Quota for Muslim OBC

Union Minister Salman Khurshid visited the Kalbe Sadiq at Unity College on Monday and in Sadiq’s presence promised that the government would soon bring “quota within quota” for Muslim OBCs.

“While I am here, secretaries in my department are busy finalising the best possible model for bringing quota within quota. There are certain models like that of Andhra Pradesh, which are being studied but more or less, it would be within the guidelines set by the court,” said Khurshid.
Later, Khurshid said told The Indian Express that, at this point, nothing can be said precisely about the quota within quota because the matter required clearance from the Cabinet.

He said different models were being studied, but “as far as my information goes, we just need to bring a notification in this regard and there is no need for separate legislation”.

Bail plea of Kanimozhi, four others Why not opposed, Supreme Court

The Supreme Court on Monday questioned the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) for not opposing bail in respect of certain accused (Ms. Kanimozhi and four others) while opposing it in some cases in the 2G case before the trial court on October 24.

A Bench of Justices G.S. Singhvi and H.L. Dattu, hearing bail applications of five corporate executives, referred to the submissions of senior counsel Ram Jethmalani about a statement made on behalf of the CBI in the trial court that it was not opposing bail in respect of Ms. Kanimozhi and four others and asked Additional Solicitor-General Harin Raval to inform by Tuesday as to what transpired in the trial court on October 24.

The five accused who had sought bail in the Supreme Court are Unitech Wireless' Managing Director Sanjay Chandra, Swan Telecom's Director Vinod Goenka and Reliance Anil Dhirubhai Ambani group's executives Hari Nair, Gautam Doshi and Surendra Pipara.

Justice Singhvi told Mr. Raval: “If the investigative agency was sure that evidence will not be tampered with by these [five] accused, then why were the accused still being kept in jail. When you are sure they will not tamper with evidence why keep them behind bars?”

Justie Dattu asked the ASG: “If that is so then what happens to the economic fabric chain which you have projected to the court.”

Justice Singhvi asked Mr. Raval to take instructions and inform the court by Tuesday whether it was a fact that the CBI made a statement before the trial court on October 24 that it was not opposing the bail for five accused.

During the course of hearing of these bail applications, Mr. Raval had informed the court that the CBI would oppose the bail applications of all accused in the trial court. However, on October 24, the CBI did not oppose the bail plea of Ms. Kanimozhi and four others (Kalaignar TV managing director Sharad Kumar; Asif Balwa and Rajiv Agarwal, directors of Kusegaon Fruits and Vegetables; and film producer Karim Morani) and this was pointed out to the Bench by Mr. Jethmalani. This prompted the Bench to seek further clarification from the CBI in this regard as to what transpired in the trial court.

Gujarat Assembly passes Bill on cow slaughter

From Oct 24 Gujarat Animal Preservation Act-2011 will become effective from Dhanteras

A Bill seeking a seven-year jail term for cow slaughter or even transporting the animal for that purpose was passed unopposed in the Gujarat Assembly on Tuesday, with the Opposition Congress extending support to it.

As per the provisions of the Gujarat Animal Preservation Act (GAPA) 1954, which prohibits cow slaughter, there is no provision to prevent transportation of the animal for slaughter.

The Amendment Bill, 2011 was tabled in the Assembly by Agriculture Minister Dileep Sanghani.

“To strengthen enforcement and implementation of the Act, stringent punishment for violation of the provisions has been proposed in the Bill,” Mr. Sanghani said.

“The six-month jail term has been extended to seven years on conviction and the fine has been increased to Rs. 50,000 from Rs. 1,000.”

E-payment gateway to settle retired govt employees' benefits from Apr 1

NEW DELHI: 2011 April 1, retired government employees don't need to run from pillar to post to claim their post-retirement benefits anymore. Once an employee retires, all benefits like gratuity and provident funds are likely to be credited to the account the next day, and the pension will be deposited from the next month.

The Controller General of Accounts (CGA), the government's official account-keeper, has developed a fully secured e-payment gateway for direct credit of dues into the accounts of beneficiaries using digitally signed electronic advice through the new system.

Besides revolutionizing payments to individual beneficiaries, the government's e-payment gateway (GePG) - linking 1.3 lakh agencies down to the level of panchayats - has been developed to capture all data on receipt, payments, borrowings and deficit real time.

The Payment of Gratuity Act - Staffers with 5 yrs of service can avail gratuity

The Madras High Court Bench here has ruled that every employee, who has served an organisation for five or more years, is entitled to gratuity, irrespective of any terminology used to send him out of service, including retirement, resignation or death.
The order was given Justice K Chandru, who dismissed a writ petition filed by the Sri Rangam Cooperative Urban Bank claming the right to withhold the gratuity of an office assistant who was allowed to retire after 34 years of service without prejudice to the criminal proceeding pending against him.
The court ruled that "merely because in the relieving order it was stated that it was being passed without prejudice to the criminal proceedings against the workman, that will have no bearing in determining the liability for payment of gratuity under section 4(1) of the Payment of Gratuity Act. Therefore, this objection must necessarily fail".
The court, however, said section 4(6) of the Act enables the employer to forfeit the gratuity. It also said that the option of invoking section 4(6) would not be available for the employers if the employee had retired or reached the age of superannuation as held by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in a 2002 verdict.
According to Section 4 6), the gratuity of an employee whose services have been terminated for any act, wilful omission or negligence causing any damage or loss to, or destruction of, property belonging to the employer, shall be forfeited to the extent of the damage or loss caused.
The gratuity payable to an employee may be wholly or partially forfeited if the services of such employee have been terminated for -(i) his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part or (ii) any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, provided that such offence is committed by him in the course of his employment. PTI

MSU to include advocate’s name in voters list - Guj HC

Gujarat High Court has directed M S University authorities to include name of a candidate, who wants to contest the forthcoming senate elections, in the voters’ list.
The court issued the order based on a petition filed by advocate Niraj Jain, who had moved the court seeking its directive to include his name in the voters list as a registered graduate of Faculty of Law.
Justice R M Chhaya on Tuesday directed the university to include Jain’s name in the voters list of the constituency of law subject till further orders of the court. The court has issued notice returnable on November 9, when it will further hear the case.
Jain’s form was rejected by MSU authorities on the ground that the photograph in his form was not attested. Jain had filed a special civil application pleading court’s directives for inclusion of his name in the voters’ list arguing that as his application had been attested by a notary, there was no need to attest the photograph in the application. Jain, a graduate from Faculty of Law, wants to contest the forthcoming senate elections from the registered graduates’ category. Elections for the registered graduates’ category of the senate will be held on December 18.

Guj.HC fines PIL litigants

Ahmedabad: The Gujarat high court has imposed a fine of Rs 25,000 on each of the two litigants from Vadodara who filed a PIL seeking cancellation of tendering process of Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd (GUVNL) in purchase of transformers.
The petitioners, Sudhir Shah and B K Vaidya, sought all five electricity companies of Gujarat to stop purchase of Amorphous transformers in place of CRGO transformers. They contended that the purchase of amorphous transformers would cause an extra burden of Rs 120 on state exchequer because they are more costly than CRGO transformers. They also argued that both the transformers are equal in energy saving, and without assigning any reason for their choice, the electricity companies have decided to purchase new transformers and initiated the tendering process.
The court questioned the bonafide of the petitioners and raised a doubt that the persons interested in CRGO transformers might project the two litigants as mouth piece. The court inquired about petitioners’ source of income, and it was found that one of them was insurance agent drawing money from interest of his savings and the other was retired engineer earning just Rs 1,000 towards pension. The court questioned as to why they should be interested in this litigation.
The court observed that whether the public companies should go for amorphous transformers or for CRGO transformers is not for the court to decide by merely trying to show that in comparison to Amorphous transformers, CRGO transformers are much better. “This Court does not have the expertise on the subject. It is for an expert body to look into all these aspects and we are satisfied that there has been substantial deliberations on this issue by an expert body. Not only this, but we have also noticed that the representation of manufacturers of CRGO transformers has also been considered,” the court noticed in its order.

