood impliedly overruled by various subsequent
decisions.”, and expressly held that these rights are natural rights that
inhere in human beings thus:- “61. The approach in the interpretation of
fundamental rights has been evidenced in a 118 recent case M. Nagaraj v. Union
of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212, in which the Court noted: “20. This principle of
interpretation is particularly apposite to the interpretation of fundamental
rights. It is a fallacy to regard fundamental rights as a gift from the State
to its citizens. Individuals possess basic human rights independently of any
constitution by reason of the basic fact that they are members of the human
race. These fundamental rights are important as they possess intrinsic value. Part
III of the Constitution does not confer fundamental rights. It confirms their
existence and gives them protection. Its purpose is to withdraw certain
subjects from the area of political controversy to place them beyond the reach
of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts. Every right has a content. Every foundational value is
put in Part III as a fundamental right as it has intrinsic value. The converse
does not apply. A right becomes a fundamental right because it has foundational
value. Apart from the principles, one has also to see the structure of the
article in which the fundamental value is incorporated. Fundamental right is a
limitation on the power of the State. A Constitution, and in particular that of
it which protects and which entrenches fundamental rights and freedoms to which
all persons in the State are to be entitled is to be given a generous and
purposive construction. In Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [AIR 1962 SC
305 : (1962) 3 SCR 842], this Court has held that while considering the nature
and content of fundamental rights, the Court must not be too astute to
interpret the language in a literal sense so as to whittle them down. The Court
must interpret the Constitution in a 119 manner which would enable the citizens
to enjoy the rights guaranteed by it in the fullest measure. An instance of
literal and narrow interpretation of a vital fundamental right in the Indian
Constitution is the early decision of the Supreme Court in A.K. Gopalan v.
State of Madras [AIR 1950 SC 27 : 1950 SCR 88 : 1950 Cri LJ 1383]. Article 21
of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of his life and
personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. The Supreme
Court by a majority held that ‘procedure established by law’ means any
procedure established by law made by the Parliament or the legislatures of the
State. The Supreme Court refused to infuse the procedure with principles of
natural justice. It concentrated solely upon the existence of enacted law.
After three decades, the Supreme Court overruled its previous decision in A.K.
Gopalan [A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (AIR 1950 SC 27 : 1950 SCR 88 : 1950
Cri LJ 1383)] and held in its landmark judgment in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, that the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must
answer the test of reasonableness. The Court further held that the procedure
should also be in conformity with the principles of natural justice. This
example is given to demonstrate an instance of expansive interpretation of a
fundamental right. The expression ‘life’ in Article 21 does not connote merely
physical or animal existence. The right to life includes right to live with
human dignity. This Court has in numerous cases deduced fundamental features
which are not specifically mentioned in Part III on the principle that certain
unarticulated rights are implicit in the enumerated guarantees.” 120 (at pages
85-86) (iii) Seervai in a trenchant criticism of the majority judgment states
as follows: “30. The result of our discussion so far may be stated thus:
Article 21 does not confer a right to life or personal liberty: Article 21
assumes or recognizes the fact that those rights exist and affords protection
against the deprivation of those rights to the extent there provided. The
expression “procedure established by law” does not mean merely a procedural law
but must also include substantive laws. The word “law” must mean a valid law,
that is, a law within the legislative competence of the legislature enacting
it, which law does not violate the limitations imposed on legislative power by
fundamental rights. “Personal liberty” means the liberty of the person from
external restraint or coercion. Thus Article 21 protects life and personal
liberty by putting restrictions on legislative power, which under Articles 245
and 246 is subject to the provisions of “this Constitution”, and therefore
subject to fundamental rights. The precise nature of this protection is
difficult to state, first because among other things, such protection is
dependent on reading Article 21 along with other Articles conferring
fundamental rights, such as Articles 14, 20 and 22(1) and (2); and, secondly,
because fundamental rights from their very nature refer to ordinary laws which
deal with the subject matter of those rights. 31. The right to life and
personal liberty which inheres in the body of a living person is recognized and
protected not merely by 121 Article 21 but by the civil and criminal laws of
India, and it is unfortunate that in the Habeas Corpus Case this aspect of the
matter did not receive the attention which it deserved. Neither the
Constitution nor any law confers the right to life. That right arises from the
existence of a living human body. The most famous remedy for securing personal
liberty, the writ of habeas corpus, requires the production before the court of
the body of the person alleged to be illegally detained. The Constitution gives
protection against the deprivation of life and personal liberty; so do the
civil and criminal laws in force in India…” (See, Seervai, Constitutional Law
of India (4th Edition) Appendix pg. 2219). We are of the view that the
aforesaid statement made by the learned author reflects the correct position in
constitutional law. We, therefore, expressly overrule the majority judgments in
ADM Jabalpur (supra). 93. Before parting with this subject, we may only
indicate that the majority opinion was done away with by the Constitution’s
44th Amendment two years after the judgment was delivered. By that Amendment,
Article 359 was amended to state that where a proclamation of emergency is in
operation, the President may by order declare that the right to move any Court
for the enforcement of rights conferred by Part III of the 122 Constitution may
remain suspended for the period during which such proclamation is in force,
excepting Articles 20 and 21. On this score also, it is clear that the right of
privacy is an inalienable human right which inheres in every person by virtue
of the fact that he or she is a human being. Conclusion 94. This reference is
answered by stating that the inalienable fundamental right to privacy resides
in Article 21 and other fundamental freedoms contained in Part III of the
Constitution of India. M.P. Sharma (supra) and the majority in Kharak Singh
(supra), to the extent that they indicate to the contrary, stand overruled. The
later judgments of this Court recognizing privacy as a fundamental right do not
need to be revisited. These cases are, therefore, sent back for adjudication on
merits to the original Bench of 3 honourable Judges of this Court in light of
the judgment just delivered by us. …………………………......J. (R.F. Nariman) New Delhi;
August 24, 2017. 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 494 OF 2012 Justice K.S. Puttaswamy
(Retd.) & Anr. …….Petitioner (s) VERSUS Union of India & Ors.
…….Respondent(s) WITH T.C.(C) No. 151 of 2013 T.C.(C) No. 152 of 2013 W.P.(C)
No. 833 of 2013 W.P.(C) No. 829 of 2013 W.P.(C) No. 932 of 2013 Cont. Pet. (C)
No. 144 of 2014 IN W.P. (C) No. 494 of 2012 T.P. (C) No. 313 of 2014 T.P. (C)
No. 312 of 2014 2 S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 2524 of 2014 W.P. (C) No. 37 of 2015 W.P.
(C) No. 220 of 2015 Cont. Pet. (C) No. 674 of 2015 IN W.P. (C) No. 829 of 2013
T.P.(C) No. 921 of 2015 Cont. Pet. (C) No. 470 of 2015 IN W.P. (C) No. 494 of
2012 Cont. Pet. (C) No. 444 of 2016 IN W.P. (C) No. 494 of 2012 Cont. Pet. (C)
No. 608 of 2016 IN W.P. (C) No. 494 of 2012 W.P. (C) No. 797 of 2016 Cont. Pet.
