Judgement Reportable
IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2001 of 2010
Dr. Sunil Clifford Daniel ..................Appellant
Versus
State of Punjab ...............................Respondent
Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.
1. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment and order
dated 1.4.2009, passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in
Criminal Appeal No. 399-DB of 2000, by which it has affirmed the judgment and
order dated 21.8.2000 passed by the Sessions Judge, Ludhiana in Sessions Case
No. 28 of 1996, convicting the appellant under Sections 302 and 201 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the˜IPC"), and awarded
him a sentence to undergo RI for life and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- and in
default of this, to undergo further RI for a period of 3 months. The appellant
has further been sentenced to undergo RI for two years and to pay a fine of
Rs.1,000/- and in default of this, to undergo further RI for a period of 2
months under Section 201 IPC. It has further been directed that the sentences
would run concurrently.
2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are as under:
A. The appellant got married to Dr. Loyalla Shagoufta, deceased, on
29.10.1993. Both of them being qualified doctors, were working in the Christian
Medical College (hereinafter referred to as ‘CMC’), Hospital Ludhiana. The
relationship between the husband and wife became strained and they have been
living separately since June 1994.
B. As per the appellant, a petition for divorce by mutual consent was filed
on 20.2.1996, under Section 28 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 in the Court of
the District Judge, Ludhiana, and both parties therein, appeared before the
District Judge, Ludhiana on the first motion of the case. However, they were
asked to wait for the second motion.
C. On 9.3.1996, the appellant handed over a set of blood stained clothes to
Dr. B. Pawar, the Medical Superintendent, (PW.1), stating that when he came to
his room that day, the same were found therein. Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1), informed
the police about the said incident on the same date.
D. Dr. Loyalla Shagoufta, wife of the appellant, had informed her mother Smt.
Victoria Rani (PW.2), who was living in Jagadhari, District Yamunanagar, by way
of a telephone call on 6.3.1996, that she would visit her on 8.3.1996. However,
she did not reach Jagadhari on 8.3.1996. Victoria Rani (PW.2), then came to
Ludhiana on 10.3.1996, and found that her daughter was missing. Smt.
Victoria Rani (PW.2) then lodged FIR No. 16 of 1996 on 10.3.1996, at 9.40
p.m. wherein being the complainant, she expressed her apprehension that the
appellant herein, had abducted her daughter with the intention of killing her.
E. In the meanwhile, Dr. Namrata Saran, one of the residents of the hostel in
which the deceased resided, also informed Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1), Medical
Superintendent that the deceased had in fact been missing from the hostel since
9.3.1996. After an enquiry it came to light that the deceased was on leave from
9.3.1996 to 16.3.1996.
F. Piara Singh, ASI (PW.13), took up the investigation of the case and went
to the appellant’s hostel, however, his room No.2010, was found to be locked.
A police party searched for the appellant, among several other places, in the
house of Mr. Rana, one of his relatives, but he could not be traced/found
anywhere. Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1) handed over the blood stained clothes given to him
by the appellant, to the I.O.
G. On 11.3.1996, Vir Rajinder Pal (PW.14), SHO, Police Station, Ludhiana
received a wireless message at 9.00 a.m., from the Police Chowki at Lalton
Kalan, which is about 20 k.m. away from the main city, informing him that the
dead body of a female had been found, lying in the bushes, near the main road.
The Investigating Officer took Victoria Rani (PW.2) with him, while accompanied
by other police personnel, and recovered the body of the deceased from the said
place.
H. Immediately after the recovery of the dead body, Vir Rajinder Pal (PW.14),
visited the room of the appellant in the hostel and conducted a thorough search
of the same, in the presence of Dr. B.
Pawar (PW.1), Medical Superintendent.
I. The post-mortem of the deceased was conducted by a Medical Board
consisting of three doctors, including Dr. U.S. Sooch (PW.11), on 11.3.1996. He
opined that the deceased had died by way of strangulation and a corresponding
ligature mark was found on her neck. She also had several grievous injuries to
her head.
J. On 11.3.1996, the Investigating Officer came to know, in the course of
interrogation that, the appellant had used the car of one Dr. Pauli (CW.2), and
that a blood stained mat was lying in the dicky of the said car. The police
hence took possession of the said car and mat, and sent the mat for preparation
of an FSL report.
