REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 342 OF 2007
Sri Sambhu Das @ Bijoy Das & Anr. .............. Appellants
Versus
State of Assam ..............Respondent
JUDGMENT
H.L. Dattu, J.
1) This appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed
by the Gauhati High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 63 of 2005, dated
26.04.2006, whereby and where under, the High Court has affirmed
the order passed by the Sessions Judge, Hailakandi, in Sessions Case
No.2 of 2002. The appellants are convicted under Section 302/34 IPC
and sentenced to imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.
10,000/- each, and in default, to undergo further imprisonment for six months each.
2) The case of the prosecution is that, on 07.06.1997 at about
5.00 P.M. the deceased Fanilal Das was returning home on a
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rickshaw driven by Manilal Das (PW2). The deceased stopped the
rickshaw near Shiva temple and after offering his prayer, he came
back to the rickshaw and at that point of time, the appellants and
others assaulted the deceased and, thereafter, forcibly took him to
the house of Kunja Mohan where he was assaulted by all the
accused persons. It is their further case, that, one Upendra Das
informed the wife of the deceased about the assault on her husband
by the appellants and on hearing the same, she came to the place of
occurrence and saw the accused persons assaulting the deceased,
and on being informed by PW-3, police came to the place of
incident and took the injured to the hospital where he was declared
dead. After completing the investigation, the accused persons
were charge-sheeted. Initially, four accused persons were tried by
the Sessions Judge, Hailkandi for commission of the offence under
Section 302/34 IPC. During the trial, four other persons were also
arrayed as accused and tried along with the appellants. All the
accused persons pleaded not guilty. During the course of the trial,
the prosecution examined eight witnesses. After completion of the
trial, the appellants were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C.,
wherein the appellants completely denied their involvement in the
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alleged offence. The learned trial Judge convicted the appellants
and two others for the offence under Section 302/34 IPC and
sentenced as stated earlier. This order of the Sessions Court is
confirmed by the Gauhati High Court by rejecting the criminal
appeals filed by the accused persons.
3) This appeal is filed only by Sambhu Das @ Bijoy Das
(Accused No. 4) and Bibhu Das @ Sekhar Das (Accused No. 5).
4) While assailing the judgment and order of the High Court, it is
contended by Shri M.N. Rao, learned senior counsel, that
admittedly, the Inquest Report was recorded by the Investigating
Officer at 9.30 PM and the FIR was lodged by the wife of the
deceased at 11.30 PM on 07.06.1997. Therefore, it is contended
that the First Information Report loses all authenticity if written
after Inquest Report. In aid of his submission, reliance is placed
on the observation made by this court in the case of Balaka Singh
& Ors. Vs. The State of Punjab, [1975(4) SCC 511] and Ramesh
Baburao Devaskar and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra, [2007(13)
SCC 501]. It is further contended that the High Court has failed to
address itself to certain crucial aspects of evidence and proceeded
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to dispose of the appeal on general observations and more so, in a
very casual and cavalier manner which is impermissible in law.
Reliance is placed on the observation made by this court in the
case of Badri vs. State of Rajasthan, [1995 Supp. (3) SCC 521],
Ishvarbhai Fuljibhai Patni vs. State of Gujarat, [1995 (1) SCC 178]
and Lal Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2003 (9) SCC 464].