(C) No. 844 of 2017 IN W.P. (C) No. 494 of 2012 W.P. (C) No. 342 of 2017 AND 3
W.P. (C) No. 372 of 2017 J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1) I have had
the benefit of reading the scholarly opinions of my esteemed learned brothers,
Justice J. Chelameswar, Justice S.A. Bobde, Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman and
Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud. Having read them carefully, I have nothing more
useful to add to the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by my esteemed
brothers in their respective opinions. 2) However, keeping in view the
importance of the questions referred to this Bench, I wish to add only few
words of concurrence of my own. 4 3) In substance, two questions were referred
to this Nine Judge Bench, first, whether the law laid down in the case of
M.P.Sharma and others vs. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate Delhi & Ors.,
AIR 1954 SC 300 and Kharak Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. AIR 1963
SC 1295 insofar as it relates to the "right to privacy of an individual”
is correct and second, whether "right to privacy" is a fundamental
right under Part III of the Constitution of India? 4) Before I examine these
two questions, it is apposite to take note of the Preamble to the Constitution,
which, in my view, has bearing on the questions referred. 5) The Preamble to
the Constitution reads as under:- “WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly
resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR 5 DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens: JUSTICE, social, economic and
political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY
of status and of opportunity; And to promote among them all FRATERNITY assuring
the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation;” 6)
Perusal of the words in the Preamble would go to show that every word used
therein was cautiously chosen by the founding fathers and then these words were
arranged and accordingly placed in a proper order. Every word incorporated in
the Preamble has significance and proper meaning. 7) The most important place
of pride was given to the "People of India" by using the expression,
WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, in the beginning of the Preamble. The Constitution was
accordingly adopted, enacted and then given to ourselves. 6 8) The keynote of
the Preamble was to lay emphasis on two positive aspects – one, "the Unity
of the Nation" and the second "Dignity of the individual". The
expression "Dignity" carried with it moral and spiritual imports. It
also implied an obligation on the part of the Union to respect the personality
of every citizen and create the conditions in which every citizen would be left
free to find himself/herself and attain selffulfillment. 9) The incorporation
of expression "Dignity of the individual" in the Preamble was aimed
essentially to show explicit repudiation of what people of this Country had
inherited from the past. Dignity of the individual was, therefore, always
considered the prime constituent of the fraternity, which assures the dignity
to every individual. Both expressions are interdependent and intertwined. 7 10)
In my view, unity and integrity of the Nation cannot survive unless the dignity
of every individual citizen is guaranteed. It is inconceivable to think of
unity and integration without the assurance to an individual to preserve his
dignity. In other words, regard and respect by every individual for the dignity
of the other one brings the unity and integrity of the Nation. 11) The
expressions "liberty“, "equality" and "fraternity"
incorporated in the Preamble are not separate entities. They have to be read in
juxtaposition while dealing with the rights of the citizens. They, in fact,
form a union. If these expressions are divorced from each other, it will defeat
the very purpose of democracy. 12) In other words, liberty cannot be divorced
from equality so also equality cannot be divorced from 8 liberty and nor can
liberty and equality be divorced from fraternity. The meaning assigned to these
expressions has to be given due weightage while interpreting Articles of Part
III of the Constitution. 13) It is, therefore, the duty of the Courts and
especially this Court as sentinel on the qui vive to strike a balance between
the changing needs of the Society and the protection of the rights of the citizens
as and when the issue relating to the infringement of the rights of the citizen
comes up for consideration. Such a balance can be achieved only through
securing and protecting liberty, equality and fraternity with social and
political justice to all the citizens under rule of law (see-S.S. Bola &
Ors. vs. B.D. Sardana & Ors. 1997 (8) SCC 522). 14) Our Constitution has
recognized certain existing cherished rights of an individual. These rights are
9 incorporated in different Articles of Part III of the Constitution under the
heading-Fundamental Rights. In so doing, some rights were incorporated and
those, which were not incorporated, were read in Part III by process of
judicial interpretation depending upon the nature of right asserted by the
citizens on case-to-case basis. 15) It was not possible for the framers of the
Constitution to incorporate each and every right be that a natural or common
law right of an individual in Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, as we can
see whenever occasion arose in the last 50 years to decide as to whether any
particular right alleged by the citizen is a fundamental right or not, this
Court with the process of judicial interpretation recognized with remarkable
clarity several existing natural and common law rights of an individual as
fundamental 10 rights falling in Part III though not defined in the
Constitution. It was done keeping in view the fact that the Constitution is a
sacred living document and, hence, susceptible to appropriate interpretation of
its provisions based on changing needs of "We, the People” and other well
defined parameters. 16) Article 21 is perhaps the smallest Article in terms of
words (18) in the Constitution. It is the heart of the Constitution as was said
by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. It reads as under: - “No person shall be deprived of his
life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” 17)
This Article is in Part III of the Constitution and deals with Fundamental
rights of the citizens. It has been the subject matter of judicial
interpretation by this Court along with other Articles of Part III in several
landmark cases beginning from A.K.Gopalan 11 vs. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC
27 up to Mohd Arif @ Ashfaq vs. Registrar, Supreme Court of India (2014) 9 SCC
737. In between this period, several landmark judgments were rendered by this
Court. 18) Part III of the Constitution and the true meaning of the expression
"personal liberty" in Article 21 and what it encompasses was being
debated all along in these cases. The great Judges of this Court with their
vast knowledge, matured thoughts, learning and with their inimitable style of
writing coupled with the able assistance of great lawyers gradually went on to
expand the meaning of the golden words (personal liberty) with remarkable
clarity and precision. 19) The learned Judges endeavored and expanded the width
of the fundamental rights and preserved the freedom of the citizens. In the
process of the judicial 12 evolution, the law laid down in some earlier cases
was either overruled or their correctness doubted. 20) It is a settled rule of
interpretation as held in the case of Rustom Cavasjee Cooper vs. Union of
India, (1970) 1 SCC 248 that the Court should always make attempt to expand the
reach and ambit of the fundamental rights rather than to attenuate their
meaning and the content by process of judicial construction. Similarly, it is
also a settled principle of law laid down in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati
Sripadagalvaru vs. State of Kerala & Anr., (1973) 4 SCC 225 that the
Preamble is a part of the Constitution and, therefore, while interpreting any
provision of the Constitution or examining any constitutional issue or while
determining the width or reach of any provision or when any ambiguity or
obscurity is noticed in any provision, which needs to 13 be clarified, or when
the language admits of meaning more than one, the Preamble to the Constitution
may be relied on as a remedy for mischief or/and to find out the true meaning
of the relevant provision as the case may be. 21) In my considered opinion, the
two questions referred herein along with few incidental questions arising
therefrom need to be examined carefully in the light of law laid down by this
Court in several decided cases. Indeed, the answer to the questions can be
found in the law laid down in the decided cases of this Court alone and one may
not require taking the help of the law laid down by the American Courts. 22) It
is true that while interpreting our laws, the English decisions do guide us in
reaching to a particular conclusion arising for consideration. The law reports
also bear the testimony that this Court 14 especially in its formative years
has taken the help of English cases for interpreting the provisions of our
Constitution and other laws. 23) However, in the last seven decades, this Court
has interpreted our Constitution keeping in view the socio, economic and
political conditions of the Indian Society, felt need of, We, the People of
this Country and the Country in general in comparison to the conditions
prevailing in other Countries. 24) Indeed, it may not be out of place to state
that this Court while interpreting the provisions of Indian Companies Act,
which is modeled on English Company’s Act has cautioned that the Indian Courts
will have to adjust and adapt, limit or extend, the principles derived from
English decisions, entitled as they are to great respect, suiting the
conditions to the Indian society as a whole. (See - Hind Overseas (P) 15 Ltd.
vs. Raghunath Prasad Jhunjhunwala & Anr. (1976) 3 SCC 259). The questions
referred need examination in the light of these principles. 25) In my
considered opinion, “right to privacy of any individual” is essentially a
natural right, which inheres in every human being by birth. Such right remains
with the human being till he/she breathes last. It is indeed inseparable and
inalienable from human being. In other words, it is born with the human being
and extinguish with human being. 26) One cannot conceive an individual enjoying
meaningful life with dignity without such right. Indeed, it is one of those
cherished rights, which every civilized society governed by rule of law always
recognizes in every human being and is under obligation to recognize such
rights in order to maintain and preserve the dignity of an individual
regardless of 16 gender, race, religion, caste and creed. It is, of course,
subject to imposing certain reasonable restrictions keeping in view the social,
moral and compelling public interest, which the State is entitled to impose by law.
27) “Right to privacy” is not defined in law except in the dictionaries. The
Courts, however, by process of judicial interpretation, has assigned meaning to
this right in the context of specific issues involved on caseto-case basis. 28)
The most popular meaning of “right to privacy” is - "the right to be let
alone”. In Gobind vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., (1975) 2 SCC 148,
K.K.Mathew, J. noticed multiple facets of this right (Para 21-25) and then gave
a rule of caution while examining the contours of such right on case-to-case
basis. 17 29) In my considered view, the answer to the questions can be found
in the law laid down by this Court in the cases beginning from Rustom Cavasjee
Cooper (supra) followed by Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India & Anr. (1978) 1
SCC 248, People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) vs. Union of India &
Anr., (1997) 1 SCC 301, Gobind’s case (supra), Mr. "X" vs. Hospital
‘Z’ (1998) 8 SCC 296, District Registrar & Collector, Hyderabad & Anr.
vs. Canara Bank & Ors., (2005) 1 SCC 496 and lastly in Thalappalam Service
Coop. Bank Ltd. & Ors. vs. State of Kerala & Ors., (2013) 16 SCC 82.
30) It is in these cases and especially the two – namely, Gobind(supra) and
District Registrar(supra), their Lordships very succinctly examined in great
detail the issue in relation to "right to privacy" in the 18 light of
Indian and American case law and various international conventions. 31) In
Gobind’ case, the learned Judge, K.K.Mathew J. speaking for the Bench held and
indeed rightly in Para 28 as under: “28. The right to privacy in any event will
necessarily have to go through a process of case-by-case development.