After land acquired Award within the stipulated two years - SC

New Delhi: Land acquisition proceedings lapses if the government fails to make the award within the stipulated two years from the date of declaration, the Supreme Court has ruled.
A bench of justices G S Singhvi and S J Mukhopadhaya said the time consumed by court litigations should be excluded.
A reading of the relevant provision makes it clear that the collector is obliged to make an award within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration.
“If no award is made within that period, the acquisition proceedings automatically lapses. By virtue of the explanation, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken pursuant to the declaration is stayed by an order of a Court is to be excluded in computing the period of two years,” Justice Singhvi writing the judgment said.
The apex court passed the ruling while allowing an appeal filed by land owners R Indira Saratchandra and others challenging the acquisition of their land by the Tamil Nadu Housing Development Corporation.
In this case the acquisition was challenged by the land owners on the ground that the government chose to pass the award beyond the stipulated two years after the Madras high court had upheld the acquisition of land by its judgment of August 29, 1996.
Subsequently, a single judge of the high court on a fresh petition filed by the aggrieved land owners quashed the acquisition as the award was passed two years after the declaration made by the Government. A division bench however, reversed the decision and upheld the Government’s decision following which they moved the apex court. PTI

UK bans 1,900 Indian banks for student visa

London: Britain on Tuesday published a list of nearly 1,900 banks in India — most of them cooperative — whose financial statements will not be accepted for student visa purposes, a move that is set to affect thousands of Indian students wanting to study there.
The new list has just 85 banks operating in India whose statements will be accepted for purposes of student visas. As part of the application for student visas — Tier 4 under the points-based system — applicants have to show evidence of possessing the necessary funds to pursue a course of study and live in the UK for the duration of the course.
From November 24, if any applicant provides bank statements from the listed nearly 1,900 Indian banks showing they have the necessary funds, the application will not be considered. The list includes banks operating in many states in India.
The list of banks whose statements will not be accepted are categorised as ‘Cooperative banks — scheduled urban cooperative banks’ and ‘Cooperative banks — nonscheduled urban cooperative banks’. Official sources said the visa officers will accept statements from student visa applicants from “international banks, or national banks with a UK private banking presence, or regulated national/state banks that provide a core banking service”.
The home office also published a list of 85 banks operating in India whose statements will be accepted for purposes of student visas. This list of banks includes ‘Scheduled commercial banks’.
The drawing up of approved and non-approved list of Indian financial institutions for student visa purposes means that applicants who have accounts in banks mentioned in the non-approved list will have to open accounts in the 85 banks mentioned in the approved list before applying for the student visas.
A home office statement said: “The list forms part of the reforms to the student immigration route. The change is to ensure that we can verify that student visa applicants hold the required maintenance funds to support themselves and pay for their course in the UK.”
Verification checks are made on the basis of documents provided with the student visa application but there have reportedly been many cases when such checks have not been “satisfactory”, particularly from cooperative or smaller banks.
The statement added: “An unsatisfactory verification check means that the institution does not respond to or provide a reliable response to our request for information, or we are unable to contact the institution.” PTI
Indians hit hard as Oz cancels 15,066 student visas
Melbourne: Australia has cancelled 15,066 student visas of foreign nationals for breaching visa conditions and over 3,000 face deportation for flunking subjects, with Indians among the hardest hit, reports said.
The Immigration Department has already cancelled 15,066 foreign student visas in the past year, a 37% spike from the previous year. About 3,624 students are facing deportation for flunking subjects or missing classes and a further 2,235 visas were cancelled on students who quit their original courses and were working illegally, in some cases in brothels, The Daily Telegraph reported.
The report said that one in every five international students is Chinese, while one in every six is Indian. The majority of international students were placed in New South Wales and Victoria. The report said that Indian students have been hit the hardest while Chinese students fared better as they were less likely to be studying for a trade. Under the new rules, University graduates will have the right to work here for two years after they graduate, leaving vocational training students to wait on a second tranche of changes, due next year, to find out where they stand. Of the 332,709 international students in Australia in June, more than half were studying at university, while a third were on vocational training visas studying diploma courses.
To receive a visa, students must be enrolled in a course and show they can pay tuition and living costs and meet health and English language tests. PTI

HC removes adverse remarks against judge

Ahmedabad: The Gujarat high court has expunged adverse remarks against a judge who had moved the court complaining against a superior judicial officer’s unwarranted observations about her in an order. The division bench of acting Chief Justice A L Dave and Justice J B Pardiwala dubbed the remarks as unwarranted and ordered that
they must be removed.
The principal civil judge and judicial magistrate first class (JMFC) of Wadhwan, N M Ramrakhyani requested HC to expunge the remarks from the Surendranagar sessions court’s order and wanted the judge to be fined for making her enter into the litigation.
Quoting the Supreme Court’s various directions, the bench advised the lower judiciary that the judgment should be passed on merit of the case but “preferably without offering any undesirable comments, disparaging remarks or indications which would impinge upon the dignity and respect of judicial system, actus curiae neminem gravabit.” The Latin term translated to English stands for “an act of the court shall prejudice no one”.
The principal civil judge Ramrakhyani had refused bail to two bootleggers earlier this year. Her order was challenged before the sessions court, where the superior judicial officer held her decision wrong and passed strictures against her. The sessions judge wrote in his order that Ramrakhyani had abdicated her duty and had not applied mind at all. Her order was dubbed as “cryptic and unreasonable” and deprecated.
Moreover, she was accused of lacking “judicial courage”.
The inclement remarks brought Ramrakhyani to HC demanding that the words be expunged from the sessions court’s order, and the judge be made to bear the cost of litigation. She contended that her order ought not to have been deprecated, but if a subordinate judicial officer has committed any error, the superior should exercise his discretion and correct the mistake.

Record 1.7 crore Compensation for medical Negligence

New Delhi: A US-based doctor was awarded a record compensation of Rs 1.73 crore in a medical negligence case by the National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission on Friday.
Three doctors and Advance Medicare and Research Institute, Kolkata, will have to pay the sum collectively.
Dr Kunal Saha’s wife, Anuradha, died of toxic epidermal necrolysis — a rare disease resulting in the peeling of skin in sheets — at Mumbai’s Breach Candy Hospital on May 28, 1998. The Rs 1.73 crore compensation may be the highest yet in India. The Supreme Court, in May 2009, had awarded the highest ever compensation of Rs 1 crore to a wheelchair-bound Infosys engineer Prashant S Dhananka for medical negligence.
In this case, Anuradha, a child-psychologist, on holiday with her husband Dr Kunal Saha in Kolkata, in April-May 2008, developed rashes and had gone to AMRI. As an out-patient she was treated and when she showed no improvement, was admitted in the hospital a few days later.
Her condition further deteriorated and she was moved to Breach Candy Hospital, Mumbai, by air ambulance. She died over a week later, on May 28, 1998. A flurry of lawsuits followed her death.
Initially, 26 individuals were served legal notice and Kunal claimed a total compensation of over Rs 55 crore.

Private sector bribery could become criminal offence: PM

With the alleged involvement of big corporates in a spate of scams apparently weighing on his mind, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Friday said government is considering changes in law to make private sector bribery a criminal offence.

Speaking at the Biennial Conference of CBI and state anti-corruption bureaux, the Prime Minister said India has ratified UN Conventions against corruption and to meet its requirements a slew of measures which include amendments in laws pertaining to anti-graft measures.

"To meet the requirements of the convention, we have introduced a Bill in Parliament to make bribery of foreign public officials an offence. We are considering changes in our laws to criminalize private sector bribery," he said.

But the Prime Minister did not not provide any details of how private sector bribery will be dealt with.

He said government is working on ways and means to minimize discretionary powers of public authorities and the issue of a public procurement law to minimize irregularities in the award of government contracts worth thousands of crores of rupees every year.

The Prime Minister however said, "Whatever we might do to minimise the opportunities for corruption, the sad reality is that we cannot build a totally fool-proof system. There will always be some instances of corrupt practices in the work of public authorities."

He urged the CBI that people induldging in corruption must realise that that they can not possibly get away from the law and would sooner rather than later suffer the consequences of their wrongdoing.

"There is a need for speedy and thorough investigation into allegations of such wrong doings, followed by expeditious prosecution to bring the guilty to book. This would act as a powerful deterrent against corruption," he said.

Noida Land notification for three villages quashed

The Allahabad High Court has quashed the land notification for three villages - Asadullapur, Shaberi Village and Devla village.

The court has also disposed off all other petitions. Farmers of other villages will get 10 per cent of developed land and enhanced compensation.

491 petitions had been filed in the court against land acquisitions in Noida and Greater Noida on housing projects on nearly 5000 hectares of land.

Farmers from 63 villages had filed petitions, alleging that the Uttar Pradesh government acquired their land by invoking the "urgency clause", which deprived them to demand considerable compensation from the authority. A full bench of the court had on September 30 reserved its judgement in these cases after hearing the versions of the state government, farmers, builders and buyers for more than two weeks.

Pankaj Dubey, the Counsel for farmers, had argued that the state's reason for invoking emergency is not genuine, "it is just a tailor made justification".

In July this year, the Supreme Court struck down the acquisition of 156 hectares in Noida extension as illegal. The Supreme Court agreed with the Allahabad High Court which said 156 hectares in the Shaberi Village in Greater Noida had been taken from farmers for industrial projects, but was actually being sold to commercial developers for high-profitable apartment complexes.

Prepay loan without fine to housing finance companies

In a development that will cheer thousands of homeowners who have availed of loans from any of the 54 housing finance companies (HFCs), the National Housing Bank (NHB) has banned the levy of pre-payment penalty.

The NHB, which is the housing finance regulator, has also asked HFCs to ensure that all borrowers pay the same interest rate, irrespective of when the loan was taken. The two decisions, notified on Wednesday, will cover all HFCs ranging from HDFC to LIC Housing Finance and Dewan Housing Finance. They come into effect immediately, NHB chairman & managing director RV Verma told TOI.

By notifying the new rules, the NHB has initiated a step that the Reserve Bank of India has been contemplating for a while. Although the banking regulator has discussed the issue with banks and ombudsmen, it is still to notify the norms.

As a result, only 33% of the Rs 5 lakh crore housing finance market will benefit from the NHB's decision.

The housing finance regulator said HFCs will no longer levy any fee on floating rate loans. In case of fixed rate loans, it has made a distinction and only those borrowers who pay from their "own sources", such as savings or even loans from relatives, will be exempted from payment of penalty. In case borrowers shift to another bank or HFC, the penalty will be applicable.