It is further contended that the High Court has erred in not
appreciating the fact that the accused has put forward a reasonable
defence throughout the trial and as well as in their statement
recorded under Section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code. While
elaborating this contention, it is stated that prior to the occurrence,
the complainant's husband and her husband's younger brother
Chunnulal Das had got involved in the case regarding the murder
of their brother Arun Das and for that reason they have been
implicated in the present case out of that grudge. It is further
submitted that in the instant case, the High Court has made
departure from the rule, that when an accused person puts forward
a reasonable defence which is likely to be true and in addition,
when the same is supported by some prosecution witnesses, the
burden of proof on the other side becomes onerous, because a
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reasonable and probable story likely to be true when pitted against
a weak and vacillating prosecution case and by that reasonable
doubt, the accused must get the benefit. It is further submitted that
this court, in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh vs. State of
Madhya Bharat, [AIR 1953 SC 468] has held that when an accused
person puts forward a reasonable defence which is likely to be true
and in addition is supported by two prosecution witnesses, then the
burden on the other side becomes all the heavier because a
reasonable and probable story likely to be true when pitted against
a weak and vacillating case is bound to raise reasonable doubts of
which the accused must get the benefit. It is also contended that
one important material witness, namely, Upen Das, who is said to
have informed PW1 that the accused person killed her husband has
not been examined by the prosecution, nor has any explanation for
not examining him as a witness been given by the prosecution and,
therefore, non-examination of Upen Das is fatal to the prosecution
story.
5) The learned counsel for the State while justifying the
impugned judgment and order, would submit that the concurrent
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findings on facts by the Sessions Court and the High Court need
not be interfered by this Court.
6) The question that requires to be noticed and answered is,
whether this Court in exercise of the powers under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India, can upset the concurrent findings of fact
recorded by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court. Shri M.N.
Rao, learned senior counsel for the appellants, submits that this
court can take a different view and also come to different
conclusion than the one arrived at by the Trial and the Appellate
Court, if this Court prima facie comes to the conclusion that the
findings of fact reached by the Trial Court and confirmed by the
High Court suffers from any patent error of law or has resulted in
miscarriage of justice. In our view, the law on this issue is now
well settled by several pronouncements made by this court.
7) In Dhananjay Shanker Shetty vs. State of Maharashtra, [(2002)
6 SCC 596], it is stated that :
"Ordinarily, after appraisal of evidence by the two
courts below and recording concurrent verdict of
conviction, this Court does not interfere with the same,
but where it is found that compelling grounds exist and
there would be failure of justice, a duty is enjoined
upon it to reappraise the evidence itself for doing
complete justice in the case."
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8) In Ravinder Parkash & Anr. vs. State of Haryana, [(2002) 8
SCC 426], it is observed :
".....It is true normally this Court would not substitute
its subjective opinion of the evidence with that of
concurrent findings of the two courts below. However,
having considered the findings of the courts below, we
have noticed that the trial court, though by a lengthy
judgment has found the appellants guilty, we have found
that finding is not supported by the material on record.
Therefore, we have considered the prosecution evidence
independently and have disagreed with the same for
reasons mentioned in this judgment. We have not done
this by merely substituting our subjective satisfaction but
we have done the same for reasons based on material on
record......." (Para 14)
9) In Bharat vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, [(2003) 3 SCC 106], it
is observed that :
"....The prosecution has to prove its case against the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The chain of
circumstances, in our opinion, is not complete so as to
sustain the conviction of the appellant. There is thus no
substance in the contention urged on behalf of the State
that this Court may not interfere in the concurrent
findings of fact of the courts below."
(Para 12 )
10) In Mousam Singha Roy & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal,
[(2003) 12 SCC 377], it is stated :
"We are also aware that this Court does not disturb
the concurrent findings of the courts below if the same
are based on legal evidence merely because another view
is possible. Thus, keeping in mind the caution expressed
by Baron Alderson (supra) as also the need to respect the
concurrent findings of the two courts below, we have
assessed the evidence in this case very carefully, but in
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spite of the same we are unable to concur with the
findings of the courts below. In our opinion, both the
courts below have departed from the rule of prudence
while appreciating the evidence led by the prosecution."
(Para 29 )
11) In Ganga Kumar Srivastava vs. State of Bihar, [(2005) 6 SCC
211], it is observed :
"From the aforesaid series of decisions of this Court
on the exercise of power of the Supreme Court under
Article 136 of the Constitution following principles
emerge:
(i) The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution are very wide but in criminal appeals this
Court does not interfere with the concurrent findings of
fact save in exceptional circumstances.