Therefore, even assuming that the right to personal liberty, the right to move
freely throughout the territory of India and the freedom of speech create an
independent right of privacy as an emanation from them which one can
characterize as a fundamental right, we do not think that the right is
absolute.” 32) Similarly in the case of District Registrar(supra), the learned
Chief Justice R.C.Lahoti (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench with
his distinctive style of writing concluded in Para 39 as under : “39. We have
referred in detail to the reasons given by Mathew, J. in Gobind to show that,
the right to privacy has been implied in Articles 19(1)(a) and (d) and Article
21; that, the right is not absolute and that any State 19 intrusion can be a
reasonable restriction only if it has reasonable basis or reasonable materials
to support it.” 33) In all the aforementioned cases, the question of “right to
privacy” was examined in the context of specific grievances made by the
citizens wherein their Lordships, inter alia, ruled that firstly, “right to
privacy” has multiple facets and though such right can be classified as a part
of fundamental right emanating from Article 19(1)(a) and (d) and Article 21,
yet it is not absolute and secondly, it is always subject to certain reasonable
restrictions on the basis of compelling social, moral and public interest and
lastly, any such right when asserted by the citizen in the Court of law then it
has to go through a process of case-to-case development. 34) I, therefore, do
not find any difficulty in tracing the "right to privacy“ emanating from
the two 20 expressions of the Preamble namely, "liberty of thought,
expression, belief, faith and worship" and "Fraternity assuring the
dignity of the individual“ and also emanating from Article 19 (1)(a) which
gives to every citizen "a freedom of speech and expression" and
further emanating from Article 19(1)(d) which gives to every citizen "a
right to move freely throughout the territory of India" and lastly,
emanating from the expression “personal liberty" under Article 21. Indeed,
the right to privacy is inbuilt in these expressions and flows from each of
them and in juxtaposition. 35) In view of foregoing discussion, my answer to
question No. 2 is that “right to privacy” is a part of fundamental right of a
citizen guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. However, it is not an
absolute right but is subject to certain reasonable restrictions, 21 which the
State is entitled to impose on the basis of social, moral and compelling public
interest in accordance with law. 36) Similarly, I also hold that the “right to
privacy” has multiple facets, and, therefore, the same has to go through a
process of case-to-case development as and when any citizen raises his
grievance complaining of infringement of his alleged right in accordance with
law. 37) My esteemed learned brothers, Justice J. Chelameswar, Justice S.A.
Bobde, Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman and Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud have
extensively dealt with question No. 1 in the context of Indian and American
Case law on the subject succinctly. They have also dealt with in detail the
various submissions of the learned senior counsel appearing for all the
parties. 22 38) I entirely agree with their reasoning and the conclusion on
question No. 1 and hence do not wish to add anything to what they have said in
their respective scholarly opinions. 39) Some learned senior counsel appearing
for the petitioners, however, argued that the law laid down by this Court in
some earlier decided cases though not referred for consideration be also
overruled while answering the questions referred to this Bench whereas some
senior counsel also made attempts to attack the legality and correctness of
Aadhar Scheme in their submissions. 40) These submissions, in my view, cannot
be entertained in this case. It is for the reason that firstly, this Bench is
constituted to answer only specific questions; secondly, the submissions
pressed in service are not referred to this Bench and lastly, it is a 23
settled principle of law that the reference Court cannot travel beyond the
reference made and is confined to answer only those questions that are
referred. (See - Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra
& Anr. (1966) 3 SCR 744 at page 753). 41) Suffice it to say that as and
when any of these questions arise in any case, the appropriate Bench will
examine such questions on its merits in accordance with law. 42) Before I part,
I wish to place on record that it was pleasure hearing the erudite arguments
addressed by all the learned counsel. Every counsel argued with brevity,
lucidity and with remarkable clarity. The hard work done by each counsel was
phenomenal and deserves to be complimented. Needless to say, but for their able
assistance both in terms of oral argument as well as written briefs (containing
thorough 24 submissions, variety of case law and the literature on the subject),
it was well nigh impossible to express the views.
………..................................J. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE] New Delhi, August
24, 2017. 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 494 OF 2012 JUSTICE K.S. PUTTASWAMY
(RETD.), AND ANOTHER …PETITIONERS VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
WITH T.C. (CIVIL) NO. 151 OF 2013 T.C. (CIVIL) NO. 152 OF 2013 W.P.(CIVIL)NO.
833 OF 2013 W.P.(CIVIL)NO. 829 OF 2013 W.P.(CIVIL)NO. 932 OF 2013 CONTEMPT PETITION
(CIVIL) NO.144 OF 2014 IN W.P. (C) NO.494/2012 T.P. (CIVIL) NO. 313 OF 2014
T.P. (CIVIL) NO.312 OF 2014 S.L.P. (CRL.) NO.2524 OF 2014 W.P.(C) NO.37 OF 2015
2 W.P.(CIVIL) NO. 220 OF 2015 CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO.674 OF 2015 IN W.P. (C)
NO.829 OF 2013 T.P. (CIVIL) NO. 921/2015 CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO.470 OF 2015
IN W.P.(C) NO.494 OF 2012 CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO.444 OF 2016 IN W.P. (C)
NO.494 OF 2012 CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO.608 OF 2016 IN W.P. (C) NO.494 OF 2012
W.P.(C) NO. 797 OF 2016 CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO.844 OF 2017 IN W.P. (C) NO.494
OF 2012 AND W.P. (CIVIL) NO. 000372 OF 2017 J U D G M E N T SANJAY KISHAN KAUL,
J 1. I have had the benefit of reading the exhaustive and erudite opinions of
Rohinton F. Nariman, J, and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. The conclusion is the
same, answering the reference that privacy is not just a common law right, but
a fundamental right falling in Part III of the 3 Constitution of India. I agree
with this conclusion as privacy is a primal, natural right which is inherent to
an individual. However, I am tempted to set out my perspective on the issue of
privacy as a right, which to my mind, is an important core of any individual
existence. 2. A human being, from an individual existence, evolved into a
social animal. Society thus envisaged a collective living beyond the individual
as a unit to what came to be known as the family. This, in turn, imposed duties
and obligations towards the society. The right to “do as you please” became
circumscribed by norms commonly acceptable to the larger social group. In time,
the acceptable norms evolved into formal legal principles. 3. “The right to
be”, though not extinguished for an individual, as the society evolved, became
hedged in by the complexity of the norms. There has been a growing concern of
the impact of technology which breaches this “right to be”, or privacy – by
whatever name we may call it. 4. The importance of privacy may vary from person
to person dependent on his/her approach to society and his concern for being
left 4 alone or not. That some people do not attach importance to their privacy
cannot be the basis for denying recognition to the right to privacy as a basic
human right. 5. It is not India alone, but the world that recognises the right
of privacy as a basic human right. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights to
which India is a signatory, recognises privacy as an international human right.
6. The importance of this right to privacy cannot be diluted and the
significance of this is that the legal conundrum was debated and is to be
settled in the present reference by a nine-Judges Constitution Bench. 7. This
reference has arisen from the challenge to what is called the ‘Aadhar Card
Scheme’. On account of earlier judicial pronouncements, there was a cleavage of
opinions and to reconcile this divergence of views, it became necessary for the
reference to be made to a nineJudges Bench. 8. It is nobody’s case that privacy
is not a valuable right, but the moot point is whether it is only a common law
right or achieves the status of a fundamental right under the Grundnorm – the
Indian 5 Constitution. We have been ably assisted by various senior counsels
both for and against the proposition as to whether privacy is a Constitutional
right or not. PRIVACY 9. In the words of Lord Action: “the sacred rights of
mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments of musty records. They
are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the
hand of Divinity itself, and can never be obscured by mortal power1 .” 10.
Privacy is an inherent right. It is thus not given, but already exists. It is
about respecting an individual and it is undesirable to ignore a person’s
wishes without a compelling reason to do so. 11. The right to privacy may have
different aspects starting from ‘the right to be let alone’ in the famous
article by Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis 2 . One such aspect is an
individual’s right to control dissemination of his personal information. There
is nothing wrong in individuals limiting access and their ability to shield
from unwanted access. This aspect of the right to privacy has assumed
particular 1 The History of Freedom and Other Essays (1907), p 587 2 The Right
to Privacy 4 HLR 193 6 significance in this information age and in view of technological
improvements. A person-hood would be a protection of one’s personality,
individuality and dignity.3 However, no right is unbridled and so is it with
privacy. We live in a society/ community. Hence, restrictions arise from the
interests of the community, state and from those of others. Thus, it would be
subject to certain restrictions which I will revert to later. PRIVACY &
TECHNOLOGY 12. We are in an information age. With the growth and development of
technology, more information is now easily available. The information explosion
has manifold advantages but also some disadvantages. The access to information,
which an individual may not want to give, needs the protection of privacy. The
right to privacy is claimed qua the State and non-State actors. Recognition and
enforcement of claims qua non-state actors may require legislative intervention
by the State. 3 Daniel Solove, ’10 Reasons Why Privacy Matters’ published on
January 20, 2014 https://www.teachprivacy.com/10-reasons-privacy-matters/ 7 A.
