Thursday, November 29, 2012

SC to examine IT Act, govt issues new guidelines


Noting that the country was "outraged" over the arrest of two girls in Maharashtra over Facebook comments, the Supreme Court today decided to examine the Information Technology Act to prevent recurrence of such incidents.

Hearing a PIL seeking amendments to the IT Act, a bench headed by Chief Justice Altamas Kabir and Justice J Chelameswar expressed surprise over how two girls were arrested in Palghar in Thane district after sunset.

One girl had criticised in a Facebook post the November 18 shutdown for Thackeray's funeral and the other had "liked" it.

While agreeing to hear the case, the bench said it was considering taking suo motu cognisance of recent incidents of arrest of people and wondered why nobody had so far challenged the particular provision of the IT Act.

"The way the little children were arrested, it outraged the sentiments of the people of the country. The way these things had been taking place needs consideration," the bench observed while asking Attorney General G E Vahanvati to assist it when it will take up the issue for hearing tomorrow.

The Bench also noted that the charge of disruption to communal harmony was there but later it was removed.

Govt's guidelines

Yielding to public protests on the recent controversial arrest of some persons for their Facebook posts, government today came out with guidelines under which a police officer no less than the rank of DCP can sanction prosecution.

In metropolitan cities, such an approval would have to be given by officers at the level of Inspector General of Police (IGP).

Only officers of these ranks will be allowed to permit registration of a case for offences under the Information Technology (IT) Act relating to spreading hatred through electronic messages in a bid to prevent the misuse of the legislation.

"... the concerned police officer or police station may not register any complaints (under Section 66 (A)) unless he has obtained prior approval at the level of an officer not below the DCP rank in urban and rural areas and IG level in metros," a top source said. Currently, a police station in-charge or an inspector can register a case under the said provision.

Guidelines in this regard are being issued against the backdrop of the arrest of two girls by police in Mumbai under Section 66 (A) of Information Technology (IT) Act that deals with spreading hatred through electronic messages.

The arrest of two teenage girls who had criticized the shutdown in Mumbai for Shiv Sena supremo Bal Thackeray's funeral had triggered an outrage. The Maharashtra police has decided to drop the charges.

Yesterday, a 19-year-old boy was detained in Thane district on suspicion of posting an "objectionable" Facebook comment against MNS chief Raj Thackeray but later let off.

The source expressed confidence that such instances can be avoided once the new guidelines are put in place.

"There are procedural difficulties faced... we are going to circulate to all state governments as guidelines with regard to registering any complaints under Section 66 (A)," the source said.

The IT Act is not being amended, an official clarified, adding that powers vest only with Parliament and what the government intends to do is only to issue operational guidelines.

Section 66 (A), which is a bailable offence and provides for a jail term of up to three years, makes it an offence to send, by means of a computer resource or communication device, any information which is grossly offensive, menacing, causes annoyance or hatred.

The Securities Appellate Tribunal today dismissed an appeal by two Sahara group firms

MUMBAI: The Securities Appellate Tribunal today dismissed an appeal by two Sahara group firms against Sebi in the high-profile case involving refund of about Rs 24,000 crore with interest to about 3 crore investors.

Sahara firms in their appeal had sought the tribunal's intervention in refund of investors' money and had accused the market regulator Sebi of wrongly charging them of non- compliance with a Supreme Court order in this regard.

The tribunal, however, said that any further direction in the case can be sought for and granted by the Supreme Court alone and dismissed the appeal.

"We, therefore, find the appeal premature as well as non-maintainable. Dismissed," the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) said in its order passed today.

Passing the order on the appeal filed on November 27, SAT observed that "a contempt petition filed by the respondent Board (Securities and Exchange Board of India) and a review petition filed by the appellants (Sahara group firms) against the order dated August 31, 2012 are already pending before Supreme Court."

The apex court had asked Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Ltd (SIRECL) and Sahara Housing Investment Corporation Ltd (SHICL) to refund an estimated Rs 24,000 crore with an annual interest of 15 per cent, while Sebi was directed to facilitate the refund of this money to about three crore bondholders of the two firms.

The Supreme Court had asked these companies to furnish the documents related to these investors to Sebi within 10 days and refund the money within three months, failing which the regulator was asked to freeze the accounts and attach properties of the two firms.

Wednesday, November 28, 2012

Adobe enables electronic issue of official documents in 18,000 Gujarat villages

Villages in Gujarat can now easily access their official documents, certificates and other government services online. Adobe Systems Incorporated has deployed its software across 18,000 villages in the state, transforming all the paper-based work into digital system.

This project is a collaboration between Adobe and the Panchayat Rural Housing and Rural Development Department, Government of Gujarat. Under the initiative, a range of services including certificates of birth, death, income, caste, domicile, property, residence proof, agriculture, tax collection, marriage, family information and land ownership will be issued, managed and stored electronically.

Umang Bedi, managing director, South Asia, Adobe said, "Besides transition from the old, paper-based system to the digital era, the project will also remove red tape, waiting period and bring in an effective grievance system. The design is so simple that even a non-savvy user can avail the services with ease."

The initiative of the Gujarat Government aims to bridge the digital divide between urban and rural Gujarat by providing citizens access to digital information for all government documentation.

"This technology will truly touch the grassroots of India. We have been progressively testing and adding the service to each village over the last six months. Our engineering centres in Gandhinagar will take up queries in terms of any doubt or technical glitch," said Bedi.

A K Rakesh, development commissioner, Government of Gujarat said, "Earlier, citizens had to travel to the district taluka for these requirements. Life has become much simpler for them." 

Tuesday, November 27, 2012

PRAVIN GADA & ANR. v. CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA & ORS. [2012] EssenSC 529 (18 September 2012)

Judgement
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NOS. 7-9 OF 2012 IN SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 30894-96 OF 2011
 
Pravin Gada and Another ...........................Petitioners
Versus
Central Bank of India and others ................Respondents
 