K. The appellant was arrested on 11.3.1996, and his room in the hostel was
searched yet again, by one Ashok Kumar, Head Constable from the Forensic
Department, who scraped some blood stained earth from the floor of the room. He
also found a pair of blood stained white V-shaped, Hawaii chappals. Photographs
of the said room were also taken. During interrogation, the appellant made a
disclosure statement on 13.3.1996 to the effect that he would be able to help in
the recovery of some relevant material from a place where he had hidden it. The
appellant then led the police party to a place behind Old Jail, Ludhiana. From
there, after removing some garbage etc., one blood stained gunny bag, a blood
stained dumb-bell and one blood stained tie, were recovered.
L. The said recovered articles alongwith the clothes etc., found on the body
of the deceased at the time of the post-mortem, and the blood stained clothes
given by the appellant to Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1), which were subsequently handed
over to the Investigating Officer, were sent for FSL report.
M. The FSL and serological report was then received, and it revealed that,
all the articles recovered by the police during investigation, including the
blood stained floor of his room, a part of the Hawaii chappals, and the
recovered tie, contained human blood, with the sole exception of the mats found
in the dicky of the car. The blood stains herein, had dis-integrated and it was
therefore not possible to ascertain whether the same also contained human blood.
N. The police completed the investigation of the case and submitted a charge
sheet against the appellant. The case was converted from one under Section 364,
to one under Sections 302 and 201 IPC. The appellant was thus charged, but as he
pleaded not guilty, he claimed trial. The prosecution examined 15 witnesses and
two court witnesses were also examined under Section 311 of Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973 (hereinafter called as `Cr.P.C.’).
O. After the conclusion of the trial and appreciation of the evidence in
full, the learned Sessions Judge, vide judgment and order dated 21.8.2000 found
the appellant guilty on both counts and hence awarded him the aforementioned
punishments.
P. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No.399-DB of 2000
before the High Court, which was dismissed by the impugned judgment and order
dated 1.4.2009.
Hence, this appeal.
3. Mrs. Kanchan Kaur Dhodi, learned counsel appearing for the appellant,
submitted that the investigation was not conducted fairly. She stated that the
appellant herein, had no motive whatsoever to commit the murder of his wife, and
that they were going to separate very soon, as both parties had filed an
application seeking divorce, by mutual consent. Further, no recovery was made
from the room of the appellant in the hostel, rather the objects recovered had
been planted. The appellant did not make any disclosure statement. Thus, even
the recovery made from the place in close vicinity of the Old Jail, was not made
in accordance with law, as there was no independent witness with respect to the
said recoveries, and the recovery memo also, was never signed by the appellant.
It is therefore, a case of circumstantial evidence. The courts below failed to
appreciate that the chain of circumstances is not complete. Hence, the appeal
deserves to be allowed.
4. Per contra, Shri Jayant K. Sud, AAG, appearing for the State of Punjab,
has opposed the appeal, contending that the circumstances in the present case,
point towards the guilt of the appellant without any exception. The deceased was
surely killed in the room of the appellant. Recoveries were clearly made in view
of the disclosure statement made by the appellant. Law does not require the
recovery memo to be signed by the accused. He also stated that the appellant
disappeared after the said incident and could only be arrested after a period of
two days. It is the appellant alone who could explain the circumstances
surrounding the purpose for which he had borrowed the car of Dr. Pauli (CW.2),
and why he had wanted to hire a taxi to go to Jagadhari, as admittedly, his
relations with his wife had been very strained. The appeal clearly lacks merit
and is therefore liable to be dismissed.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the
parties and perused the records.
6. Dr. U.S. Sooch (PW.11), was among the members of the Board of Doctors, who
conducted the post-mortem of the body of the deceased on 11.3.1996, at 5.00 p.m.
and found the following injuries on her person:
“1. Well defined ligature mark 9†x 3.4†placed horizontally on the
front of neck and both lateral sides of the neck, in the middle of neck and on
the right side of the neck reaching below the lobule of the right ear. On
exploration of the ligature the subcutaneous tissue was ecchymosed with
laceration of underneath muscles and the hyoid bone was fractured. The larynx
and trachea were congested.
2. An abrasion ½ †x ½â€ on the tip of the chin.
3. Abrasion ¾â€ x ½â€ and 1†below the angle, of left mandible.
4. Lacerated wound 2, ½â€ x 1†x bone deep obliquely placed on the right
fronto parietal region and 1†inside the hair line near the midline.
5. Lacerated wound with badly crushed margins 2, ½â€ x ½â€ bone deep on the
right occipital region.
6. Defused swelling 3†x 2†on the right occipital region across the
midline.