Privacy Concerns Against The State 13. The growth and development of technology
has created new instruments for the possible invasion of privacy by the State,
including through surveillance, profiling and data collection and processing.
Surveillance is not new, but technology has permitted surveillance in ways that
are unimaginable. Edward Snowden shocked the world with his disclosures about
global surveillance. States are utilizing technology in the most imaginative
ways particularly in view of increasing global terrorist attacks and heightened
public safety concerns. One such technique being adopted by States is
‘profiling’. The European Union Regulation of 20164 on data privacy defines
‘Profiling’ as any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of
the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a
natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that
natural person's performance at work, economic situation, health, personal
preferences, 4 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 8 interests,
reliability, behaviour, location or movements5 . Such profiling can result in
discrimination based on religion, ethnicity and caste. However, ‘profiling’ can
also be used to further public interest and for the benefit of national
security. 14. The security environment, not only in our country, but throughout
the world makes the safety of persons and the State a matter to be balanced
against this right to privacy. B. Privacy Concerns Against Non-State Actors 15.
The capacity of non-State actors to invade the home and privacy has also been
enhanced. Technological development has facilitated journalism that is more
intrusive than ever before. 16. Further, in this digital age, individuals are
constantly generating valuable data which can be used by non-State actors to
track their moves, choices and preferences. Data is generated not just by
active sharing of information, but also passively, with every click on the
‘world 5 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 9 wide web’.
We are stated to be creating an equal amount of information every other day, as
humanity created from the beginning of recorded history to the year 2003 –
enabled by the ‘world wide web’.6 17. Recently, it was pointed out that
“‘Uber’, the world’s largest taxi company, owns no vehicles. ‘Facebook’, the
world’s most popular media owner, creates no content. ‘Alibaba’, the most
valuable retailer, has no inventory. And ‘Airbnb’, the world’s largest
accommodation provider, owns no real estate. Something interesting is
happening.”7 ‘Uber’ knows our whereabouts and the places we frequent.
‘Facebook’ at the least, knows who we are friends with. ‘Alibaba’ knows our
shopping habits. ‘Airbnb’ knows where we are travelling to. Social networks
providers, search engines, e-mail service providers, messaging applications are
all further examples of non-state actors that have extensive knowledge of our
movements, financial transactions, conversations – both personal and
professional, health, mental state, interest, travel locations, fares and shopping
habits. As we move towards becoming a digital economy 6Michael L. Rustad,
SannaKulevska, Reconceptualizing the right to be forgotten to enable
transatlantic data flow, 28 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 349 7
https://techcrunch.com/2015/03/03/in-the-age-of-disintermediation-the-battle-is-all-for-the-customer-interface/
Tom Goodwin ‘The Battle is for Customer Interface’ 10 and increase our reliance
on internet based services, we are creating deeper and deeper digital
footprints – passively and actively. 18. These digital footprints and extensive
data can be analyzed computationally to reveal patterns, trends, and
associations, especially relating to human behavior and interactions and hence,
is valuable information. This is the age of ‘big data’. The advancement in technology
has created not just new forms of data, but also new methods of analysing the
data and has led to the discovery of new uses for data. The algorithms are more
effective and the computational power has magnified exponentially. A large
number of people would like to keep such search history private, but it rarely
remains private, and is collected, sold and analysed for purposes such as
targeted advertising. Of course, ‘big data’ can also be used to further public
interest. There may be cases where collection and processing of big data is
legitimate and proportionate, despite being invasive of privacy otherwise. 19.
Knowledge about a person gives a power over that person. The personal data
collected is capable of effecting representations, influencing decision making
processes and shaping behaviour. It can be 11 used as a tool to exercise
control over us like the ‘big brother’ State exercised. This can have a
stultifying effect on the expression of dissent and difference of opinion,
which no democracy can afford. 20. Thus, there is an unprecedented need for
regulation regarding the extent to which such information can be stored,
processed and used by non-state actors. There is also a need for protection of
such information from the State. Our Government was successful in compelling
Blackberry to give to it the ability to intercept data sent over Blackberry
devices. While such interception may be desirable and permissible in order to
ensure national security, it cannot be unregulated.8 21. The concept of ‘invasion
of privacy’ is not the early conventional thought process of ‘poking ones nose
in another person’s affairs’. It is not so simplistic. In today’s world,
privacy is a limit on the government’s power as well as the power of private
sector entities.9 8 Kadhim Shubber, Blackberry gives Indian Government ability
to intercept messages published by Wired on 11 July, 2013
http://www.wired.co.uk/article/blackberry-india 9 Daniel Solove, ’10 Reasons
Why Privacy Matters’ published on January 20, 2014 https://www.teachprivacy.com/10-reasons-privacy-matters/
12 22. George Orwell created a fictional State in ‘Nineteen Eighty-Four.’
Today, it can be a reality. The technological development today can enable not
only the state, but also big corporations and private entities to be the ‘big
brother’. The Constitution of India - A Living Document 23. The Constitutional
jurisprudence of all democracies in the world, in some way or the other, refer
to ‘the brooding spirit of the law’, ‘the collective conscience’, ‘the intelligence
of a future day’, ‘the heaven of freedom’ , etc. The spirit is justice for all,
being the cherished value. 24. This spirit displays many qualities, and has
myriad ways of expressing herself – at times she was liberty, at times dignity.
She was equality, she was fraternity, reasonableness and fairness. She was in
Athens during the formative years of the demoscratos and she manifested herself
in England as the Magna Carta. Her presence was felt in France during the
Revolution, in America when it was being founded and in South Africa during the
times of Mandela. 13 25. In our country, she inspired our founding fathers –
The Sovereign, Socialist, Secular Democratic Republic of India was founded on
her very spirit. 26. During the times of the Constituent Assembly, the great
intellectuals of the day sought to give this brooding spirit a form, and sought
to invoke her in a manner that they felt could be understood, applied and
interpreted – they drafted the Indian Constitution. 27. In it they poured her
essence, and gave to her a grand throne in Part III of the Indian Constitution.
28. The document that they created had her everlasting blessings, every part of
the Constitution resonates with the spirit of Justice and what it stands for:
‘peaceful, harmonious and orderly social living’. The Constitution stands as a
codified representation of the great spirit of Justice itself. It is because it
represents that Supreme Goodness that it has been conferred the status of the
Grundnorm, that it is the Supreme Legal Document in the country. 29. The
Constitution was not drafted for a specific time period or for a certain
generation, it was drafted to stand firm, for eternity. It sought to 14 create
a Montesquian framework that would endear in both war time and in peace time
and in Ambedkar’s famous words, “if things go wrong under the new Constitution
the reason will not be that we had a bad Constitution. What we will have to say
is that Man was vile.”10 30. It has already outlived its makers, and will
continue to outlive our generation, because it contains within its core, a set
of undefinable values and ideals that are eternal in nature. It is because it
houses these values so cherished by mankind that it lives for eternity, as a
Divine Chiranjeevi. 31. The Constitution, importantly, was also drafted for the
purpose of assisting and at all times supporting this ‘peaceful, harmonious and
orderly social living’. The Constitution thus lives for the people. Its deepest
wishes are that civil society flourishes and there is a peaceful social order.
Any change in the sentiments of the people are recognised by it. It seeks to
incorporate within its fold all possible civil rights which existed in the
past, and those rights which may appear on the horizon of the future. It
endears. The Constitution was never intended to serve as a means to stifle the
protection of the valuable rights of its citizens. Its aim and purpose was
completely the opposite. 10 Dhananjay Keer, Dr.Ambedkar: Life and Mission,
Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1971 [1954], p.410.) 15 32. The founders of the
Constitution, were aware of the fact that the Constitution would need
alteration to keep up with the mores and trends of the age. This was precisely
the reason that an unrestricted amending power was sought to be incorporated in
the text of the Constitution in Part 20 under Article 368. The very
incorporation of such a plenary power in a separate part altogether is prima
facie proof that the Constitution, even during the times of its making was
intended to be a timeless document, eternal in nature, organic and living. 33.
Therefore, the theory of original intent itself supports the stand that the
original intention of the makers of the Constitutional was to ensure that it
does not get weighed down by the originalist interpretations/remain
static/fossilised, but changes and evolves to suit the felt need of the times.
The original intention theory itself contemplates a Constitution which is
organic in nature. 34. The then Chief Justice of India, Patanjali Sastri, in
the State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar11 observed as follows: “90. I
find it impossible to read these portions of the Constitution without regard to
the background out of which 11 AIR 1952 SCR 284 16 they arose. I cannot blot
out their history and omit from consideration the brooding spirit of the times.