(ii) It is open to this Court to interfere with the
findings of fact given by the High Court, if the High
Court has acted perversely or otherwise improperly.
(iii) It is open to this Court to invoke the power under
Article 136 only in very exceptional circumstances as
and when a question of law of general public importance
arises or a decision shocks the conscience of the Court.
(iv) When the evidence adduced by the prosecution
fell short of the test of reliability and acceptability and as
such it is highly unsafe to act upon it.
(v) Where the appreciation of evidence and finding is
vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found
contrary to the principles of natural justice, errors of
record and misreading of the evidence, or where the
conclusions of the High Court are manifestly perverse
and unsupportable from the evidence on record.
(Para 10)
12) This Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 136 of the
Constitution, will not re-open the findings of the High Court when
there are concurrent findings of facts and there is no question of
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law involved and the conclusion is not perverse. Article 136 of the
Constitution, does not confer a right of appeal on a party. It only
confers a discretionary power on the Supreme Court to be
exercised sparingly to interfere in suitable cases where grave
miscarriage of justice has resulted from illegality or
misapprehension or mistake in reading evidence or from ignoring,
excluding or illegally admitting material evidence. [See Basudev
Hazra v. Matiar Rahaman Mandal - AIR 1971 SC 722].
13)Keeping in view the aforesaid settled legal principles, we now
proceed to examine the main contention canvassed by learned
senior counsel Shri M.N. Rao, appearing for the appellant. It is
submitted that in the instant case, the investigating officer (PW8),
has recorded/prepared the inquest report on 7.6.1997 at 9.30 PM
and at the instance of PW1, the first information report was
recorded by PW8 on 7.6.1997 at 11.30 PM under Sections 147,
148, 149, 341, 342, 325, 326 and 302 of IPC against four persons
and, therefore, it is contended that since FIR is lodged after inquest
was held, the FIR is not reliable. Alternatively, it is contended that
in a case under Section 302 read with Section 32 IPC, First
Information Report cannot be lodged after the inquest has been
9
held. Reliance, as we have already stated, is on the decision of this
Court in Balkasingh's case (supra) and in Ramesh Babu Rao
Devaskar's case (supra).
14) In Balaka Singh's case, it was observed by this Court, that the
names of four accused out of nine were missing in the body of the
Inquest Report and this omission was not explained and, therefore,
it lead to the probability that FIR must have been prepared after the
preparation of Inquest Report. That was a case where there were
nine accused persons and the names of five accused were
mentioned in the Inquest Report. The A.S.I. had no valid
explanation for the same. It was also found by the Court that FIR
was registered subsequently. Therefore, the observation of this
Court is to be understood in that background. We do not think that
this decision lays down that under all circumstances, the First
Information Report loses its authenticity, if it is filed after Inquest
Report.
15) In Ramesh Babu Rao Devaskar's case, First Information Report
was lodged after inquest was held and the same was based on the
version of alleged eye witness. This court was of the view that
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there was no explanation why FIR was not lodged by eye witness
and also noticed that the name of only one accused was mentioned
in the FIR. However, in the Inquest Report statements of Panch
witnesses recorded to the effect that some unknown assailants
killed the deceased. Apart from the above omission, copy of the
FIR was sent to the concerned Magistrate after four days, sharing
of common object by other accused persons with the accused who
was named in the FIR was not made out and one of the PWs turned
hostile and testimony of other two PWs was not reliable. In view
of these discrepancies, this Court, on facts, held it would be
hazardous to record conviction of the accused.
16) In the present case, there is the documentary evidence in the
form of G.D. entry No.164 recorded by PW-8 in the General Diary
on 07.06.1997 at about 6.30 P.M. That entry was made on the
telephonic message/information supplied by Asabuddin
Mazumdar, PW-3. It is clearly stated therein by PW-3 that a man
named Fanilal Das was lying in a serious condition on the side of
verandah of Chandan Das. It was on receipt of this information
that PW-8 went to the place of occurrence of the incident, drew up
the inquest report, made seizure of the material objects and
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recorded the statement of those present, including PW-1.