Therefore, it is evident from the aforementioned injuries, as also from the
medical report, that the deceased Loyalla Shagoufta was, without a doubt, a
victim of homicide.
7. Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1), Medical Superintendent, deposed to the extent that
the deceased was supposed to be on leave from 9.3.1996 to 16.3.1996, and that on
the date of the said incident, she was not present in her hostel. Further, the
appellant had reported to him, that when he came back to his room, he had found
some blood stained clothes therein. The clothes were thereafter collected in a
bag, and were kept in the office of Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1), and the possession of
the same, was subsequently taken, by the police.
8. Smt. Victoria Rani (PW.2), mother of the deceased supported the case of
the prosecution. She deposed that her daughter’s marriage with the appellant
had been quite strained, since no child could be born out of the wedlock and
hence, they had started living separately. Her daughter had informed her by way
of a telephone call, that she would visit Jagadhari on 7.3.1996, but she never
came. Therefore, the complainant, Victoria Rani (PW.2), came to Ludhiana to
search for her daughter, but she was found to be missing. Thus, she submitted a
complaint to the police, on the basis of which, an FIR was lodged, wherein, she
expressed her doubts with regard to the intention of the appellant, as in her
opinion, he had been wanting to get rid of her daughter, and therefore, he could
have kidnapped her for the purpose of killing her and fulfilling his purpose,
once and for all.
9. Some of the witnesses, particularly Sarabjit Singh (PW.7), Security Guard
of the hospital, Anil Kumar (PW.9), a Cook, working in the canteen of the Junior
Doctor’s Hostel and Joginder Singh (PW.12), did not support the case of the
prosecution and turned hostile.
However, the evidence of Kirpal Dev Singh (PW.8), is highly relevant. He
deposed in court that he was providing services of a taxi and would park the
same in the premises of CMC Hospital, Ludhiana. On 8.3.1996, the Canteen
Contractor Joshi, had asked him to talk to Dr. Sunil of CMC, who wished to hire
his taxi to go to Jagadhari. Accordingly, he went to speak to the appellant and
became aware of the fact that the appellant wished to travel to Jagadhari on
9.3.1996. He then went to the appellant’s hostel with his taxi on 9.3.1996,
but was told by him that his wife had presently gone to collect her salary from
Lalton Kalan and therefore, asked him to come again at 10.00 a.m. Thus, the said
witness went to the doctor’s place again, at 10.00 a.m. but he was yet again
asked to come later, this time at 11.30 a.m. It was then, that the said witness
told the doctor that he was no longer willing to go to Jagadhari and he may
engage another taxi, for this purpose.
10. Piara Singh, ASI (PW.13), deposed that he came to know about the said
incident and henceforth went to CMC Hospital, Ludhiana, on 10.3.1996, after
receiving the complaint made by Victoria Rani (PW.2). However, he found room No.
2010 of the said hostel occupied by the appellant to be locked from the outside.
He then went alongwith a police party, to the room of the deceased but found
that, this too had been locked from the outside. The witness then attempted to
search for the appellant, and for this purpose, he also went to the house of Mr.
Rana, who was a relative of the appellant and was living in close proximity to
the hospital in Ludhiana itself, but the appellant could not be found either
here.
He continued his search at various other places, including hotels but was
unable to find the accused.
On 11.3.1996, he stated that he had accompanied Vir Rajinder Pal (PW.14), and
had therefore participated in the recovery of the dead body of deceased Dr.
Loyalla Shagoufta from Lalton Kalan. He further deposed that on 13.3.1996, one
gunny bag, one iron dumb bell and one tie were recovered in the presence of
panch witness, Randhir Singh.
A disclosure statement was also made by the appellant, in his presence to the
effect that, these articles were related to the murder of the deceased and he
had offered to help recover the same.
11. After recording the evidence led by the prosecution, the statement of the
appellant was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The appellant denied all the
allegations made by the prosecution and pleaded innocence. He stated that the
blood stained clothes had been left in the balcony of his room, when he was not
present therein and that he had produced the said clothes before Dr. B.
Pawar (PW.1), Medical Superintendent, prior to the lodging of the FIR.
12. Vir Rajinder Pal (PW.14), supported the case of the prosecution in full,
giving complete details from the very beginning of the incident, as he was
posted as the SHO, Police Station, Ludhiana on 10.3.1996. He deposed regarding
the recoveries made from the room of the accused, after the checking of the room
and the preparation of seizure memos. The keys of the car parked in the premises
of CMC hospital, one blood stained mat, duly attested by the panch witnesses,
and a photocopy of the registration certificate of the said car, were taken into
possession, as also the recovery of the blood stained clothes, which were handed
over to him by Dr. B.