While a similar advisory was issued last October, the NHB has said that any violation will attract penal action. The move will enable several borrowers to now shift their loans to banks or HFCs that offer home loans at a lower rate. Banks and HFCs levy pre-payment penalty of up to 4%, which often resulted in borrowers continuing to pay higher rates. "The idea is to protect the interests of borrowers. It will give them freedom to exercise their choice," Verma said. HFCs, however, refused to comment on the issue, saying they were studying the matter.

On uniform interest rates, the NHB's letter was in the nature of an advisory and did not talk of any penal action for violation. "It is accordingly advised that HFCs should ensure uniformity in rates, on floating rate basis, charged to their old and new customers, with the same risk profile irrespective of the time of entry of borrowers in the market," the letter said.

Banks and HFCs have long argued that they were earlier offering loans at a discount to the prime lending rate and argued for the continuation of the differential rate regime. But with the advent of a base rate system, under which lending below the benchmark rate is not allowed, the system is being changed.

SC directs Jayalalithaa to appear before court tomorrow

Tamil Nadu chief minister J Jayalalithaa was on Wednesday directed by the Supreme Court to appear in a Bangalore trial court tomorrow in a disproportionate assets against her after Karnataka assured the apex court of her security.

Rejecting the AIADMK chief's plea to defer her hearing on the ground that the Karnataka government had failed to provide sufficient security, a bench of justices Dalveer Bhandari and Dipak Misra asked Jayalalithaa to appear in the Bangalore court as scheduled.

The apex court's order came after Karnataka's chief secretary and its director general of police both filed affidavits assuring the apex court of foolproof security measures in tune with her Z plus status and NSG cover.

The trial of the disproportionate assets case, allegedly involving accumulation of assets worth over Rs 66 crore by her between 1991 and 1996, was shifted earlier to Bangalore by the apex court on her fears that she might be denied a fair trial in Tamil Nadu due to state's erstwhile DMK government, which she had accused of implicating her in false cases.

When senior counsel Mukul Rohtagi persisted with his apprehensions over her safety, the bench remarked, "You are a public figure. How can you remain away from people?"

The bench also turned down Jayalalithaa's plea to at least shift the venue of her trial closer to the airport.

"What more do you want? The helipad has been prepared. Once the hearing is over, fly back home," the bench observed.

Jayalalithaa's counsel had earlier contended that venue of the trial court being 65 km away from the airport, her safety and security may be rendered more vulnerable.

The apex court, however, was assured by both Karnataka government's counsel Anita Shenoy and Additional Solicitor General P P Malhotra that adequate security measures have been taken to protect Jayalalithaa.

But despite their assurances, Rohtagi submitted that the chief minister was "under a threat perception" and hence sought deferrment of the hearing by at least a few days.

He, however, failed to convince the apex court which said, "Please be reasonable. We are also concerned about the security. After these affidavits and the Supreme Court's directions, there cannot be any fears."

The apex court reiterated that the state shall provide adequate security to Jayalalithaa from the time of her arrival till her departure to Tamil Nadu.

The Karnataka chief secretary and its police chief, earlier, in sworn affidavits faxed from Bangalore to the Supreme Court registry, explained the various steps taken by the state to provide security to Jayalalithaa right from her arrival till her departure.

The affidavits also said the state has no problem in ensuring security as it has been regularly ensuring the same to various national and international dignitaries visiting the state.

The affidavits also contradicted Jayalalithaa's claim that no prior intimation was provided to her either about the security arrangements or the venue for hearing.

The affidavits said Karnataka was in constant touch with Tamil Nadu's State Intelligence Bureau since September 24 on the issue.

The apex court earlier had asked the Karnataka government to explain steps taken to protect Jayalalithaa during her hearing in the trial court.

The apex court had on September 12 dismissed Jayalalithaa's plea for exemption from personal appearance owing to the perceived threat perception.

Jayalalithaa in her fresh application has submitted that even the NSG which is normally given advance notice of the security arrangement made for the protectee has not been given any intimation on either the venue or the measures taken to protect her by the local police.

She had further submitted that she was apprehensive of a hostile atmosphere in Bangalore from organisations like the "Al Mun Thameen Force" which had vowed to avenge the killing of its cadre Imam Ali and others in an encounter with the Tamil Nadu police in Bangalore during 2002.

Besides, she said there were a number of other threat perceptions to her.

"Grave prejudice and irreparable loss and hardship would be caused to the applicant if this application is not allowed," the application stated.

TRAMBAKESHWAR DEVASTHAN TRUST & ANR. v. PRESIDENT PUROHIT SANGH & ORS. [2011] INSC 1052 (13 October 2011)

Judgement

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6639 OF 2003

Trambakeshwar Devasthan Trust & Anr. ... Appellants

Versus

President, Purohit Sangh & Ors. ... Respondents

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs.6640 OF 2003, 6641 OF 2003 AND 6642 OF 2003

A. K. PATNAIK, J.

These are three appeals against the common judgment dated 5th of August, 2002 of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal Nos. 1252 of 1996, 1325 of 1996 and 1322 of 1996 and relate to the ancient Shiva temple situated at Trambakeshwar near Nashik (for short `the temple').

2. The facts very briefly are that a public trust under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (for short `the Act') was registered in respect of the temple in 1952 and one 2 Jogalekar was appointed as its sole trustee with hereditary succession. In 1965, some of the devotees of the temple filed an application under Section 50A(1) of the Act for settlement of a scheme for management of the trust. In 1967, a scheme for management of the trust was framed but the same was challenged by the sole trustee Jogalekar under Section 72 of the Act before the District Judge, Nashik. The District Judge, Nashik amended the scheme but the amendment was not to the liking of the sole trustee Jogalekar and Jogalekar resigned and none of his legal heirs were willing to be the trustee of the trust. In 1977, the Charity Commissioner modified the scheme and appointed one Gokhale as interim sole trustee and directed an inspection. After inspection, the Deputy Charity Commissioner submitted the inspection report narrating the entire history and activities of the temple. The inspection report gave the details of the traditional role played by Tungars, Purohits and Pujaris in the temple for hundreds of years. The Charity Commissioner considered the report and by order dated 30.11.1981 modified the scheme and appointed 5 trustees, one from the Tungars, one from the 3 Purohits and remaining 3 to be appointed by the Charity Commissioner.

3. The sole trustee Gokhale, however, challenged the order dated 30.11.1981 of the Charity Commissioner under Section 72 of the Act before the District Judge, Nashik. After hearing the parties the 5th Additional District Judge, Nashik in his order dated 28.12.1993, held that Tungars get offerings made by the devotees in the plate situated before the idol and Purohits earn income from the devotees who visit the temple and therefore they have financial interest in the offerings and the devotees and their respective participation in the management of the trust is likely to be in conflict with the interest of the trust. The Additional District Judge held that the apprehension of the appellant before him that Tungars and Purohits, if appointed as trustees, are bound to look after their well being first and divert the attention of the devotees was well-founded and accordingly allowed the appeal and set aside the appointment of one of the Tungars and one of the Purohits as trustees. The Additional District Judge directed that instead a Civil Judge, Senior Division, be nominated by the 4 District Judge, Nashik and the Chief Officer of Trambakeshwar Municipality or in his absence the next subordinate be appointed as Ex-officio trustee and that the Civil Judge, Senior Division, so appointed by the District Judge, Nashik shall be the Chairman of the Board of Trustees.

4. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Nashik, the President, Purohit Sangh filed First Appeal No.1252 of 1996, the Tungars filed First Appeal No.1322 of 1996 and the Pujaris represented by Krushnaji Ramchandra Ruikar and three others filed First Appeal No.1325 of 1996. After hearing the parties, the High Court in the impugned judgment dated 05.08.2002 has held that the Tungars, Purohits as well as Pujaris should get representation in the trust and allowed the appeal in part and modified the composition of the trust. The High Court held in the impugned order that the trust will have a maximum of 7 members namely, one nominee of the District Judge who would be the Ex-officio Trustee and Chairman of the Board, the Chief Executive Officer of the Trimbakeshwar Municipal Council who would be the Ex-officio Trustee and 5 in his absence, his immediate subordinate nominated by the Municipal Council, one representative to be nominated by the Tungar Public Trust, one representative to be nominated by the Purohit Sangh (registered society), one person to be nominated from amongst the three Pujari families; and two persons to be appointed by the Charity Commissioner from amongst male/female, adult Hindu devotees preferably residents of Trimbakeshwar.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant in the three appeals submitted that the High Court was not right and justified in giving representation in the Board of Trustees to the Tungars, Purohits and Pujaris, particularly when Tungars and Purohits have direct pecuniary interest in the temple. He explained that Tungars collected the offerings made by the devotees to the idol and Purohits perform pujas for the devotees and earn money from the devotees. He submitted that the interest of Tungars and Purohits were in direct conflict with the interest of the trust and they should not have been given the representation in the Board of Trustees. By way of illustration, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that if the Board of Trustees was to decide to 6 place a cash-box in which the devotees would contribute money for the benefit of the temple, the Tungars and Purohits or their representatives would not like this decision to come through because such a decision would affect their earnings. He submitted that in fact in 1997, the Tungars had opposed the installation of cash-box before the idol. He submitted that the Additional District Judge, Nashik was therefore right in coming to the conclusion that Tungars and Purohits have financial interest in the offerings and the devotees and their appointment as trustees will not be in the interest of the trust. He referred to the provisions of Section 47(3) of the Act to show that the Charity Commissioner shall have regard to the question whether the appointment of a trustee will promote or impede the execution of the trust and to the interest of the public or the section of the public who have interest in the trust. He submitted that it is the devotees of the temple who have got maximum interest in the temple whereas Tungars and Purohits have their own interest as against the interest of the temple and should not have been appointed as trustees. 7