Admittedly, the inquest report is prepared by PW-8 at 9.30 P.M.
and the formal FIR is lodged by PW-1 at 11.30 P.M. The learned
senior counsel Shri M.N. Rao, by placing his fingers on the
admission made by PW-8 in his evidence would contend, that, FIR
loses its authenticity if it is lodged after the inquest report is
recorded. This submission of the learned counsel is a general
proposition and may not be true in all cases and all circumstances.
This general proposition cannot be universally applied, by holding
that if the FIR is lodged for whatever reason after recording the
inquest report the same would be fatal to all the proceedings
arising out of the Indian Penal Code.
17)The Inquest Report is prepared under Section 174 Cr.P.C. The
object of the inquest proceedings is to ascertain whether a person
has died under unnatural circumstances or an unnatural death and
if so, what the cause of death is? The question regarding the
details as to how the deceased was assaulted or who assaulted him
or under what circumstances he was assaulted, is foreign to the
ambit and scope of the proceedings under Section 174 Cr.P.C. The
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names of the assailants and the manner of assault are not required
to be mentioned in the inquest report. The purpose of preparing
the inquest report is for making a note in regard to identification
marks of the accused. The inquest report is not a substantive
evidence. Mention of the name of the accused and eye witness in
the inquest report is not necessary. Due to non-mentioning of the
name of the accused in the inquest report, it cannot be inferred that
FIR was not in existence at the time of inquest proceedings.
Inquest report and post mortem report cannot be termed to be
substantive evidence and any discrepancy occurring therein can
neither be termed to be fatal nor even a suspicious circumstance
which would warrant a benefit to the accused and the resultant
dismissal of the prosecution case. The contents of the inquest
report cannot be termed as evidence, but they can be looked into to
test the veracity of the witnesses. When an officer incharge of
Police Station receives information that a person had committed
suicide or has been killed or died under suspicious circumstances,
he shall inform the matter to the nearest Magistrate to hold Inquest.
A criminal case is registered on the basis of information and
investigation is commenced under Section 157 of Cr.P.C. and the
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information is recorded under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. and,
thereafter, the inquest is held under Section 174 Cr.P.C. This
Court, in the case of Podda Narayana Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
[AIR 1975 SC 1252], has indicated that the proceedings under
Section 174 Cr. P.C. have limited scope. The object of the
proceedings is merely to ascertain whether a person has died in
suspicious circumstances or an unnatural death and if so, what is
the apparent cause of the death. The question regarding details as
to how the deceased was assaulted or who assaulted him or under
what circumstances, he was assaulted is foreign to the ambit and
scope proceeding under Section 174. Neither in practice nor in law
was it necessary for the Police to mention these details in the
Inquest Report. In George Vs. State of Kerala AIR 1998 SC 1376,
it has been held that the Investigating Office is not obliged to
investigate, at the stage of Inquest, or to ascertain as to who were
the assailants. In Suresh Rai Vs. State of Bihar AIR 2000 SC
2207, it has been held that under Section 174 read with Section
178 of Cr. P.C., Inquest Report is prepared by the Investigating
Officer to find out prima facie the nature of injuries and the
possible weapon used in causing those injuries as also possible
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cause of death.
18)This Court has consistently held that Inquest Report cannot be
treated as substantive evidence but may be utilized for
contradicting the witnesses of the Inquest. Section 175 Cr. P.C.
provides that a Police Officer proceedings under Section 174 may,
by an order in writing, summon two or more persons for the
purpose of the said investigation. The provisions of Sections 174
and 175 afford a complete Code in itself for the purpose of
inquiries in cases of accidental or suspicious deaths.