Pawar (PW.1). He further deposed with regard to how the appellant was
arrested as also about the items that were recovered from his body, the recovery
of the blood stained floor from the appellant’s room and the V-shaped pair of
Hawaii chappals. The articles were all sealed and sent for FSL. He finally
deposed regarding the manner in which the body was recovered, how the panchnama
of recovery was prepared, and also about the manner in which, the post- mortem
was conducted.
13. Dr. Pauli (CW.2), deposed that on 9.3.1996, he was contacted by the
appellant at 6.00 p.m. and was told by him that his wife was missing, as a
result of which, the appellant was in need of his car.
Dr. Pauli (CW.2), therefore, gave his car to the appellant, bearing
registration No. CH01-5653. The appellant returned after a duration of 1½ hours,
parked the car outside the hostel, and handed over the key to the said witness.
The possession of the said car was taken by the police on 11.3.1996, and the
blood stained rubber mat was then recovered from the dicky of the car. The said
mat was sealed and taken away by the Investigating Officer (PW.14).
14. The trial court after appreciating the evidence on record came to the
following conclusions:
“However, various pieces of circumstantial evidence discussed above i.e.
blood scratching lifted from the hostel room in occupation of accused production
of various blood stained clothes by the accused before the Medical
Superintendent of the Hospital and the recovery of blood stained neck tie and
dumb-bell on the basis of a disclosure statement suffered by the accused and the
blood stained car mat recovered in the case leave no manner of doubt that Dr.
Mrs. Loyalla Shagoufta was first done to death in the hostel room no. 2010 in
occupation of the accused by strangulating her as well as causing various
injuries to her and thereafter the accused appeared to Dr. Pauli CW.2 to remove
the traces of evidence appearing against him and was liable for the murder of
Dr. Mrs. Loyalla Shagoufta deceased as well as for causing dis-appearance of the
evidence.
Dr. Loyalla Shagoufta in fact appeared to have been murdered in the hostel
room in occupation of the accused.
Various blood stains recovered from that room are a clear pointer to the fact
that she was murdered in that room.
None else could commit the crime in that room except with the knowledge and
consent of the accused when the accused alone was in occupation of that room and
was responsible for the crime committed in that room. Production of various
blood stained clothes by the accused before the Medical Superintendent of the
Hospital also goes to show that he was fully involved in the crime. On the
fateful evening he also borrowed car from Dr. Pauli CW.2, which was used by him
in removal of the dead body from the place of crime and the recovery of a blood
stained mat from that car also goes to show that he in fact removed the dead
body in that car.
All this shows that he in fact murdered his wife Dr. Mrs.
Loyalla Shagoufta and later on removed her dead body to cause dis-appearance
as well as for causing dis-appearance of the evidence against him.†So far as
the motive is concerned, the court came to the conclusion that there was
sufficient motive to kill the deceased, as the appellant wanted to now get rid
of the deceased. More so, the appellant could not explain how the deceased
happened to meet her death in his room. The court noted that though there were
minor discrepancies in the story, the same were not fatal to the case of the
prosecution and added that the case of the prosecution was fully supported by
the FSL report and therefore, on such grounds, convicted the appellant.
15. The High Court concurred with the finding of the trial court observing as
under:
“Non-production of copy of Divorce Petition shows that the
appellant-accused had the motive to eliminate the deceased.
Admission of the appellant-accused before Dr. B. Pawar that blood stained
clothes were found lying in his room and later on change of stand when examined
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that the blood stained clothes were lying in the
balcony of the Junior Doctor’s Hospital show that the prosecution story
inspires confidence. Firstly, Dr.
Shagoufta was murdered. Blood stained clothes were recovered from the room
and by arranging car of Dr. Pauli dead body was thrown in the area of village
Lalton Kalan.
Dead body lying near the road is suggesting that the appellant-accused was in
hurry to dispose of the dead body, that is why, after 1½ hours key of the car
was returned to Dr. Pauli. Tie, dumb-bell and gunny bag were recovered as per
disclosure statement and the recovered articles were found to be stained with
blood. On 9.3.1996, Dr. Yogesh through Sarabjit Singh, Security Guard summoned
the appellant-accused to Operation Theatre, but nothing on the file that the
appellant-accused had attended the Operation Theatre to assist Dr. Yogesh. PW.7
Sarabjit Singh had gone to the room of the appellant-accused with the request
that services of the appellant-accused are needed in the Operation Threatre.