6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents referred to the inspection report to show the important functions performed by the Tungars, Purohits and Pujaris at the temple for the last hundred of years. They also referred to the reasons given by the Joint-Charity Commissioner in his order dated 30.11.1981 for giving representations to the Tungars, Purohits and Pujaris in the Board of Trustees. They submitted that the High Court has given good reasons in the impugned judgment to show that there is no conflict between the interest of the Tungars, Purohits and Pujaris and the interest of the trust. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in the Fakir Mohamed Abdul Razak vs. The Charity Commissioner, Bombay and Ors. (AIR 1976 Bom.304) a Division Bench of the High Court while deciding a matter under the Act has held in paragraph 37 that the court has to consider while settling the Scheme the past history of the institution and the way in which the management of the trust has been carried on till the settlement of the scheme and the appointment of the trustees. They submitted that the Joint-Charity Commissioner and the High Court have taken into 8 consideration the past history of the trust and in particular the role played by the Tungars, Purohits and Pujaris and held that they should be given representations in the Board of Trustees. They submitted that the appointment of representatives of the Tungars, Purohits and Pujaris does not in any way impede the execution of the trust. They argued that Tungars, Purohits and Pujaris, all are persons who have interest in the trust within the meaning of Section 2(10) of the Act and they are entitled to be represented in the trust.

7. Section 2(10) of the Act and Section 47(3) of the Act which are relevant for deciding the issues raised before us are quoted hereinbelow:

"Section 2(10) "Person having interest" includes - (a) in the case of a temple, person who is entitled to attend at or is in the habit of attending the performance of worship or service in the temple, or who is entitled to partake or is in the habit of partaking in the distribution of gifts thereof, (b) in the case of a math, a disciple of the math or a person of the religious persuasion to which the math belongs, (c) in the case of wakf, a person who is entitled to receive any pecuniary or other benefit from the wakf and includes a person 9 who has right to worship or to perform any religious rite in a mosque, idgah, imambara, dargah, maqbara or other religious institution connected with the wakf or to participate in any religious or charitable institution under the wakf, (d) in the case of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, any member of such society, and (e) in the case of any other public trust, any trustee or beneficiary;

47. Power of Charity Commissioner to appoint, suspend, remove or discharge trustees and invest property to new trustees : (3) In appointing a trustee under sub-section (2), the Charity Commissioner shall have regard (a) to the wishes of the author of that trust;

(b) to the wishes of the persons, if any, empowered to appoint a new trustee;

(c) to the question whether the appointment will promote or impede the execution of the trust;

(d) to the interest of the public or the section of the public who have interest in the trust; and (e) to the custom and usage of the trust.

It will be clear from a reading of Section 2(10)(a) of the Act that in the case of a temple, person who is entitled to attend 10 at or is in the habit of attending the performance of worship or service in the temple, or who is entitled to partake or is in the habit of partaking in the distribution of gifts of the temple is a person having interest. Section 47(3) of the Act quoted above provides that the Charity Commissioner shall have regard to the factors mentioned in clauses (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) while appointing a trustee. The Charity Commissioner, therefore, must have regard to the question whether the appointment will promote or impede the execution of the trust as mentioned in clause (c) and to the interest of the public or section of the public who have interest in the trust as mentioned in clause (d).

8. We find that the High Court has considered the provisions of Sections 2(10) and 47(3) of the Act in the impugned judgment and has held that the Tungars, Purohits and Pujaris need to be represented in the Board of Trustees. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the impugned judgment of the High Court are quoted hereinbelow:

"15. In a case of a religious public trust, undoubtedly, the Authority or the Court will have to keep in mind the requirements of Section 47(3) of the Act and the interest of or the proper management and administration of such trust. The persons 11 to be appointed, by law, are required to be persons who have interest in the affairs of the trust which is real, substantive and an existing one, though not direct one. It is well settled that merely being resident of the area is not enough for being labeled as a suitable and fit person. At the same time the legislative scheme would suggest that the management and administration of a public religious trust such as the Trimbakeshwar Devasthan should be entrusted to such person so as to preserve the interest of the public or the section of the public who have interest in the trust. Obviously, regard being had to the fact that the appointment will promote and not impede the execution of the trust or its policies. By the very nature of the activities in a place used as a place of public religious worship and dedicated to or for the benefit of or used as of right by the Hindu community or any Section thereof, it is antithesis to a private and closed door management of its affairs. On the other hand there has to be complete openness and transparency in its administration and above all by observing democratic values or principles. To put it differently, it is public trust "for the community, by the community and of the community" or any section thereof. If such is the purport of the Trust then diversified representation and involvement of all concerned or the section of the pubic who have interest in the Trust and in particular associated with the day to day activities of the temple of the devasthan is inevitable - and the most appropriate step to further and promote the objectives of such a Trust.

16. Once we reach at this position, the next question that needs to be examined is; 12 whether persons belonging to a particular Section can be generally disqualified on the ground of "conflict of interest" with the affairs of the trust of fact attached to an individual? I have no hesitation to hold that disqualification is essentially of an individual and cannot be because of the fact that the person belongs to the family of "Tungar", "Pujari" or "Purohit" as such, as the case may be. A person can be said to be disqualified or would render himself unfit for being appointed as the trustees only when he has direct interest in the trust or the devasthan and is hostile to the affairs of the Trust and his object is to see that the Trust is destroyed. To put it differently, there is a perceptible difference between "person having interest in the trust" and "person having conflict of interest". The former is the quintessence for being eligible to be considered or for being appointed as the trustee. This mandate flows from the provisions of Section 47 read with Section 2(1) of the Act. Therefore, merely because the "Tungars" have the right to take away the entire cash offerings in the form of notes or coins near the idol or the threshold of the Garbhagriha in a plate or that the "Purohits" entertain the Yajmans or offer their services for consideration or the "Pujaris" are engaged in the performance of the official puja in the temple, cannot be said to be hostile to the affairs of the Trust or having direct interest so as to conflict with the administration and management of the Trust. As observed earlier Section 2(10) of the Act would envelope even the beneficiary of the Trust. Understood thus, it is incomprehensible that the "Tungars", "Purohits" or the "Pujaris" in the devasthan can be singled out as a class from the administration and management of the 13 Trust. This view would answer point number (iii) and (iv) above."

9. A reading of paragraphs 15 and 16 of the impugned judgment of the High Court quoted above shows that the High Court has not only kept in mind the interest of the public but also interest of the temple and has taken a view that the appointment of representatives of the Tungars, Purohits or Pujaris in the trust would not be in conflict with the interest of the trust only because they have interest in the cash offerings, the consideration for the pujas or performance of the official puja in the temple. The High Court has rightly held that Tungars, Purohits and Pujaris have interest in the trust and not necessarily an interest which is in conflict with the interest of the trust. We are also of the view that in most of the decisions of the Board of Trustees, there would not be a conflict of interest between that of the trust and that of the Tungars, Purohits and Pujaris. Rather, representation of Tungars, Purohits and Pujaris in the Board of Trustees may be necessary to ensure the smooth functioning of the temple. We are, therefore, not inclined to set aside the impugned order of the High Court in so far as it has held that Tungars, Purohits and Pujaris 14 need to be represented in the Board of Trustees by one member from each of these classes.

10. Law is however well settled that the interest of the public is paramount in any religious public trust. The Division Bench of the High Court in Fakir Mohamed Abdul Razak vs. The Charity Commissioner, Bombay and Ors. (supra) has held in para 35: "It is well settled that in suits like the suits for settling the Scheme, the Court has a duty once it is found that it is a Trust for public purposes, to consider what is best in the interests of public. Settling a scheme is one of the most important relieves relating to the administration of public trust. The primary duty of the Court is to consider the interest of the public for whose benefit the trust has been created........" To ensure that the interest of the public is protected and safeguarded in all the decisions of the Board of Trustees, we hold that, instead of two persons, four persons will be appointed by the Charity Commissioner from amongst male/female, adult Hindu devotees preferably residents of Trimbakeshwar, who will represent the public in the Board of Trustees. This will ensure that in a composition of maximum of nine members, four members at least will represent the public or the devotees of the temple and the 15 decisions of the Board of Trustees will be in the larger interest of temple and the public or the devotees.

11. The impugned judgment of the High Court is modified accordingly and the appeals stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.

.............................J.

(R. V. Raveendran)

.............................J.

T. VARGHESE GEORGE v. KORA K. GEORGE & ORS. [2011] INSC 1051 (13 October 2011)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 6786 OF 2003 with Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 22590-22591 OF 2007 and Contempt Petition (C) No. 435 of 2004

Dr. T. Varghese George ... Appellant

Versus

Kora K. George & Ors. ... Respondents

J U D G E M E N T

H.L. Gokhale J.