They are not just dull, lifeless words static and hide-bound as in some
mummified manuscript, but, living flames intended to give life to a great
nation and order its being, tongues of dynamic fire, potent to mould the future
as well as guide the present. The Constitution must, in my judgment, be left
elastic enough to meet from time to time the altering conditions of a changing
world with its shifting emphasis and differing needs.” 35. How the Constitution
should be read and interpreted is best found in the words of Khanna,J., in
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala12 as follows: “1437. …. A Constitution
is essentially different from pleadings filed in Court of litigating parties.
Pleadings contain claim and counter-claim of private parties engaged in
litigation, while a Constitution provides for the framework of the different
organs of the State viz. the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. A
Constitution also reflects the hopes and aspirations of a people. Besides
laying down the norms for the functioning of different organs a Constitution
encompasses within itself the broad indications as to how the nation is to
march forward in times to come. A Constitution cannot be regarded as a mere
legal document to be read as a will or an agreement nor is Constitution like a
plaint or written statement filed in a suit between two litigants. A
Constitution must of necessity be the vehicle of the life of a nation. It has
also to be borne in mind that a Constitution is not a gate but a 12 (1973) 4
SCC 225 17 road. Beneath the drafting of a Constitution is the awareness that
things do not stand still but move on, that life of a progressive nation, as of
an individual, is not static and stagnant but dynamic and dashful. A
Constitution must therefore contain ample provision for experiment and trial in
the task of administration. A Constitution, it needs to be emphasised, is not a
document for fastidious dialectics but the means of ordering the life of a
people. It had (sic) its roots in the past, its continuity is reflected in the
present and it is intended for the unknown future. The words of Holmes while
dealing with the U.S. Constitution have equal relevance for our Constitution.
Said the great Judge: “… the provisions of the Constitution are not
mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic
living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital
not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a
dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their growth.” [See
Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914)]. It is necessary to keep in
view Marshall's great premises that “It is a Constitution we are expounding”.
To quote the words of Felix Frankfurter in his tribute to Holmes: “Whether the
Constitution is treated primarily as a text for interpretation or as an
instrument of Government may make all the difference in the word. The fate of
cases, and thereby of legislation, will turn on whether the meaning of the
document is derived from itself or from one's conception of the country, its
development, its needs, its place in a civilized society.” (See Mr Justice
Holmes edited by Felix Frankfurter, p. 58). (Emphasis supplied) 18 36. In the
same judgment, K.K. Mathew, J., observed : 1563 ... That the Constitution is a
framework of great governmental powers to be exercised for great public ends in
the future, is not a pale intellectual concept but a dynamic idea which must
dominate in any consideration of the width of the amending power. No existing
Constitution has reached its final form and shape and become, as it were a
fixed thing incapable of further growth. Human societies keep changing; needs
emerge, first vaguely felt and unexpressed, imperceptibly gathering strength,
steadily becoming more and more exigent, generating a force which, if left
unheeded and denied response so as to satisfy the impulse behind it, may burst
forthwith an intensity that exacts more than reasonable satisfaction. [See
Felix Frankfurter, of Law and Men, p 35] As Wilson said, a living Constitution
must be Darwinian in structure and practice. [See Constitutional Government in
The United States, p 25] The Constitution of a nation is the outward and
visible manifestation of the life of the people and it must respond to the deep
pulsation for change within. “A Constitution is an experiment as all life is an
experiment.” [See Justice Holmes in Abrams v United States, 250 US 616]…” 37.
In the context of the necessity of the doctrine of flexibility while dealing
with the Constitution, it was observed in Union of India vs. Naveen Jindal13 :
“39. Constitution being a living organ, its ongoing interpretation is
permissible. The supremacy of the Constitution is essential to bring social
changes in the national polity evolved with the passage of time. 13 (2004) 2
SCC 510 19 40. Interpretation of the Constitution is a difficult task. While
doing so, the Constitutional courts are not only required to take into
consideration their own experience over the time, the international treaties
and covenants but also keeping the doctrine of flexibility in mind. This Court
times without number has extended the scope and extent of the provisions of the
fundamental rights, having regard to several factors including the intent and
purport of the Constitution-makers as reflected in Parts IV and IV-A of the
Constitution of India.” 38. The document itself, though inked in a parched
paper of timeless value, never grows old. Its ideals and values forever stay
young and energetic, forever changing with the times. It represents the pulse
and soul of the nation and like a phoenix, grows and evolves, but at the same
time remains young and malleable. 39. The notions of goodness, fairness,
equality and dignity can never be satisfactorily defined, they can only be
experienced. They are felt. They were let abstract for the reason that these
rights, by their very nature, are not static. They can never be certainly
defined or applied, for they change not only with time, but also with
situations. The same concept can be differently understood, applied and
interpreted and therein lies their beauty and their importance. This
multiplicity of interpretation and application is the very core which allows
them to be 20 differently understood and applied in changing social and
cultural situations. 40. Therefore, these core values, these core principles,
are all various facets of the spirit that pervades our Constitution and they
apply and read differently in various scenarios. They manifest themselves
differently in different ages, situations and conditions. Though being rooted
in ancient Constitutional principles, they find mention and applicability as
different rights and social privileges. They appear differently, based on the
factual circumstance. Privacy, for example is nothing but a form of dignity,
which itself is a subset of liberty. 41. Thus, from the one great tree, there
are branches, and from these branches there are sub-branches and leaves. Every
one of these leaves are rights, all tracing back to the tree of justice. They
are all equally important and of equal need in the great social order. They
together form part of that ‘great brooding spirit’. Denial of one of them is
the denial of the whole, for these rights, in manner of speaking, fertilise and
nurture each other. 21 42. What is beautiful in this biological, organic growth
is this: While the tree appears to be great and magnificent, apparently
incapable of further growth, there are always new branches appearing, new
leaves and buds growing. These new rights, are the rights of future generations
that evolve over the passage of time to suit and facilitate the civility of
posterity. They are equally part of this tree of rights and equally trace their
origins to those natural rights which we are all born with. These leaves,
sprout and grow with the passage of time, just as certain rights may get weeded
out due to natural evolution. 43. At this juncture of time, we are incapable
and it is nigh impossible to anticipate and foresee what these new buds may be.
There can be no certainty in making this prediction. However, what remains
certain is that there will indeed be a continual growth of the great tree that
we call the Constitution. This beautiful aspect of the document is what makes
it organic, dynamic, young and everlasting. And it is important that the tree
grows further, for the Republic finds a shade under its branches. 44. The
challenges to protect privacy have increased manifold. The observations made in
the context of the need for law to change, by 22 Bhagwati, J., as he then was,
in National Textile Workers Union Vs. P.R. Ramakrishnan 14 would equally apply
to the requirements of interpretation of the Constitution in the present
context: “We cannot allow the dead hand of the past to stifle the growth of the
living present. Law cannot stand still; it must change with the changing social
concepts and values. If the bark that protects the tree fails to grow and
expand along with the tree, it will either choke the tree or if it is a living
tree, it will shed that bark and grow a new living bark for itself. Similarly,
if the law fails to respond to the needs of changing society, then either it
will stifle the growth of the society and choke its progress or if the society
is vigorous enough, it will cast away the law which stands in the way of its
growth. Law must therefore constantly be on the move adapting itself to the
fast-changing society and not lag behind.” 45. It is wrong to consider that the
concept of the supervening spirit of justice manifesting in different forms to
cure the evils of a new age is unknown to Indian history. Lord Shri Krishna
declared in Chapter 4 Text 8 of The Bhagavad Gita thus: “पराणायसाधूनां
वनाशायचद क ु
ृताम। ् धम संथापनाथा य सà¤à¤µा!म
यु गे य
ुगे ||” 14 (1983) 1 SCC 228
23 46. The meaning of this profound statement, when viewed after a thousand
generations is this: That each age and each generation brings with it the
challenges and tribulations of the times. But that Supreme spirit of Justice
manifests itself in different eras, in different continents and in different
social situations, as different values to ensure that there always exists the
protection and preservation of certain eternally cherished rights and ideals.