 OR D E R
 
These are the applications for seeking certain directions in view of the subsequent developments after the order passed on 5.7.2012.
2. We have heard Mr. C.A. Sundaram, learned senior counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Mukul Rohtagi and Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned senior counsel for the Central Bank of India, respondent No. 1. 3. Before we advert to order dated 5.7.2012, it is necessitous to refer to order dated 27.3.2012. In the said order, after referring to the order passed by the High Court in W.P. No. 2689 and other connected matters, the interim order passed by this Court on 25.11.2011, recording the contentions of Mr. Sundaram, learned senior counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned senior counsel for the Central Bank of India and taking note of the chart produced in respect of the dues of the Central Bank of India, Standard Chartered Bank and Workmen through Official Liquidator, this Court passed the following order: - “It is submitted by Mr. Gupta that in fitness of things and regard being had to the concept of obtaining of the highest price in Court sale, having of auction is the warrant and, therefore, auction should be directed to be held. The learned senior counsel further submitted that the property is likely to fetch much more amount than that has been deposited by the petitioners. Mr. Sundaram, learned senior counsel would contend that the sale had been given effect to in the year 2006 on acceptance of 2.5 crores and with the efflux of time if there has been a price rise solely on the said base a public auction should not be directed. Be it noted that at one point of time, a third party had deposited 6 crores to purchase the property but later on he withdrew as the matter was litigated in Court. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and regard being had to the totality of the circumstances, we issue the following directions: - (i) The property in question be put to auction by issuing a public advertisement in at least two newspapers one in English and another in Kannada language having wide circulation in the city of Mysore inviting bids for the sale of the property. (ii) It shall be mentioned in the advertisements that the reserve price is 3 crores and the same shall be deposited before the Recovery Officer of the DRT to enable one to participate in the bid. (iii) Any one who would not deposit the amount would not be permitted to participate in the auction as speculative bids are to be totally avoided. (iv) The newspaper publication shall be made within a period of two weeks stipulating that the deposit is a condition precedent for participation in the auction which shall be made before the DRT within a week from the date of publication of the advertisement in the newspaper. (v) The auction shall be held within a period of two weeks from the issuance of the advertisement which shall state the specified time and place for the auction. (vi) The petitioners without prejudice to the contentions to be raised and dealt with in these Special Leave Petitions shall participate in the bid without the deposit as they have purchased the property in the year 2006. (vii) The bid shall not be finalized and the bid sheet shall be produced before this Court in a sealed cover. We reiterate at the cost of repetition that the above arrangements are subject to the result of the final adjudication in these Special Leave Petitions. List the matter after five weeks.” 4. After the said order was passed two Interlocutory Applications forming Nos. 4-6 of 2012 were filed. This Court, looking at the facts and the contentions raised, passed the following order on the said applications: - “These applications were preferred by the Bank stating that going by the present valuation the property will fetch nearly Rs.10 crore whereas the order stipulates Reserved Price only Rs.3 crores. Hence, the Bank has sought modification of the upset price fixed by the Court. Learned counsel for the Bank also submitted that as per the Debt Recovery Tribunal Act the time stipulated for auction is thirty days whereas the order directs to conduct the auction within two weeks. To this extent the respondent seeks modification of that direction also. Learned counsel on the either side submitted that the auction should go on without any delay. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case we are inclined to dispose of these applications directing the Recovery Officer to go on with the auction within the time limit stipulated in the bid. The question as to whether the upset price has been correctly fixed or not will depend upon the bid amount offered by the bidders in the auction. With the above directions, the I.As are disposed of.” 5. In the present applications it has been asseverated that in compliance with the order dated 5.7.2012, the Recovery Officer of Debt Recovery Tribunal-I, Mumbai, ordered for publication of the notice in two newspapers which was published on 20.7.2012 calling upon interested parties to give their offer within seven days from the date of publication as directed by this Court vide order dated 27.3.2012. Pursuant to the publication carried in English and Kannada newspapers no other offer whatsoever was received by the Recovery Officer and till 7th only the offer of the petitioners, namely, Praveen Gada and Amarnath Singhla, was received. 6. When the matter was taken up, order dated 30.8.2012 passed in R.P. No. 419 of 2003 was brought to our notice. The said order reads as under: - “As per directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its orders dated 27.3.2012 & 5.7.2012, advertisement was published fixing reserve price at Rs.3.00 Crores. Only one bid of Shri Pravin Gada & Amarnath Singhla has been received on 07.08.2012 as per public notice. His bid was opened at the scheduled date & time of the auction. He has given offer of Rs. 3 crores. As his participation in auction was without deposit as directed in above orders, there was no question of his depositing EMD. Relevant columns of Bid Sheet were accordingly filled in and signature of the bidder has been obtained. As per the directions, the said bid sheet be submitted to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Apart from above, 3 offers in closed envelops were received today, but those are not opened & considered in view of the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as per aforesaid orders. On the date of auction the above 3 closed envelops containing offers have been received. This being new situation arisen at the time of auction, in my opinion it would be appropriate to bring this fact to the kind notice of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Hence these 3 closed envelops be also submitted to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. As per directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Bid Sheet at Exh. 154 be submitted to the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a sealed cover.” 7. The bid sheets were opened before us and we find that an offer amounting to Rs.3,30,00,000/- by Kumar Enterprises, Rs.3,30,00,000/- by Riddisiddhi Bullions Ltd. and Rs.3,30,00,000/- by Krishna Texturisers Pvt. Ltd. were deposited by way of bank drafts on 29.8.2012 and 30.8.2012 respectively. 8. It is submitted by Mr. Sundaram, learned senior counsel for the petitioners that as the said offers were not in accord, the same should not be considered and the petitioners should be treated as the highest bidder in the auction. Mr. Rohtagi and Mr. Gupta, learned senior counsel for the Central Bank of India, per contra, submitted that the price of the property as on today is worth more than Rs.10 crores and the reason for the offerees not coming is that the petitioners are in possession and they have put up a board indicating their name and status. It is urged by them that it is one thing to say that the auction is conducted by virtue of the order passed by this Court and the whole thing is subject to the pendency of the lis but it is another thing to see at the entrance that the board is fixed and the people are not allowed to survey the nature and character of the assets. The photographs of the board that have been put up are filed in Court and we have perused the same. Be it noted, the putting up of the said photographs is not disputed. 9. Regard being had to the facts and circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that there should be a re-auction and we are inclined to modify the conditions incorporated in the earlier order. Keeping in view the totality of circumstances we issue the following directions: - (i) The property in question be put to auction by issuing a public advertisement within two weeks in at least two newspapers, one in English and another in Kannada language, having wide circulation in the city of Mysore inviting bids for the sale of the property. (ii) It shall be mentioned in the advertisement that the reserved price is Rs.5 crores and the same shall be deposited by way of bank drafts drawn on a nationalized bank before the Recovery Officer of the DRT to enable one to participate in the bid. The advertisement shall stipulate that the deposit of the reserved price fixed by this Court is a condition precedent for participation in the auction. iii) It shall be clearly stated in the advertisement that the property would be available for inspection in presence of the Registrar of Civil Court or any equivalent officer nominated by the Principal District and Session Judge, Mysore, and it is so done to avoid the grievance from any quarter that the property was not available for proper verification. The inspection by any interested party shall be done within one week from the date of advertisement between 11.00 a.m. to 3.00 p.m. iv) During the entire period of inspection the concerned officer deputed by the learned Principle District and Sessions Judge, Mysore shall see to it that the board that has been fixed is removed from the site so that there can be inspection of the plot without any kind of pre- conceived notion by the perspective bidders. v) The aforesaid reserved price shall be deposited before the Recovery Officer of the DRT within ten days from the date of the advertisement. Any one who would not deposit the reserved price within the time limit, his bid shall not be considered. vi) The auction shall be held within a period of two weeks from the date of issuance of the advertisement which shall state the specified time and place for the auction. vii) The petitioners without prejudice to the contentions to be raised and dealt with in these Special Leave Petitions shall participate in the auction without the deposit as they have purchased the property in the year 2006. viii) The offerees who have already given the bids shall deposit the balance amount to meet the reserved price before the Recovery Officer of the DRT failing which they shall be ineligible to participate in the bid. ix) After the submission of the bids there shall be a public auction amongst the eligible offerees to get the maximum price. x) The auction shall not be finalized and the bid sheet shall be produced before this Court in a sealed cover for issuance of further directions, if required. 10. We repeat at the cost of repetition that the above arrangements are subject to the result of the final adjudication to the Special Leave Petitions. 11. A copy of the order passed today be sent by fax, e-mail and speed- post to the Principal District Judge, Mysore by the Registry of this Court. 12. List the matters on 1.11.2012. ........................................
.J. [K. S. Radhakrishnan]
.........................................
J. [Dipak Misra] New Delhi; September 18, 2012.