Civil Appeal No. 6786 of 2003 raises the question as to whether T. Thomas Educational Trust, Perambur, Chennai, is in any way a Minority Educational Trust? And if so, whether the Division Bench of the Madras High Court was justified in framing a scheme for the administration of this trust under Section 92 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (`CPC' for short) by treating it as a Public Charitable Trust? Facts leading to Civil Appeal No. 6786 of 2003 are this wise -

2. One Shri T. Thomas son of Shri Thomas Pappy, of Perambur, Chennai, started a school in Chennai by name `St. Mary's School' sometime in the year 1970. On 4.4.1975, he executed a deed of declaration of a trust by name 'T. Thomas Educational 2 Trust' for the purpose of running of the school on the terms and conditions mentioned therein. In para 2 of this deed he declared the objects of the trust as follows:- "2. The said Trust shall have the following objects namely - a. to run the said St. Mary's School, b. to run other Educational Institutions and Institutions allied to Educational Institutions like Research Institutions.

c. to accept donations in any manner from any person or Institutions whether Governmental or quasi Governmental or otherwise, for carrying out the purpose of the Trust.

d. to borrow moneys from banks and/or other credit Institutions and/or individuals and/or public bodies and/or other Governmental or quasi-Governmental bodies, on the security of its properties or otherwise, for the purpose of the Trust.

e. to lease out or sell or mortgage or otherwise deal with any of the properties of the Trust whether moveable or immovable for the purpose of the Trust."

3. In para 3 he declared that the entire control and management of the Trust including appointment of the Correspondent of the School shall rest in a `Board of Trustee' who shall consist of the following persons namely:- (a) The Principal of the School (ex-officio) (b) Headmaster or Headmistress (c) Warden of the St. Mary's School Hostel (ex-officio) (d) A member elected from the Parents Association of the School.

(e) A member elected from the Staff Council of the School.

(f) Three members nominated by the above five members, having high standing in the Educational field.

3 He nominated the First Board of Trustees in para 4. The members thereof were as follows: - (a) Rev. Fr. G.M. Thomas, B.Sc., L.T., acting Principal of the School.

(b) Mr. Joseph Ebenezer, B.Sc., L.T. Headmaster (c) Mrs. Elizabeth Saraswathi, Warden of the St. Mary's English School Hostel (d) Mrs. Molly Thayil, 37, Vyasa Nagar, Madras-39 (e) Mr. J. Devaraj, B.A. (Staff Member) (f) Mrs. Mary Joshna Thomas, M.A.B.D., Prof. of History, St. Stephen's College, Pathanapuram, Kerela (g) Mr. D.V. DeMonte, M.L.C., President, Anglo Indian Association, Madras (h) Pandit M.C. Chandy, Teaching Assistant (Retd.) Madras Christian College School, Madras

4. What Shri T. Thomas declared in para 10 with respect to the income of the School and utilisation of its funds is very crucial for our purpose. This para reads as follows:- "10. The income from the School or any income or funds pertaining to the Trust shall be exclusively used for the purpose of the Trust including financial assistance to poor and deserving pupils or students irrespective of case, creed or religion." (emphasis supplied)

5. Shri Thomas died on 16.1.1984, and the trust and the school fell under the management of his wife Smt. Elizabeth Thomas. There were allegations with respect to mis-management of the funds of the institution by her. This led three persons taking interest in the activities of the trust to institute a suit in the Madras High Court under Section 92 of the CPC for framing of a scheme for this trust. They were:- (i) Shri D.V. DeMonte, a member of the First Board of Trustee, 4 (ii) Dr. K.P. Natrajan, a parent of a student of the institution, and (iii) Shri Kora K. George, respondent No. 1 herein, who is husband of the sister of Late T. Thomas.

6. This suit was numbered as Civil Suit No. 601/1987, wherein (i) T. Thomas Educational Trust, (ii) Smt. Elizabeth Thomas, (iii) Smt. Molly Thayil and (iv) Rev. Thomas Mar Osthatheos, were joined as the defendants. The learned Single Judge framed the necessary issues and then after recording evidence decided the suit. Issue Nos. 6 and 7 from amongst them were as follows:- "6. Whether the suit falls outside the purview of section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure as contended by the second defendant?

7. Whether this court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the management and with administration of the first administration of the first defendant Trust under section 92 C.P.C."

7. It was canvassed by Smt. Elizabeth Thomas before the learned single Judge that the concerned trust was a private trust and a Minority Institution. She pointed out that three schools of the institution had obtained declaration of being minority educational institutions. Therefore, it was submitted that the single Judge did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit under Section 92 of CPC. That submission was not accepted by the learned single Judge. The learned Judge looked into the original trust deed and noted that in para 3 of the founders declaration, one of the objects was to accept donation in any manner from any person or institutions whether governmental or otherwise for carrying out the purpose of the Trust, which was the educational purpose. He also referred to the above referred clause 10 which stated that the income and funds of the institution were to be exclusively used for the purposes of the trust, including financial assistance to the poor and deserving students irrespective 5 of caste, creed or religion. He referred to the prospectus of St. Mary's group of schools. He also noted that no benefit whatsoever was to be retained by any member of the family, and the beneficiaries were only public. At the end of para 29 he held that the above factors would show that it is a Public Charitable Trust. This para reads as follows:- "29. Issue 6 and 7:- Ex. P-1 is the Trust deed. I shall refer to the clauses in it, which are relevant for considering whether it is a public charitable trust. In the first page he has stated that this declaration of trust is made by T. Thomas, herein after called the declarant which expression shall whenever it is not repugnant to the context mean and include the heirs, successors, executors, administrators and legal representatives of the Declarant. In para 3, it is stated that the said trust shall have the following objects, viz., (a) to run the said St. Mary's School;

(b) to run other educational institutions, and institution like research institution;

(c) to accept donation in any manner from any person or institutions whether governmental or otherwise for carrying out the purpose of the Trust etc.

In page 5, as per clause 8, a sum of Rs.2,000/- has been deposited with Indian Overseas Bank, Perambur in the name of the trust, which sum along with further donation etc., shall be utilized for the purposes for which the trust is created. As per clause 10, which is found at page 6, the income form the school or any income or funds pertaining to the trust shall be exclusively used for the purpose of the trust, including financial assistance to poor and deserving pupils or students irrespective of caste, creed or religion. IN Ex. P-2, which is prospectus of St. Mary's group of Schools under T. Thomas educational trust, in para 1, it is stated as follows:- "T. Thomas educational trust was founded by chevalier t. Thomas M.A., Dip in Econ. (London), to promote quality education in North Madras." The above would show that the trust was created wholly for the purpose of imparting education. It is also seen that there is provision for donations from the public. It is further seen that no benefit whatsoever was retained by any member of the family and the beneficiaries are only public. The above would show that it is a public Charitable Trust."

6

8. The learned Judge however was of the view that the three conditions as [1967] INSC 30; [AIR 1967 SC 1044], had to be satisfied for invoking Section 92 of CPC viz. that (i) the trust is created for public purpose of a charitable or religious nature. (ii) there was breach of trust as directions of court is necessary in the administration of such a trust; and (iii) the relief claimed is one of the reliefs enumerated therein. The single Judge took the view that a case of breach of trust had not been made out, and the prayer for direction was vague, and therefore although he found the trust to be a charitable trust, he gave a finding in the affirmative on issue Nos. 6 and 7. Issue No.8 was as to whether the plaintiffs could be considered as interested persons to maintain the suit and ask for settlement of a scheme. The learned single Judge held that they could not be said to be interested persons. He therefore, dismissed the suit. At the end of para 30 he held as follows:- "30........But, if after evidence is taken, it is found breach of trust alleged has not been made out and that the prayer for direction of the Court is vague and is not based on any solid foundation in facts of reasons but is made only with a view to brig the suit under section then a suit purporting to be brought under section 92 must be dismissed. In this case, after evidence is taken it is found that the breach of trust alleged has not been made out and the allegations in the plaint and the grievances made are not based on any fact or basis. The ratio of this ruling squarely applies to the facts of this case. Though I have found that this trust is a Public Charitable Trust, in view of my findings under Issues 1 to 3, 5 and 8 it follows that Issues 6 and 7 are to be decided in the affirmative."

9. The respondent No. 1 herein carried the matter in appeal by filling O.S.A. No. 49 of 1995. Smt. Elizabeth did not file any cross appeal or objection on the finding rendered by the single Judge that the institution was a public trust. The Division Bench noted with approval that on Issues No.6 and 7, the single Judge had held that 7 the institution was a public trust. With respect to the finding of the single Judge on above Issue No.8, the Division Bench noted that Shri Kora K. George was instrumental in buying vast lands which are in possession and ownership of T. Thomas Educational Trust. He was also incharge of constructing buildings for Marian School at and St. Mary's Girls School, Sembium at Madras. The Division Bench held that he was a person who was very much interested in the trust and the view taken by the learned single Judge to the contrary was not correct. In the facts and circumstances of the case the Division Bench formed the opinion that having held the institution to be a public trust, it was necessary to frame an appropriate scheme. It noted that initially there was only one school run by the trust, but now it was running a college also, and a representation to the Principal of the college on the board of trustees was necessary. The Court was of the view that it was absolutely necessary to fill up the lacunae in the deed of trust which could be done only be framing a scheme therefor. The Court, therefore, passed an order on 20.11.1995 calling upon both the parties to file draft schemes for the consideration of the Court. Smt. Elizabeth Thomas did not file any draft scheme in spite of this specific order. The Court, thereafter, considered the draft scheme filed by Shri Kora K. George, and modified it appropriately and accordingly allowed the appeal by its judgment and order dated 4.12.1995.