It is a reflection of this divine ‘Brooding spirit of the law’, ‘the collective
conscience’, ‘the intelligence of a future day’ that has found mention in the
ideals enshrined in inter- alia, Article 14 and 21, which together serve as the
heart stones of the Constitution. The spirit that finds enshrinement in these
articles manifests and reincarnates itself in ways and forms that protect the
needs of the society in various ages, as the values of liberty, equality,
fraternity, dignity, and various other Constitutional values, Constitutional
principles. It always grows stronger and covers within its sweep the great
needs of the times. This spirit can neither remain dormant nor static and can
never be allowed to fossilise. 47. An issue like privacy could never have been
anticipated to acquire such a level of importance when the Constitution was
being contemplated. 24 Yet, today, the times we live in necessitate that it be
recognised not only as a valuable right, but as a right Fundamental in
Constitutional jurisprudence. 48. There are sure to be times in the future,
similar to our experience today, perhaps as close as 10 years from today or as
far off as a 100 years, when we will debate and deliberate whether a certain
right is fundamental or not. At that time it must be understood that the
Constitution was always meant to be an accommodative and all-encompassing
document, framed to cover in its fold all those rights that are most deeply
cherished and required for a ‘peaceful, harmonious and orderly social living.
49. The Constitution and its all-encompassing spirit forever grows, but never
ages. Privacy is essential to liberty and dignity 50. Rohinton F. Nariman, J.,
and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud J., have emphasized the importance of the protection
of privacy to ensure protection of liberty and dignity. I agree with them and
seek to refer to some legal observations in this regard: 25 In Robertson and
Nicol on Media Law15 it was observed: “Individuals have a psychological need to
preserve an intrusion-free zone for their personality and family and suffer
anguish and stress when that zone is violated. Democratic societies must
protect privacy as part of their facilitation of individual freedom, and offer
some legal support for the individual choice as to what aspects of intimate personal
life the citizen is prepared to share with others. This freedom in other words
springs from the same source as freedom of expression: a liberty that enhances
individual life in a democratic community.” 51. Lord Nicholls and Lord Hoffmann
in their opinion in Naomi Campbell’s case16 recognized the importance of the
protection of privacy. Lord Hoffman opined as under: “50. What human rights law
has done is to identify private information as something worth protecting as an
aspect of human autonomy and dignity. And this recognition has raised
inescapably the question of why it should be worth protecting against the state
but not against a private person. There may of course be justifications for the
publication of private information by private persons which would not be
available to the state - I have particularly in mind the position of the media,
to which I shall return in a moment - but I can see no logical ground for
saying that a person should have less protection against a private individual
than he would have against the state for the 15 Geoffrey Robertson, QC and
Andrew Nicol, QC, Media Law fifth edition p. 265 16 Campbell V. MGN Ltd.2004
UKHL 22 26 publication of personal information for which there is no
justification. Nor, it appears, have any of the other judges who have
considered the matter. 51. The result of these developments has been a shift in
the centre of gravity of the action for breach of confidence when it is used as
a remedy for the unjustified publication of personal information. …. Instead of
the cause of action being based upon the duty of good faith applicable to
confidential personal information and trade secrets alike, it focuses upon the
protection of human autonomy and dignity - the right to control the
dissemination of information about one's private life and the right to the
esteem and respect of other people.” Lord Nicholls opined as under: “12. The
present case concerns one aspect of invasion of privacy: wrongful disclosure of
private information. The case involves the familiar competition between freedom
of expression and respect for an individual's privacy. Both are vitally
important rights. Neither has precedence over the other. The importance of
freedom of expression has been stressed often and eloquently, the importance of
privacy less so. But it, too, lies at the heart of liberty in a modern state. A
proper degree of privacy is essential for the wellbeing and development of an
individual. And restraints imposed on government to pry into the lives of the
citizen go to the essence of a democratic state: see La Forest J in R v Dymont
[1988] 2 SCR 417, 426.” 52. Privacy is also the key to freedom of thought. A
person has a right to think. The thoughts are sometimes translated into speech
but confined to the person to whom it is made. For example, one may want to
criticize someone but not share the criticism with the world. 27 Privacy –
Right To Control Information 53. I had earlier adverted to an aspect of privacy
– the right to control dissemination of personal information. The boundaries
that people establish from others in society are not only physical but also
informational. There are different kinds of boundaries in respect to different
relations. Privacy assists in preventing awkward social situations and reducing
social frictions. Most of the information about individuals can fall under the
phrase “none of your business”. On information being shared voluntarily, the
same may be said to be in confidence and any breach of confidentiality is a
breach of the trust. This is more so in the professional relationships such as
with doctors and lawyers which requires an element of candor in disclosure of
information. An individual has the right to control one’s life while submitting
personal data for various facilities and services. It is but essential that the
individual knows as to what the data is being used for with the ability to
correct and amend it. The hallmark of freedom in a democracy is having the
autonomy and control over our lives which 28 becomes impossible, if important
decisions are made in secret without our awareness or participation.17 54. Dr.
D.Y. Chandrachud, J., notes that recognizing a zone of privacy is but an
acknowledgement that each individual must be entitled to chart and pursue the
course of development of their personality. Rohinton F. Nariman,J., recognizes
informational privacy which recognizes that an individual may have control over
the dissemination of material which is personal to him. Recognized thus, from
the right to privacy in this modern age emanate certain other rights such as
the right of individuals to exclusively commercially exploit their identity and
personal information, to control the information that is available about them
on the ‘world wide web’ and to disseminate certain personal information for
limited purposes alone. 55. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890 expressed
the belief that an individual should control the degree and type of private –
personal information that is made public : 17 Daniel Solove, ’10 Reasons Why
Privacy Matters’ published on January 20, 2014
https://www.teachprivacy.com/10-reasons-privacy-matters/ 29 “The common law
secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent
his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.... It
is immaterial whether it be by word or by signs, in painting, by sculpture, or
in music.... In every such case the individual is entitled to decide whether
that which is his shall be given to the public.” This formulation of the right
to privacy has particular relevance in today’s information and digital age. 56.
An individual has a right to protect his reputation from being unfairly harmed
and such protection of reputation needs to exist not only against falsehood but
also certain truths. It cannot be said that a more accurate judgment about
people can be facilitated by knowing private details about their lives – people
judge us badly, they judge us in haste, they judge out of context, they judge
without hearing the whole story and they judge with hypocrisy. Privacy lets
people protect themselves from these troublesome judgments18 . 57. There is no
justification for making all truthful information available to the public. The
public does not have an interest in knowing 18 Daniel Solove, ’10 Reasons Why
Privacy Matters’ published on January 20, 2014
https://www.teachprivacy.com/10-reasons-privacy-matters/ 30 all information
that is true. Which celebrity has had sexual relationships with whom might be
of interest to the public but has no element of public interest and may
therefore be a breach of privacy.19 Thus, truthful information that breaches
privacy may also require protection. 58. Every individual should have a right
to be able to exercise control over his/her own life and image as portrayed to
the world and to control commercial use of his/her identity. This also means
that an individual may be permitted to prevent others from using his image,
name and other aspects of his/her personal life and identity for commercial
purposes without his/her consent.20 59. Aside from the economic justifications
for such a right, it is also justified as protecting individual autonomy and
personal dignity. The right protects an individual’s free, personal conception
of the ‘self.’ The right of publicity implicates a person’s interest in
autonomous self- 19 The UK Courts granted in super-injunctions to protect
privacy of certain celebrities by tabloids which meant that not only could the
private information not be published but the very fact of existence of that
case & injunction could also not be published. 20 The Second Circuit’s
decision in Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.
1953) penned by Judge Jerome Frank defined the right to publicity as “the right
to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture”. 31 definition,
which prevents others from interfering with the meanings and values that the
public associates with her.21 60. Prosser categorized the invasion of privacy
into four separate torts22 : 1) Unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of
another; 2) Appropriation of another’s name or likeness; 3) Unreasonable
publicity given to the other’s private life; and 4) Publicity that unreasonably
places the other in a false light before the public From the second tort, the
U.S. has adopted a right to publicity.23 61. In the poetic words of Felicia
Lamport mentioned in the book “The Assault on Privacy24” : “DEPRIVACY Although
we feel unknown, ignored As unrecorded blanks, Take heart! Our vital selves are
stored In giant data banks, Our childhoods and maturities, Efficiently
compiled, Our Stocks and insecurities, All permanently filed, 21Mark P.
McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L.