Sarabjit Singh is not related to the deceased. So, there was no idea to
disbelieve him.
As per post-mortem examination, death was due to strangulation as well as by
causing various injuries. Neck tie recovered as per disclosure statement
suffered by the appellant-accused was found to be stained with blood.â€
16. The instant case is a case of blind murder and is based entirely on
circumstantial evidence, as there is no eye-witness to the said incident.
17. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622, it
was held by this court that, the onus is on the prosecution to prove, that the
chain is complete and that falsity or untenability of the defence set up by the
accused, cannot be made the basis for ignoring any serious infirmity or lacuna
in the case of the prosecution. The Court then proceeded to indicate the
conditions which must be fully established before a conviction can be made on
the basis of circumstantial evidence. These are:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn
should be fully established. The circumstances concerned ‘must’ or
‘should’ and not ‘may be’ established;
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of
the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any
other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be
proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave
any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done
by the accusedâ€.
Thus, in a case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish
each instance of incriminating circumstance, by way of reliable and clinching
evidence, and the circumstances so proved must form a complete chain of events,
on the basis of which, no conclusion other than one of guilt of the accused can
be reached. Undoubtedly, suspicion, however grave it may be, can never be
treated as a substitute for proof. While dealing with a case of circumstantial
evidence, the court must take utmost precaution whilst finding an accused
guilty, solely on the basis of the circumstances proved before it.
18. Admittedly, the appellant, after handing over the said blood stained
clothes to Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1), on 9.3.1996, became untraceable as a result of
which, he could only be arrested on 11.3.1996, at 6.00 p.m. Though this
circumstance was not taken into consideration by the courts below, the learned
standing counsel appearing for the State has relied upon it very strongly indeed
before us.
19. This Court has considered this issue time and again and held that the
mere act of absconding, on the part of the accused, alone does not necessarily
lead to a final conclusion regarding the guilt of the accused, as even an
innocent person may become panic stricken and try to evade arrest, when
suspected wrongly of committing a grave crime; such is the instinct of
self-preservation. (See: Matru v. State of U.P.[1971] INSC
71; , AIR 1971 SC 1050; State
thr. CBI v. Mahender Singh Dahiya, (2011) 3 SCC 109; and Sk. Yusuf v. State of
West Bengal, AIR 2011 SC 2283).
In view of the above, we do not find any force in the submissions advanced by
the learned counsel for the State.
20. In a case of circumstantial evidence, motive assumes great significance
and importance, for the reason that the absence of motive would put the court on
its guard and cause it to scrutinize each piece of evidence very closely in
order to ensure that suspicion, emotion or conjecture do not take the place of
proof.
21. In Subedar Tewari v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1989 SC 733, this
Court observed as under:
“The evidence regarding existence of motive which operates in the mind of
an assassin is very often than (sic) not within the reach of others. The motive
may not even be known to the victim of the crime. The motive may be known to the
assassin and no one else may know what gave birth to the evil thought in the
mind of the assassin.â€
22. Similarly, in Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 2420,
this court held as under:
“In a case of circumstantial evidence, the evidence bearing on the guilt of
the accused nevertheless becomes untrustworthy and unreliable because most often
it is only the perpetrator of the crime alone who knows as to what circumstances
prompted him to adopt a certain course of action leading to the commission of
the crime. Therefore, if the evidence on record suggest sufficient/necessary
motive to commit a crime it may be conceived that the accused had committed
it.â€
23. Thus, if the issue is examined in light of the aforesaid settled legal
proposition, we may concur with the courts below on the said aspect.
24. In Jackaran Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 2345, this Court held
that:
“The absence of the signatures or the thumb impression of an accused on the
disclosure statement recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act detracts
materially from the authenticity and the reliability of the disclosure
statement.â€
25. However, in State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram, AIR 1999 SC 1776, this Court
examined the said issue at length and considered the provisions of Section
162(1) Cr.P.C., Section 162(1) reads, a statement made by any person to a police
officer in the course of an investigation done, if reduced to writing, be signed
by the person making it. Therefore, it is evident from the aforesaid provision,
that there is a prohibition in peremptory terms and law requires that a
statement made before the Investigating Officer should not be signed by the
witness. The same was found to be necessary for the reason that, a witness will
then be free to testify in court, unhampered by anything which the police may
claim to have elicited from him. In the event that, a police officer, ignorant
of the statutory requirement asks a witness to sign his statement, the same
would not stand vitiated. At the most, the court will inform the witness, that
he is not bound by the statement made before the police. However, the
prohibition contained in Section 162(1) Cr.P.C.