O

Sunday, November 25, 2012

NATIONAL INS.CO.LTD. v. BALAKRISHNAN & ANR. [2012] EssenSC 676 (20 November 2012)

Judgement 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8163 OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 1232 of 2012) 

National Insurance Company Ltd. ... Appellants 
Versus 
Balakrishnan & Another ... Respondents

 
Dipak Misra, J.

Leave granted.

2. The singular issue that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the first respondent, the Managing Director of the respondent No.
2, a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, is entitled to sustain a claim against the appellant-insurer for having sustained bodily injuries. Succinctly stated, the facts are that the respondent No. 1 met with an accident about 8.30 p.m. on 23.3.2001 while travelling in the Lancer car bearing registration No. TN 49 K 2750 belonging to the respondent No. 2, as it dashed against a bullock cart near Muthandipatti Pirivu Road-I. He knocked at the doors of the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal (for short “the the tribunal”) in MACOP No. 357 of 2004 under Sections 140, 147 and 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity “the Act”) claiming compensation of Rs.20,00,000/- jointly and severally from the appellant as well as the company on the foundation that the vehicle in question was insured with the appellant-company. Be it noted, the amount was calculated on the basis of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.
3. The insurer resisted the claim on the grounds that the claimant had suppressed the fact that he was the Managing Director of the company and hence, the application deserved to be thrown overboard; that even if the petition was entertained the insurance company could not be held liable to indemnify the respondent as the appellant was himself the owner being the Managing Director and under no circumstances he could be treated as a third party; that the policy taken by the company did not cover an occupant in the vehicle but only covered the owner for a limited quantum and hence, the claim was not allowable as sought for.
4. The tribunal, in its award dated 19.4.2007, addressed to the issues of rash and negligent driving of the driver, injuries sustained by the insured and the liability of the insurance company. On the basis of the material brought on record, it came to hold that the accident had occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the 1st respondent; that the claimant was injured in the accident; that regard being had to the injuries sustained he was entitled to get Rs.8,63,200/- as compensation with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of the petition till the date of deposit; and that the insurance company was liable to indemnify as the owner of the vehicle was the company, and the injured was travelling in the car as a third party.
5. Being dissatisfied with the award passed by the tribunal, the insurer preferred C.M.A. (M.D.) No. 1624 of 2008 before the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court and in appeal it was urged that the victim, the Managing Director, who was running the hospital in the name of his deceased father, was the legal owner of the car though the vehicle was insured in the name of the company and, therefore, the liability was to the limited extent as stipulated in the policy. It was also canvassed, in any case, he was a non- fare paying passenger in the car for which no extra premium was paid and hence, the liability could not be fastened on the insurer. The High Court treated the company to be the owner of the vehicle and repelled the stand that the Managing Director was the owner, and further held that as he was only an occupant of the car the insurance company was liable to indemnify the owner for the claim put forth by the victim. It is worthy to note that the High Court opined that if no premium is paid to cover the owner, the insurer is not liable to make good the loss but if another person travels with the owner and suffers injuries the insurer is liable to pay the compensation. Being of this view, the High Court dismissed the appeal.
Hence, the present appeal by the insurer.
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. As has been indicated at the beginning, the seminal issue is whether the appellant-company is liable to make good the compensation determined by the tribunal to the victim in the accident. On a scrutiny of the award passed by the tribunal which has been given the stamp of approval by the High Court, it is manifest that the 1st respondent was the Managing Director of the respondent No. 2 and the vehicle was registered in the name of the company but the Managing Director had signed on behalf of the company in the R. C. book of the car that was involved in the accident.
The High Court has returned a finding that the company and the Managing Director are two different legal entities and hence, the Managing Director cannot be equated with the owner. On that foundation, the claimant has been treated as a passenger and, accordingly, liability has been fastened on the insurer. The learned counsel appearing for the insurer would contend that assuming he is the owner being a signatory in the R.C. book, the liability of the company is limited upto Rs.2,00,000/- and under no circumstances a non-fare paying passenger would be covered under the policy. In oppugnation, the learned counsel for the respondent-claimant has proponed that barring the insurer and the insured, all others are third parties and, therefore, he is covered by the policy. It is also urged by him that as he had travelled as an occupant in a private car he is a third party vis-à-vis the insurer and hence, it is bound to indemnify the owner as the risk of the third party is covered.
7. As per the command of Section 146 of the Act, the owner of a vehicle is obliged to obtain an insurance for the vehicle to cover the third party risk. Section 147 deals with the requirements of policies and limits of liability. Section 147 (1) which is relevant for the present purpose is reproduced below:- “147. Requirement of policies and limits of liability. – (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which - (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; and (b) insurers the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub – section (2) – (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily [injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle] or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place ;
(ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;
Provided that a policy shall not be required – (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee - (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) if it is a public service vehicle, engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle or (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or (ii) to cover any contractual liability.
Explanation. – For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place.” On a scanning of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that the policy of insurance must be a policy which complies with the conditions enumerated under Section 147 (1) (a) & (b). It also provides where a policy is not required and also stipulates to cover any contractual liability.
8. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Others[1], this Court referred to the concurring opinion rendered in a three-Judge Bench decision in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. V. Asha Rani[2] and ruled thus:- “In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owed no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.” It is worthy to note that in the said case the controversy related to gratuitous passenger carried in private vehicle.
9. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jhuma Saha (Smt) and Others[3], the controversy related to fastening of liability on the insurer for the death of the owner of a registered vehicle, Maruti van. The Court observed that the accident did not involve any other motor vehicle than the one which he was driving and as the liability of the insurer Company is to the extent of indemnification of the insured against the respondent or an injured person, a third person or in respect of damages of property, the insured cannot be fastened with any liability under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, and, therefore, the question of the insurer being liable to indemnify the insured does not arise. Thereafter, the Bench referred to the decision in Dhanraj v. New India Assurance co. Ltd.[4] and ruled thus:- “The additional premium was not paid in respect of the entire risk of death or bodily injury of the owner of the vehicle. If that be so, Section 147 (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act which in no uncertain terms covers a risk of a third party only would be attracted in the present case.”
10. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain Dhut[5], after elaborately referring to the analysis made in Asha Rani (supra), the Bench stated thus:- “Section 149 is part of Chapter XI which is titled “Insurance of Motor Vehicles against Third-Party Risks”. A significant factor which needs to be noticed is that there is no contractual relation between the insurance company and the third party. The liabilities and the obligations relatable to third parties are created only by fiction of Sections 147 and 149 of the Act.” In the said case, it has been opined that although the statute is a beneficial one qua the third party, yet that benefit cannot be extended to the owner of the offending vehicle.
11. In Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Meena Variyal and Others[6], the facts were that a Regional Manager of the company, which was the owner of the vehicle, was himself driving a vehicle of the company and met with an accident and eventually succumbed to the injuries. It was contended by the insurer before this Court that the policy did not cover the employee of the owner who was driving the vehicle while attending the business of the employer-company and the deceased was not a third party in terms of the policy or in terms of the Act. It was also urged that the same would be the position even if the deceased was only travelling in the car in his capacity as a Regional Manger of the owner-company and the vehicle was being driven by the driver. This Court observed that a contract of insurance is ordinarily a contract of indemnity and when a car belonging to an owner is insured with the insurance company and it is being driven by a driver employed by the insured, when it meets with an accident, the primary liability under law for payment of compensation is that of the driver.