REV. 225, 282 (2005). 22William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960)
23 the scope of the right to publicity varies across States in the U.S. 24
Arthur R. Miller, The University of Michigan Press 32 Our tastes and our
proclivities, In gross and in particular, Our incomes, our activities Both
extra-and curricular. And such will be our happy state Until the day we die
When we’ll be snatched up by the great Computer in the Sky” INFORMATIONAL
PRIVACY 62. The right of an individual to exercise control over his personal
data and to be able to control his/her own life would also encompass his right
to control his existence on the internet. Needless to say that this would not
be an absolute right.The existence of such a right does not imply that a
criminal can obliterate his past, but that there are variant degrees of
mistakes, small and big, and it cannot be said that a person should be profiled
to the nth extent for all and sundry to know. 63. A high school teacher was
fired after posting on her Facebook page that she was “so not looking forward
to another [school] year” since that the school district’s residents were
“arrogant and snobby”. A flight attended was fired for posting suggestive
photos of herself in the 33 company’s uniform.25 In the pre-digital era, such
incidents would have never occurred. People could then make mistakes and
embarrass themselves, with the comfort that the information will be typically
forgotten over time. 64. The impact of the digital age results in information
on the internet being permanent. Humans forget, but the internet does not
forget and does not let humans forget. Any endeavour to remove information from
the internet does not result in its absolute obliteration. The foot prints
remain. It is thus, said that in the digital world preservation is the norm and
forgetting a struggle26 . 65. The technology results almost in a sort of a
permanent storage in some way or the other making it difficult to begin life
again giving up past mistakes. People are not static, they change and grow
through their lives. They evolve. They make mistakes. But they are entitled to
re-invent themselves and reform and correct their mistakes. It is 25 Patricia
Sánchez Abril, Blurred Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the
Twenty-First-Century Employee, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 69 (2012). 26 Ravi Antani,
THE RESISTANCE OF MEMORY : COULD THE EUROPEAN UNION’S RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
EXIST IN THE UNITED STATES ? 34 privacy which nurtures this ability and removes
the shackles of unadvisable things which may have been done in the past. 66.
Children around the world create perpetual digital footprints on social network
websites on a 24/7 basis as they learn their ‘ABCs’: Apple, Bluetooth, and Chat
followed by Download, E-Mail, Facebook, Google, Hotmail, and Instagram.27 They
should not be subjected to the consequences of their childish mistakes and
naivety, their entire life. Privacy of children will require special protection
not just in the context of the virtual world, but also the real world. 67.
People change and an individual should be able to determine the path of his
life and not be stuck only on a path of which he/she treaded initially. An
individual should have the capacity to change his/her beliefs and evolve as a
person. Individuals should not live in fear that the views they expressed will
forever be associated with them and thus refrain from expressing themselves.
27Michael L. Rustad, Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the right to be
forgotten to enable transatlantic data flow, 28 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 349 35
68. Whereas this right to control dissemination of personal information in the
physical and virtual space should not amount to a right of total eraser of
history, this right, as a part of the larger right of privacy, has to be
balanced against other fundamental rights like the freedom of expression, or freedom
of media, fundamental to a democratic society. 69. Thus, The European Union
Regulation of 201628 has recognized what has been termed as ‘the right to be
forgotten’. This does not mean that all aspects of earlier existence are to be
obliterated, as some may have a social ramification. If we were to recognize a
similar right, it would only mean that an individual who is no longer desirous
of his personal data to be processed or stored, should be able to remove it
from the system where the personal data/ information is no longer necessary,
relevant, or is incorrect and serves no legitimate interest. Such a right
cannot be exercised where the information/ data is necessary, for exercising
the right of freedom of expression and information, for compliance with legal
obligations, for the 28 Supra 36 performance of a task carried out in public
interest, on the grounds of public interest in the area of public health, for
archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research
purposes or statistical purposes, or for the establishment, exercise or defence
of legal claims. Such justifications would be valid in all cases of breach of
privacy, including breaches of data privacy. Data Regulation 70. I agree with
Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J., that formulation of data protection is a complex
exercise which needs to be undertaken by the State after a careful balancing of
privacy concerns and legitimate State interests, including public benefit
arising from scientific and historical research based on data collected and
processed. The European Union Regulation of 201629 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data
may provide useful guidance in this regard. The State must ensure that 29 Supra
37 information is not used without the consent of users and that it is used for
the purpose and to the extent it was disclosed. Thus, for e.g. , if the posting
on social media websites is meant only for a certain audience, which is
possible as per tools available, then it cannot be said that all and sundry in
public have a right to somehow access that information and make use of it.
Test: Principle of Proportionality and Legitimacy 71. The concerns expressed on
behalf of the petitioners arising from the possibility of the State infringing
the right to privacy can be met by the test suggested for limiting the
discretion of the State: “ (i) The action must be sanctioned by law; (ii) The
proposed action must be necessary in a democratic society for a legitimate aim;
(iii) The extent of such interference must be proportionate to the need for
such interference; (iv) There must be procedural guarantees against abuse of
such interference.” The Restrictions 38 72. The right to privacy as already
observed is not absolute. The right to privacy as falling in part III of the
Constitution may, depending on its variable facts, vest in one part or the
other, and would thus be subject to the restrictions of exercise of that
particular fundamental right. National security would thus be an obvious
restriction, so would the provisos to different fundamental rights, dependent
on where the right to privacy would arise. The Public interest element would be
another aspect. 73. It would be useful to turn to The European Union Regulation
of 201630 . Restrictions of the right to privacy may be justifiable in the
following circumstances subject to the principle of proportionality: (a) Other
fundamental rights: The right to privacy must be considered in relation to its
function in society and be balanced against other fundamental rights. (b)
Legitimate national security interest (c) Public interest including scientific
or historical research purposes or statistical purposes 30 Supra 39 (d)
Criminal Offences: the need of the competent authorities for prevention
investigation, prosecution of criminal offences including safeguards against
threat to public security; (e) The unidentifiable data: the information does
not relate to identifiedor identifiable natural person but remains anonymous.
The European Union Regulation of 2016 31 refers to ‘pseudonymisation’ which
means the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data
can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of
additional information, provided that such additional information is kept
separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure
that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable
natural person; (f) The tax etc: the regulatory framework of tax and working of
financial institutions, markets may require disclosure of private information.
But then this would not entitle the disclosure of the information to all and
sundry and there should be data protection rules according to the objectives of
the processing. There may however, be processing which is compatible for the
purposes for which it is initially collected. Report of Group of Experts on
Privacy 74. It is not as if the aspect of privacy has not met with concerns.
The Planning Commission of India constituted the Group of Experts on Privacy 31
Supra 40 under the Chairmanship of Justice A.P. Shah, which submitted a report
on 16 October, 2012. The five salient features, in his own words, are as
follows: “1. Technological Neutrality and Interoperability with International
Standards: The Group agreed that any proposed framework for privacy legislation
must be technologically neutral and interoperable with international standards.
Specifically the Privacy Act should not make any reference to specific
technologies and must be generic enough such that the principles and
enforcement mechanisms remain adaptable to changes in society, the marketplace,
technology, and the government. To do this it is important to closely harmonise
the right to privacy with multiple international regimes, create trust and
facilitate cooperation between national and international stakeholders and
provide equal and adequate levels of protection to data processed inside India
as well as outside it. In doing so, the framework should recognise that data
has economic value, and that global data flows generate value for the
individual as data creator, and for businesses that collect and process such
data. Thus, one of the focuses of the framework should be on inspiring the
trust of global clients and their end users, without compromising the interests
of domestic customers in enhancing their privacy protection. 2.
Multi-Dimensional Privacy: This report recognises the right to privacy in its
multiple dimensions. A framework on the right to privacy in India must include
privacy-related concerns around data protection on the internet and challenges
emerging therefrom, appropriate protection from unauthorised interception,
audio and video surveillance, use of personal identifiers, bodily privacy
including DNA as well as physical privacy, which are crucial in establishing a
national ethos for privacy protection, 41 though the specific forms such
protection will take must remain flexible to address new and emerging concerns.
3. Horizontal Applicability: The Group agreed that any proposed privacy
legislation must apply both to the government as well as to the private sector.