10. Smt. Elizabeth Thomas and T. Thomas Educational Trust filed a Civil Appeal before this Court against that judgment and order, which was numbered as Civil Appeal 16578 of 1996. A bench of three Judges of this Court disposed of the said appeal on 27.10.1999 by passing the following order:- "We are of the opinion that the judgment of the High Court on the legal issues which were raised does not call for any 8 interference but considering the fact that the appellants had been the managing trustees ever since the inception, one further opportunity should be granted to them to file a draft scheme which should be considered along with the draft scheme which was filed by the respondent herein. It will be more appropriate, in our opinion, that the exercise of consideration the draft schemes should be undertaken by the High Court rather than by this Court. We, therefore, while affirming the judgment of the High Court in all other aspects remand the case to the High Court for considering afresh the draft schemes. The appellants herein will file the draft scheme within eight weeks from today. The High Court will decide the question thereafter after giving reasonable opportunity to both the sides........."

(emphasis added) As can be seen from this order, this Court specifically affirmed the judgment of the High Court on all aspects. It remanded the matter only with a view to give an opportunity to Smt. Elizabeth Thomas who had filed the appeal. It is also material to note that pending the decision on the scheme, this Court continued the status-quo with regard to the operation of the approved scheme.

11. After the matter was remanded, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court went into the issue of framing of the scheme. It looked into the history of the proceeding as stated above. The High Court noted that although initially the trust was running only one school, by the time the appeal was being decided in December 2002, it was running eight schools and colleges. The Court noticed that there were allegations of financial mis-management against Smt. Thomas, and therefore appointed Mr. Justice Kanakaraj, a retired Judge of Madras High Court as an interim Chairman of the trust. He gave two reports on 3.6.2002 and 7.10.2002, wherein he reported that Smt. Elizabeth Thomas was trying to sell the land of the institution situated at Madhavaram which was purchased for its engineering college. 9

12. The Court examined the draft scheme presented by Smt. Elizabeth Thomas, Shri Kora K. George and also by the interim Chairman. Smt. Thomas once again tried to raise the issue that it was a minority institution, but the Division Bench declined to accept that submission in view of the finding of the single Judge on that issue being left undisturbed by this Court. Smt. Thomas wanted to be appointed as a trustee for life. Division Bench noted that there were serious allegations with respect to mis-appropriation of funds against her. While looking into these allegations, the High Court noted that she had created one trust of her own by name Elizabeth Thomas Trust in October 1997. She had obtained a loan of Rs.2.50 crores on the security of T. Thomas Education Trust, and diverted that amount to her own trust. The Division Bench had therefore, by an earlier order dated 27.3.2002 held that the assets of the Elizabeth Thomas Trust shall be treated as belonging to the T. Thomas Trust. Smt. Thomas sought the appointment of a religious leader of the Christian community as a trustee for life and as Chairman of the trust. The Division Bench observed in para 16 of its judgment, that such a request cannot be acceded to, and a public trust cannot be by a backdoor method converted into a religious trust. It therefore framed the scheme in its judgment and order dated 5.12.2002. In paragraph 25 it appointed a Board of Trustees consisting of eight persons. This para 25 reads as follows:- "25. The first Board of Trustees shall comprise of Justice J. Kanakaraj, former Judge of the Madras High Court, as Chairman, Shri S. Palamalai, I.A.S. (Retd.), as Executive Trustee and Mrs. Elizabeth Thomas, as trustee, Dr. V.A. Vasantha, the Principal/Headmaster of St. Mary's Matriculation Boys High Secondary School, Perambur, Chennai 11, the Principal/Headmistress of St. Mary's Matriculation Girls Higher Secondary School, Sembium, Chennai-11, the Principal/Headmaster of Chevalier T. Thomas Elizabeth Matriculation Higher Secondary School, Perambur, Chennai 11, the Principal of Chevalier T. Thomas Elizabeth College for Women, Perambur, Chennai 11, as trustees. They shall within 10 two months from the date of their first meeting nominate a trustee to represent the non teaching staff employed in the institution."

13. Smt. Elizabeth Thomas filed SLP No.24352 of 2002, to challenge the said judgment and order, but later on she withdrew the same on 20.01.2003. (She has subsequently passed away on 5.9.2006.) In the present Civil Appeal No. 6786/2003, this judgment and order is challenged by the appellant herein who is a medical practitioner from Chennai, and who admittedly was not a party before the High Court as stated by himself in para 1.1 of the SLP. He claims to have arranged some good funds for the trust. He has once again sought to raise the issue in this Court that T. Thomas Educational Trust cannot be considered as a public trust. According to him it is a minority institution and therefore, the High Court erred in exercising the jurisdiction under Section 92 of CPC.

14. The appellant thereafter filed Civil Miscellaneous Petition (CMP) No. 20476 of 2003 to implead himself in disposed of O.S.A No. 49 of 1995. He filed another CMP No. 5673 of 2003 on 10.12.2003 for removal of the Chairman and the managing trustee before the Madras High Court in O.S.A No. 49 of 1995. The appellant made a grievance that the executive trustee and the Chairman were alienating the properties and assets to the prejudice of the trust. He however, did not move that CMP, and filed I.A. No.4 in Civil Appeal No. 6786 of 2003, to restrain the trustees from alienating any of those estates or properties and sought appointment of a receiver. This Court rejected the said I.A. by passing the following order on 16.4.2004"- "We are not inclined to appoint a receiver as prayed for in this application at this stage. However, we restrain the trustees from alieniating any of the estates or the property without the permission of this Court. IA is rejected." 11

15. The appellant thereafter moved a Contempt Petition bearing No. 435 of 2004 and pointed out that in breach of this order dated 16.4.2004, the above executive trustee and Chairman were disposing of few vehicles and furnitures of the institution. Thereupon, this Court passed the following order on 6.9.2004:- "List the Contempt Petition along with the main appeal. The application filed by the applicant for the appointment of Receiver shall be moved before the High Court. We grant permission to the applicant to make such application before the High Court."

16. (i) CMP No. 20476/2003 was allowed by the High Court on 9.3.2005 and the appellant was joined as a respondent in O.S.A No. 49 of 1995. Thereafter, the appellant moved CMP No. 5660/2005 in O.S.A No. 49 of 1995 for appointment of a receiver. He also filed CMP No. 9402 of 2006 seeking modification of the scheme decree passed in O.S.A No. 49 of 1995. The appellant made various grievances including that some five acres of land of the trust at Madhavaram had been sold at a much lesser price to the prejudice of the trust. The executive trustee and the Chairman denied these allegations, and pointed out that all the decisions were taken by the entire board of trustees and not only by these two persons. On the other hand they alleged that the appellant was acting at the instance of Smt. Elizabeth Thomas. The Division Bench of the High Court examined all these issues, and accepted the submissions of the executive trustee and the Chairman, and dismissed these three CMPs on merits by a detailed order dated 21.9.2007. The Court held that the appellant had not substantiated his allegations against the Chairman and the Executive Trustee that they had acted against the interest of the trust or has mis-managed its affairs. Therefore, there was no justification for appointing a receiver for the trust. The High Court held that even assuming that there was any irregularity in the sale of 5 acres of 12 land and that the price fetched was less, it was open to the appellant to seek appropriate remedy before the appropriate forum. (ii) CMP No.10340 and 10341 of 2005 were filed by one Shri V.G. Panneerselvam and Shri C.V.W Davidson to join in the proceeding as additional applicants. However, since CMP Nos. 5673 of 2003, 5560 of 2005 and 9402 of 2006 were being dismissed on merits, the Court did not entertain these two CMPs also. These two CMPs for impleadment were therefore disposed of alongwith the said common order. This common order dated 21.9.2007 has led to SLP Nos.22590 and 22591 of 2007. They are being heard and decided along with Civil Appeal No. 6786 of 2003.

Submissions by the rival parties -

17. Shri K. Subramanian, Senior Advocate, appeared for the appellant. Respondent No. 9 and 10 i.e. T. Thomas Educational Trust as represented by its Executive Trustee, Shri. S. Palamalai and its Chairman Justice J. Kanakaraj, have been joined in this matter vide this Court's order dated 22.8.2003. Shri M.S. Ganesh, Senior Advocate has represented them.

18. The principle submission on behalf of the appellant has been that the T. Thomas Educational Trust is a minority institution and the High Court has erred in appointing Shri S. Palamalai, a non-christian as the Executive Trustee and Correspondent of the Trust. In support of his submission that it is a minority institution, Shri Subramanian, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the trust was found by Late Shri T. Thomas who was a Christian. The school started by him was named as St. Mary's School. Subsequently, three schools belonging to this trust obtained a certificate of being minority schools under the Tamil 13 Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 (Tamil Nadu Act) from a Civil Court which had been left undisturbed in appeal also. All these factors were ignored by the High Court in passing the impugned order. In his submission the High Court should not have accepted the scheme proposed by Justice J. Kankaraj.