Once the driver is liable, the owner of the vehicle becomes vicariously liable for payment of compensation. It is this vicarious liability of the owner that is indemnified by the insurer. Dealing with the said liability, the Bench analysed the language employed under Section 147 (1) of the Act and observed as follows:- “The object of the insistence on insurance under Chapter XI of the Act thus seems to be to compulsorily cover the liability relating to their person or properties of third parties and in respect of employees of the insured employer, the liability that may arise under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of the driver, the conductor and the one carried in a goods vehicle carrying goods. On this plain understanding of Section 147, we find it difficult to hold that the Insurance Company, in the case on hand, was liable to indemnify the owner, the employer Company, the insured, in respect of the death of one of its employees, who according to the claim, was not the driver.
Be it noted that the liability is not one arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and it is doubtful, on the case put forward by the claimant, whether the deceased could be understood as a workman coming within the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. Therefore, on a plain reading of Section 147 of the Act, it appears to be clear that the Insurance Company is not liable to indemnify the insured in the case on hand.”
12. After so stating, the Bench adverted to the decisions in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh[7], Laxmi Narain Dhut (supra), Asha Rani (supra) and Tilak Singh (supra) and opined that a policy in terms of Section 147 of the Act does not cover persons other than third parties.
Eventually, it ruled thus:- “The victim was the Regional Manager of the Company that owned the car. He was using the car given to him by the Company for use. Whether he is treated as the owner of the vehicle or as an employee, he is not covered by the insurance policy taken in terms of the Act—without any special contract—since there is no award under the Workmen's Compensation Act that is required to be satisfied by the insurer. In these circumstances, we hold that the appellant Insurance Company is not liable to indemnify the insured and is also not obliged to satisfy the award of the Tribunal/Court and then have recourse to the insured, the owner of the vehicle.”
13. In Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Sudhakaran K. V. and Others[8], a two-Judge Bench, while dealing with the issue whether a pillion rider on a scooter would be a third party within the meaning of Section 147 of the Act, after referring to number of authorities, stated thus:- “The contract of insurance did not cover the owner of the vehicle, certainly not the pillion-rider. The deceased was travelling as a passenger, stricto sensu may not be as a gratuitous passenger as in a given case she may not (sic) be a member of the family, a friend or other relative. In the sense of the term which is used in common parlance, she might not be even a passenger. In view of the terms of the contract of insurance, however, she would not be covered thereby.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx The law which emerges from the said decisions, is: (i) the liability of the insurance company in a case of this nature is not extended to a pillion-rider of the motor vehicle unless the requisite amount of premium is paid for covering his/her risk; (ii) the legal obligation arising under Section 147 of the Act cannot be extended to an injury or death of the owner of vehicle or the pillion-rider; (iii) the pillion-rider in a two-wheeler was not to be treated as a third party when the accident has taken place owing to rash and negligent riding of the scooter and not on the part of the driver of another vehicle.”
14. In New India Assurance Company Limited v. Sadanand Mukhi and Others[9], the son of the owner of the insured while driving the motor cycle met with an accident and died. The accident allegedly took place as a stray dog came in front of the vehicle. The stand of the insurance company was that in view of the relationship between the deceased and the owner of the vehicle being father and son the deceased was not a third party. The Bench relied on the decisions in Tilak Singh (supra), Jhuma Saha (supra), Meena Variyal (supra), Laxmi Narain Dhut (supra) and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Davinder Singh[10] and came to hold that the insurance company was not liable to indemnify the owner.
15. At this juncture, we may refer with profit to a two-Judge Bench decision in Bhagyalakshmi and others v. United Insurance Company Limited and another[11] wherein the learned Judges took note of the contention of the learned senior counsel for the claimant-appellant which was to the effect that after the deletion of the second proviso appended to Section 95(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 in the 1988 Act, the liability of a passenger in a private vehicle must also be included in the policy in terms of the provisions of the 1988 Act. The Bench reproduced the policy, referred to Section 64-B of the Insurance Act, 1938, took note of the role of the Tariff Advisory Committee and referred to the decisions in Amrit Lal Sood and Another v. Kaushalya Devi Thapar and Others[12], Asha Rani (supra), Tilak Singh (supra), Jhuma Saha (supra) and Sudhakaran K. V. and Others (supra) and observed thus :- “Before this Court, however, the nature of policies which came up for consideration were Act policies. This Court did not deal with a package policy. If the Tariff Advisory Committee seeks to enforce its decision in regard to coverage of third-party risk which would include all persons including occupants of the vehicle and the insurer having entered into a contract of insurance in relation thereto, we are of the opinion that the matter may require a deeper scrutiny.” On a perusal of the aforesaid paragraph, it is clear as crystal that the decisions that have been referred to in Bhagyalakshmi (supra) involved only “Act Policies”. The Bench felt that the matter would be different if the Tariff Advisory Committee seeks to enforce its decision in regard to coverage of third party risk which would include an occupant in a vehicle.
It is worth noting that the Bench referred to certain decisions of Delhi High Court and Madras High Court and thought it appropriate to refer the matter to a larger Bench. Be it noted, in the said case, the Court was dealing with comprehensive policy which is also called a package policy.
In that context, in the earlier part of the judgment, the Bench had stated thus:- “The policy in question is a package policy. The contract of insurance if given its face value covers the risk not only of a third party but also of persons travelling in the car including the owner thereof. The question is as to whether the policy in question is a comprehensive policy or only an Act policy.”
16. Thus, it is quite vivid that the Bench had made a distinction between the “Act policy” and “comprehensive policy/package policy”. We respectfully concur with the said distinction. The crux of the matter is what would be the liability of the insurer if the policy is a “comprehensive/package policy”. We are absolutely conscious that the matter has been referred to a larger Bench, but, as is evident, the Bench has also observed that it would depend upon the view of the Tariff Advisory Committee pertaining to enforcement of its decision to cover the liability of an occupant in a vehicle in a “comprehensive/package policy” regard being had to the contract of insurance.
17. At this stage, it is apposite to note that when the decision in Bhagyalakshmi (supra) was rendered, a decision of High Court of Delhi dealing with the view of the Tariff Advisory Committee in respect of “comprehensive/package policy” had not come into the field. We think it apt to refer to the same as it deals with certain factual position which can be of assistance. The High Court of Delhi in Yashpal Luthra and Anr.
V. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another[13], after recording the evidence of the competent authority of Tariff Advisory Committee (TAC) and Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA), reproduced a circular dated 16.11.2009 issued by IRDA to CEOs of all the Insurance Companies restating the factual position relating to the liability of Insurance companies in respect of a pillion rider on a two-wheeler and occupants in a private car under the comprehensive/package policy. The relevant portion of the circular which has been reproduced by the High Court is as follows:- “IRDA Ref: IRDA/NL/CIR/F&U/073/11/2009 16.11.2009 To CEOs of all general insurance companies Re: Liability of insurance companies in respect of occupants of a Private car and pillion rider on a two-wheeler under Standard Motor Package Policy (also called Comprehensive Policy).
Insurers’ attention is drawn to wordings of Section (II) 1 (ii) of Standard Motor Package Policy (also called Comprehensive Policy) for private car and two-wheeler under the (erstwhile) India Motor Tariff.
For convenience the relevant provisions are reproduced hereunder:- ‘Section II - Liability to Third Parties
1. Subject to the limits of liabilities as laid down in the Schedule hereto the company will indemnify the insured in the event of an accident caused by or arising out of the use of the insured vehicle against all sums which the insured shall become legally liable to pay in respect of - (i) death or bodily injury to any person including occupants carried in the vehicle (provided such occupants are not carried for hire or reward) but except so far as it is necessary to meet the requirements of Motor Vehicles Act, the Company shall not be liable where such death or injury arises out of and in the course of employment of such person by the insured.’ It is further brought to the attention of insurers that the above provisions are in line with the following circulars earlier issued by the TAC on the subject:
(i) Circular M.V. No. l of 1978 - dated 18th March, 1978 (regarding occupants carried in Private Car) effective from 25th March, 1977.
(ii) MOT/GEN/10 dated 2nd June, 1986 (regarding pillion riders in a two-wheeler) effective from the date of the circular.
The above circulars make it clear that the insured liability in respect of occupant(s) carried in a private car and pillion rider carried on two-wheeler is covered under the Standard Motor Package Policy. A copy each of the above circulars is enclosed for ready reference.
The Authority vide circular No. 066/IRDA/F&U/Mar-08 dated March 26, 2008 issued under File & Use Guidelines has reiterated that pending further orders the insurers shall not vary the coverage, terms and conditions wording, warranties, clauses and endorsements in respect of covers that were under the erstwhile tariffs. Further the Authority, vide circular No. 019/IRDA/NL/F&U/Oct-08 dated November 6, 2008 has mandated that insurers are not permitted to abridge the scope of standard covers available under the erstwhile tariffs beyond the options permitted in the erstwhile tariffs. All general insurers are advised to adhere to the afore-mentioned circulars and any non- compliance of the same would be viewed seriously by the Authority.
This is issued with the approval of competent authority.
Sd/- (Prabodh Chander) Executive Director” [emphasis supplied]
18. The High Court has also reproduced a circular issued by IRD dated 3.12.2009. It is instructive to quote the same:- “IRDA IRDA/NL/CIR/F&U/078/12/2009 3.12.2009.
To All CEOs of All general insurance companies (except ECGC, AIC, Staff Health, Apollo) Re: Liability of insurance companies in respect of occupant of a private car and pillion rider in a two-wheeler under Standard Motor Package Policy (also called Comprehensive Policy).
Pursuant to the Order of the Delhi High Court dated 23.11.2009 in MAC APP No. 176/2009 in the case of Yashpal Luthra v. United India and Ors., the Authority convened a meeting on November 26, 2009 of the CEOs of all the general insurance companies doing motor insurance business in the presence of the counsel appearing on behalf of the Authority and the leaned amicus curie.
Based on the unanimous decision taken in the meeting by the representatives of the general insurance companies to comply with the IRDA circular dated 16th November, 2009 restating the position relating to the liability of all the general insurance companies doing motor insurance business in respect of the occupants in a private car and pillion rider on a two wheeler under the comprehensive/package policies which was communicated to the court on the same day i.e.
November 26, 2009 and the court was pleased to pass the order (dt.
26.11.2009) received from the Court Master, Delhi High Court, is enclosed for your ready reference and adherence. In terms of the said order and the admitted liability of all the general insurance companies doing motor insurance business in respect of the occupants in a private car and pillion rider on a two-wheeler under the comprehensive/package policies, you are advised to confirm to the Authority, strict compliance of the circular dated 16th November, 2009 and orders dt. 26.11.2009 of the High Court. Such compliance on your part would also involve:
i) withdrawing the plea against such a contest wherever taken in
the cases pending before the MACT, and issue appropriate
instructions to their respective lawyers and the operating officers within 7 days;
ii) with respect to all appeals pending before the High Courts on this point, issuing instructions within 7 days to the respective operating officers and the counsel to withdraw the contest on this ground which would require identification of the number of appeals pending before the High Courts (whether filed by the claimants or the insurers) on this issue within a period of 2 weeks and the contest on this ground being withdrawn within a period of four weeks thereafter;
iii) With respect to the appeals pending before the Hon'ble Apex Court, informing, within a period of 7 days, their respective advocates on record about the IRDA Circulars, for appropriate advice and action. Your attention is also drawn to the discussions in the CEOs meeting on 26.11.2009, when it was reiterated that insurers must take immediate steps to collect statistics about accident claims on the above subject through a central point of reference decided by them as the same has to be communicated in due course to the Honourable High Court. You are therefore advised to take up the exercise of collecting and collating the information within a period of two months to ensure necessary & effective compliance of the order of the Court. The information may be centralized with the Secretariat of the General Insurance Council and also furnished to us.
IRDA requires a written confirmation from you on the action taken by you in this regard.
This has the approval of the Competent Authority.
Sd/- (Prabodh Chander) Executive Director” [emphasis added]
19. It is extremely important to note here that till 31st December, 2006 the Tariff Advisory Committee and, thereafter, from 1st January, 2007, IRDA functioned as the statutory regulatory authorities and they are entitled to fix the tariff as well as the terms and conditions of the policies by all insurance companies. The High Court had issued notice to the Tariff Advisory Committee and the IRDA to explain the factual position as regards the liability of the insurance companies in respect of an occupant in a private car under the “comprehensive/ package policy”. Before the High Court, the Competent Authority of IRDA had stated that on 2nd June, 1986, the Tariff Advisory Committee had issued instructions to all the insurance companies to cover the pillion rider of a scooter/motorcycle under the “comprehensive policy” and the said position continues to be in vogue till date. It had also admitted that the “comprehensive policy” is presently called a “package policy”. It is the admitted position, as the decision would show, the earlier circulars dated 18th March, 1978 and 2nd June, 1986 continue to be valid and effective and all insurance companies are bound to pay the compensation in respect of the liability towards an occupant in a car under the “comprehensive/package policy” irrespective of the terms and conditions contained in the policy. The competent authority of the IRDA was also examined before the High Court who stated that the circulars dated 18th March, 1978 and 2nd June, 1986 of the Tariff Advisory Committee were incorporated in the Indian Motor Tariff effective from 1st July, 2002 and they continue to be operative and binding on the insurance companies.
Because of the aforesaid factual position, the circulars dated 16th November 2009 and 3rd December, 2009, that have been reproduced hereinabove, were issued.
20. It is also worthy to note that the High Court, after referring to individual circulars issued by various insurance companies, eventually stated thus:- “In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that the comprehensive/package policy of a two wheeler covers a pillion rider and comprehensive/package policy of a private car covers the occupants and where the vehicle is covered under a comprehensive/package policy, there is no need for Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to go into the question whether the Insurance Company is liable to compensate for the death or injury of a pillion rider on a two-wheeler or the occupants in a private car. In fact, in view of the TAC’s directives and those of the IRDA, such a plea was not permissible and ought not to have been raised as, for instance, it was done in the present case.”
21. In view of the aforesaid factual position, there is no scintilla of doubt that a “comprehensive/package policy” would cover the liability of the insurer for payment of compensation for the occupant in a car. There is no cavil that an “Act Policy” stands on a different footing from a “Comprehensive/Package Policy”. As the circulars have made the position very clear and the IRDA, which is presently the statutory authority, has commanded the insurance companies stating that a “Comprehensive/Package Policy” covers the liability, there cannot be any dispute in that regard.
We may hasten to clarify that the earlier pronouncements were rendered in respect of the “Act Policy” which admittedly cannot cover a third party risk of an occupant in a car. But, if the policy is a “Comprehensive/Package Policy”, the liability would be covered. These aspects were not noticed in the case of Bhagyalakshmi (supra) and, therefore, the matter was referred to a larger Bench. We are disposed to think that there is no necessity to refer the present matter to a larger Bench as the IRDA, which is presently the statutory authority, has clarified the position by issuing circulars which have been reproduced in the judgment by the Delhi High Court and we have also reproduced the same.
22. In view of the aforesaid legal position, the question that emerges for consideration is whether in the case at hand, the policy is an “Act Policy” or “Comprehensive/Package Policy”. There has been no discussion either by the tribunal or the High Court in this regard. True it is, before us, Annexure P-1 has been filed which is a policy issued by the insurer. It only mentions the policy to be a “comprehensive policy” but we are inclined to think that there has to be a scanning of the terms of the entire policy to arrive at the conclusion whether it is really a “package policy” to cover the liability of an occupant in a car.
23. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we think it apposite to set aside the finding of the High Court and the tribunal as regards the liability of the insurer and remit the matter to the tribunal to scrutinize the policy in a proper perspective and, if necessary, by taking additional evidence and if the conclusion is arrived at that the policy in question is a “Comprehensive/Package Policy”, the liability would be fastened on the insurer. As far as other findings recorded by the tribunal and affirmed by the High Court are concerned, they remain undisturbed.
24. Consequently, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above and the matter is remitted to the tribunal for the purpose of adjudication as directed hereinabove. There shall be no order as to costs.
...................................J.
[K. S. Radhakrishnan] 
........................................J
[Dipak Misra] New Delhi;
November 20, 2012. 

ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. SURENDRA NATH LOOMBA AND ORS. [2012] EssenSC 677 (20 November 2012)


Judgement 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1345-1346 OF 2009 

Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. ...Appellant 
Versus 
Surendra Nath Loomba and Others ...Respondents 

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1347-1348 OF 2009 

Surendra Nath Loomba ...Appellant 
Versus 
Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & ors. ...Respondents

 
Dipak Misra, J.

In the present batch of appeals, two preferred by the Oriental Insurance Company Limited and two preferred by claimant, the assail is to the common judgment passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in A.O. No. 201 of 2003 and A.O. No. 284 of 2003 wherein the award dated 19.5.2003 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Dehradun (for short ‘the tribunal’) in M.A.C.T. Petition No. 10 of 1999 was challenged by the insurer and the claimant from different spectrums.
2. The facts which are requisite to be stated are that on 9.10.1998 about 4.30 a.m. claimant, Surendra Nath Loomba, was travelling in a Maruti Esteem Car bearing Registration No. DL 8C-5096 belonging to the respondent No. 3, Savita Matta, and driven by the respondent No. 2, Raj Loomba, the son of the claimant. Near the President Body-guard House, Rajpur Road, the vehicle dashed against a tree and in the accident the windscreen (front) of car was smashed and its pieces got inserted into the eyes of the claimant as a consequence of which he lost his both eyes. As set forth, at the time of the accident the claimant was working as a Senior Manager in Punjab National Bank and his gross salary was Rs.18,949.86 per month and various perquisites were also attached to the service. Keeping in view his salary and other perquisites he filed an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 before the tribunal putting forth a claim of Rs.62,00,000/- with 18% interest as compensation.
3. The respondent No. 2, Raj Loomba, filed his written statement contending, inter alia, that at the time of accident the vehicle was insured with the Oriental Insurance Company Limited and hence, it being the insurer was liable to pay the compensation.
4. The insurance company resisted the claim of the claimant on the ground that the driver of the vehicle did not have a valid driving licence;
that the proceedings had been initiated in a collusive manner; and that even if the accident as well as the injuries were proven the insurer was not liable to indemnify the owner as the claimant was travelling as a gratuitous passenger.
5. The tribunal on the basis of material brought on record came to hold that as the insurer had issued Certificate of Insurance in respect of the vehicle in question and it was valid during the period when the accident occurred, it was liable to pay the compensation; that the opposite party No. 1 had a valid driving licence and the accident had occurred and there was no collusion between the parties; and that the victim was entitled to get a total sum of Rs.20,97,984/- towards compensation with 9% interest per annum regard being had to the pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses. Be it noted, the tribunal, while computing the amount, had deducted certain sum under certain heads which need not be stated in detail.
6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid award the insurance company preferred A.O.
No. 201 of 2003 and the injured claimant preferred A.O. No. 284 of 2003 before the High Court. The High Court, by the common impugned order, reduced the amount of compensation to Rs.16,42,656/- and concurred with the conclusion arrived at by the tribunal as regards the liability. Thus, the appeal preferred by the insurance company was allowed in part and the appeal preferred by the claimant was dismissed. Hence, the present batch of appeals by the insurance company as well as by the claimant.
7. First, we shall deal with the appeals preferred by the insurance company It is worth noting that the Certificate of Insurance was filed before the tribunal which clearly showed that the vehicle was insured with the appellant-company. Dr. Meera Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellant-insurer would submit that it was only an “Act Policy” and, therefore, the liability of the insurer does not arise. She has commended us to the decisions in United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v. Tilak Singh and Others[1], Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Jhuma Saha (Smt.)[2], Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Sudhakaran K.V. and others[3] and New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Sadanand Mukhi and others[4].
8. Learned counsel for the respondents would contend that whether the policy is an “Act Policy” or a “Comprehensive/Package Policy” or whether any extra premium was paid to cover the passenger, is not reflected from the Certificate of Insurance as the policy was not brought on record by tendering the same before the tribunal.
9. In Tilak Singh (supra) this Court referred to the concurring opinion rendered in a three-Judge Bench decision in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. V.
Asha Rani[5] and ruled thus:- “In our view, although the observations made in Asha Rani case were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of the appellant Insurance Company that it owed no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased Rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy, and hence it did not cover the risk of death of or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger.” It is worthy to note in the said case the controversy related to gratuitous passenger carried in a private vehicle.
10. In Jhuma Saha (Smt.) (supra) this Court has stated thus: - “The additional premium was not paid in respect of the entire risk of death or bodily injury of the owner of the vehicle. If that be so, Section 147 (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act which in no uncertain terms covers a risk of a third party only would be attracted in the present case.”
11. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain Dhut[6] after elaborately referring to the analysis made in Asha Rani (supra) the Bench ruled thus:- “Section 149 is part of Chapter XI which is titled “Insurance of Motor Vehicles against Third-Party Risks”. A significant factor which needs to be noticed is that there is no contractual relation between the insurance company and the third party. The liabilities and the obligations relatable to third parties are created only by fiction of Sections 147 and 149 of the Act”.
In the said case it has been opined that although the statute is a beneficial one qua the third party but that benefit cannot be extended to the owner of the offending vehicle. The said principle was reiterated in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Meena Variyal and Other[7], Sudhakaran K. V. (supra) and Sadanand Mukhi (supra).
12. It is apt to note here that this Court in Bhagyalakshmi and others v.
United Insurance Company Limited and another[8], after dealing with various facets and considering the authorities in Amrit Lal Sood and Another v.
Kaushalya Devi Thapar and Others[9], Asha Rani (supra), Tilak Singh (supra), Jhuma Saha (supra), Sudhakaran K. V. and Others (supra), has observed thus :- “Before this Court, however, the nature of policies which came up for consideration were Act policies. This Court did not deal with a package policy. If the Tariff Advisory Committee seeks to enforce its decision in regard to coverage of third-party risk which would include all persons including occupants of the vehicle and the insurer having entered into a contract of insurance in relation thereto, we are of the opinion that the matter may require a deeper scrutiny.” 13. Recently this Bench in National Insurance Company Ltd. v.