19) Section 2 (a) of the Cr.P.C. defines "Investigation" as
including all the proceedings under this code for the collection of
evidence conducted by the police officer.
20) Section 157 of the Code says that if, from the information
received or otherwise an officer incharge of a police station has
reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is
empowered to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the
same to the Magistrate concerned and proceed in person to the spot
to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, if he does
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not send a report to the Magistrate, that does not mean that his
proceedings to the spot, is not for investigation. In order to bring
such proceedings within the ambit of investigation, it is not
necessary that a formal registration of the case should have been
made before proceeding to the spot. It is enough that he has some
information to afford him reason even to suspect the commission
of a cognizable offence. Any step taken by him pursuant to such
information, towards detention etc., of the said offence, would be
part of investigation under the Code.
21)In Maha Singh vs. State (Delhi Administration), [(1976)
SCC 644], this court considered a case in which police officer
arranged a raid after recording a complaint, but before sending it
for registration of the case. It was held in that case that "the
moment the Inspector had recorded a complaint with a view to take
action to track the offender, whose name was not even known at
that stage, and proceeded to achieve the object, visited the locality,
questioned the accused, searched his person, seized the note and
other documents, turns the entire process into investigation under
the Code.
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22) In State of U.P. vs. Bhagwant Kishore, [AIR 1964 SC 221], this
court stated that "Though ordinarily investigation is undertaken on
information received by a police officer, the receipt of information
is not a condition precedent for investigation."
23) The principles now well settled is that when information
regarding a cognizable offence is furnished to the police that
information will be regarded as the FIR and all enquiries held by
the police subsequent thereto would be treated as investigation,
even though the formal registration of the FIR takes place only
later.
24)Assuming that some report was made on telephone and that was
the real First Information Report, this by itself would not affect the
appreciation of evidence made by the learned Sessions Judge and
the conclusions of fact drawn by him. The FIR under Section 154
Cr. P.C. is not a substantive piece of evidence. Its only use is to
contradict or corroborate the maker thereof. Therefore, we see no
merit in the submission made by learned counsel for the appellants.
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25)Now we focus our attention to the merits of the appeal. The
Postmortem was conducted by Dr. Ashit Som (PW6). From the
Postmortem Report of the deceased Fanilal Das, it appears that
injuries on their examination were found to be ante mortem in
nature. In his opinion, death is due to shock and haemorrhage
resulting from the injuries sustained which were caused by blunt
weapons. Unfortunately, the doctor has not stated in his report
whether the injuries sustained by the deceased were of homicidal
in nature. Therefore, we have seen the report furnished by the
doctor, who, as per his post mortem report found lacerated wound
over the middle of frontal region of the scalp with fracture of
frontal bone corresponding to the injury, lacerated wound over
right parietal of the scalp 6cmx2cmx2cm fracture of parietal bone,
two incisior and two canine teeth of both jaws were dislocated.
Dislocation of both elbow and ankle joint was also there. He has
further opined that the injuries were fresh and caused by a blunt
object. It has come in the evidence of PW-8 that immediately after
the inquest report was prepared, the body of the deceased was sent
for post mortem. This would coincide with this evidence on this
aspect. Secondly, the seizure report which is marked as one of the
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exhibit in the evidence, he has clearly stated the material objects
seized by him, such as nylon rope, bamboo stick, iron chain, dao,
rod and lathi etc. A little comparison of these seized objects and
the wounds found on the body of the deceased, a safe inference can
be drawn that this part of evidence of this witness can be believed,
since it corroborates with the opinion of the Doctor, PW-6.
Therefore, it can be safely inferred that the deceased died because
of the injuries sustained by the assault made by other persons and
not by self inflicted wounds.