is not applicable to any statements made under Section 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter called ‘Evidence Act’), as explained by
the provision under Section 162(2) Cr.P.C. The Court concluded as under:
“The resultant position is that the Investigating Officer is not obliged to
obtain the signature of an accused in any statement attributed to him while
preparing seizure memo for the recovery of any article covered by Section 27 of
the Evidence Act. But if any signature has been obtained by an Investigating
Officer, there is nothing wrong or illegal about it.â€
26. In Golakonda Venkateswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2003 SC
2846, this court once again reconsidered the entire issue, and held that merely
because the recovery memo was not signed by the accused, will not vitiate the
recovery itself, as every case has to be decided on its own facts. In the event
that the recoveries are made pursuant to the disclosure statement of the
accused, then, despite the fact that the statement has not been signed by him,
there is certainly some truth in what he said, for the reason that, the recovery
of the material objects was made on the basis of his statement. The Court
further explained this aspect by way of its earlier judgment in Jackaran Singh
(supra) as, in this case, there was a dispute regarding the ownership of a
revolver and the cartridge recovered therein. The prosecution was unable to lead
any evidence to show that the crime weapon belonged to the said appellant and
observations were made by this Court in the said context. The court held as
under:
“The fact that the recovery is in consequence of the information given is
fortified and confirmed by the discovery of wearing apparel and skeletal remains
of the deceased which leads to believe that the information and the statement
cannot be false.â€
27. In view of the above, the instant case is squarely covered by the ratio
of the aforesaid judgments, and the submission advanced in this regard is
therefore, not acceptable.
28. Most of the articles recovered and sent for preparation of FSL and
serological reports contained human blood. However, on the rubber mat recovered
from the car of Dr. Pauli (CW.2) and one other item, there can be no positive
report in relation to the same as the blood on such articles has dis-integrated.
All other material objects, including the shirt of the accused, two T-shirts,
two towels, a track suit, one pant, the brassier of the deceased, bangles of the
deceased, the under-garments of the deceased, two tops, dumb bell, gunny bag,
tie etc. were found to have dis-integrated.
29. A similar issue arose for consideration by this Court in Gura Singh v.
State of Rajasthan, AIR 2001 SC 330, wherein the Court, relying upon earlier
judgments of this Court, particularly in Prabhu Babaji Navie v. State of Bombay,
AIR 1956 SC 51; Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v. State of U.P., [1962] INSC
205; AIR 1963 SC 74; and Teja
Ram (supra) observed that a failure by the serologist to detect the origin of
the blood due to dis-integration of the serum, does not mean that the blood
stuck on the axe would not have been human blood at all.
Sometimes it is possible, either because the stain is too insufficient, or
due to haematological changes and plasmatic coagulation, that a serologist may
fail to detect the origin of the blood. However, in such a case, unless the
doubt is of a reasonable dimension, which a judicially conscientious mind may
entertain, with some objectivity, no benefit can be claimed by the accused, in
this regard.
30. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed very heavy reliance on the
judgment of this Court in Sattatiya @ Satish Rajanna Kartalla v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 2008 SC 1184, wherein it was held that in case the Forensic
Science Laboratory Report/Serologist Report is unable to make out a case, that
the blood found on the weapons/clothes recovered, is of the same blood group as
that of the deceased, the same should be treated as a serious lacuna in the case
of the prosecution.
The appellant cannot be allowed to take the benefit of such an observation in
the said judgment, for the reason that in the aforementioned case, the recovery
itself was doubted and, in addition thereto, the non- matching of blood groups
was treated to be a lacunae and not an independent factor, deciding the case.
31. A similar view has been reiterated in a recent judgment of this court in
Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 2008, Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab, decided on
20.7.2012, wherein it was held that, once the recovery is made in pursuance of a
disclosure statement made by the accused, the matching or non-matching of blood
group (s) loses significance.
32. In John Pandian v. State represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu,
(2010) 14 SCC 129,
this Court held:
“….The discovery appears to be credible. It has been accepted by both the
courts below and we find no reason to discard it. This is apart from the fact
that this weapon was sent to the forensic science laboratory (FSL) and it has
been found stained with human blood. Though the blood group could not be
ascertained, as the results were inconclusive, the accused had to give some
explanation as to how the human blood came on this weapon. He gave none.