Balakrishnan & Another[10], after referring to various decisions and copiously to the decision in Bhagyalakshmi (supra), held that there is a distinction between “Act Policy” and “Comprehensive/Package Policy”.
Thereafter, the Bench took note of a decision rendered by Delhi High Court in Yashpal Luthra and Anr. V. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another[11] wherein the High Court had referred to the circulars issued by the Tariff Advisory Committee (TAC) and Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA). This Court referred to the portion of circulars dated 16.11.2009 and 3.12.2009 which had been reproduced by the High Court and eventually held as follows: - “19. It is extremely important to note here that till 31st December, 2006 Tariff Advisory Committee and thereafter from 1st January, 2007, IRDA functioned as the statutory regulatory authorities and they are entitled to fix the tariff as well as the terms and conditions of the policies by all insurance companies. The High Court had issued notice to the Tariff Advisory Committee and the IRDA to explain the factual position as regards the liability of the insurance companies in respect of an occupant in a private car under the “comprehensive/ package policy”. Before the High Court the Competent Authority of IRDA had stated that on 2nd June, 1986 the Tariff Advisory Committee had issued instructions to all the insurance companies to cover the pillion rider of a scooter/motorcycle under the “comprehensive policy” and the said position continues to be in vogue till date. He had also admitted that the comprehensive policy is presently called a package policy. It is the admitted position, as the decision would show, the earlier circulars dated 18th March, 1978 and 2nd June, 1986 continue to be valid and effective and all insurance companies are bound to pay the compensation in respect of the liability towards an occupant in a car under the “comprehensive/package policy” irrespective of the terms and conditions contained in the policy. The competent authority of the IRDA was also examined before the High Court who stated that the circulars dated 18th March, 1978 and 2nd June, 1986 of the Tariff Advisory Committee were incorporated in the Indian Motor Tariff effective from 1st July, 2002 and they continue to be operative and binding on the insurance companies.
Because of the aforesaid factual position the circulars dated 16th November 2009 and 3rd December, 2009, that have been reproduced hereinabove, were issued.
20. It is also worthy to note that the High Court after referring to individual circulars issued by various insurance companies and eventually stated thus:- “In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that the comprehensive/package policy of a two wheeler covers a pillion rider and comprehensive/ package policy of a private car covers the occupants and where the vehicle is covered under a comprehensive/package policy, there is no need for Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to go into the question whether the Insurance Company is liable to compensate for the death or injury of a pillion rider on a two-wheeler or the occupants in a private car. In fact, in view of the TAC’s directives and those of the IRDA, such a plea was not permissible and ought not to have been raised as, for instance, it was done in the present case.”
21. In view of the aforesaid factual position there is no scintilla of doubt that a “comprehensive/package policy” would cover the liability of the insurer for payment of compensation for the occupant in a car. There is no cavil that an “Act Policy” stands on a different footing than a “Comprehensive/Package Policy”. As the circulars have made the position very clear and the IRDA, which is presently the statutory authority, has commanded the insurance companies stating that a “Comprehensive/Package Policy” covers the liability, there cannot be any dispute in that regard. We may hasten to clarify that the earlier pronouncements were rendered in respect of the “Act Policy” which admittedly cannot cover a third party risk of an occupant in a car. But, if the policy is a “Comprehensive/Package Policy”, the liability would be covered. These aspects were not noticed in the case of Bhagyalakshmi (supra) and, therefore, the matter was referred to a larger Bench. We are disposed to think that there is no necessity to refer the present matter to a larger Bench as the IRDA, which is presently the statutory authority, has clarified the position by issuing circulars which have been reproduced in the judgment by the Delhi High Court and we have also reproduced the same.
22. In view of the aforesaid legal position the question that emerges for consideration is whether in the case at hand the policy is an “Act Policy” or “Comprehensive/Package Policy”.
There has been no discussion either by the tribunal or the High Court in this regard. True it is, before us Annexure P-1 has been filed which is a policy issued by the insurer. It only mentions the policy to be a comprehensive policy but we are inclined to think that there has to be a scanning of the terms of the entire policy to arrive at the conclusion whether it is really a package policy to cover the liability of an occupant in a car.”
14. We have quoted in extenso to reiterate the legal position. In the case at hand, the policy has not been brought on record. The learned counsel for the appellant-insurer would submit that it is an “Act Policy”.
The learned counsel for the respondent would seriously dispute and submit that extra premium might have been paid or it may be a “Comprehensive/Package Policy”. When Certificate of Insurance is filed but the policy is not brought on record it only conveys that the vehicle is insured. The nature of policy cannot be discerned from the same. Thus, we are disposed to think that it would be appropriate to remit the matter to the tribunal to enable the insurer to produce the policy and grant liberty to the parties to file additional documents and also lead further evidence as advised, and we order accordingly.
15. It needs no special emphasis to state that whether the insurer would be liable or not would depend upon the nature of the policy when it is brought on record in a manner as required by law.
16. As far as quantum is concerned, though numbers of grounds were urged, yet the learned counsel for the parties did not really address on the same and, therefore, we do not think it necessary to dwell upon the same and treat it as just and proper compensation requiring no interference.
17. In the result, the appeals preferred by the insurer, namely, Oriental Insurance Company Limited are allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove and to that extent the award is set aside and the matter is remitted to the tribunal and the appeals preferred by the claimant for enhancement of compensation are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
........................................J.
[K. S. Radhakrishnan]
 .................................................J.
 [Dipak Misra]
 New Delhi;
November 20, 2012

Soon, open a bank account with single proof document

Soon, you can open a bank account with just one document which includes your address and identity proof. The Reserve Bank of India is moving towards simplifying the Know Your Customer norms that banks follow while issuing loans and opening accounts. 