26)The prosecution case solely rests on the evidence of PW1. She is
the wife of the deceased. PW2, though turned hostile, has spoken
to a part of the incident. PW3 is the U.D.P. Secretary of Paikan
Bazar. He is alleged to have gone to Paikan Tempur Bazar to
purchase sweets and having heard from the people gathered on the
side of the verandah of Chandu Das's house at the Paikan Bazar,
that Fanilal Das lying in a serious condition, he informed the
Police from Ballu Das's telephone. This version of PW3 appears
to be correct. This information, in fact, triggered the Investigating
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Agency to reach the place of incident after making necessary
entries in the Registers at the Police Station.
27)The evidence of PW1 requires a thorough scrutiny. PW1 is the
wife of the deceased. According to her, one Upendra Das informed
her that the accused persons including the appellants are assaulting
her husband in Kunja Mohan's house and on receiving the
information, it is further stated by her, that she immediately rushed
to that place and found that the accused persons had tied the hands
of her husband and were assaulting him. It has also come in her
evidence that she saw all the accused persons dragging her
husband inside their house. She has further stated around that
time, the Police Party reached the spot and took her husband in a
vehicle and she also accompanied her husband in the same vehicle
and on arriving at the hospital, the doctors declared that her
husband was dead and after inquest of the dead body, she returned
home with the help of police and immediately she lodged the First
Information Report (Ext.1). In her cross-examination, suffice it to
say, that nothing very striking except minor contradiction has been
elicited, which would not shake her credibility. In fact, she has
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stated that immediately after the Postmortem of the dead body, she
lodged the FIR with the Police and she has further denied the
suggestion that she did not tell the police that the accused persons
had assaulted her husband and killed him while he was returning
home from Hailkandi Town on a Rickshaw. Therefore, two
important aspects emerge from her evidence before the Trial Court.
Firstly, she has seen that her husband was tied by means of a rope
in the house of Kunj Mohan Das and secondly, the accused persons
including the appellants were assaulting her husband. The case of
the prosecution and the fate of the accused entirely depend on her
version and, therefore, as we said earlier, it is on her testimony that
the fate of these accused persons/appellants really hinges. The
reasons for not examining Upendra Das, who is supposed to have
informed PW1 about the incident, is not explained by the
prosecution. Therefore, we might have to eschew this part of the
evidence of PW1, since no effort is made by the prosecution to
explain the reason for non-examination of one of the important
persons, who is said to have informed PW1 about the assault and
dragging of the deceased into the house of first accused, who is not
before us. Then, the next question that would arise is, can we
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believe, as has been done by both the Courts below, the other part
of the testimony of this witness. At this juncture, we intend to add
that if the prosecution fails to explain the reason for non-
examination of an important witness, who is supposed to have
informed the alleged incident, should the accused persons go scot
free. It is a difficult question, sometimes difficult to answer.
Since, it is noticed by this Court time and again that in number of
criminal cases, because of sloppy attitude shown by the
prosecution, the real culprit goes scot free. It is no doubt true that
when her statement was recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., she
had not implicated four other accused persons but certainly
implicated the appellants and two other accused persons. Merely
because she has made some improvement in the FIR lodged by her,
we cannot totally discard her testimony.
28)PW8 is the Investigating Officer. He was attached to Hailakandi
Police Station. He was the one who visited the place of occurrence
on being directed to do so by the office-in-charge of the Police
Station. In his evidence, he has stated that Iti Mohan Das-PW3
took him to the place of occurrence and he found the injured
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Fanilal Das tied at the veranda of the accused persons. It has also
come in his evidence that on reaching the place of occurrence, he
drew up sketch map of the place of occurrence, and seized
incriminating materials. He has also stated that he removed the
injured to Hailakandi Civil Hospital where the Medical Officer
declared him dead. It has also come in his evidence that he was
the one who prepared the Inquest Report. He further narrates that
PW2 informed him that the deceased was travelling in his rickshaw
and at that time, Chandra Das@Smritikanta and two unknown
persons dragged him out of the rickshaw and assaulted him by
means of rod, hunter etc. Though PW2 turned hostile, their part of
evidence supports the case of the prosecution. In his cross
examination, defence has elicited from him that Inquest Report
was prepared by him at 9.30 PM and FIR was registered at 11.30
PM. Much was made at out of this admission by learned senior
counsel arguing for the appellants, we have already answered this
issue while considering the issue that whether FIR loses all
authenticity if written after Inquest Report. The other important
admission that was made by him that when he recorded the
statement of PW1, she did not mention the names of Subhash, Bela
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Krishna and Rajan, but had mentioned the names of all the other
accused persons. Her version that she went to the place of
occurrence on being informed to her about the assaulting of her
husband by the accused persons is corroborated in his testimony.