19. Shri Subramanian submitted that Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India gives a fundamental right to the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, and this right should not be allowed to be diluted. He relied upon a judgment of a Constitution Bench of this Court in State of particularly paragraph 8 thereof. This paragraph reads as follows:- "8. Article 30(1) has been construed before by this Court. Without referring to those cases it is sufficient to say that the clause contemplates two rights which are separated in point of time. The first right is the initial right to establish institutions of the minority's choice. Establishment here means the bringing into being of an institution and it must be by a minority community. It matters not if a single philanthropic individual with his own means, founds the institution or the community at large contributes the funds. The position in law is the same and the intention in either case must be to found an institution for the benefit of a minority community by a member of that community. It is equally irrelevant that in addition to the minority community others from other minority communities or even from the majority community can take advantage of these institutions. Such other communities bring in income and they do not have to be turned away to enjoy the protection."

20. Thereafter, he referred to the judgment in the case of Secretary, SCC 386], wherein one of us (R.V. Raveendran, J.) was a member of the Bench. The Counsel submitted that in paragraph 19, this Court had summarised the general 14 principles relating to establishment and administration of educational institutions by minorities. The principle (i) (a) laid down therein reads as follows:- "(i) The right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice comprises the following rights:

(a) to choose its governing body in whom the founders of the institution have faith and confidence to conduct and manage the affairs of the institution;"

He submitted that the correspondent appointed under the impugned order could not be said to be person in whom the founders would have had confidence. In any case, Smt. Elizabeth wife of the founder did not have confidence in him. He drew our attention to the observations of this Court in paragraph 63 (6) of the judgment in All Saints' High [1980] INSC 18; [1980 (2) SCC 478] to submit that introduction of an outside authority however high in the governing body would be destructive of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. In his submission, the proper course must be to consider the past history of the institution and the way in which the management has been carried out herein before as was laid down by the Privy Council in MD. Ismail P.C. 132]. This being the position, in his submission the order of appointment of the Executive Trustee was vitiated. The High Court had not discharged its function under Section 92 of CPC correctly, and therefore, this Court ought to interfere and set-aside the impugned judgment and order, and if necessary, remand the matter to the High Court for re-consideration. He also drew our attention to some of the allegations of mis-management against the Chairman and correspondent.

15

21. Shri M.S. Ganesh, learned senior counsel appearing for the Chairman and the correspondent of the trust on the other hand submitted that the appellant was working at cross purposes with the trust, and this fact should not be lost sight of. The appellant claims to have arranged contributions of lakhs of rupees to the trust when Smt. Elizabeth Thomas was in the management, and has subsequently started claiming those amounts from the present management. On 24.2.2003, he sent a fax message demanding lakhs of rupees from the trust, and when Shri S. Palamalai visited Kottayam, the appellant threatened him to return the amounts which led the correspondent to lodge a complaint with the police on 26.2.2003. Smt. Elizabeth Thomas and the appellant were hand in gloves, and, therefore although she withdrew her appeal to this Court, she recommended the appellant for being taken in the formal meetings of the board by her letter dated 22.1.2003, and in spite of the above referred incident on 26.2.2003 she once again wrote to the Chairman of trust that his moneys be returned.

22. Apart from this aspect, Shri Ganesh pointed out the fact that this trust is a secular public trust for the purposes of education, is writ large in the document of the trust as well as its activities. He pointed out that the trust deed permits receiving of funds from anybody, it does not anywhere state that it is set up in the interest of any minority community having a separate culture of its own. On the other hand para 10 of the trust document specifically states that its funds will be utilized for encouraging the deserving and poor students, irrespective of caste, creed or religion. All throughout the findings on this aspect have been very clear. The single Judge has held that it was a public charitable trust and not a minority institution. That view was accepted by a 16 Division Bench, and reaffirmed by a bench of three judges of this Court. That being so there was no occasion to reopen the issue any more.

23. With respect to the orders of being minority institutions obtained by three schools of the trust under the Tamil Nadu Act, Shri Ganesh submitted that at the highest those orders will have to be read as obtained for the purposes of that statute, though in his submission the orders were obtained from an authority viz. the Civil Court which did not have the jurisdiction to issue such orders. In any case, the orders could not be used for the purposes of restricting the objective of the trust, and for making a submission that the trust is a minority institution. The intention of the founder of the trust must be correctly understood and given utmost importance, which is what the Court had done in this matter all throughout. He relied upon the judgment of a 662] where in the context of Article 30(1) this Court observed in paragraph 19 as follows:- "19. ...... The Article in our opinion clearly shows that the minority will have the right to administer educational institutions of their choice provided they have established them, but not otherwise. The article cannot be read, to mean that even if the educational institution has been established by somebody else, any religious minority would have the right to administer it because, for some reason or other, it might have been administering it before the Constitution came into force. The words "establish and administer" in the article must be read conjunctively and so read it gives the right to the minority to administer an educational institution provided it has been established by it. ...... We are of opinion that nothing in that case justifies the contention raised of behalf of the petitioners that the minorities would have the right to administer an educational institution even though the institution may not have been established by them. The two words in Article 30(1) must be read together and so read the Article gives this right to the minority to administer institutions established by it. If the educational institution has not been established by a minority it cannot claim the right to administer it under Article 30(1). ...."

(emphasis supplied) 17 Shri Ganesh submitted that as the proposition states, if an educational institution is established by somebody else, a religious minority does not acquire the right to administer it only on the ground that for some reason or the other, it might be administering it. In the instant case, though the trust is constituted by person belonging to a religious minority, he created a secular trust. He has specifically stated that its income is not to be utilized for the benefit of students belonging to any particular community. The objects of the trust in no way state that the trust is set up in the interest of any minority having a distinct culture within the meaning of Article 29(1) of the Constitution.

23. He referred to a recent judgment of this Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation and particularly paragraph 117 thereof where this Court referred to the judgment in (1) SCC 717] which reiterated the observations of Das, CJ in Kerala Education Bill [AIR 1958 SC 956] to the effect that right to administer is to be tempered with regulatory measures to facilitate smooth administration. The right to manage a minority institution does not mean a right to mismanage the same. He also made a wider submission based on the observations of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt reported in [1954 (5) SCR 1005], where in the context of Article 26 (b) of the Constitution, it is observed at page 1023 that "it is clear therefore that questions merely relating to administration of properties belonging to a religious group or institutions are not matter of religion to which clause (b) of the 18 Article applies." In his submission administration of an educational trust is a secular activity and the appointment of a person belonging to another religion cannot amount to any infringement of the right of a minority under Article 30 (1) of the Constitution.

Consideration of the rival submissions -

24. We have noted the submissions of both the counsel. To begin with, we would like to refer to the provision of Section 92 of CPC whereunder the proceedings leading to these appeals were initiated. This Section reads as follows:- "92. Public charities - (1) In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate-General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the [leave of the Court] may institute a suit, whether contentious or not, in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate to obtain a decree- (a) removing any trustee;

(b) appointing a new trustee;

(c) vesting any property in a trustee;

[(cc) directing a trustee who has been removed or a person who has ceased to be a trustee, to deliver possession of any trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property;] (d) directing accounts and inquiries;

(e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust;

(f) authorizing the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged;

(g) settling a scheme; or (h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require.

(2) Save as provided by the Religious Endowments Act, 1863 (20 of 1863), [or by any corresponding law in force in [the territories which, immediately before the 1st specified in sub-section (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with the provisions of that sub-section. 19 (3) The Court may alter the original purposes of an express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature and allow the property or income of such trust or any portion thereof to be applied cypres in one or more of the following, circumstances, namely:- (a) where the original purposes of the trust, in whole or in part,- (i) have been, as far as may be, fulfilled; or (ii) cannot be carried out at all, or cannot be carried out according to the directions given in the instrument creating the trust or, where there is no such instrument, according to the spirit of the trust; or (b) where the original purposes of the trust provide a use for a part only of the property available by virtue of the trust; or (c) where the property available by virtue of the trust and other property applicable for similar purposes can be more effectively used in conjunction with, an to that end can suitably be made applicable to any other purpose, regard being had to the spirit of the trust and its applicability to common purposes; or (d) where the original purposes, in whole or in part, were laid down by reference to an area which then was, but has since ceased to be, a unit for such purposes; or (e) where the original purposes, in whole or in part, have, since they were laid down,- (i) been adequately provided for by other means, or (ii) ceased, as being useless or harmful to the community, or (iii) ceased to be, in law, charitable, or (iv) ceased in any other way to provide a suitable and effective method of using the property available by virtue of the trust, regard being had to the spirit of the trust]."

25. As can be seen from this Section two or more persons having interest in the trust may institute a suit in the principle civil court of original jurisdiction to obtain a decree concerning a public charity for various purposes mentioned therein. Such suit will lie where these persons make out a case of alleged breach of any trust created for public purposes or for directions of the Court for administration of the trust. One of the purposes set out in sub-section (1) (g) is settling a scheme, sub-section (b) speaks 20 about a new trustee being appointed, and sub-section (a) speaks about removing a trustee. Out of the three persons who filed the Civil Suit No.601 of 1987, Shri D.V.D. Monte was a member of the Board of Trustees nominated by the founder Shri T. Thomas himself. Shri Kora K. George is a brother-in-law of Shri T. Thomas. He has raised funds for buying lands for the institution, and for constructing the buildings of the school. Therefore, although the single Judge held that he could not be said to be a person having interest in the trust, that finding was reversed by the Division Bench in OSA No.49 of 1995. Dr. Natrajan is a parent of a student of the institution. None of these persons can be criticized as persons lacking good intention for the trust.