This discovery would very positively further the prosecution case.â€
(Emphasis added)
33. In view of the above, the Court finds it impossible to accept the
submission that, in the absence of the report regarding the origin of the blood,
the accused cannot be convicted, upon an observation that it is only because of
lapse of time that the classification of the blood cannot be determined.
Therefore, no advantage can be conferred upon the accused, to enable him to
claim any benefit, and the report of dis-integration of blood etc. cannot be
termed as a missing link, on the basis of which, the chain of circumstances may
be presumed to be broken.
34. When the appellant herein made a disclosure statement, a panchnama was
prepared and recovery panchnamas were also made. The evidence on record revealed
that the same were duly signed by two police officials, and one independent
panch witness, namely, Randhir Singh Jat, who was admittedly, not examined.
Therefore, a question arose regarding the effect of non-examination of the said
panch witness, and also the sanctity of the evidence, in respect of recovery
made only by two police officials.
35. The issue was considered at length by this Court in State, Govt. of NCT
of Delhi v. Sunil & Anr., (2001) 1 SCC 652,
wherein this Court held as under:
“….But if no witness was present or if no person had agreed to affix his
signature on the document, it is difficult to lay down, as a proposition of law,
that the document so prepared by the police officer must be treated as tainted
and the recovery evidence unreliable. The court has to consider the evidence of
the investigating officer who deposed to the fact of recovery based on the
statement elicited from the accused on its own worth.
We feel that it is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer
should be approached with initial distrust………At any rate, the court cannot
start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a
proposition of law the presumption should be the other way around. That official
acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of
presumption and recognised even by the legislature. Hence when a police officer
gives evidence in court that a certain article was recovered by him on the
strength of the statement made by the accused it is open to the court to believe
the version to be correct if it is not otherwise shown to be unreliable. It is
for the accused, through cross- examination of witnesses or through any other
materials, to show that the evidence of the police officer is either unreliable
or at least unsafe to be acted upon in a particular case. If the court has any
good reason to suspect the truthfulness of such records of the police the court
could certainly take into account the fact that no other independent person was
present at the time of recovery. But it is not a legally approvable procedure to
presume the police action as unreliable to start with, nor to jettison such
action merely for the reason that police did not collect signatures of
independent persons in the documents made contemporaneous with such actions.â€
36. One Randhir Singh Jat had been the Panch witness for the disclosure
Panchnama and Recovery Panchnama. He has not been examined by the prosecution.
No question was put to the Investigating Officer (PW.14), in his
cross-examination, as to why the prosecution had withheld the said witness. The
I.O. was the only competent person to answer the query. It is quite possible
that the witness was not alive or traceable.
37. It is obligatory on the part of the accused while being examined under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. to furnish some explanation with respect to the
incriminating circumstances associated with him, and the Court must take note of
such explanation even in a case of circumstantial evidence, to decide as to
whether or not, the chain of circumstances is complete. The aforesaid judgment
has been approved and followed in Musheer Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 748.
(See also:
The Transport Commissioner, A.P., Hyderabad & Anr. v. S. Sardar Ali &
?38. This Court in State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471,
held that, when the attention of the accused is drawn to such circumstances that
inculpate him in relation to the commission of the crime, and he fails to offer
an appropriate explanation or gives a false answer with respect to the same, the
said act may be counted as providing a missing link for completing the chain of
circumstances. We may hasten to add that we have referred to the said decision,
only to highlight the fact that the accused has not given any explanation
whatsoever, as regards the incriminating circumstances put to him under Section
313 Cr.P.C.
39. In view of the above, a conjoint reading of the complete evidence and
material on record, suggests as under:
(i) The deceased Loyalla Shagoufta had informed her mother residing in
Jagadhari, on 6.3.1996 that she would reach there on 7.3.1996.
However, she did not make it there. Therefore, Victoria Rani (PW.2), that is,
mother of the deceased, came to Ludhiana to search for her daughter on
10.3.1996.
(ii) On 9.3.1996, the appellant handed over certain blood stained clothes to
Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1), Medical Superintendent, stating that he had found the same,
in his room, when he returned from the hospital. Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1), informed
the police about the said incident, on the same date.
(iii) On 10.3.1996, Victoria Rani (PW.2), filed a complaint about the
incident and an FIR was lodged. The Investigating Officer went to the room of
the appellant, as well as of the deceased, in their respective hostels but the
rooms were found to be locked from the outside. He then made an attempt to
search for the appellant at the residence of his relative Mr. Rana, and also in
other dhabas and hotels, but was unable to trace him, despite his efforts to do
so.