Given that the international trend is towards a set of unified norms governing
both the private and public sector, and both sectors process large amounts of
data in India, it is imperative to bring both within the purview of the
proposed legislation. 4. Conformity with Privacy Principles: This report
recommends nine fundamental Privacy Principles to form the bedrock of the
proposed Privacy Act in India. These principles, drawn from best practices
internationally, and adapted suitably to an Indian context, are intended to
provide the baseline level of privacy protection to all individual data
subjects. The fundamental philosophy underlining the principles is the need to
hold the data controller accountable for the collection, processing and use to
which the data is put thereby ensuring that the privacy of the data subject is
guaranteed. 5. Co-Regulatory Enforcement Regime: This report recommends the
establishment of the office of the Privacy Commissioner, both at the central
and regional levels. The Privacy Commissioners shall be the primary authority for
enforcement of the provisions of the Act. However, rather than prescribe a pure
top-down approach to enforcement, this report recommends a system of
co-regulation, with equal emphasis on Self-Regulating Organisations (SROs)
being vested with the responsibility of autonomously ensuring compliance with
the Act, subject to regular oversight by the Privacy Commissioners. The SROs,
apart from possessing industry-specific knowledge, will also be better placed
to create awareness about the right to privacy and explaining the sensitivities
of privacy protection both within industry as well as to the public in
respective 42 sectors. This recommendation of a co-regulatory regime will not
derogate from the powers of courts which will be available as a forum of last resort
in case of persistent and unresolved violations of the Privacy Act.” 75. The
enactment of a law on the subject is still awaited. This was preceded by the
Privacy Bill of the year of 2005 but there appears to have been little
progress. It was only in the course of the hearing that we were presented with
an office memorandum of the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology
dated 31.7.2017, through which a Committee of Experts had been constituted to
deliberate on a data protection framework for India, under the Chairmanship of
Mr. Justice B.N. Srikrishna, former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, in
order to identify key data protection issues in India and recommend methods of
addressing them. So there is hope ! 76. The aforesaid aspect has been referred
to for purposes that the concerns about privacy have been left unattended for
quite some time and thus an infringement of the right of privacy cannot be left
to be formulated by the legislature. It is a primal natural right which is only
being recognized as a fundamental right falling in part III of the Constitution
of India. 43 CONCLUSION 77. The right of privacy is a fundamental right. It is
a right which protects the inner sphere of the individual from interference
from both State, and non-State actors and allows the individuals to make
autonomous life choices. 78. It was rightly expressed on behalf of the
petitioners that the technology has made it possible to enter a citizen’s house
without knocking at his/her door and this is equally possible both by the State
and non-State actors. It is an individual’s choice as to who enters his house,
how he lives and in what relationship. The privacy of the home must protect the
family, marriage, procreation and sexual orientation which are all important
aspects of dignity. 79. If the individual permits someone to enter the house it
does not mean that others can enter the house. The only check and balance is
that it should not harm the other individual or affect his or her rights. This
applies both to the physical form and to technology. In an era where there are
wide, varied, social and cultural norms and more so in a country like ours
which prides itself on its diversity, privacy is one of the most 44 important
rights to be protected both against State and non-State actors and be
recognized as a fundamental right. How it thereafter works out in its
inter-play with other fundamental rights and when such restrictions would
become necessary would depend on the factual matrix of each case. That it may
give rise to more litigation can hardly be the reason not to recognize this
important, natural, primordial right as a fundamental right. 80. There are two
aspects of the opinion of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud,J., one of which is common to
the opinion of Rohinton F. Nariman,J., needing specific mention. While
considering the evolution of Constitutional jurisprudence on the right of
privacy he has referred to the judgment in Suresh Kumar Koushal Vs. Naz
Foundation. 32 In the challenge laid to Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code
before the Delhi High Court, one of the grounds of challenge was that the said
provision amounted to an infringement of the right to dignity and privacy. The
Delhi High Court, inter alia, observed that the right to live with dignity and
the right of privacy both are recognized as dimensions of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. The view of the High Court, however did not find 32
(2014) 1 SCC 1 45 favour with the Supreme Court and it was observed that only a
miniscule fraction of the country’s population constitutes lesbians, gays,
bisexuals or transgenders and thus, there cannot be any basis for declaring the
Section ultra virus of provisions of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the
Constitution. The matter did not rest at this, as the issue of privacy and
dignity discussed by the High Court was also observed upon. The sexual
orientation even within the four walls of the house thus became an aspect of
debate. I am in agreement with the view of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J., who in
paragraphs 123 & 124 of his judgment, states that the right of privacy
cannot be denied, even if there is a miniscule fraction of the population which
is affected. The majoritarian concept does not apply to Constitutional rights
and the Courts are often called up on to take what may be categorized as a
non-majoritarian view, in the check and balance of power envisaged under the
Constitution of India. Ones sexual orientation is undoubtedly an attribute of
privacy. The observations made in Mosley vs. News Group Papers Ltd. 33, in a broader
concept may be usefully referred to: 33 (2008) EWHS 1777 (QB) 46 “130… It is
not simply a matter of personal privacy versus the public interest. The modern
perception is that there is a public interest in respecting personal privacy.
It is thus a question of taking account of conflicting public interest
considerations and evaluating them according to increasingly well recognized
criteria. 131. When the courts identify an infringement of a person’s Article 8
rights, and in particular in the context of his freedom to conduct his sex life
and personal relationships as he wishes, it is right to afford a remedy and to
vindicate that right. The only permitted exception is where there is a
countervailing public interest which in the particular circumstances is strong
enough to outweigh it; that is to say, because one at least of the established
“limiting principles” comes into play. Was it necessary and proportionate for
the intrusion to take place, for example, in order to expose illegal activity
or to prevent the public from being significantly misled by public claims
hitherto made by the individual concerned (as with Naomi Campbell’s public
denials of drug-taking)? Or was it necessary because the information, in the
words of the Strasbourg court in Von Hannover at (60) and (76), would make a
contribution to “a debate of general interest”? That is, of course, a very high
test, it is yet to be determined how far that doctrine will be taken in the
courts of this jurisdiction in relation to photography in public places. If
taken literally, it would mean a very significant change in what is permitted.
It would have a profound effect on the tabloid and celebrity culture to which
we have become accustomed in recent years.” 81. It is not necessary to delve
into this issue further, other than in the context of privacy as that would be
an issue to be debated before the appropriate Bench, the matter having been
referred to a larger Bench. 47 82. The second aspect is the discussion in
respect of the majority judgment in the case of ADM Jabalpur vs. Shivkant
Shukla34 in both the opinions. In I.R. Coelho Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu35 it
was observed that the ADM Jabalpur case has been impliedly overruled and that
the supervening event was the 44th Amendment to the Constitution, amending
Article 359 of the Constitution. I fully agree with the view expressly
overruling the ADM Jabalpur case which was an aberration in the constitutional
jurisprudence of our country and the desirability of burying the majority
opinion ten fathom deep, with no chance of resurrection. 83. Let the right of
privacy, an inherent right, be unequivocally a fundamental right embedded in
part-III of the Constitution of India, but subject to the restrictions
specified, relatable to that part. This is the call of today. The old order changed
yielding place to new.
……………………………………..J.
(SANJAY KISHAN KAUL) New Delhi August 24 , 2017.
34 (1976) 2 SCC 521 35 (2007) 2 SCC 1 1
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO 494 OF 2012
JUSTICE K.S.PUTTASWAMY (RETD.), AND ANR. ..Petitioners
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA
AND ORS. ..Respondents
WITH T.C. (CIVIL) NO 151 OF 2013 T.C. (CIVIL) NO 152 OF
2013 W.P.(CIVIL) NO 833 OF 2013 W.P.(CIVIL) NO 829 OF 2013 W.P.(CIVIL) NO 932
OF 2013 REPORTABLE 2 CONMT. PET. (CIVIL) NO 144 OF 2014 IN W.P.(C)NO.494/2012
T.P.(CIVIL) NO 313 OF 2014 T.P.(CIVIL) NO 312 OF 2014 S.L.P(CRL.)NO.2524/2014
W.P.(CIVIL)NO.37/2015 W.P.(CIVIL)NO.220/2015 CONMT. PET. (C)NO.674/2015 IN
W.P.(C)NO.829/2013 T.P.(CIVIL)NO.921/2015 CONMT.PET.(C)NO.470/2015 IN
W.P.(C)NO.494/2012 CONMT.PET.(C)NO.444/2016 IN W.P.(C)NO.494/2012
CONMT.PET.(C)NO.608/2016 IN W.P.(C)NO.494/2012 W.P.(CIVIL)NO.797/2016
CONMT.PET.(C)NO.844/2017 IN W.P.(C)NO.494/2012 W.P.(C) NO.342/2017 AND WITH
W.P.(C)NO.000372/2017 3 ORDER OF THE COURT 1 The judgment on behalf of the
Hon’ble Chief Justice Shri Justice Jagdish Singh Khehar, Shri Justice R K
Agrawal, Shri Justice S Abdul Nazeer and Dr Justice D Y Chandrachud was
delivered by Dr Justice D Y Chandrachud. Shri Justice J Chelameswar, Shri
Justice S A Bobde, Shri Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre, Shri Justice Rohinton Fali
Nariman and Shri Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul delivered separate judgments. 2 The
reference is disposed of in the following terms: (i) The decision in M P Sharma
which holds that the right to privacy is not protected by the Constitution
stands over-ruled; (ii) The decision in Kharak Singh to the extent that it
holds that the right to privacy is not protected by the Constitution stands
over-ruled; (iii) The right to privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the
right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and as a part of the
freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. 4 (iv) Decisions
subsequent to Kharak Singh which have enunciated the position in (iii) above
lay down the correct position in law.
........................................................CJI
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR]
……...….............................................J [J
CHELAMESWAR]
..…….................................................J [S A
BOBDE]
.........................................................J
[R K AGRAWAL]
….…..................................................J
[ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN]
….……...............................................J
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
............................................................J
[Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
............................................................J
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL]
….........................................................J
[S ABDUL NAZEER] New Delhi; AUGUST 24, 2017