26. Sub-section (2) of Section 92 lays down that a suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub-section (1) has to be instituted in conformity with that sub- section. Such suit having been filed, the Trial Court gave a finding that it was a public trust and not a minority institution. That finding has been left undisturbed by the High Court, and confirmed by a bench of three judges of this Court. Although, the Trial Court declined to accept the principle prayer of Shri Kora K. George and others, the Division Bench in appeal realised that an appropriate scheme for the administration of the trust was necessary. The Court, therefore, framed the scheme considering the objects of the trust by its order dated 4.12.1995.

27. It is material to note that the Division Bench had framed the scheme by its order dated 4.12.1995, after calling upon Smt. Elizabeth Thomas to give her proposals which she had declined to do so. Still, with a view only to give one more opportunity to her, this Court remanded the matter once again to the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court which heard the matter after remand appointed 21 Justice J. Kankaraj, a retired Judge of Madras High Court as the interim Chairman, and a retired IAS Office Shri Palamalai as the Executive Trustee and Correspondent in April 2002. Hon'ble Justice J. Kankaraj made the necessary reports to the Division Bench and pointed out that Smt. Elizabeth was mis-managing the trust. The Division Bench considered all the aspects and proposals including that of Smt. Elizabeth Thomas for framing the scheme and framed an appropriate scheme by its order dated 5.12.2002. Apart from the appellant, and Smt. Elizabeth hardly anybody has raised any grievance with respect to the functioning of the Chairman or the Correspondent. The appellant did not choose to initiate any proceedings with respect to the functioning of the trust as required under Section 92. After the scheme was finalized, although Smt. Elizabeth filed an appeal, she withdrew the same. It was at this stage that the appellant filed the present appeal raising the issues that he has raised. The correct course of action for him ought to have been to file his suit under Section 92, if he deemed it fit.

28. As can be seen from the narration above, as far as the character of the trust as a secular public trust is concerned, that view was taken initially by a learned Single Judge. Subsequently, it was confirmed by a Division Bench as well as by a bench of three judges of this Court. The fact that the trust was set up by Late Shri T. Thomas who belongs to a religious minority was very much there before the Courts all throughout. The fact that three schools of this trust had obtained a certificate of minority character was canvassed before the single Judge, and in spite of that submission the single judge gave a finding that the trust was not a minority trust. He recognised the secular character of the institution, particularly by referring to Clause 10 of the declaration made by the founder. The specific finding on concerned issues No. 6 and 7 was left undisturbed by a Division Bench of the High Court in appeal and 22 reaffirmed by a bench of three judges of this Court. Smt. Elizabeth did not file any appeal on this finding of the single Judge to the Division Bench of the High Court. This Court has already confirmed that finding. Explanation IV to Section 11 of Code of CPC clearly lays down that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such latter suit, and a Civil Court cannot try the same issue once again between the same parties or between the parties under whom they were litigating. The same proposition applies to issue estoppel. Such a view has been taken Harnam Singh reported in [2003 (11) SCC 377]. In that matter this Court was concerned with the issue as to whether a particular sect could be regarded as a sect belonging to the Sikh religion. That issue had already been decided in Mahant 17, of its Judgment this Court, therefore, held as follows:- "The factual findings relating to the nature and character of the institutions, specifically, found on an elaborate review of the governing legal principles as well, and which have reached finality cannot be reagitated and the same is precluded on the principle of "issue estoppel" also. As has been rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, decisions rendered on the peculiar fact situation specifically found to exist therein cannot have any irreversible application."

This being the position, the issue with respect to the character of the trust as a Secular Education Trust cannot be permitted to be reopened.

29. Then comes the question as to whether the orders obtained under the above referred Tamil Nadu Act by three schools belonging to the trust can make any difference. It is necessary to note in this connection that these orders were obtained from a Civil Court and were confirmed in appeal. However, we must note that a 23 recognition of a school as a minority school is to be obtained from a competent authority under Section 11 of that Act, and not from any Civil Court, and any party aggrieved by non-grant thereof has a right of appeal under Section 41 of that Act to the prescribed Authority. Section 53 of the Act clearly lays down that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be decided or dealt with by an authority or officer mentioned in this Act. Thus, prima facie, it would appear that the orders were obtained from a forum non- juris. The reliance on the judgments of the Civil Court though pressed into service before the single Judge were not taken as a relevant factor for deciding the minority character of the trust. Now, that this submission is being reiterated, Shri Ganesh has submitted with some force that these orders are from a Court without any jurisdiction. We must note in this connection, that the statement of objects and reasons of the Act states that the act was passed to regulate the service conditions of the teaching and non-teaching staff in private schools and in that context some separate provisions were made for the minority schools. In the present case, though the declaration was claimed under the Tamil Nadu Act, it was not obtained from an authority specifically created for that purpose under the act to give such a status declaration. Therefore, in our understanding these orders cannot be used for determining the character of the trust. It is also relevant to note that these orders were obtained after the demise of the founder and not during his life time.

30. With respect to an outsider coming in the management, it is to be seen that the founder had not designated any of the persons on the board by their religion. Thus, he nominated all the persons in their ex-officio capacity as follows:- (a) Principal of the school (ex-officio), (b) Headmaster/Headmistress, (c) Warden of the Hostel (ex- 24 officio), (d) Member elected by the parent association, (e) Member elected from the staff council, and (f) Three persons having high standard in the education field nominated by the first five. When one sees the formation of this board, one just cannot say that persons other than Christians cannot be in the management of the institution. Incidentally, we may note that the nominated Chairman Justice J. Kanakraj, son of Late P. Jacob is a Christian. The objection of the appellant appears to be only on the basis of the religion of S. Palamalai, the Executive Trustee and Correspondent of the trust.

31. Paragraph 8 of Very Rev. Mother Provincial quoted above lays down two tests. The negative test is that a contribution from other communities to a minority institution and conferring of benefits of the institution to the majority community are not the factors which matter in deciding the minority character of the institution. The positive test is that the intention in founding the institution must be to found an institution for the benefit of a minority community. As far as, these negative testes are concerned, they can be said to be satisfied in the present case. But the positive test which is more significant namely that the intention must be to found an institution for the benefit of a minority community, is not satisfied. We do not find anywhere in the initial declaration made by the founder that the institution was to be a minority institution. All the trustees nominated were on ex-officio basis or on the basis of their qualifications and not on the basis of religion. The funds and income was to be utilized for encouraging poor and deserving students irrespective of caste, creed or religion. It is nowhere stated in that declaration that the trust was being created for the benefit of the Christian community. Thus the proposition in Very Rev. Mother Provincial in fact goes against the appellant. 25

32. In the facts of the present case, we may not be required to go to the extreme as canvassed by Shri Ganesh based on the quotation from judgment in the case of Shirur Mutt (supra). But, we cannot ignore the proposition laid down in S. Azeez Basha (supra) namely that if an institution is established by somebody else, meaning thereby a person belonging to another religion or a secular person, still a religious minority can claim the right to administer it on the basis of Article 30(1) merely because he belongs to a minority or for some reason or the other people of a minority might have been administering it. In the instant case the approach of the founder is clearly seen to be a secular approach and he did not create the trust with any restricted benefits for a religious community. Merely because he belongs to a particular faith, the persons belonging to that faith cannot claim exclusive right to administer the trust. The establishment and administration must be both by and for a minority which is not so in the present case. Similarly, it is material to note as observed in sub para (ii) and (iii) of para 19 in Malankara Syrian Catholic College (supra), the right conferred on minorities under Article 30 is only to ensure equality with the majority and not intended to place the minorities in a more advantageous position vis-`-vis the majority. The right to establish and administer educational institution does not include the right to maladminister. This being the position in the present case, there is no occasion for us to apply the propositions in para 63 (6) of All Saints' High School judgment (supra) or the one in the case of MD. Ismael (supra).

33. Having seen the scenario and the legal position, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, in our view there was no error in the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of Madras High Court dated 5.12.2002 on O.S.A 49 of 1995 in holding that T. Thomas Educational Trust is a secular public charitable trust 26 and not a minority institution. The High Court was accordingly justified in framing the scheme under Section 92 of CPC to see to it that the trust is administered in a better way. We find the scheme to be in the interest of the trust. We have perused the common order of the Division Bench dated 21.9.2007 in CMP Nos. 5673 of 2003, 5560 of 2005, 9402 of 2006 and CMP No. 10340 and 10341 of 2005. The High Court has held on merits that the appellant had failed to make out any case of mis-management against the Chairman or the correspondent, and we do not find any error in the High Court order in that behalf. We do not find any merit in the Contempt Petition No. 435 of 2004 either. In the circumstances, Civil Appeal No. 6786 of 2003, Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 22590-22591 OF 2007 and Contempt Petition (C) No. 435 of 2004 are all dismissed. There will however be no order as to costs.