It is also of some importance that PW-1 for the first time, in her
evidence before the Court, implicated them and that is how, they
were arrayed as co-accused and tried along with others. The
learned Trial Judge, however, has acquitted those accused persons.
In our view, rightly so. In our opinion, it is not necessary for the
prosecution to examine every other witness cited by them in the
charge-sheet. Mere non-examination of some persons does not
corrode the vitality of the prosecution version, particularly, the
witnesses examined have withstood the cross-examination and
pointed to the accused persons as perpetrators of the crime. The
Trial Court and the High Court have come to the conclusion that
the evidence of PW1 is trustworthy and reliable. We have also
carefully perused the evidence of PW1, whose evidence is
corroborated by PW-8 and the Postmortem report issued by PW6,
we are convinced that the Trial Court and the High Court were
justified in believing the testimony the testimony of PW-1.
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29)Manilal Das - PW2 is declared hostile by the prosecution.
However, in his examination-in-chief, he says that he was carrying
Fanilal Das in his Rickshaw and he stopped the Rickshaw at Tepur
Bazar on the request made by the deceased and it is at that time,
the deceased had a quarrel with some people and some persons
assaulted him with blunt objects. In his cross-examination by the
learned counsel for the prosecution, he denies the suggestions put
to him with reference to his statement made under Section 161 Cr.
P.C. before the Investigating Officer.
30)Md. Asaf Ali Majumdar - PW3, Md. Masuraff Ali Barbhuiya -
PW4, Harmendra Das-PW5 are brought in by the prosecution as
eye-witnesses to the occurrence. But all of them have turned
hostile. Unfortunately, the trend in this country appears to be, as
the time passes, dead are forgotten and the living with a criminal
record are worshipped and adored and no witness would like to
speak against them. The Trial Court and the High Court has not
given any credence to their evidence.
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31)The testimony of Itimohan Das -PW7 has some relevance. He is a
local tea shop owner. He has stated that he accompanied the
Police to the house of the accused and found the deceased tied with
a rope in the verandah of Kunja Mohan. He also states that he saw
some injuries on the body of the deceased person. He also
confirms that the Investigating Officer seized a chain, a lathi, one
dao and a rope.
32)In our view, having carefully seen the evidence of PW1, which is
corroborated by the postmortem report issued by PW6 and the
evidence of PW8, it is trustworthy and reliable. The Trial Court
and the High Court have accepted her evidence while holding that
the accused persons in furtherance of the common intention,
assaulted Fanilal Das and killed him. We do not find any good
reason to upset this finding of the Trial Court and the High Court.
33)The learned senior counsel submitted that the High Court in a most
casual manner has rejected the appeals filed by the accused. This
assertion, in our opinion, is not justified. The High Court has
arrived at its findings after examination and consideration of the
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main features of evidence. It is only thereafter, the High Court has
affirmed the findings of the trial court while convicting the accused
persons.
34)In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not see any merit in this
appeal. Accordingly, it is dismissed.
..............................................J.
[ DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA ]
..............................................J.
[ H.L. DATTU ]
New Delhi,
September 15, 2010.
27
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Thursday, September 16, 2010
Sri Sambhu Das @ Bijoy Das & Anr V/S State of Assam CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 342 OF 2007 September 15, 2010.
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