(iv) On 11.3.1996, Dr. Namrata Saran, informed Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1) that the
deceased had been missing from the hostel since 9.3.1996.
On the same day, Vir Rajinder Pal (PW.14), SHO, received a wireless message
from the Police Chowki at Lalton Kalan, that the dead body of a female was lying
in the bushes near an area of thoroughfare, closeby. He then rushed to the place
alongwith Victoria Rani (PW.2), and recovered the dead body of the deceased and
went on to prepare the panchanama etc. The room of the appellant was searched,
but no recovery was made from the room.
(v) During the course of the investigation, Vir Rajinder Pal (PW.14), SHO,
realised that the appellant had borrowed the car of Dr.
Pauli (CW.2). Thus, the said car which was parked in the same compound, was
taken into possession by the police, and a mat having blood stains on it, was
recovered and sealed.
(vi) On 12.3.1996, experts were called and the room of the appellant was
searched. Blood stains were found on the floor, which were scraped off and
alongwith the same, a pair of V-shaped Hawaii chappals, also having blood stains
on them, were recovered. The said articles were sealed.
(vii) The appellant was arrested on 11.3.1996, as he was produced by Joginder
Singh (PW.12), and made a disclosure statement in the presence of police
officials and also one Randhir Singh, the panch witness, and the panchnama was
prepared and in it, he stated that, he would help in the recovery of articles,
used while committing the murder of the deceased. On the basis of the said
disclosure statement, he led the police party to the Old Ludhiana Jail and aided
in making recoveries of a gunny bag, a dumb bell and one tie, as the same had
been hidden below garbage and bushes. The same were duly recovered and panchnama
was prepared. All the materials so recovered were then sent for FSL/serological
report, and the report received stated that all the said articles contained
human blood etc. except for a few, wherein the blood had dis-integrated and as a
result of this, no report could be submitted.
(viii) On 11.3.1996, the dead body of the deceased, was sent for post- mortem
examination by a Board of doctors including Dr. U.S. Sooch (PW.11), and various
articles of the deceased, including her bangles etc. were taken into possession
by the police.
(ix) In his statement, under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the appellant changed the
version of his story, from the one given to Dr. B. Pawar (PW.1), stating that
blood stained clothes handed over by him, were found in the balcony,
interconnecting various rooms, as against his original statement wherein he had
disclosed that he had found them in his room. He could not furnish any
explanation with respect to how the blood stained clothes were found in his
room.
(x) Kirpal Dev Singh (PW.8), a taxi driver, though did not identify the
appellant in court, yet was not declared hostile by the prosecution, deposed
that, on being asked by the canteen contractor Joshi, he had gone to meet the
appellant on 9.3.1996, who told him that he wanted to go to Jagadhari. At that
time, he was told to come later, as the wife of the appellant had purportedly
gone to collect her salary from Lalton Kalan. Admittedly, the appellant and his
wife, the deceased were living separately and they did not have a cordial
relationship. In such a fact-situation, the appellant would not have hired a
taxi to go to Jagadhari. More so, if the deceased was living separately, it was
not possible for the appellant to say that his wife had gone to Lalton Kalan, to
collect her salary. The evidence of Dr.
Pauli (CW.2), makes it clear that the appellant had in fact taken his car,
used it for one and a half hours, and then brought the same back, and parked it
in the hostel compound, after which he handed over the keys for the same to Dr.
Pauli (CW.2).
(xi) The nature of the injuries mentioned in the post-mortem report makes it
crystal clear that the deceased died of strangulation i.e.
asphyxia, and she also had several injuries to her head, which could have
been caused by a dumb bell, which was one of the materials recovered and found
to have blood stains on it.
(xii) As the appellant had a strained relationship with his wife, he no doubt
wanted to get rid of her. Although he has claimed that the petitions for divorce
by mutual consent were pending before the court, he has never submitted any
documents with respect to this before the court. Thus, inference may be drawn
that the appellant did in fact wish to get rid of his wife.
(xiii) As the recoveries of the blood stained gunny bag, dumb bell, tie etc.
were made on the basis of the disclosure statement of the appellant himself, the
chain of circumstances is therefore, complete.
40. In view of the above, we do not find any reason to interfere with the
concurrent findings recorded by the courts below. The appeal lacks merit and is
therefore, dismissed accordingly.
...............................................J. (Dr. B.S. )
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