“We have done some further relaxation with this issue of one set of identity proof and one
set of address proof. We’re trying to see if there is one document as both and if it can be accepted. For example, the Aadhar card or passport,” said HR Khan, deputy governor, Reserve Bank of India.
Banks currently ask for different sets of proofs for verifying identity and address
Khan said the new guidelines will be out in a week. He said the RBI has also provided more time to customers to submit new address proofs with banks. 
“If somebody changes his address, he can be given time for six months to give another proof. For six months, he can run the same proof,” said Khan, speaking on the sidelines of the Bank Economists Conference 2012 here.

Thursday, November 22, 2012

BMW case - Supreme Court Advocate Anand told to provide free legal services

An advocate R.K. Anand has been told by the Supreme Court to provide free legal services for a year and pay Rs.21 lakh to Bar Council of India to support law colleges attended mostly by students from poor families.

Delhi High Court convicted Anand for his attempt to influence prosecution witness Sunil Kulkarni in the 1999 BMW hit?and?run case, in which six people were killed.

The involvement of Anand was exposed by a news channel in a sting operation.

The apex court bench of Justice G.S. Singhvi, Justice Aftab Alam and Justice C.K. Prasad said that no useful purpose would be served in sending Anand to jail while accepting his offer to perform the pro bono services.

Justice Alam said “…circumstances persuade us to take a slightly lenient view of the matter. We feel that no useful purpose will be served by sending the contemnor to jail. On the contrary, by keeping him out and making him do the things that he has undertaken to do would serve a useful social purpose. We, accordingly, accept the offer made by the contemnor.”

The court said that at the end of one year, Anand could resume his private law practice. But he would not leave any case assigned to him by the Delhi Legal Services Authority incomplete. He would continue to attend to those cases, free of cost, till they come to a close.

According to the court, “He shall exclusively devote his professional services to help pro bono the accused who, on account of lack of resources, are not in a position to engage any lawyer to defend themselves and have no means to have their cases effectively presented before the court”

The judgment said the Delhi Legal Services Authority, in coordination with the Delhi High Court Legal Services Authority, will frame a scheme to avail of Anand’s services.

The apex court by its July 29, 2009, verdict not only upheld the Delhi High court order holding Anand guilty of derailing the course of justice in the BMW case, but also issued notice to him asking as to why his sentence should not be enhanced.

In the BMW case, six people, including three policemen, were killed Jan 10, 1999. The luxury car was being driven by Sanjeev Nanda, son of arms dealer Suresh Nanda and grandson o

Supreme Court questions operations of private security agencies

The apex court bench of Justice D.K. Jain and Justice J.S. Khehar while issuing the notice to the home ministry told that we take suo motu cognizance of the said reports, relating, inter alia, to the licensing and working of private security agencies.

The court said the “recent firing incident, widely reported in the press, resulting in the death of two people, allegedly on account of use of firearms by some private security personnel is a matter of grave concern”.

Framing four questions for the home ministry to address, the apex court bench said that “the questions are of great public importance and need to be urgently addressed.”

The court asked as to “what is the legal regulatory framework under which the private security agencies operate” and “what are the parameters/norms that are considered for issue of firearm/weapon licences to private security personnel”.

The court also sought information on the guidelines, if any, “governing the use of such firearms/weapons by private security personnel”; and if not, “whether it is necessary to frame definite parameters on the subject”.

The court asked the ministry to inform it about “the rights and duties of private security agencies under the law, particularly, vis−a−vis the criminal law of the land”.

The apex court asked the ministry to file an affidavit explaining its stand on the “broad questions” posed by it and gave it two weeks time to respond. The court said the affidavit should be filed by a senior ministry official

Tuesday, November 20, 2012

India votes against UNGA resolution banning death penalty

India votes against UNGA resolution banning death penalty

India was among the 39 countries that voted against a UN General Assembly draft resolution which called for abolishing the death penalty, saying every nation had the "sovereign right" to determine its own legal system.
The non-binding resolution called for a moratorium on executions with a view to abolishing the death penalty.

It was adopted yesterday at the General Assembly's Third Committee, which deals with social and humanitarian issues, after 110 nations voted in favour of the resolution while 36 abstained.

The draft resolution expresses its "deep concern about the continued application of the death penalty and calls on states to establish a moratorium on executions, with a view to abolishing the practice".

It calls on nations to progressively restrict the death penalty's use and not impose capital punishment for offences committed by persons under age 18 or pregnant women.

States would also be called on to reduce the number of offences for which the death penalty might be imposed.

Speaking in explanation of the vote, India said each state had the sovereign right to determine its own legal system.

"The draft resolution sought a moratorium on executions. India could not support the text in its present form," India said in its explanation of the vote.

Among the nations voting against the resolution were Bangladesh, China, Korea, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Kuwait, Libya, Pakistan and the US.

An Indian delegate participating in the vote added that the practice of death penalty was exercised only on the "rarest of occasions" in India and the country's laws contained provisions for suspending the death penalty in the cases of pregnant women.

The delegate further said that in India death sentences must be confirmed by a superior court and the accused had the right to appeal to a superior court or the Supreme Court.

The resolution is voted on every two years at the Assembly's third committee.

Those who voted in favour included Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, Israel, Russia, Nepal, South Africa and UK.

Ajmal Kasab hanged at Yerwada Jail in Pune


 Ajamal  Kasab, accused for the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack, was today hanged at the Yerwada Jail in Pune at 7:30am.
NEW DELHI: Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorist Ajmal Kasab, accused for the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack, was today hanged at the Yerwada Jail in Pune at 7:30 am after President Pranab Mukherjee rejected his mercy petition.

According to an TV reports, the petition was rejected on November 5 after which the Lashkar-e-Toiba operative was shifted from Mumbai's Arthur Road Jail to Pune's Yerawada Jail.

The entire process was excuted very secretly, the report added.

The President's rejection came two months after the Home ministry rejected Kasab's mercy petition.

Kasab and nine other Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists had sailed into Mumbai on November 26, 2008 from Karachi and killed 166 people.